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“A Christian World Order:” Protestants, Democracy and Christian Aid to Germany, 1945-1961 
By  
Ky Woltering   
Advisor: Benjamin Hett 
This dissertation examines the relationship between the German and American Protestantism 
from 1945-1961. I argue that in response to the threat of Nazism and communism, mainline 
ecumenical American Protestants aimed to create a universalist “Christian World Order” based 
on liberal democracy and Christian ethics. Only this new order, they argued, could supersede 
nationalist and materialist agendas and restore world peace. By rhetorically depicting Nazi and 
Communist "totalitarianism" as anti-Christian, a construction I refer to as the Christian-
Totalitarian Dichotomy, these Protestants drove German conservatives away from Nazism and 
toward Western liberal democracy through association with Christianity. They accomplished this 
through two primary methods. First, by politicizing Allied occupation policy as "vengeful" and 
positioning the majority of Germans as "victims" of Nazism, ecumenical Protestants successfully 
lobbied for political leniency that facilitated the German transition from enemy to ally. Second, 
American Protestants embarked on a widespread philanthropic aid campaign that brought 
millions of dollars of goods to Germany. Their aid campaigns continuously emphasized horrific 
material conditions in postwar Germany, with the necessity of humanitarian aid to stave off both 
a return of nihilism and an aggressive Soviet-communist advance. By reinforcing the need to 
spread and defend global democracy, ecumenical Protestants also helped forge a new postwar 
American nationalism that embraced international responsibility.     




Writing this dissertation has been one of the most rewarding, challenging and worldview-shaking 
experiences of my life. The complexities of the issues I have attempted to unravel are enormous, 
and my conclusions ought to be treated with careful wisdom and above all more research. My 
personal stakes in unraveling the connection between National Socialism, the Protestant tradition 
and democracy could not be higher. I recognize now, even if I did not at the time I began, that 
my investigation of these issues stemmed from a personal wrestling with the historical 
significance of these themes and their relationship to transcendent values. That I have found my 
footing and completed this task at a moment when American Protestants’ relationship to 
democracy, truth and totalitarianism is at the center of American political life seems somehow 
portentous. Questions of national-community, inclusion and justice seem just as pressing in 
Germany.   
The various foundations and institutions that funded my research and cost of living made 
the completion of this dissertation possible. I am grateful to the CUNY Graduate Center for six 
years of fellowship funding and numerous research grants. The Transatlantic Seminar between 
Ruhr-Universität Bochum and the Graduate Center, as well as Central European History also 
provided generous travel funds. Barbara Leopold and Kathleen McCarthy at the Center for 
Philanthropy and Civil Society also offered fellowships at times of great need. My colleague 
Darius Harwardt and his wife Claudia extended to me friendship and lodgings on two separate 
occasions in Germany. There are many archivists and library staff who I ought to mention, but 
two in particularly stand out: Joel Thoreson at the Evangelical Lutheran Archives of America, 
and Herr Doktor Peter Baier at the Protestant Central Church Archives in Berlin. 
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Many scholars have molded me into a professional historian over the past decade, but a 
few stand out as particularly influential. My many colleagues at the Graduate Center created a 
welcoming, collaborative and inspiring work environment, especially Mila Burns, Diana Moore, 
Glen Olsen, Chelsea Shields and David Viola. I hope they learned as much from me as I from 
them. Belinda Davis has stuck with me the longest, guiding me as both an undergraduate and 
graduate student and I have no doubt I would not be here today without her counsel. The many 
lengthy conversations I held with Mary Roldán informed my understanding of the relationship 
between religious organizations and the American government. Constantin Goschler gave me 
incredibly useful advice in structuring my dissertation. Susannah Heschel and Matthew 
Hockenos both graciously offered resources and notes, the latter informing my grasp of Martin 
Niemöller’s trip in America, the former my take on transnational Christian-Jewish dialogue and 
Holocaust memory. Benjamin Pearson also graciously exchanged resources, time and drafts of 
his own work on the Kirchentage which proved enormously useful. I would also like to thank the 
members of this dissertation committee for their time and feedback. Julia Sneeringer’s insightful 
comments as second reader have refined my arguments and analysis. David Nasaw taught me 
both as an instructor and gave thoughtful feedback on my dissertation proposal. Of course, all 
mistakes, errors and failures are of my own making.  
The only word fitting to describe my relationship with Benjamin Carter Hett is the 
German “Doktorvater.” He has shamed me with his incredible work ethic and discipline. He has 
been enormously generous with his time and resources, so much so that I am certain I have 
squandered his many insights into History and my research. His insightful, patient, challenging, 
honorable and demanding spirit has guided me through graduate studies as no other. Whether 
discussing Protestant political-theology in his office or dissecting the German National Team 
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over a beer in Berlin, he has never accepted anything less than my absolute best in all things. He 
has molded me into a better writer, historian, citizen and person and for that I am immensely 
grateful and thankful.  
This dissertation was also only possible through the many sacrifices of family and 
friends. My supportive parents Kerry Busick and Reed Woltering have encouraged and 
facilitated my studies in too many ways to count. My grandparents Robert and Gloria Busick, 
whose passing engendered much introspection and inspired this project, have long served to 
guide my path in life. My in-laws Aaron and Ann Kinney, who hosted me through my 
undergraduate degree and whose many hours of childcare, household maintenance and love have 
made my studies possible. My children Aundrea, Arabella, Ivy and Jacob have endured many 
weeks separated from their father as I travelled, and countless hours peering through a sliding 
glass door but rarely disturbing my studies. They may never fully appreciate how important their 
patience has been to me, but I love them even more for it. 
Finally, my wife Ashley. No person has sacrificed more for this dissertation than she has. 
Her support through the twists and turns of dissertation research, her patience with my 
insecurities through coursework and the pressures of exams, the overtime shifts taken to support 
our family and her willingness to put her own ambitions and aims on hold for me speaks 
tremendously of her character. She is my foundation, inspiration and hope, and I owe everything 
to her.    
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Matthew 5:43-48  
 
Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine 
enemy. 
But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them 
that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; 
That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for he maketh his 
sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the 
unjust. 
For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans 
the same? 
And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? do not even the 
publicans so? 









W o l t e r i n g  | ix 
 
Table of Contents 
Prologue: God’s Task for America……………………………………………………………….1 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………..10 
Chapter One: The New World Order: American Protestants and the Moral Crisis of 
Modernity………………………………………………………………………………………...32 
Chapter Two: Controlling the Narrative: American Protestants and German 
Democratization……………………………………………………………………………….....72 
Chapter Three: Martin Niemöller in America and the Christian-Totalitarian 
Dichotomy………………………………………………………………………………………120 
Chapter Four: The Wilderness of Want: American Protestant Aid to Germany and the Marshall 
Plan……………………………………………………………………………………………..151 
Chapter Five: Save Mankind! Building an Imagined Protestant Political Community at the 
German Kirchentag, 1949-1961………………………………………………………………..188  
Conclusion: The Effects of the Christian Totalitarian Dichotomy and National 
Renewal…………………………………………………………………………………………234 
Epilogue: The Rise and Fall of the Christian-Totalitarian 
Dichotomy………………………………………………………………………………………238 






W o l t e r i n g  | x 
 
List of Illustrations  
 
Figure 1: Johan Aasgaard, Ralph H. Long and Sylvester C. Michelfelder……………….….…...2 
Figure 2: Visser T’hooft………………………………………………………..………...……….4 
Figure 3: Stewart W. Herman, Sylvester C. Michelfelder and Samuel McCrea Calvert…………5 
Figure 4: Freiburg in 1945 and today……………………………………………………………..6  
Figure 5: Freiburg Cathedral worker, date unknown……………………………………………..6 
Figure 6: St. Marien Windows and Organ today…………………………………………………7 
Figure 7: Stork’s Nest Ostheim Germany 1945 and today………………………………...……..9 
Figure 8: Joe Louis propaganda poster…………………………………………………………..49 
Figure 9: Nazis as anti-Christian (US Propaganda)……………………………………………..50 
Figure 10: Nazis as anti-Christian (US Propaganda)…………………………………………....50 
Figure 11: Norman Rockwell, Freedom of Worship……………………………………….…...52 
Figure 12: Episcopal Cathedral, Washington DC 1948…………………………………..……152 
Figure 13: Lutheran Church of America Occupation meals………………………………..….157 
Figure 14: Lutheran World Relief Kiddie Kits……………………………………….………..158 
Figure 15: Lutheran Church Dresden, 1945………………………………………………..…..158 
Figure 16: Lutheran Church Dresden (today)…………………………………………..……...159 
Figure 17: Barracks Church in Nuremberg, 1945………………………………………..…….159 
Figure 18: CARE package……………………………………………………………….…….169 
Figure 19: Abraham Lincoln Friendship Train………………………………………..……….171 
 
 
W o l t e r i n g  | 1 
 
 
Prologue: God’s Task for America 
 
At midday, Friday November 23, 1945, two unassuming Americans arrived in Geneva, 
Switzerland. Each carried in some secure, tucked away corner of their traveling cloaks a letter of 
some importance signed by President Harry Truman himself. Earned through weeks of hard 
lobbying, their respective letters granted permission to “survey the religious situation in 
Germany,” but in truth the two men had a more pressing goal; to save Western Civilization from 
the perils of nihilism.1 Upon arriving, Ralph H. Long, Executive Director of the National 
Lutheran Council of America, and President of the Norwegian Lutheran Church of America 
Johan Arnd Aasgaard, were met by a welcome sight, their longtime friend and colleague 
Sylvester C. Michelfelder. Michelfelder had arrived in Europe just five months earlier on the 
troopship Mariposa with his wife Florence.2 The fifty-one-year-old American of German descent 
did not possess the rigorous theological credentials of his colleagues, but his service at Lutheran 
conferences in Pittsburgh and Toronto had earned him a certain degree of respect within 
ecumenical Protestant circles, enough so that Long had appointed him as the American Lutheran 
commissioner to the World Council of Churches. With the war finally at an end in Europe, 
concerned ecumenists knew that if they were to ever realize their dream of a united world body 
of Protestant churches, they would have to bring the Germans back into the fold.   
                                                 
1 See report from Michelfelder Nov. 23rd- Dec 15th 1945. 5/344-2/6. Z45, Allied Control Authority Religious Affairs 
Committee Z45. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), Koblenz, Germany.   
2 Archives of the Lutheran World Federation. Accessed online 10/26/16 
https://www.lutheranworld.org/sites/default/files/archives-section/LWF-GS-since-1947.pdf 
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Figure 1: Johan Arnd Aasgaard (left) with Ralph H. Long (center) of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in America meeting Sylvester C. Michelfelder (right) of the World Council of Churches3 
 
 The fledgling World Council of Churches (WCC) did not officially convene until 1948, 
although leading Protestant leaders in America, Britain and Sweden had agreed to organize in the 
mid-1930s, at least until the Second World War disrupted their plans. Unlike the name suggests, 
the World Council of Churches hardly represented the entirety of global Christianity. 
Membership excluded the Roman Catholic Church entirely (the Vatican refused to send invited 
representatives, though two “observers” did attend) and most of Orthodox Christianity as well.4 
Initially however, Western Protestant churches composed almost the entirety of the WCC’s 147-
member churches.5 Despite the limited inclusion of non-Western churches in the 1940s, the 
WCC’s significance should in no way be casually dismissed. Its founding was entirely 
unprecedented within the scope of Christian history, especially considering its true genesis 
predominantly occurred during the height of European nationalism between the two World 
                                                 
3 Joel Thoreson (archivist at ELCA), e-mail to the author, October 26, 2016. 
4 Though Eastern Orthodox churches would eventually join en-masse in the 1960s. 
5 For a brief overview of the founding of the WCC, see its official website World Council of Churches, “History,” 
oikoumene.org. http://www.oikoumene.org/en/about-us/wcc-history (accessed February 5, 2018).  
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Wars.6 Proponents of Protestant unity therefore had good reason to be concerned at war’s end. 
Reconciling European national churches after the most destructive war in human history would 
be difficult, but maintaining the theological unity necessary to sustain the movement would be 
even more challenging. Still, the WCC symbolized peace for millions of American Christians. 
They believed that only the creation of a new international organization based on Christian 
values and cooperation could usher in a new age of world peace. The World Council of 
Churches, was that organization.       
By 1944, the WCC had already made a name for itself amongst the Western Allies. Soon 
to be WCC general secretary Willem Adolph Visser ‘t Hooft, a Dutch Reformed Theologian 
whom close friends affectionately referred to as “Wim,” participated directly in the struggle 
against Nazi Germany, establishing a network of contacts within resistance circles both inside 
and outside of Germany. His residence in Geneva Switzerland quickly became a home to both 
refugees and illegal gatherings of the German Resistance, a particularly daring combination 
given the latter’s obvious need for discretion.7 ‘t Hooft understood better than most, that 
Europe’s best chance for survival was to form some sort of federation that bound together its 
disparate and warring nation-states. Ecumenical Christianity’s universalist message offered a 
way forward.   
 But ‘t Hooft also knew that for European federalism and Christian ecumenism to work, 
he needed to solve the German Problem. The ecumenical movement had tried and failed to unite 
during the interwar years, principally because of the rise of National Socialism and European 
                                                 
6 Michael G. Thompson, For God and globe: Christian internationalism in the United States between the Great War 
and the Cold War. (Cornell University Press, 2015). 
7 Antonella Braga, “The 1944 Meetings at the House of Willem Adolph ‘t Hooft.” “Die Welt war Meine Gemeinde” 
Willem Visser ‘t Hooft: A Theologian for Europe between Ecumenism and Federalism. Filippo Maria Giordano and 
Stefano Dell’Acqua (Eds). (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2014). 166-168.  
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Fascism.8 With the Nazi end in sight and a real chance to rebuild the moral character of Europe, 
‘t Hooft called on allies in America to take a vested interest in the German churches. He had 
hoped that his good friend Dietrich Bonhoeffer would be there with him. But the Nazis executed 
Bonhoeffer for his role in the July 20th plot to assassinate Hitler just before the end of the war, 
ending all hopes of a German escort. Bonhoeffer, he knew, had the potential both to convince the 
Allies that “good Germans” lived and fought against Hitler, and convince his colleagues in 
Germany to join the universal church. “His death” ‘t Hooft would lament, was “a death for 
Germany, indeed for Europe too.”9 Instead, Michelfelder, Long and Aasgard would have to 
make their journey without a representative from Germany. 
 
Figure 2: Visser ‘t Hooft of the World Council of Churches10 
  By Fall 1945, Michelfelder had made good use of his first five months in Europe. His 
first tour through Germany with ‘t Hooft, former Lutheran pastor of the American Church in 
Berlin Stewart W. Herman and executive Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches Samuel 
McCrea Calvert established contact with Confessing Church pastors like Martin Niemöller and 
                                                 
8 Martin Erdmann, Building the Kingdom of God on Earth: The Churches’ Contribution to Marshal Public Support 
for World Order and Peace, 1919-1945. (Wipf & Stock Pub, 2005). 100-105.  
9 Ferdinand Slingenspiepen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer 1906-1945: Martyr, Thinker, Man of Resistance.  (Bloomsbury 
T&T Clark, 2012). 380. 
10 World Council of Churches, General Secretary ‘t Hooft. https://www.oikoumene.org/en/about-us/organizational-
structure/general-secretary/since-1948/willem-a-visser-t-hooft. (accessed February 5, 2018) 
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Eugen Gerstenmeier to see what American Protestants might do to help Germans rebuild both 
materially and spiritually. The devastation appalled Michelfelder. In Freiburg, Michelfelder 
recalled seeing a solitary “brave soul” trying in vain to fix the bent pipes of the Gottfried 
Silberman Organ in the Lutheran St. Marien Cathedral. The organ, which had once played host 
to the great Johann Sebastian Bach, now sat silent surrounded by broken pews and a small touch 
of sunlight cascading in from the damaged roof above. The church’s brilliant stained-glass 
windows had all been shattered, but in truth the building fared better than the surrounding city, 
which had been burned to the ground by a 35-minute long air raid of American bombers. The 
attack set the surrounding buildings on fire, claiming the lives of 3,000 Germans.11  
 
Figure 3: Stewart W. Herman (1967)  Sylvester C. Michelfelder  Samuel McCrea Calvert12 
 
                                                 
11 See Report from Michelfelder to the Religious Affairs Office, October 15th-25th 1945, Z45, BAK. Michelfelder 
cites an extremely high figure of 35,000 killed, which was almost certainly an exaggeration. It is unclear precisely 
which raid he was referring too, but most likely it is that of November 27th, 1944, which included the use of 
incendiary weapons and caused a great deal of structural damage to the city. For more on the bombing raid at 
Freiburg see Randall Hansen, Fire and Fury: The Allied Bombing of Germany 1942-1945. (Penguin Books, 2008). 
218.  
12 Joel Thoreson (archivist at ELCA), e-mail to the author, October 26, 2016. 
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Figure 4: Freiburg then and now.13  
  
Figure 5: Workers outside the Cathedral. Date unknown.14 
 
                                                 
13 Freiburg im Breisgau – Feuersturm. Hist-chron.com. http://www.hist-chron.com/2wk/b/1944-11-27-Freiburg-im-
Breisgau-feuersturm.html (accessed February 5, 2018) 
14 Ibid. 
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Stained Glass windows at St. Marien’s Cathedral today.  
 
Figure 6: St. Marien Cathedral, Gottfried Silbermann Organ today.15  
 
                                                 
15 The Great Organ by Gottfried Silbermann, 1711/14 
http://www.freiberger-dom.de/en/concerts/organs-by-silbermann/great-organ-by-silbermann.html. http://www.hist-
chron.com/2wk/b/1944-11-27-Freiburg-im-Breisgau-feuersturm.html (accessed February 5, 2018) 
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 On just his second day in Germany journeying with Calvert to Stuttgart, Michelfelder’s 
car was struck by a large coal truck. It was a miracle the two emerged relatively unharmed. The 
car lay broken, leaking gasoline and water onto the road while the truck had toppled over 
scattering coal all across the ground. Michelfelder knew then, that he had “been spared only by 
the Providence of God.” He also knew that he had a task; convince his colleagues of Germany’s 
great need. “As Christ fed the multitude in the wilderness, not merely to satisfy physical hunger, 
but for the purpose of his miracles…” so must he.16   
The following month when Michelfelder met with Long and Aasgaard, he knew what 
they must see. After acquiring the necessary military permits in Berne on November 27th, the 
trio, now joined by two rival members of the Lutheran Missouri Synod,17 boarded a train for 
Mulhausen, France before being escorted by American Captain E. Richard West via Jeep to 
Frankfurt. There, doctors Long and Aasgaard soon realized Michelfelder properly understood 
Germany’s condition.     
On the journey to Frankfurt, the committee stopped at the small German village of 
Ostheim. All that remained of the town was a single wall with a Stork’s Nest of the town’s old 
church (the stand-alone wall still exists today with a small plaque as a reminder of the war) and a 
new wooden structure in the middle: A barracks church sent by the World Council of Churches 
Department of Reconstruction, where Michelfelder now served as co-chair.  
 
                                                 
16 5/344-2/6 Report from Michelfelder Religious Affairs Office, October 15th-25th 1945. Z45, BAK. 
17 The Missouri Synod and the Evangelical Lutheran Synod are two of the three largest Lutheran Churches in 
America and differ on several serious matters related to doctrinal interpretation and church structure. The Missouri 
Synod adheres to strict interpretations of the Bible (including Biblical inerrancy), whereas the Evangelical Synod 
allows for varying interpretative methods. Related to ecumenism, the Missouri Synod often refuses to join with 
Christian denominations that do not share their theological beliefs. For instance, in the 1920s and beyond, the 
Missouri Synod refused to join the American ecumenical body The Federal Council of Churches, unlike the 
Evangelical Synod.  
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Figure 7: Stork’s Nest Ostheim Germany (Postwar and Now)18 
 
From there the committee traveled from Frankfurt to Augsburg through Munich and on to 
Nuremberg. Along the way, they saw refugees living in box cars, young girls who had been 
raped, mothers holding starving sick children and thousands of amputees. They met German 
pastors besieged with letters asking for food, medical supplies and help locating lost family 
members. The only relief they could offer, was news that additional wooden barracks churches 
were on their way, paid for by the World Council of Churches and generous congregations in 







                                                 
18  
19See report from Michelfelder and the WCC Department of Reconstruction and Inter-church aid November 23-
December 15th, 1945. 5/344-2/6. Z45, BAK. 





Michelfelder, Long and Aasgard’s initial impressions of postwar Germany illustrated in the 
prologue represents an important but often overlooked theme in the evolution of German 
democratization; the role of sympathetic, influential American churchmen. Their hopes for the 
future hinged on the restoration of a Christian Germany in the crusade against dictatorship and 
tyranny. This dissertation seeks to reconfigure interpretations of American Cold War Policy and 
Western German democracy by incorporating the often neglected historiography of 
Protestantism into existing meta-narratives. It has two primary aims: First, to consider the 
religious dimensions of West German democratization by investigating how American and 
German Protestants built a “useable past” for Germans after the Second World War.20 Second, 
by connecting mainline American Protestant interpretations of Nazism to the evolution of the 
“spiritual” Cold War and the construction of a Christian American identity during the Second 
World War and early years of the Cold War. Only by connecting the four often separate 
historiographical strands of West German Democratization, the historiography of German 
occupation, American and German Church history and American Cold War Foreign Policy, can 
scholars fully appreciate the important contributions of religious leaders to German 
democratization.  
 This dissertation therefore adds to existing scholarship in three ways. First, I argue that 
the needed integration of former Nazis into West German society for democratization occurred 
                                                 
20 Robert Moeller argues one of the primary difficulties in building community in postwar Germany stemmed from 
the fact that any sort of nationalist sentiment would inherently be contaminated by National Socialism. Instead, a 
shared sense of victimhood and the insistence that “totalitarian” forces were a European, not just a German, 
problem, made space for a new sense of political unity. See Robert G Moeller. War Stories: The Search for a Usable 
Past in the Federal Republic of Germany. (Berkeley, US: University of California Press, 2003.)  
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in part because German and American Protestants composed a narrative of German victimhood 
and Christian resistance during and after the Second World War. Only Christianity had the 
international, historical and moral reputation to facilitate such a transition after the Third Reich, 
despite the actual conduct of its representatives in Germany. Second, this process likewise could 
not have occurred without the acquiescence of international, and particularly American, 
Christianity. Because the United States developed a strong Christian identity during the war, and 
because the material and military realities of 1945 made the United States a major world 
superpower, American Protestantism necessarily took center stage in Western Christianity. 
American Protestants actively contributed to democratization by whitewashing the conduct of 
many former Nazis during occupation, thereby encouraging the tacit acquiescence of democratic 
systems by former opponents. This process ironically fostered democracy by opposing many of 
the policies designed to root out and eliminate Nazism.21 Finally, I suggest that the “spiritual 
battle” America waged during the Cold War began in the fight against Nazi “totalitarianism” in 
the years preceding the Second World War. This is not to say that many Americans had not 
internalized opposition to communism prior to the 1930s, but rather to say that the “religious” 
conception of Christianity’s incompatibility with both Nazism and communism emerged prior to 
the Cold War. The transition from one “totalitarian” enemy to the next was only possible because 
religious groups had already mobilized in active opposition to Nazism. American political 
leaders during the Cold War internalized these changes and consequently sought to harness 
religious mobilization for political gain.  
                                                 
21 On this point, my analysis also supports recent studies on the British ecumenist and friend to German Confessing 
Church leaders George Bell. Both Andrew Chandler and Gerhard Besier argue that Bell held positions 
overwhelmingly similar to that many of the American protagonists in this dissertation. See Andrew Chandler, 
George Bell, Bishop of Chichester: Church, State, and Resistance in the Age of Dictatorship (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2016). Gerhard Besier, ed., “Intimately Associated for Many Years”: George K. A. Bell’s and Willem A. 
Visser’t Hooft’s Common Life-Work in the Service of the Church Universal – Mirrored in Their Correspondence, 
Parts 1 and 2 (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2015). Steven P. Remy The Malmedy Massacre: The War 
Crimes Trial Controversy. (Harvard University Press, 2017).  
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At first glance, one might feel hard pressed to find common threads between these 
nuanced historical sub disciplines, but I propose that the intellectual and theological crisis of the 
1930s fostered the creation of a powerful dichotomy that permeated almost every aspect of social 
and political life in the early 1930s, aspects which endure well into the present day. I have taken 
to calling this the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy.22 Because mainline American Protestants 
saw potential Allied victory during the war as “a great opportunity to educate, educate, educate 
for a Christian world order”23 and Germany quite clearly presented the greatest challenge to this 
order, the encounter between the two groups would have lasting impact on the social and 
political formation of what would become the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).    
 The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in America operated on three key premises. First 
and foremost, it posited that both National Socialism and communism were entirely incompatible 
with Christianity on a theological level. Because, Protestants argued, Hitler attempted to replace 
the Christian God with the Aryan race, National Socialism could never be acceptable to 
universalist Christian doctrine. Communism’s materialism likewise sought to replace Christian 
values with base mundane concerns and was therefore also unacceptable. Second, drawing upon 
America’s long history of both democracy and English Protestant dissenting tradition,24 the 
Dichotomy contended that Christianity and democracy were fundamentally inseparable. 
Democracy needed Christian universalism to buttress natural rights theory, just as democracy 
offered the best possible method for limiting man’s natural inclinations towards injustice and 
therefore offered the greatest potential for bringing civilization nearer to a Kingdom of God on 
                                                 
22 I will henceforth often refer to this simply as the Dichotomy for the sake of brevity.  
23 Quote from Dr. Eric M. North at the Foreign Missions Conference of North America in Swarthmore, PA June 
13th, 1940. RG 18 74 25. Presbyterian Historical Society Archives (PSHA). Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, United 
States of America.  
24 See Jonathan D. Sasse, "The First Party Competition and Southern New England's Public Christianity." Journal of 
the Early Republic 21, no. 2 (2001): 261-99. See also, Ernest Lee Tuveson, Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America’s 
Millennial Role. (University of Chicago Press, 1968).  
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earth. Finally, it contended that Nazism and Communism formed when secularism and 
materialism overtook Christian values in any given nation. Both were symptoms of a larger 
“spiritual” disease, the replacement and redefinition of Christianity’s superior moral values given 
to man from God with profane and fundamentally selfish values drawn from man. In this sense, 
they often subscribed to the popular notion that Nazism and communism were in fact “political 
religions.”25 Protestant leaders often saw both communism and Nazism as but two sides of the 
same coin and used the term “totalitarianism” interchangeably.     
 In Germany however, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy took on a different meaning. 
While German Protestants likewise saw “godless” communism as unredeemable and the primary 
enemy of Christianity, they did not equate democracy with Christianity. Instead, they cherished 
hopes that National Socialism might rejuvenate the German nation through a combination of 
authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, anti-communism and nationalism. While the Second World War 
and twelve years of National Socialism had soured most Germans on the concept of Nazism 
while reinforcing their hatred for communism, German pastors still did not see democracy as 
compatible with Christianity in the mid-late 1940s. Crucially therefore, while both Germans and 
Americans would evoke the Dichotomy, their nuances of its meaning varied from individual to 
individual.  
 To scholars familiar with either American or German Protestantism in the 20th century, 
this is hardly new. In fact, existing scholarship has been making similar observations about the 
                                                 
25 Jason Stevens lays out Reinhold Niebuhr’s sophisticated definition of totalitarianism. See Jason Stevens, God 
Fearing and Free: A Spiritual History of America’s Cold War. (Harvard University Press, 2010). 20. See 
specifically footnote 59 on page 352. The idea that Fascism, Communism and or/Nazism were fundamentally 
religious in their construction features prominently in many explanations for the rise of these respective movements. 
See for example Emilio Gentile’s reliance on Emilie Durkheim in The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy. 
(Harvard University Press, 1996). Ian Kershaw observes that the world “totalitarianism” often serves as little more 
than a “Boo-word” in common parlance. This certainly seems to be the case with church leaders. Suffice to say that 
“totalitarianism” often functioned as a catch-all for Protestants, encompassing a variety of factors which they 
despised. See Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation. (Bloomberg, 2000). Pg. 
34.  
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German churches and American Cold War views for over twenty years, even if, to my 
knowledge, no scholar has used the phrase Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in his or her 
analysis.26 However, very few scholars have considered the relationship between the two groups, 
and those that have focus almost exclusively on institutional developments within the German 
Church.27 I aim to build on the work of German Church scholars like Gerhard Besier and Martin 
Greschat by contextualizing the transnational relationship of German and American Protestants. I 
argue that only by inserting these church narratives directly into both interpretations of West 
German democratization and American Cold War policy, can scholars gain a full understanding 
of both processes. To this end I strive to take up Mark Ruff’s call to “integrate religious history 
into the mainstream.”28  
 In the United States, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy functioned as a critical arm of 
what John Fousek calls the rise of American “nationalist globalism.”29 By simultaneously 
reinforcing notions of both American greatness via the superiority of democracy and global 
responsibility through the fight against totalitarianism, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy 
articulated a distinctly Christian national identity while also reinforcing the need to spread and 
                                                 
26 Mark Edwards comes close by calling the American liberal ecumenical Protestant tradition “countertotalitarian,” 
though his text Mark Thomas Edwards, The Right of the Protestant Left: God’s Totalitarianism. (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012).  Many other scholars have noted the contrast consciously created between religious belief and 
communism especially in relation to German and American anti-communist thought during the Cold War, but none 
have connected this directly to Nazism as a predecessor of communism, nor have they framed it specifically as 
“totalitarian.” For instance, Mike Grimshaw refers to a “Manichean Dualism” of “religion versus communism,” but 
never uses the phrase totalitarianism nor draws specific links to Nazism. See Mike Grimshaw, "Encountering 
Religion: Encounter, Religion, and the Cultural Cold War, 1953–1967." History of Religions 51, no. 1 (2011): 35.   
27 Gerhard Besier has certainly done the most research on this point. See a collection of his translated essays in 
Gerhard Beiser, Religion, State and Society in the Transformations of the Twentieth Century: Modernization, 
Innovation and Decline. (Lit Publishing, 2008).   
28 See Mark Edward Ruff, "Integrating Religion into the Historical Mainstream: Recent Literature on Religion in the 
Federal Republic of Germany." Central European History, Vol. 42, No. 2 (JUNE 2009), pp. 307-337. While Ruff’s 
emphasis was on German and European Historiography, the same is true for American history, outside of the 
significant interest in the rise of the Evangelical Right in the late 20th century. 
29 John Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War. 
(University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 6-8.  
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defend American values internationally.30 Germany, as both the heart of the Second World War 
and the geographical and cultural center of Europe, became the primary focal point for 
ecumenical Protestants because they saw it as the central battle ground over which the 
ideological struggle for Europe was to be waged. That ecumenical Protestants, most especially 
Midwestern Lutherans, also shared cultural and theological affinities with German Protestants 
undoubtedly likewise influenced the importance of Germany in their political and religious 
thinking.  
 The development of Fousek’s nationalist globalism formed as a reluctant embrace of 
Cold War politics rather than as a desired outcome of the Christian World Order. Indeed, 
Michael G. Thompson describes the ecumenical movement as a rejection of nationalism in favor 
of universalism.31 Mark Edwards likewise argues the American ecumenical Protestant left 
imbued “theo-political” democratic Progressive ideals such as the preservation of small-group 
freedom (from big government and big business) and distributive justice with the recovery of 
Protestant Christian traditions through a “supra-national” world church. Its eventual realization 
was intended to overcome nationalistic agendas and imperialism in favor of a “new 
Christendom.”32 This dissertation therefore also adds to recent scholarship of the American 
Protestant left by examining how ecumenical leaders implemented their aims in occupied 
Germany.  
 The concept of a Christian World Order, emerged distinctly as a production of the 
American (Western) fight against Nazism. At its core, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy 
articulated a distinctly non-national religious identity that ostensibly united Western Christianity 
(and perhaps even East Orthodox Christians and Jews) against communism, nihilism and the 
                                                 
30 Fousek likewise sees the 1930s as a period of reenergizing democracy in the battle against totalitarianism. Ibid, 8. 
31 Michael G. Thompson, For God and globe: 4. 
32 Mark Edwards, The Right of the Protestant Left, 3-11.  
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forces of totalitarianism. However, because this non-national identity emerged from narratives 
emphasizing and reinforcing America’s mission to the world, it also simultaneously constructed 
a new nationalist globalist identity in America itself. Conversely in Germany, this ostensibly 
non-nationalist identity attempted to reconstruct and save Germany through a rehabilitating re-
Christianization. To borrow from both Benedict Anderson and John Fousek’s definition of 
nationalism, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy posited the possible creation of a newly 
“imagined community” built around Christian identity.33 Because both Americans and Germans 
utilized this concept to construct and reorient their own national identities, national Christian 
identity often overrode this newly imagined international order. 34  The slogan of the National 
Council of Churches emphasized this contradiction clearly: “building of a Christian America in a 
Christian world.”35 Still, as Protestants imagined it, this new Christian World Order functioned 
as an ideological framework through which Western Civilization might perpetuate Christian 
morality and save itself from disaster.  
 The relevance of the Dichotomy to historical change in the late 1940s and 1950s relates 
to the broader religious renewal occurring in most Western nations after the Second World War. 
In the United States, approximately 47 percent of the US population attended church on average 
between 1955-1958,36 an increase of 30 percent from just thirty years prior.37 Church 
construction increased from $26 million in 1945 to $409 million in 1950, while church 
membership increased from 57% to 63.3% throughout the 1950s. On average, church attendance 
                                                 
33 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. (New 
York, 1991).  
34 Michael Thompson argues Christian ecumenicalism refuted Nazi ideology by recovering the ideal of the 
“Universal Church.” See For God and Globe, 14.  
35 Mark Edwards, Right of the Protestant Left, 2. 
36 Robert S. Ellwood, The Fifties Spiritual Marketplace: American Religion in a Decade of Conflict. (New 
Brunswick: NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997). 1-8. 
37 Jonathan Herzog, The Spiritual Industrial Complex: America's Religious Battle Against Communism in the Early 
Cold War. (Oxford University Press, 2011) 24-25.  
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increased by 70 percent in a single generation, twice the rate of the booming 1950s general 
population.38 Distribution of religious scripture increased 140% from 1949-1953, with over four-
fifths of adult Americans calling the Bible “the revealed word of God.”39 This increase in 
religious life has long attracted the interests of scholars, particularly since it stands outside of the 
orthodox secularism thesis, but also because it inspired significant social, political and cultural 
transformations.40 While scholars have rightly debated the precise characteristics of this revival, 
addressing concerns of superficiality, intellectual versus populist religion and the sacralization of 
political life, the underlying religiosity remains unquestionably potent.41  
 In the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), no such participatory religious 
revival occurred. Church attendance remained roughly around 10 percent, with membership 
remaining static at 48% Protestant and 47% Catholic of the total population.42 Nonetheless, as 
the only institution to survive the Nazi era intact, an “Hour of the Church” dominated the moral 
landscape of the late 1940s and 1950s even if the aimed at “re-Christianization” of Germany 
proved superficial and temporary. Spurred by the emergence of the CDU (Christian Democratic 
Union), Protestant and Catholic confessional publications dominated political discourse about 
democracy and family life.43 The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy therefore emerged in a 
                                                 
38 Ellwood, The Fifties Spiritual Marketplace. 1-8.  
39 Will Herberg, Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology.” (Garden City: At the Life 
County Press), 1955. 1-4.  
40 Callum Brown calls the 1950s the unquestionable high of religious participation in Britain the immediate postwar 
decade. See Callum G. Brown, The Death of Christian Britain: Understanding Secularization 1800-2000 (London, 
2001). 170. Steve Bruce, ed., Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization 
Thesis. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992). Hugh McLeod, The Religious Crises of the 1960s. (Oxford University Press, 
2010).  
41 To name two pieces not otherwise referenced in detail in this dissertation, see, Angela M. Larr, Millennial Dreams 
and Apocalyptic Nightmares: The Cold War Origins of Political Evangelicalism. (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
Andrew S. Finstuen Original Sin and Everyday Protestants: The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, Billy Graham, and 
Paul Tillich in an Age of Anxiety (University of North Carolina Press, 2009).  
42 Karl Schmitt, Konfession und Wahlverhalten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Ordo Politicus 27, ed. Dieter 
Oberdörfer (Berlin, Dunecker and Humbolt, 1989), 310-11. 
Till van Rahden, "Fatherhood, Rechristianization, and the Quest for Democracy in Postwar West Germany", in: Dirk 
Schumann (ed.), Raising Citizens in the “Century of the Child:” Child-Rearing in the United States and German 
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moment of intense religious sentiment and probing, a moment in which a return to “stability,” 
“normalcy” and “morality” understandably garnered the attention of much of the Western 
World.44 
Broadly speaking, scholars interpret the remarkable stabilization of postwar West 
German democracy in four separate ways. First, the economic thesis, which posits the incredible 
growth of the economy in the 1950s generated jobs and raised living standards thereby 
stabilizing the country and fostering belief in American-style economic and political systems.45 
Second, the Allied imposition thesis, which argues that the Allies, particularly the Americans, 
imposed democracy on the Germans by mandating legal, economic and institutional reforms.46 
Third, the "democratization via integration" thesis, which theorizes that West German democracy 
stabilized because the administration of West Germany’s first Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
brought former Nazis into the fold of the new government, thereby limiting political turnover 
                                                                                                                                                             
Central Europe in the Twentieth Century (New York: Berghahn Books), 142-4. See also Sean A. Forner, German 
Intellectuals and the Challenge of Democratic Renewal: Culture and Politics after 1945. (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014). 67-73.  
44 Eckart Conze traces this idea in considerable detail in his book Die Suche nach Sicherheit: eine Geschichte der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1949 bis in die Gegenwart. (München: Siedler Verlag, 2009). Dagmar Herzog also 
develops this idea in great depth regarding postwar attempts to reinstitute sexual propriety in Sex After Fascism: 
Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).  
45 Almost every interpretation of West German democratization attends to this in some way, but the best-known 
example and certainly the piece with the largest impact on historiography remains Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and 
Democracy in Germany. (Garden City: Double Day, 1965). For Dahrendorf, economic stability and prosperity was 
crucial to the success of German democracy because of the overwhelming pervasive attitudes of self-interest and a 
strong desire for order and hierarchy, overrode concern for communal development and the poor. For an updated 
form of this thesis, see Rebecca Boehling, A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in 
Postwar Germany. (New York: Berghahn Books, 1996). Boehling argues that the American emphasis on economic 
recovery stymied and in many ways prevented and undermined institutional reform and widespread structural 
changes. Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek's famous edited collection considers economic developments in 
conjunction with broad cultural and social changes, describing what he considers "Modernization." See Axel Schildt 
and Arnold Sywottek, eds. Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre. (Bonn: 
Dietz, 1993). Konrad Jarausch, has also produced a similar study but instead emphasizes "recivilizing" Germans, as 
opposed to Modernization. See Konrad Jarausch, After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945-1995. (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2006).  
46 The most forceful argument on this account is Richard L. Merritt's Democracy Imposed: US Occupation Policy 
and the German Public, 1945-1945. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). For Merritt, Germany had little 
inclination to move toward democratic rule and an even more limited capacity to do so even if the desire had been 
higher. Thus for him, the building of West German Democracy was crucially, and in fact almost solely, an Allied 
imposition.  
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and potential opposition.47 Fourth, the internationalist interpretation suggests that West German 
leaders' desire to attain greater autonomy after the war required a certain adoption of Western 
principles for the sake of geopolitics. Therefore, the Federal Republic bound itself to Western 
Europe and the United States by joining institutions such as the EEC and NATO, while also 
significantly paying reparations to Israel to foster international goodwill. Over time, this process 
embedded democratic values within German society by stabilizing European politics and 
placating residual nationalistic claims. The developing Cold War remains crucial to this 
interpretation, as Germans saw democracy as a preferred alternative to Soviet communism.48 
Further sub-disciplines consider lingering anti-democratic sentiment in the Federal Republic 
often examining specific individuals, localities or individuals.49  
 However, often missing from these works are the German churches, particularly the 
Protestant churches. This notable absence stands out not only because German Protestants made 
                                                 
47 The best articulated example of this thesis remains Norbert Frei's Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The 
Politics of Amnesty and Integration. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). The phrase "democratization via 
integration" however does not directly appear in the Frei and should be credited to Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: 
The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 289. Furthermore, Devin Pendas 
has an excellent overview of the ramifications and breakdown of this method in his book The Frankfurt Auschwitz 
Trial, 1963-1965: Genocide, History and the Limits of the Law. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).     
48 See for example, K.D. Bracher's analysis of the concept of the German State and the foundation of the Bonn 
Republic in The German Dilemma: The Relationship of State and Democracy. Translated by Richard Barry. (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1975). 136-142. Bracher explicitly credits the context of the Cold War and anti-
communist sentiment for the rooting of democracy in the Federal Republic. Anthony Kauders, The Democratization 
of the Jews: Munich, 1945-1965. (University of Nebraska Press, 2004) and Fritz Stern in The Whitewashing of the 
Yellow Badge: Antisemitism and Philosemitism in Postwar Germany. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1992). Both 
credit international context and the importance of reparations to Israel to democratization of West Germany. For 
Stern especially, reparations emerge not out of benevolence but rather calculated self-interest and in efforts to gloss 
over serious discussions about the Holocaust and the Nazi past.  
49 For anti-Americanism and anti-democratic thought, see Richard Stöss, Politics against Democracy: Right Wing 
Extremism in West Germany. Translated by Lindsay Baton. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990). Karrin Hanshew, 
Terror and Democracy in West Germany. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012)., and Christoph Hendrik 
Müller, West Germans Against the West: Anti-Americanism in Media and Public Opinion in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 1949-1968. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). For more localized studies or for interactions 
between Americans and Germans, see Brian M. Puaca, Learning Democracy: Education Reform in West Germany, 
1945-1961. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009.) John Gimbel, A German Community under American Occupation: 
Marburg, 1945-1952., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961).   
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up a large part of the Nazi electorate,50 but also because of the electoral dominance of the 
Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) in the early Federal 
Republic. While the CDU/CSU predominantly built upon the old Catholic parties of the Weimar 
Republic, the early inclusion of Protestants into the party was a notable change from the past, 
and subsequent disputes between Protestants and Catholics certainly influenced internal CDU 
politics and policy.51 Much of what has been discussed about the transformation of the Protestant 
churches does not engage with broader questions of democratization, and instead focuses only on 
internal democratization.52 In many ways the two bodies of historiography function in complete 
isolation from one another.53   
                                                 
50 Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1933. (North Carolina 
University Press, 1983), 188-192.  
51 This is also a massive body of scholarship. For an excellent overview and careful analysis of Protestant-Catholic 
relations, see Maria Mitchell, The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern Germany. 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012).  
52 Much has been written on internal tensions and democratization within the churches. Orthodox scholarship tended 
to exaggerate the resistance of the Confessing Church to Nazism, thereby more or less pushing aside questions of 
democratization. Revisionist scholars have argued only a small minority of church leaders really pushed for 
democratization in the late 40s and early 1950s, most notably Barthians and Martin Niemöller, and greatly critiqued 
the early church's unwillingness to engage with its failures during the Third Reich and lingering anti-Semitism. For 
these scholars, when old conservatives fell out of power and church membership declined significantly in the late 
1960s, leftists gained more power and full democratization took place. Such scholarship similarly tends to 
emphasize shifting conditions in the Federal Republic that facilitated democratization despite internal conservative 
reluctance to embrace democratic principles. More recently, a small minority of scholars have challenged these 
assumptions, arguing certain tendencies even within certain conservative circles could be considered pro-
democratic. Still others have argued that the early years of the postwar German church were far more complex than 
previous scholarship had indicated, with Martin Greschat perhaps most accurately summarizing the founding of the 
EKD as "neither a new beginning nor a restoration." Much of the debate surrounds examining the reorganization of 
the EKD in 1945, various official statements such as the Stuttgart Declaration of guilt and theological shifts. For an 
excellent historiographical overview, see Thomas Sauer's introduction in Westorientierung im deutschen 
Protestantismus? Vorstellung und Tätigkeit des Kronberger Kreises. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999). Sauer also is one 
of the major proponents of conservative democratization in the early 1950s. See also, Michael J. Inacker, Zwischen 
Transzendence Totalitarismus und Demokratie: Die Entwicklung die kirchlichen Demokratieverständnisses von der 
Weimar Republik bis zu den Anfängen der Bundesrepublik (1918-1959).  (Neukirchen-Vlyuyn: Neukirchener, 1994). 
Chong-Hun Jeong, Die deutsche evangelische Sozialethik und die Demokratie seit 1945: Der Beitrag der EKD-
Denkschriften zur Demokratie. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1997). Also, Martin Greschat's Der Protestantism 
in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945-2005. (Evangelische Verlagsanstalt GmbH, 2010).     
53 There are of course exceptions to this. Steven M. Schroeder, To Forget it All and Begin Anew: Reconciliation in 
Occupied Germany, 1944-1954. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013). Schroeder does deal with Allied 
interaction with the German Churches in considerable detail, which is not all that surprising given his emphasis on 
reconciliation between Germans, Allies and German victims. He does not however, deal in much detail with Allied 
attempts at democratizing the church, instead focusing on Jewish-Christian reconciliation. For an overview of 
relatively recent scholarship concerning the German Churches, as well as observations concerning the disconnect 
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Recent scholarship on the Cold War argues US policy makers understood the conflict 
with the Soviet Union first and foremost as a "spiritual battle" which pitted "godly" American 
freedom against the forces of atheistic communism.54 Much of the material discussing the 
religious origins of the Cold War has been published in the past decade. However, while scholars 
have examined religious influences on Soviet policy and American conduct in Latin America, 
very little attention has been paid to Germany, the initial testing grounds of US democracy and 
Cold War foreign policy.55 American Protestant Church historiography on the 1940s and 1950s 
tends to focus on either the divisions within church leadership, church leaders’ efforts in 
planning and imaging a postwar peace or the theological debates between Christian Realists like 
Reinhold Niebuhr and liberal Protestants like John Dewey. Nonetheless, such historiography 
clearly shows that Christian groups in America sought to recast the postwar world on the basis of 
universalist Christian thought and democracy.56 The success of the ecumenical movement and 
                                                                                                                                                             
between "profane" historiography and church historiography, see Mark Edward Ruff, "Integrating Religion into the 
Historical Mainstream.” Recent historiography on gender and sex politics in modern Germany does a far better job 
of encapsulating and including the role of religion in German politics and society than does much of church 
historiography. For an excellent recent example see Friederike Brühöfener, "Sex and the Soldier: The Discourse 
about the Moral Conduct of Bundeswehr Soldiers and Officers during the Adenauer Era." Central European 
History, Vol 48, No. 4 (DECEMBER 2015), pp. 523-540.  
54 See William Inboden, III The Soul of Containment: Religion and American Foreign Policy 1945-1960. 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008.) and Jonathan P.Herzog The Spiritual-Industrial Complex. Inboden argues that 
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, in addition to high ranking officials such as Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, were greatly influenced by American Protestantism. For example, Inboden argues that Dulles believed there 
could never be world peace so long as atheistic communists dictated terms in Europe. Similarly, Dulles argued that 
the best way to demonstrate American resolve was in the church pew. See Inboden, pgs. 32-36. Jonathan Herzog 
argues that US policy makers actively sought to establish a sort of national church voice, in which Protestants (and 
to a lesser extent Catholics), would rise and lead the fight in the Cold War. As such they deliberate used State, 
Federal, commercial and celebrity resources to foster religious revival in America.   
55 See for example T. Jeremy Gunn, Spiritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forging of an American National 
Religion. Praeger Publishers, 2008. Two excellent edited collections both with the same title Religion and the Cold 
War ed. Diane Kirby. (Palgrave Macmillian, 2003) and Religion and the Cold War: A Global Perspective, ed. Philip 
Muehlenbeck. (Vanderbilt University, 2012). Matthew Hockenos's essay on Cold War politics in West Germany 
found in the Kirby is the only essay that addresses Germany. Even then, Hockenos's emphasis is on politics within 
the Church but does not fully engage with the transnational dimension.  
56 D.G. Hart, That Old-Time Religion in Modern America: Evangelical Protestantism in the Twentieth Century (Ivan 
R. Dee, 2003) and Robert S. Ellwood, The Fifties Spiritual Marketplace and Jason Stevens, God-fearing and Free. 
Heather A. Warren, Theologians of a New World Order: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Christian Realists. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). See also David A. L. Hollinger, "The Realist–Pacifist Summit Meeting of March 
1942 and the Political Reorientation of Ecumenical Protestantism in the United States." Church History. 79.3 
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European Christian-Democracy in the late 1940s and 1950s demonstrates the widespread appeal 
these ideals had for many Europeans.  
 The eventual encounter between American and German Protestant interpretations of the 
Dichotomy after World War II had significant bearing on the democratization of Germany for 
several complex reasons.57 Americans insisted both during and after the War that National 
Socialism had launched a ceaseless assault on religious liberty and the institutional autonomy 
and ideology of both Protestant and Catholic Churches. This myth, carefully cultivated by 
German pastors themselves, postulated that those Protestants and Catholics who had not 
succumbed to the false prophet of Hitler had likewise waged an unending struggle against the 
Nazi State. The power of this narrative endured well into the postwar period and carried over 
into church historiography. Indeed, I suggest that Richard Steigman-Gall’s polemical book The 
Holy Reich operates overwhelmingly within the confines of the Dichotomy itself. Responding to 
the Dichotomy’s enduring categories of “Christian” and “Nazi,” Steigmann-Gall erroneously 
attempts to meld both categories together.58   
During occupation, Germans internalized and adopted for themselves a key component of 
American Protestant interpretations of Nazism and its relationship to Christianity.59 In so doing 
however, Americans also required Germans to ostensibly accept democracy. German 
Protestants’ continued loathing of communism and their new-found rejection of Nazism as 
defined by the Dichotomy left democracy as the only presentable alternative. But, in 1945 
German Protestants still held democracy to be entirely suspect, and often said as much to both 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2010): 654-677. Gerald Sittser, A Cautious Patriotism: The American Churches and the Second World War. 
(Chapel Hill University: North Carolina University Press, 1997). Andrew Preston, The Sword of the Spirit, The 
Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy. (Anchor, 2012). 
57 See also chapter 2 for more on occupation church historiography, 82-88. 
58 See pages 64-77 for a detailed discussion of The Holy Reich and greater detail of church Kirchenkampf 
historiography  
59 This is not to say that Germans themselves were not responsible for the creation of these narratives, but to rather 
suggest that the American conceptualization of the Dichotomy gave them a receptive and active audience. 
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American pastors and Allied officials. They feared that without a Christian state, democracy 
could not deter communism and would instead set the conditions for a hostile takeover. 
However, because American Protestants adopted and imposed a narrative of resistance by 
supporting German critiques of Allied policies, Germans continued to remain within its general 
confines.  
For these reasons, this dissertation best supports both the democratization via integration 
thesis and the democratization via imposition thesis. American Protestants did impose 
democracy on Germans via the conceptions of the Dichotomy, but it came at the cost of 
integrating the morally compromised Protestant church in Germany into the wider confines of 
the “Christian World Order.” Moreover, because Americans believed communism and Nazism 
could (re)conquer Germany at any moment, they sought to physically and spiritually rebuild the 
country through an astoundingly successful private aid campaign in the early postwar period. 
The American Christian politicization of the material crisis in postwar Germany led to 
widespread support for the Marshall Plan and Germany’s inclusion therein. This bound German 
churches to American churches both ideologically and materially, with many congregations 
dependent upon their American brethren for the very pews they sat upon. It also contributed to 
West Germany’s transition from enemy to ally in the preliminary stages of the Cold War, another 
burgeoning interest of scholarship that overlooks religious contributions.60     
Yet by binding German Protestants to the terms of the Christian World Order, Americans 
                                                 
60 See Carolyn Woods Eisenberg’s analysis of the political narrative of the decision to divide between West and East 
Germany in Drawing the line: The American Decision to divide Germany 1944-1949. (Cambridge University Press, 
1996). For an interesting analysis of American visual propaganda and its role in instilling American values in 
Germany see Cora Sol Goldstein, Capturing the German Eye: American Visual Propaganda in Occupied Germany. 
(University of Chicago Press, 2009). Also, Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Transmission Impossible: American Journalism 
as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1955. (Louisiana University Press, 1999.) For gender roles and 
American authorities see Rebecca Boehling “Gender Roles in Ruins: German Women and Local Politics under 
American Occupation, 1945-1955” in Gender and the Long Postwar: The United State and the Two Germanys 
1945-1989. Eds. Karen Hagemann and Sonya Michel. (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).  
W o l t e r i n g  | 24 
 
likewise validated their domestic moral authority. This in turn allowed religious leaders to 
construct many of the social values of the Federal Republic, including conservative bourgeois 
gender roles and fierce anti-communism. Inclusion in the Christian World Order also allowed 
German Protestants to comfortably distance themselves from the values of National Socialism 
while still maintaining some of the racial, national and cultural values that led to their initial 
support of Nazism. This is not to say that Americans imposed such values on Germans, or that 
Germans even needed American direction to embrace anti-communism or a conservative family 
orientation. Rather, I argue the Dichotomy laid the foundation for an exculpatory narrative for 
German Protestantism that facilitated the Federal Republic’s transition to these positions more 
broadly, even if some German Protestants, particularly Martin Niemöller, would not adopt it 
entirely.        
Because of the scope of this dissertation, I will readily acknowledge three inherent 
shortfalls. First, my very limited inclusion of Catholic participation in these processes undeniably 
means that this dissertation can only present one part of the puzzle. Catholic priests and 
laypersons were highly involved at the very same levels as Protestants presented herein. While 
their role often coincided with Protestant positions, this was not always the case, and the two 
often vied for influence and power. However, because this project already has a very large 
breadth, the inclusion of additional theological and institutional dimensions remains outside the 
realm of feasibility. I welcome critiques, suggestions, additions and even reinterpretations on this 
point from the academic community. Second, the encounter between German and foreign 
religious leaders could be significantly expanded beyond the American-German dynamic 
presented here. Undoubtedly, ecumenical Protestants in countries like Great Britain and 
Switzerland played a significant role imposing the Dichotomy in Germany, and doubtlessly had 
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nuanced understandings of their own. My analysis does incorporate to a limited degree the role 
of international ecumenical organizations such as the World Council of Churches, but this too 
represents a narrative gap overall. Finally, this dissertation often assumes categories of 
confessional, theological or denominational allegiance override other categories of identity in its 
analysis. While this likely goes without saying, on an individual level such things rarely line up 
as neatly as presented here. But for the great need to simplify categories into working and 
relatable terms, I on occasion will present claims about “Lutherans,” “liberal theology” or 
“Protestantism” that will not hold up to close historical scrutiny on a micro-narrative level. 
Because understanding the Dichotomy and the reasons for its effectiveness requires 
taking seriously church history and theology, this dissertation by necessity will employ such 
language to a limited degree. To that end I would like to clarify my use of a few important terms. 
Liberal and conservative theology differ principally in their relationship to biblical text. 
Theological conservatives take as a given the separation of cultural and biblical moral values. 
For them, God, through the Bible, has passed down a series of metaphysical and existential truths 
that offer guidance for humanity. This includes but is not limited to the preeminence of God, the 
deity of Jesus, the reality of the Holy Spirit, the brokenness of humanity and the need for 
restoration to the divine reality of God. Theological liberalism emerged predominantly in 19th 
century German Protestantism and generally attempts to apply the principles of Enlightenment-
era rationalism to Christianity and biblical interpretation. It is often non-doctrinal, emphasizing 
cultural revelation (or attaining ethical values and existential meaning through human culture). 
While these are loose and broad definitions, it is vital to point out the basic distinctions between 
the two given the ways in which the intellectual and theological crisis of the 1930s fermented 
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new, often radical, solutions in the search for existential meaning and value.61  
My use of the word “democracy,” will follow Robert Dahl’s definition of a political 
regime that has the following seven characteristics: Power constitutionally vested in elected 
officials, fair elections, universal suffrage, universal opportunity for representation, free speech, 
free press and free association.62 While German Protestants did not reject these ideals in full, 
they nonetheless sought to place restrictions or limitations on almost all seven of these features. 
Because Protestants favored monarchy and a powerful centralized state, they often had little 
objection to limiting freedom of speech, press or association to organizations or individuals they 
deemed hostile toward such interests. This in part explains their support for National Socialism, 
which they believed would restore proper state power and usher in some sort of polyarchic-
dictatorship. 
Totalitarianism as employed in this dissertation does loosely conform to Hannah Arendt’s 
definition of the term in her seminal The Origins of Totalitarianism, but its use in Protestant 
circles predates her scholarship by more than a decade and should not be confused with her 
work.63 Protestants often used the term loosely, and I have already proffered that the general 
conceptions of the word meant different things to Americans and Germans prior to occupation. 
Like Arendt, Protestant leaders described the “totalitarian” State as inherently oppressive. Its 
very makeup included an omnipotent dictator with an omnipresent secret police force. Likewise, 
the totalitarian State as defined by Protestants deeply interfered with both the public and personal 
spheres. However, unlike Arendt, Protestants traced its origins not to European Imperialism, 
anti-Semitism or the rise of contradictions found within the nation-state, but rather to the 
                                                 
61 Robert Ericksen, Theologians Under Hitler. (Yale University Press, 1985).   
62 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. (Yale University Press, 1972). For seven features of 
democracy see chapter 1.  
63 For a summary of the origins of the term See Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship. 22-26. Kershaw dates it back 
specifically to Italy in the 1920s.  
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proliferation of nihilistic and materialistic culture brought on by secularization. They also did not 
emphasize mass culture, the camp system or the loss of individuality as described by Arendt.64 
Protestants also did not develop a strict definition for the term, and in fact its lack of specificity 
likely enhanced its appeal. For these reasons the two definitions should not be confused. My use 
of the term relates specifically and directly to its usage in historical sources and should not be 
taken as an endorsement of its usefulness in explaining National Socialism, Soviet Communism 
or any other 20th century historical movement.    
Chapter one investigates the origins of the Dichotomy in America while also addressing 
how American religious leaders politicized the German Kirchenkampf and the war with Nazi 
Germany. I argue American church leaders took the struggle with Nazism as a starting point to 
imagine and proclaim the need for a “Christian World Order.” The chapter also provides a 
summary of recent historiography on the German Church Struggle and its relationship to the 
Dichotomy, including a refutation of Richard Steigmann-Gall’s polemical but important The 
Holy Reich.  
 Chapter two considers directly the relationship between American Protestants, American 
military officials and the German Protestant clergy during occupation. I argue that because 
military officials desired to avoid getting caught up in what they viewed as “religious” affairs, 
they ceded enormous leeway both to German church leaders and visiting American pastors. This 
process allowed American pastors to present and argue for a narrative that aggrandized Christian 
resistance and explained away controversial statements made by German pastors who refused to 
acknowledge responsibility for the Holocaust or National Socialism. Such pastors also often 
                                                 
64 See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harvest Books, 1951). See Part I for the 
importance of anti-Semitism and the preface of Part II for its link to Imperialism. Arendt argued that the creation of 
the nation-state created the political problem of minority communities for European nationalists, and, in 
combination with Imperialism which sparked imaginings of world domination, set the stage for totalitarianism. 
These interpretive links are completely absent in Protestant conceptions of totalitarianism.  
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expressed anti-democratic sentiments and open hostility toward certain Allied policies (like the 
redrawing of German borders in the East). This not only enhanced the reputation of German 
clergy during occupation but also legitimized their moral authority both nationally and 
internationally. 
 Chapter three addresses Martin Niemöller’s tour of the United States in 1946, which 
scholars have yet to examine in any detail. I argue the tour served three key purposes. First, to 
rehabilitate the image of German Protestantism in America by emphasizing the Confessing 
Church’s resistance to Hitler. Second, to portray Niemöller as a proponent of American 
democracy in the eyes of the American public, despite his previous statements indicating 
otherwise. Finally, to impress upon the American people the seriousness of the moral and 
material crisis in Germany. His tour also encouraged Americans to take action by donating to 
private Christian aid organizations supporting the reconstruction of Germany on a Christian 
basis.  
 Chapter four examines Christian aid campaigns for Germans in the mid-to-late 1940s. I 
argue American churchmen launched an all-out public relations campaign to convince the 
American people that unless Christians supported ethnic Germans materially and spiritually, 
totalitarianism was sure to retake the country and the continent. The result was a staggeringly 
successful aid campaign which preceded and eventually morphed into a Christian justification 
for the Marshall Plan. This process solidified free-market capitalism as synonymous with 
Christian identity in America while also sacralizing American aid to Europe in the fight against 
totalitarianism.  
 Finally, Chapter 5 offers a case study of German democratization in the 1950s by 
examining the role of the Protestant Kirchentag, a series of mass week long annual rallies held in 
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West Germany. I argue Kirchentag organizers desired to control what they saw as the moral and 
structural shortcomings of parliamentary democracy by promoting an imagined political 
community defined by religious identity. This community positioned itself in opposition to 
National Socialism, and therein offered a redefinition of the German nation. However, this new 
nation did not simply reject the values and norms of National Socialism, but also redefined and 
repurposed them for its own use, inadvertently creating the space for democracy by repositioning 
traditional conservative social and political values as anti-Nazi. Over time, internal division 
within German Protestantism over issues such as rearmament and political ethics prevented the 
coalescence of this new political community. However, public discourse and efforts to preserve 
this new community despite disagreements served to reinforce democratic values and encourage 
compromise, eventually resulting in the inadvertent acceptance of democratic rule, albeit with 
reservations. The space created by the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy made this sort of 
maneuvering possible.  
 I conclude by examining the ways in which the Dichotomy shifted in both the United 
States and Germany during and after its initial triumph in The Second World War. In Germany, 
the mythmaking necessary to sustain the Dichotomy came under severe strain in the 1960s, 
eventually resulting in a splintering of religious thought and a general decline in religious 
participation. In America, mainline Protestantism’s contradictory support of the Dichotomy and 
its wavering reluctance to combat Soviet Russia directly places many liberal ecumenist pastors 
into a theological and political corner. Their inability to define precisely the tenets of Christian 
belief and distinguish between denominations in conjunction with their support for labor 
movements opened them up to charges of being communist sympathizers. Evangelical 
fundamentalists rose to the forefront by insisting upon a literal interpretation of the Bible and 
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embracing both free-market capitalism and anti-communism.   
Ultimately, American church leaders and European ecumenical integrationists like Visser 
‘t Hooft succeeded in binding German Protestantism to the ecumenical movement through a 
combination of material support, consistent lobbying that the Confessing Church had resisted 
Hitler from the onset and claiming that Christianity would prevent future totalitarian movements. 
American Protestants facilitated a rapid if superficial re-Christianization of Germany during the 
late 1940s and early 1950s based upon a conservative family structure, anti-communism and tacit 
support for democracy while also simultaneously creating and propagating numerous myths 
about Nazism and its relationship to Christianity. By binding German Protestants to the confines 
of the Dichotomy, ecumenists both obfuscated and tempered the nationalistic and anti-
democratic ideals commonly held by leading members of the German Protestant Church while 
also rehabilitating their conservative political values to make them more palatable in a post-Nazi 
Germany. Over time, this eventually resulted in a reluctant embrace of democracy by the 
national-conservative German Protestant milieu; those who broke overwhelmingly with 
traditional conservative parties in support of National Socialism in 1933.       
This means the historian’s task when confronting the formulation of a Christian World 
Order requires cautious appraisal. The power of the Dichotomy and its memory enables an easy 
slide into the trap of polemics. Certainly, the politicization of the Dichotomy obscured Christian 
anti-Semitism and its supportive role of Nazism throughout most of the Third Reich. It likewise 
provided exculpatory narratives for church leaders, everyday Germans and former Nazis after the 
Second World War.65 Certainly too, American business leaders utilized the Dichotomy to defend 
the expansion of free-market capitalism.66 American government officials and pastors also 
                                                 
65 See Chapter 2 on denazification  
66 See Kevin M. Kruse’s One Nation Under God: How Corporate America Invented Christian America, (Basic 
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advanced the superiority of Western liberal democracy in the fight against the Nazi dictatorship 
and international Soviet communism in morally compromising ways all over the world.67 Surely 
too however, the Dichotomy also fundamentally attempted to protect the tenets of the Christian 
faith from radical heresy while genuinely striving to combat extreme racism, nationalism and 
war during and after the most destructive event in human history.68 Whatever one thinks of its 
moral platform and justifications, the fragmented and short lived Christian World Order did 


























                                                                                                                                                             
Books, 2016).  
67 Jeremy Gunn, Spiritual Weapons. Pages 131-196. Summary also on 196-200. American Protestants used this to 
significant effect to justify human rights violations and propagation of numerous dictatorships in Latin America 
during the Cold War. Jeremy Gunn argues that because of the internationalization of American nationalism and 
Christianity, the former often subverted the professed values of the latter.  
68 See for example the anti-racist and anti-nationalist rhetoric of the WCC at their inaugural 1948 meeting.  
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Chapter 1: The New World Order: American Protestantism and the Moral Crisis of Modernity 
 
In May of 1943, “The Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace” of the 
Federal Council of Churches of Christ (FCCoC)69 issued a statement of guiding principles 
addressing the eventual end of the Second World War. Referencing an article from The 
Federalist written in 1787, the committee warned of the incredibly high stakes: “The American 
People again find themselves in an era of critical decision. It must now be determined, this time 
in worldwide terms, whether men are capable of establishing good government from reflection 
and choice, or whether they will continue to be buffeted about by force and by accident.” The 
commission asserted the world stood upon the brink of total destruction. “The ills which afflict 
our society,” they noted, “are fundamentally due to non-conformity with a moral order, the laws 
of which are as imperative and as inexorable as are those that order our physical world. 
Indifference to and violation of these moral laws always bring such sickness and suffering as 
today afflict mankind.”70 The Commission clearly implied two things. First, that the War 
represented more than a disagreement between warring parties but rather spoke to the very 
question of human civilization and the principles of governance. This therefore threatened the 
very essence of the America idea of democratic governance. Second, that the War was but a 
symptom of an underlying deviation of moral principles.  
 The Commission’s interpretation of the purpose of the Second World War correlated 
precisely with the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. It understood and interpreted the Second 
World War fundamentally as a struggle between Biblical values and anti-Biblical values, 
                                                 
69 Henceforth referred to as The Commission  
70 The Six Pillars of Peace: A Study Guide based on “A Statement of Political Propositions” by The Commission to 
Study The Bases of a Just and Durable Peace of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ. 1. RG 490 Box 6 Folder 
12. PHSA. 
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warning of the costs of shifting away from such principles. That Americans overwhelmingly 
associated individual freedom and democracy with Christianity only reinforced their perspective. 
As Vice President Henry Wallace put it in 1942, “The idea of freedom—the freedom that we in 
the United States know and love so well—is derived from the Bible with its extraordinary 
emphasis on the dignity of the individual.” Or as the Commission’s guiding principles put it, 
“There is a moral order which is fundamental and eternal, and which is relevant to the corporate 
life of men and the ordering of human society.”71  
 The guiding principles of The Committee established what would become the postwar 
platform of American Protestantism in Germany. In emphasizing “penitence,” “no retaliation,” 
“a true community of nations,” “economic security” and “international machinery,” the 
Committee described the primary characteristics of the imagined Christian World Order. 
Practically speaking these principles produced items such as the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt, 
an enormous amount of Christian aid for postwar Germany and Europe, strong criticism of the 
Potsdam Agreement and German Expulsion,72 the formulation of international bodies such as the 
World Council of Churches (and strong support for the UN) and Protestant support for free trade 
capitalism and the Marshall Plan. Its hallmark pamphlet, The Six Pillars of Peace likely 
functioned as the most accurate articulation of American foreign policy in Europe by any non-
                                                 
71. Post-War: an information bulletin issued by the staff of The Commission To Study The Bases of A Just and 
Durable Peace. July 1942. RG 490 Box 6 Folder 12. PHSA.   
72 This refers specifically to the expulsion of Germans from east Central Europe and what was once eastern Prussia, 
to what we now recognize as Germany during or immediately following the Second World War. This included, 
especially in places like Posen and West Prussia, citizens of the pre-war Reich and the Volksdeutsche who had 
moved East with Nazi expansion. In total, scholars estimate as many as 12-13 million Germans were expelled from 
east Central Europe, with varying estimates of 200,000 up to 2 million said to have perished on the trip, though more 
reliable statistics tend to agree upon 200,000-250,000. At Potsdam, the Western Allies generally accepted this as a 
necessary condition for peace, and even had they wanted to stop it would likely not have been able to do so without 
force. Instead, they focused on trying to control the flow of refugees into Germany itself. For a concise and 
informative overview of this process see Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2000). 217-220. This topic itself though has been of interest to scholars, especially concerning the 
way in which it was remembered in postwar German memory especially in relation to crimes committed by National 
Socialism. For an assessment with historiographical analysis see Robert Moeller, The Search for a Usable Past, 51-
87.       
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governmental organization and was certainly the most publicized and circulated document of any 
church publication of the 20th century.73    
This chapter traces the genesis and proliferation of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy 
in the United States and its relationship to both the international ecumenical movement and the 
German Church Struggle (Kirchenkampf). I argue the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy emerged 
within American Protestant circles for three conjoined reasons: First, to protect established 
biblical interpretation from competing powerful worldviews like National Socialism. Second, to 
defend democracy from the alternative state-structures produced during and after the First World 
War by conjoining democracy with American exceptionalism and Christian morality. Finally, to 
encourage and justify American participation in the Second World War against Germany. 
Crucially, proponents of the Dichotomy correctly understood the threat they faced. The National 
Socialist worldview could not co-exist with standard biblical interpretation any more than 
Nazism could tolerate classic European ‘Jewish’ liberal democracy. These assertions held true 
during and after the war. However, the construction of the Dichotomy in America also 
misrepresented Christianity’s political relationship with Nazism by arguing this inherent 
incompatibility mirrored the conduct of the German churches toward the Nazi-state (and vice-
versa). This formulation did not emerge immediately with Hitler’s rise to power, but unfurled 
over the course of the 1930s, beginning first with disillusionment over Hitler’s treatment of 
Confessing Church leaders and then shifting toward pro-war sentiment in the 1940s.74  
This dissertation can only present a few pieces of this puzzle, as certainly individual non-
American and German actors were vital in the Dichotomy’s firm formulation as a political 
                                                 
73 See Inboden, The Soul of Containment. 30-32. Also, Martin Erdmann, Building the Kingdom of God, 248-271. 
The document was distributed directly to foreign supporters, American Press corps, sent directly to Congressman 
and even featured prominently on the front page of the London Times.  
74 Gerhard Besier, “The friends…in America need to know the truth…” The German Churches in the Opinion of the 
“United States (1933-1941). Found in Religion, State and Society, 104-105. 
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concept, most especially the British Bishop of Chichester George Bell, Dutch Theologian and 
eventual General Secretary of the World Council of Churches Willem Visser ‘t Hooft and 
prominent Scandinavian Church leaders such as Nathan Söderblom to say nothing of the role of 
Catholicism.75 Winston Churchill’s portrayal of Britain as a lone democratic island standing 
against the Satanic forces of Nazism likewise come to mind.76 With the War’s end, the question 
of communism and war with Soviet Russia became all the more pertinent, reinforcing American 
conceptualizations of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy against communism.77 However, 
scholarship has yet to fully examine the relationship between rising Cold War spiritualism and 
pro-war rhetoric.78  
 For Americans, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy formed principally around those 
who supported definitive American action in the Second World War. The idea came into being 
from both wartime propaganda portraying the Nazis as inherently anti-Christian and from 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s theological dismantling of the naivety of American liberalism and Protestant 
pacifistic isolationism. In a series of writings-most notably Moral Man and Immoral Society 
(1932), and The Children of Light and Darkness (1943)-and public debates with pacifists, 
Niebuhr fiercely defended democratic principles and interventionist foreign policy.79 Proponents 
of the Dichotomy therefore often described the origins of American democracy as 
                                                 
75 See for example the importance of George bell and Visser ‘t Hooft in the creation of the World Council of 
Churches and their relationship through the war in George Bell, Bishop of Chichester. Gerhard Besier, 
ed., “Intimately Associated for Many Years”Parts 1 and 2 Also, Fillippo Maria Giordano and Stefano Dell’Acqua 
eds., “Die Welt war meine Gemeinde,” Willem A. Visser ‘t Hooft: A Theologian for Europe between Ecumenism and 
Federalism. (Brussels: Peter Lang S.A., 2014.).  
76 Andrew Preston, The Sword of the Spirit. 351. 
77 Herzog, The Spiritual Industrial Complex. See Chapters 1 and 2.  
78 Recent scholarship has taken this up, and I aim to build upon the work of Michael G. Thompson, For God and 
Globe. Mark Thomas Edwards, The Right of the Protestant Left.  
79 This was truer of Children of Light and Darkness than Moral Man and Immoral Society. The former especially 
evoked a Christian justification for democracy. Robert McAfee Brown’s description of Niebuhr’s intellectual 
transformation in relation to both the quotation about and his critique of American liberalism is a useful point of 
reference. See Reinhold Niebuhr and Robert McAfee Brown, The Essential Niebuhr: Selected Essays and 
Addresses. (Yale University Press, 1986). Xi-xxiv.  
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overwhelmingly Christian (if not explicitly Protestant), linking together natural rights theory 
with Christian beliefs. Tracing the precise origins of the phenomenon is difficult, but by the early 
to mid-1940’s, the concept had almost universal acceptance even amongst the disparate and often 
disjointed groups of mainline Protestants, Evangelicals and the declining Christian 
Progressivism. Certainly though, it grew gradually as the 1930s went on.  
 American conceptions of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy formulated around 
popular interpretations of the Nazi Persecution of the German Churches. Quick to sensationalize 
and politicize Protestant opposition to Hitler, American Protestants would come to see Nazism as 
inherently oppressive toward Christianity. They likewise interpreted German religious resistance 
to Nazism as firm support for democratic natural rights when in fact such political resistance 
rarely occurred within German circles.80 Due in part to the alliance forged between American 
Protestants, Jews and Catholics during the war81 and the limited amount of information on the 
subject,82 American interpretations of the German “Church Struggle”  (Kirchenkampf) 
overlooked anti-Semitism and anti-democratic beliefs within German circles in order to craft 
religious justifications for the war. However, because European nationalistic dictatorships such 
as Nazism had blurred religious and political categories significantly, this interpretation required 
a redefining of Christian religious categories often via political categories. To give the most 
common outcome of such defining in the postwar West, calling oneself a Christian required both 
a theological and a political statement of faith. It carried with it the assumption that if one were a 
                                                 
80 For the most prominent example of such misinterpretations, see Chapter 3 and the controversy surrounding Martin 
Niemöller’s visit to the United States in 1946.  
81 See Kevin Schultz, Tri-Faith America: How Catholics and Jews Held Postwar America to its Protestant Promise. 
(Oxford University Press, 2011.)  
82 That which was available came almost exclusively from the Confessing Church itself, which was hardly likely to 
recognize its own shortcomings or make public mention of them even if individual members did. Almost all the 
writers of press releases came from either the Federal Council of Churches, Confessing Church Members or 
Catholics. To be fair to the reporters, they were unlikely to get an alternative view unless they spoke directly with 
members of the Deutsche Christen in the 1930s, and this would have been all but impossible during the war.  
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Christian, one also supported liberal democracy. This process, I argue, significantly altered not 
only American and German national identity but also popular memory of the war itself by 
creating new fixed categories centered around Christianity.  
  
The German Kirchenkampf 
 
To understand the ways in which American Protestant utilized and politicized the German 
Church Struggle, one must have a firm grasp on the topic itself. The German Church Struggle 
took place on two levels with three distinct phases. The primary conflict consisted of a 
theological dispute between the radical racial anti-Semitism of the German Christian Faith 
Movement (Glaubensbewegung Deutsche Christen), and the conservative-nationalist Confessing 
Church (Bekennende Kirche), with a majority third neutral faction (roughly 80%) often 
sympathetic to both sides but unwilling to take a stand. Historians have studied the 
Kirchenkampf in considerable detail and generally arrived at a strong consensus on a master 
narrative, even if moral interpretations of church conduct remain polemical.83  
The German Christian Movement is somewhat difficult to summarize, not only because 
of its fragmented and amorphous nature, but also because of the overwhelming number of 
seemingly contractionary84 beliefs inherent within its theology and practices. Generally, the 
movement was an attempt to blend Christianity with Nazi racial policy by essentially 'proving' 
                                                 
83 For an excellent overview of historiographical polemical tendencies and the Kirchenkampf, see Diana Jane Beech 
PhD. Dissertation “Between Defiance and Compliance: The Lutheran Landesbischöfe of Hanover, Bavaria and 
Württemberg in the Third Reich,” University of Cambridge, 2010. 12-18. 
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/240607/Beech_DJ_phDthesis.pdf;jsessionid=3D8819BC8
AD27BE6789AE11CB0C4DBAB?sequence=1 last accessed 1/1/2017 11:35 PM.    
84 For instance, there is no straightforward way to reconcile the Christian doctrines of Original Sin, universal 
judgement, salvation of all human beings through Christ’s sacrificial death on the Cross and the universal mission of 
the church to life as a unified body of Christ on earth with the preeminence of race and militarism present in 
Deutsche Christian theology.   
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that Jesus was part of the Aryan race and sent by God to depose of Jews. The Institute for the 
Study and Eradication of Jewish Influence on German Church Life (Institut zur Erforschung und 
Beseitigung des jüdischen Einfluss auf das deutsche kirchliche Leben) likely provides the best 
example of an institutional manifestation of these values. The institute, headed by prominent 
theologians like Walter Grundmann, reorganized the Bible without the Old Testament, published 
new hymnals free of Jewish “corruption” and crafted virulent anti-Semitic liturgies to better suit 
the Nazi racial agenda. 85 While the Institute represented a subversion of Christian theology in an 
extreme form, it had precedence in German liberal theology and völkisch religious ideas that 
emphasized natural revelation over biblical revelation.86 The movement also had long-term 
antecedents in European anti-Semitism in the late 1800s and völkisch Christian thought in 
Austria leading up to the First World War, which expanded and radicalized after the Central 
Power’s defeat and the Great Depression.87   
The Confessing Church consisted of three factions, hardline national-conservative 
Lutherans, more moderate Lutherans and the minority Barthian Reformed Protestants.88 Most 
German Protestants were national-conservative Lutherans, who, since the Kaiserreich, had 
maintained fierce loyalties to the state through their interpretation of Luther's Two Kingdoms 
doctrine. Per their understanding of Luther, Christians owed their loyalty to the throne (or the 
state) and subservience to the altar (or God and the Church). Thus for most Lutherans, their love 
                                                 
85 See Susannah Heschel, The Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008). Bergen, Doris L. Twisted Cross: the German Christian Movement in the Third 
Reich. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996.) Ed. Robert P. Ericksen and Susannah Heschel, 
Betrayal: German Churches and the Holocaust. (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1999.) 
86 Cultural revelation is an emphasis on understanding God’s design and purpose for life through culture instead of 
interpretation and close readings of the Bible. For a good description of this in relation to Nazism, see Samuel 
Koehne, “Were the National Socialists a Völkisch Party? Paganism, Christianity and the Nazi Christmas.” Central 
European History, 2014, 47 (04), pp. 760-790.  
87 Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Austria and Germany. (Harvard University Press, 1988.) See 
particularly Pulzer’s analysis of Austria and German theology and politics in chapters 6-9. 
88 This is not to exclude others such as members of the Prussian Union Churches. 
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of the Fatherland and loyalty to the state were honorable Christian virtues. Theologically, 
members of the Confessing Church tended to hold very orthodox views on biblical interpretation 
and doctrine.  
In the Weimar era, working class opposition to traditional elites from both Communists 
and Social Democrats as well as the Left’s emphasis on “free thinking,” pitted Lutheran national-
conservatives directly against the political Left.89 National-conservatives largely welcomed 
Hitler’s rise to power initially, often endorsing his anti-Semitism and anti-communism.90 Church 
leaders’ transition into the Nazi party largely mirrored that of their constituents, as middle-class 
and bourgeoise parties generally shifted away from national-conservative and liberal parties in 
favor of National Socialism and its platform.91  
The theological conflict between the two sides began in earnest with the rise of the Nazi 
backed Deutsche Christen in 1933. In part because Nazi leaders required party members to 
participate in run-off regional elections, and Hitler himself openly endorsed the Deutsche 
Christen in a national radio broadcast the night before, the elections saw Deutsche Christen 
candidates capture roughly two thirds of the vote. The result paved the way for an attempted 
creation of a Reichskirche, which sought to end the umbrella confederation of Germany’s 28 
                                                 
89 In terms of identity politics, this often meant that working class Lutheran families broke with official church 
political positions, which became a topic of considerable concern for church leadership in the 1950s. In addition, 
this also meant that national-conservative Lutherans fundamentally opposed a weak centralized state and divisive 
parliamentary politics. See Victoria Barnett, For the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest against Hitler. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992) 9-46. Also, See also Richard V Pierard, “The Lutheran Two Kingdoms 
Doctrine and Subservience to the State in Modern Germany,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 29, 2 
(June 1986): 193-203. 
90 See the first chapter in Matthew D. Hockenos, A Church Divided: German Protestants Confront the Nazi Past. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.) Manfred Gailus describes the Day of Potsdam (The day Hitler took 
control of the German Parliament, March 21nd 1933) ceremonies as an indiscriminate affirmative endorsement of 
Nazism by German Protestantism. See Manfred Gailus, ed., Täter und Komplizen in Theologie und Kirchen 1933-
1945. (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2015).  
91 As an example, See Julia Sneeringer, Winning Women’s Votes: Propaganda and Politics in Weimar Germany. 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 244-254. Sneeringer shows that Nazi appropriation of 
National-conservative and liberal family value positions proved quite effective at capturing women’s votes in the 
late 1930s.  
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regional churches and place them all within a single hierarchical national church. The 
controversial appointment of the previously unknown Deutsche Christen military-chaplain and 
longtime Nazi Party member (Ӓlte Kämpfer) Lüdwig Müller to the newly formed position of 
Reich Bishop, despite a previously annulled election of regional church leaders overwhelmingly 
selecting the respected Westphalian pastor Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, resulted in the 
significant controversy. In late 1933, Müller’s subsequent attempts to impose the “Aryan 
Paragraph,” which restricted membership in the church (and especially the pastorate) to Aryans, 
sparked the formation of the Pastor’s Emergency League which would eventually morph into the 
Confessing Church. The League openly opposed the Deutsche Christen’s policy, particularly 
rejecting the Aryan paragraph for its refusal to accept Jewish converts as pastors.92  
Thereafter, the primary conflict of the Kirchenkampf consisted of the two sides battling 
for control of church institutions, with the Nazi party occasionally siding with Deutsche Christen 
leaders until they began to fall out of favor in the late 1930s. 93 The Confessing Church’s rigid 
theologically conservative beliefs manifested in opposition to the Deutsche Christen’s attempts 
to redefine Christian theology and Nazi attempts to modify church institutional structures. 
Undoubtedly, the Confessing Church’s insistence on theological orthodoxy marked the biggest 
point of contention with the Deutsche Christen, as the 1934 Barmen Declaration clearly 
denoted.94 Still, most of the Confessing Church might best be described as “loyal opposition” 
during the Third Reich, as members only opposed certain aspects of Nazi State policy and the 
theological outlook of the Deutsche Christen, but never took any institutionalized united steps 
                                                 
92 Barnett, For the Soul of the People, 30-34. 
93 For a brief but fact focused interpretation of this struggle in English see the introduction of Kyle Jantzen, Faith 
and Fatherland: Parish Politics in Hitler’s Germany. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008.) 
94 See for example Chong-Hun Jeong’s analysis of the Barmen Declaration in Die deutsche evangelische Sozialethik 
und die Demokratie nach 1945. (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2013).  
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against the State.95      
On a secondary level, the Kirchenkampf consisted of a series of tensions between the 
Confessing Church and the Nazi state. The two sides mostly warred over church policy and the 
Nazi desire for denominational and institutional homogenization (Gleichschaltung) under state 
control. Some members of the Confessing Church were imprisoned or even killed for their 
opposition to National Socialism, but the degree of their resistance to Nazism varied 
significantly. Opposition tended to erupt most forcefully during Nazi interference with Church 
structures or so called “religious matters,” for example the Aryan Paragraph and its implications 
for the Christian ritual of baptism. As the war began in earnest in 1939, some Protestants took a 
more active stance against Nazi censorship, the T-4 euthanasia project and, in rare instances, the 
persecution of Jews (mostly on behalf of converted Christians).96 However, aside from a few 
exceptions (like the Protestant martyr Dietrich Bonhoeffer), the Confessing Church neither 
supported non-Christian Jews nor seriously challenged the validity of the Nazi state.97  
Confessing Church’s conduct during the Kirchenkampf garnered considerable postwar 
clout in the eyes of proponents of ecumenical Protestantism. Given its conclusive complicity 
with Nazism, the German Christian Movement became the ideal scapegoat during denazification 
and postwar posturing. It is worth noting however, that continued anti-Semitic ideals within 
German Protestantism facilitated the quick reintegration of Deutsche Christen into the EKD.98 In 
practical terms, this meant that ecumenical Protestants dealt almost entirely with members of the 
                                                 
95See Barnett, For the Soul of the People. Hockenos, A Church Divided.  
96 John Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches, 1933-1945 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968).  Barnett, For 
the Soul of the People.  
97 Wolfgang Gerlach. And the Witnesses Were Silent: The Confessing Church and the Persecution of the Jews. 
(University of Nebraska Press, 2000). Also, John Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches  
98 See Robert P. Ericksen and Susannah Heschel. Betrayal: German Churches and the Holocaust. (Minneapolis: 
Augsburg Fortress Press, 1999). Also, Doris Bergen, Twisted Cross. and Susannah Heschel, The Aryan Jesus. For an 
excellent recent edited collection of essays describing in detail Christian complicity with Nazism see Manfred 
Gailus, ed., Täter und Komplizen in Theologie und Kirchen 1933-1945. (Wallstein, 2015).   
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Confessing Church and publicly and privately endorsed their resistance. 
In the postwar period, the overwhelming majority of German theologians and pastors 
were unwilling to confront this harsh reality. They often deflected the issue of Christian inaction 
and anti-Semitism by denying it entirely or reminding the Allies of their own war crimes.99 
Numerous historical difficulties made this deflection even easier. Germany’s divided status, 
extreme poverty, persistence of postwar anti-Semitism and widespread ignorance and confusion 
about the inner workings of the Nazi government made it all too easy for German Protestants to 
avoid the issue. There were attempts to evaluate Christianity's attitudes toward Jews in postwar 
Germany, but most German Christians proved unwilling to consider the issue.100  
The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy facilitated this disengagement by making the point 
of emphasis not anti-Semitism or even the degree of resistance, but instead membership in the 
wider worldwide ecumenical Christian community. In this way, one’s historical conduct did not 
matter as much as one’s reputation as a bearer of traditional Christian morality. American 
Protestantism proselytized this message both to their own parishioners, government officials and 
the general American public consistently from the very onset of the Nazi rise to power, who in 
turned adopted the binary as a form of propaganda. The theological and intellectual stakes of 
both the 1930s and the Second World War similarly created the space necessary for the 
propagation of the Dichotomy in popular memory. 
                                                 
99 See Donald J. Dietrich, Christian Responses to the Holocaust: Moral and Ethical Issues. (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 2003.) and Matthew D. Hockenos, A Church Divided. 
100 The Protestant Kirchentag and Catholic Katholikentag were biennial events held in Germany which established 
an Arbeitsgemeinschaft (working committee) between Jews and Christians in 1961. However, their ideas (which 
included ending efforts to convert Jews) were not well received by German theologians. See Gabriele Kammerer, In 
die Haare, in die Arme: 40 Jahre Arbeitsgemeinschaft “Juden und Christen” beim Deutschen Evangelischen 
Kirchentag. (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2001.) Pg. 9 See also Eva Fleischner. Judaism in German 
Christian Theology since 1945: Christianity and Israel Considered in Terms of Mission. (Metuchen: Scarecrow 
Press, 1975.) 72-73. For Catholic discussions see introduction and first chapter of Hanspeter Heinz and Michael A. 
Signer Coming Together for the Sake of God: Contributions to Jewish-Christian Dialogue from Post-Holocaust 
Germany. (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2007.) For further evidence of German prejudice see Katherine 
Sonderegger, That Jesus Christ was Born a Jew: Karl Barth’s “Doctrine of Israel.” (Pennsylvania State University, 
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The Proliferation of The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy: Reinhold Niebuhr and 
American Religious Propaganda during the Second World War 
 
The spread of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in the United States came predominantly 
from two sources: The concern of church leaders over the nature of Nazism and American 
government propaganda describing the Nazis as anti-Christian. While its rise to widespread 
acceptance occurred predominantly during the Second World War and in the immediate postwar 
era, its origins lay in the debates of the decade before.  
 For American Protestants, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy brought both unity and 
disharmony. On one hand, whether progressive modernist, evangelical fundamentalist, 
denominational hardliner or mainline ecumenist,101 the Dichotomy brought a form of unity and 
shared purpose amongst the churches rarely seen in American History. All agreed, even if their 
solutions for combatting the enemy differed, that Nazism and communism were diametrically 
opposed to Christian beliefs. In the 1940s mainline Protestants (Baptists, Congregationalists, 
                                                 
101 American Protestantism from the 1920s on can broadly be broken into such categories, although significant 
differences also existed regionally and based on race. The four factions differed predominantly on their relationship 
to doctrinal and ritualistic interpretation. For instance, evangelical fundamentalists emphasized literal interpretations 
of the Bible and pietistic forms of worship. Progressive modernists roughly believed that God’s Kingdom could be 
realized on Earth via cultural transformation, and therefore tended to incorporate scientific theory and 
Enlightenment era teachings into their theology and activism far more so than other groups. Denominational 
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telling of how modernists and fundamentalists warred within mainline Protestant churches see Bradley J. Longfield, 
The Presbyterian Controversy: Fundamentalists, Modernists, and Moderates. (Oxford University Press, 1993). On 
evangelicals in America see D.G. Hart, That Old-Time Religion in Modern America. For racial segregation and a 
concise overview of American church history in the 20th century see the introduction in James F.  Findlay Jr. Church 
People in the Struggle: The National Council of Churches and the Black Freedom Movement, 1950-1970. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993.) Also, Robert S. Ellwood, The Fifties Spiritual Marketplace. Also, Mark Noll, 
God and Race in American Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.) 
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Disciples, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Methodists, and Presbyterians) continued to dominate the 
American religious scene as they essentially had since the country’s founding, though they often 
allied themselves with Catholics and Jews occasionally embracing a form of religious pluralism 
which would have been almost unheard of a few decades prior.102   
 The appeal of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy for Americans was, paradoxically, 
both its clearly defined political position and its undetermined nature. This gave the Dichotomy 
an unparalleled capacity to unite the disparate religious factions of the country while also 
allowing room for maneuverability.103 For American policy makers, it provided a means of 
uniting the country against Japanese militarism, Nazi barbarity and later Soviet communism.104 
For Protestant fundamentalists, it offered a chance by which they might combat spreading 
secularism and declining religiosity.105 For ecumenists, it was the cause needed to finally bring 
                                                 
102 See Kevin Schultz’s analysis of the origins of the National Council of Christians and Jews in Tri-Faith America 
Chapter 1.   
103 This is not to assume that religious forces became a single united block during World War II and the Cold War. I 
would agree with such scholars like Jonathan Herzog and Gerald Sittser who argue in fact the opposite occurred. 
Instead what I suggest that all religious leaders agreed with the parameters of the Dichotomy, even pacifists who 
condemned Hitler’s anti-Semitism but refused to take further action. Universal agreement on this point allowed for 
common ground and often the creation of effective policy on the basis of religious belief. For more on Christian 
disunity during the war see Gerald Sittser, A Cautious Patriotism.  
104 See Part II of Jonathan Herzog analysis of the Federal Government’s marshalling of religious forces against 
communism. He argues that Truman deliberately positioned American as a “Christian Nation” in letters to Pius XII 
hoping to gain the Vatican’s favor in an “Allied war against communism.” He similarly argued how Truman took 
the story of the Four Chaplains—which became religious lore when four American chaplains (2 protestants, a Jew 
and a Catholic) gave their life-vests to other soldiers, joined hands and went down with the torpedoed USS 
Dorchester in 1943—to argue for the need of religious cooperation and inter-faith harmony in the Cold War era. Or, 
how military leaders such as George Marshall and John Divine tried to use religious teaching to maintain moral and 
discipline in the military. See how attending religious services became mandatory for trainees at Fort Knox in 1947 
and attempts to convert new recruits to Christianity proved tremendously effective. The Spiritual Industrial 
Complex, 75-113.   
105 See for example Jonathan Herzog’s analysis of Arnold J. Toynbee’s tour of the United States in 1947, which 
claimed America and all of Western Civilization were on the verge of collapse due to “spiritual insolvency.” 
Herzog, The Spiritual Industrial Complex. 15-20. Herzog’s first chapter generally outlines that most Protestants 
believed strongly in the declension narrative of the 20th century (Herzog himself also puts much stock in this), and 
therefore were quite receptive to the idea of a need for spiritual renewal. To a degree though, such narratives are 
often limited in scope, most especially in America where Protestantism thrived on a motif of rebirth and national 
rejuvenation via faith. See for instance Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America 1877-
1920. (Harper Collins, 2009). Rebekka Habermas also argues quite convincingly that the narrative of secularization 
has been adopted uncritically by many scholars, and indeed anachronistically utilized terms such as profane and 
sacred without considering their meaning in a specific time and place. While her analysis tends predominantly to 
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together American and international Christians.106 For modernist theologians, it offered the 
potential to implement Christian values in statecraft and foreign negotiations.107 For Catholics 
and Jews, it presented a mechanism through which they might be included more broadly in 
concepts of the American nation.108 Finally, for the new pro-interventionists, it became the path 
forward through which Christians could combat the true evils of the world. Of course, 
individuals often believed and endorsed the Dichotomy for more than one reason, but 
nonetheless, the concepts basic effectiveness was its flexibility: it could be turned toward almost 
any political or theological argument provided one stayed within its confines.109 
 Several other external factors lent themselves to the spread of the concept. First, the 
natural impulse of individuals and nations faced with the imminent possibility of death is to 
ponder existential questions of meaning and value, and therefore a societal turn toward 
religiosity is hardly unexpected in wartime. Second, the mobilization and coordination required 
to fight a total war demanded a clear articulation of the enemy, which in turn meant individuals 
accepted binary choices and outcomes more readily than they might otherwise.110 Finally, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
19th Germany, her narrative about both contemporaries and historians believing and adopting secularization 
narratives uncritically warrants mentioning in early 20th century American also. See Rebekka Habermas, “Piety, 
Power and Powerlessness: Religion and Religious Groups in Germany, 1870-1945 in The Oxford Handbook of 
Modern Germany. (Online Publication 2012.)    
106 See ‘t Hooft’s use of the war to rally the cause of European Federalism in Fillippo Maria Giordano and Stefano 
Dell’Acqua eds.,“Die Welt war meine Gemeinde” Willem A. Visser ‘t Hooft.  
107 This point was particularly flexible, as many Christians saw this as an opportunity, not just modernists. This was 
true certainly from John Foster Dulles’s perspective, as well as the likes of Reinhold Niebuhr and Emerson Fosdick. 
See, Martin Erdmann, Building the Kingdom of God on Earth. 248-271. Also Heather Warren, Theologians of a 
New World Order.  
108 Kevin Schultz’s analysis of the Catholic-Protestant-Jewish Alliance during the Second World War suggests that 
the three groups presented and described America as the defenders of Judeo-Christian morality in the fight against 
Nazism. With war’s end, this would offer Catholics and Jews considerably more access into mainstream American 
culture and identity and somewhat unintentionally brought about the second disestablishment of the 1960s. See 
Schultz, Tri-Faith America, Chapter 1.  
109 See, for example, the way in which Civil Rights Activists like Martin Luther King made use of international 
ecumenical contacts and Christian identity in their petitions to end segregation and combat racism in the 1960s. See 
Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy. (Princeton University History, 
2011). Chapter 2 and 3.   
110 Jörg Echternkamp, “At War, Abroad and at Home: The Essential Features of German Society in the Second 
World War.” Found in Germany and the Second World War. Ed. Jörg EchternkampVolume IX/I. (Clarendon Press, 
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extreme destruction and loss of life felt during the Second World War raised the stakes 
significantly, as every nation desired an end to warfare.111  
 Reinhold Niebuhr, likely the most famous American Protestant theologian of the 20th 
century, articulated many of the major points of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy by 
prioritizing the threat of Nazi Germany as a fundamental threat to Western democracy and 
natural rights.112 The son of German immigrants raised in the often insular communities of 
Midwest German Protestantism (denominationally, the American branch of the Prussian-Union 
Church), Niebuhr rose to prominence as an ethicist, theologian, political commentator and 
professor at Union Theological Seminary. His influence extended well beyond the church and 
into newsrooms, academic halls and even cabinet meetings.113  
Defining Niebuhr’s contributions to the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy requires a 
cautious hand precisely because Niebuhr’s theology and ethics changed over time.114 Moreover, 
because of his penchant for both politics and dialectic theology, Niebuhr was, and still is, 
sometimes misrepresented by scholars, politicians and the like.115 Ultimately though, Niebuhr’s 
defense of liberal democracy from an ethical perspective proved effective precisely because it 
did not defend democracy solely from a religious perspective, but rather as a method for 
                                                                                                                                                             
2008.) 
111 See Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945. (Penguin Books, 2005). 121-124. 
112 Heather A. Warren, Theologians of a New World Order. See also David A. L. Hollinger, "The Realist–Pacifist 
Summit Meeting of March 1942. 
113 For an example of his political influence, see Daniel E. Rice, Reinhold Niebuhr and His Circle of Influence 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
114 For instance, Niebuhr hardly argued for a firm intervention against Nazism in the early to mid-1930s. Only when 
Hitler’s threat to the world became undeniable, did Niebuhr sound the call to arms, even though he is often closely 
identified as standing against both communism and Nazism. See Gary Dorrien’s introduction to Niebuhr’s The 
Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional 
Defense. (University of Chicago Press, 2011).   
115 See the many examples in Eyan J Naveh’s essay “Beyond Illusion and Despair: Niebuhr’s Liberal Legacy in a 
Divided American Culture,” in Reinhold Niebuhr Revisited: Engagements with an American Original. Ed. Daniel 
Rice (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2009).    
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restraining individual and group egotism.116 This idea, most clearly articulated in his 1943 
masterpiece The Children of Light and Darkness, contended that Nazism’s very existence proved 
traditional European liberalism blindly assumed rationalism could solve the ethical problems of 
human existence. As he put it, “Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man’s 
inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.”117  
Niebuhr’s contributions to the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy are therefore threefold. 
First, his defense of democracy from both a secular ethical position and Christian ethics 
enhanced his appeal and more generally provided a strong moral justification for war.118 Second, 
his condemnation of Nazism and communism119 as ideologies devoted to self-interest created a 
firmly divided Christian justice and love from totalitarianism.120 Finally, his direct participation 
in politics derived from his earlier support of Social Gospel121 activism created and reinforced an 
imperative for direct political action and involvement.  
Niebuhr’s debates with Protestant pacifists in the late 1930s and 1940s further bolstered 
his profile and the Dichotomy.122 By equating American democracy with Christian values and 
simultaneously demonizing Nazism as the antithesis of such values, Niebuhr reinforced the 
either-or framework of the Dichotomy. A series of essays Niebuhr published in 1940 under the 
                                                 
116 Dorrien in The Children of Light and Darkness, xx.  
117 Ibid. xx.  
118 This tradition is in fact still alive and well in contemporary America as seen in journals such as Providence 
Magazine.  
119 This deserves far more careful treatment then is articulated here. Niebuhr himself was a supporter of the Socialist 
party until 1939 (with the Ribbentrop Pact), and even after his departure remained a fierce critic of capitalist 
inequality.  
120 This interestingly dovetailed with German critiques of both communism and capitalism materialism in the 1950s. 
See, Maria Mitchell, “Materialism and Secularism. CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945-1949,” Journal of 
Modern History, 67, no. 2 (June 1995): 278-308.   
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122 Warren, Theologians of a New World Order.  
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title Christianity and Power Politics serves as a good example of the types of arguments Niebuhr 
utilized to bolster his position. Pacifism he remarked, “is unable to distinguish between the peace 
of capitulation to tyranny and the peace of the Kingdom of God,” because “modern liberal 
perfectionism…is unable to make significant distinctions between tyranny and freedom because 
it can find no democracy pure enough to deserve its devotion…”123 Here, Niebuhr’s insistence 
on supporting American democracy despite its shortfalls perhaps unintentionally helped support 
the Dichotomy by nullifying critical counter-arguments about American society and democracy.  
Take for example the famous dictum of African American boxer Joe Louis, "Lots of 
things wrong with America, but Hitler ain't going to fix them."124 Louis whose family migrated 
North during the First Great Migration to escape violence from the Ku Klux Klan, faced off in 
two high profile bouts against German Max Schmeling. Louis, undoubtedly a victim of 
American racism and discrimination, nonetheless expressed sentiments of the Dichotomy in a 
famous propaganda poster created in 1942 which read “Pvt. Joe Louis says, “We’re going to do 
our part…and we’ll win because God is on our side” (Figure 8).125 Louis’s sentiments reflected 
Niebuhr’s overall argument that whatever moral shortfalls American democracy might have, 
totalitarian ideologies were certainly not going to solve them.  
 
                                                 
123 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics. (New York: Archon Books, 1939). ixx. Also Michael Novak, 
“Why the Church is not Pacifist,” Crisis Magazine June 1, 1984. http://www.crisismagazine.com/1984/why-the-
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124 Ira Berknow. “Joe Louis was there Earlier.” The New York Times, April 22nd, 1997.  
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125 United States. Office of Facts and Figures. University of North Texas Digital Library 
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 Figure 8126 
 
Niebuhr’s direct intervention into political affairs during the war likewise upheld the 
Dichotomy in opposition to what he dismissed as wide-eyed moralism. His mobilization against 
Herbert Hoover’s Plan to feed the “neutral” nations of Europe under Nazi occupation proved 
effective and consequential in Washington circles. Niebuhr and his allies charged that any aid 
given to neutral European nations would either be requisitioned by the Nazis or allow Hitler to 
divert resources elsewhere. Therefore, any American humanitarian aid to Europe during the way 
would be morally complicit in aiding Nazi aggression.127 Thus despite disagreement and 
opposition, Niebuhr’s position of wartime protagonist eventually won out in most church and 
government circles.  
Wartime propaganda played a key role in establishing the Christian-Totalitarian-
                                                 
126 Digital Library University of North Texas,  https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc491/ last accessed 
1/1/2017 
127 See Andrew Preston, The Sword of the Spirit. 290-296. 
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Dichotomy in the psyche of Americans. This becomes quite apparent by examining just a few of 
the many propaganda posters created during the war by both individual churches and the 
American government (see figures 9 and 10). Created by the ad firm Kelly and Read and Co. for 
the “Think American” propaganda campaign in the early 1940s, Figure 9 depicts a giant black 
boot with a Nazi swastika stepping on a New-England steeple-church. Figure 10, issued from the 
Office of War Information in 1942, similarly shows a large hand with a dark jacket embroidered 




Figure 9128     Figure 10129 
Both documents clearly depict Nazism as a violent antagonistic force opposed to 
Christianity. Indeed, their respective captions “We’re Fighting to Prevent This,” and “This is the 
                                                 
128 Think America Institute, Kelly Read & Co. NARA Still Picture Branch(NWDNS-44-PA-2376) 
https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/powers_of_persuasion/warning/images_html/fighting_to_prevent.html last 
accessed 1/1/2017 
129 Digital Library University of Delaware 
http://archives.delaware.gov/100/other_stories/Defining_the_Enemy.shtml last accessed 1/1/2017 
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Enemy” clearly portray the war as a fight against Nazi oppression of Christianity. Government 
rhetoric surrounding such images also linked Nazi violence with anti-American ideas, especially 
in relation to freedom of worship in the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights (Figure 11). 
Issued by Norman Rockwell and the Office of War Information in 1943, Figure 11 shows a 
group of men and women, heads bowed in prayer. The image encourages viewers to “Save 
Freedom of Worship” through the purchase of war bonds. While the caption ostensibly applies to 
all forms of worship, particularly the subheading “Each According to the Dictates of His Own 
Conscience” overlaying the image, one man in clearly shown holding a bible and the young 
woman front and center likewise holds a rosary. Moreover, the absence of any clearly 
distinguishable Jews further associates “Freedom of Worship” with Christianity. The deliberate 
depiction of Nazism as anti-Christian and in opposition to Christian values reinforced American 
conceptions on the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in multiple ways. First, it reaffirmed the 
idea that America in had been founded on Christian values, thereby inferring that American 
democracy was synonymous with Christianity. Second, it portrayed Nazism as fundamentally 
incompatible with Christianity and by extension America. By positing that Nazism would 
disallow both American political values and Christian moral teachings, the dagger through the 
Bible represented a Nazi attack on both Christian principles and democratic liberties.   
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 Figure 11130  
 
The Kirchenkampf in America 
 
Protestants in America also drove the narrative of anti-Christian Nazism by politicizing 
the Kirchenkampf at home and abroad. Because of the substantial number of American 
Protestants with German ancestry and the relevance of German theologians for the early 20th 
century, many Americans had sympathy and personal connections with their colleagues in 
Germany. Through ecumenical contacts, Germans in exile in American during the war, 
American pastors living and working in Germany (the American Church in Berlin was a 
significant factor here) and organized resistance groups, American Protestants politicized the 
plight of the Confessing Church almost from the onset of its conflict with the Deutsche Christen. 
Although some American Protestants openly expressed sympathy toward Hitler, the narrative of 
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https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc152/ Last accessed 1/2/2017.  
W o l t e r i n g  | 53 
 
Nazi persecution of Christians began to win out after 1938, particularly when Kristallnacht, the 
publicized imprisonment of Martin Niemöller131 and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact convinced 
even sympathetic German-American Lutherans of the merits of the Dichotomy.132  
 Consider the way the New York Times began a report in 1935 covering a dispute 
between Minister of Church Affairs Hanns Kerrl and presiding bishop of the Confessing Church 
August Marahrens: As “Germany’s struggle between the totalitarian state and the Protestant 
Church took a dramatic turn when Hanns Kerrl…undertook to paralyze the opposition to his 
regime.”133 Or how executive secretary of the Universal Christian Council and  
foreign secretary of the FCCoC Henry Smith Leiper’s special report to the Chicago Tribune in 
December of 1934, called the “Christian church…the one real barrier able to stop the totalitarian 
idea of Hitler’s state.” Continuing he claimed, “The church has become the central point in the 
clash…Hitler’s aim has been to take the heart of German Christianity and substitute a Nazi 
heart.” Leiper continued noting “Throughout the world, thoughtful men now realize that the only 
basis of democratic government is the Christian ideal of life.” The report even quoted famous 
physicist Albert Einstein noting that “the puny, insignificant church is being found equal to the 
task while the powerful groups [in Germany] remained impotent.” 134 Leiper’s interesting use of 
the term “Christian church” instead of the Confessing Church implied that the Deutsche Christen 
were not actually Christians. The use of Einstein’s description of the church as “puny” and 
“insignificant” also refuted declension narratives of religious weakness and decline, undoubtedly 
                                                 
131 This is of particular importance and discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
132 See Gerhard Besier, “In Contradiction to the Grassroots, The Stance of the Federal Council of the Churches of 
Christ towards the “Third Reich.” Found in Gerhard Besier, Religion, State and Society in the Transformations of 
the Twentieth Century: Modernization, Innovation and Decline. (Berlin: Lit, 2008). Particularly page 141. Also, 
Gerhard Besier, “The friends…in America need to know the truth…” The German Churches in the Opinion of the 
“United States (1933-1941). Found in Religion, State and Society, 105. 
133 Wireless to THE NEW, YORK TIMES. (1935, Dec 03). NAZIS TO REPRESS PROTESTANT FOES. New 
York Times (1923-Current File) 
134 Evans, J. (1934, Dec 11). CHURCH CALLED THE ONE BARRIER TO STOP HITLER. Chicago Daily 
Tribune (1923-1963)  
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designed to inspire believers.       
 Even before the creation of the Pastors’ Emergency League (the predecessor of the 
Confessing Church) in 1934,135 American papers were describing German churches as resisting 
and impeding Nazi rule. They described Friedrich von Bodenschwingh’s victory in church 
elections in 1933 as a “hero,” and likewise conflated the meaning of the election to signify 
widespread complete opposition toward Nazism by German Protestantism.136  
Other reports denoted the extreme measures of “de-Christianization” taken by the Nazi 
State. In a four-part special report published in The Washington Post in 1937, Ewart Edward 
Turner, longtime personal friend of Martin Niemöller and pastor of the American Church in 
Berlin from 1930-1934, claimed the Nazis sought to replace Christianity with a new religion of 
“Blood and Soil.”137 He likewise described an extremely tense situation in the Catholic Church 
leading up to the Anschluss vote, claiming the Nazis held the Austrian Catholic Church in 
“Captivity.” 138  
A 1938 survey conducted by showed that while 94% of Americans disapproved of the 
Nazi Treatment of Jews, 97% disapproved of their treatment of Catholics. In 1940, to emphasize 
the oppression and suffering experienced at Nazi hands by Christians in Europe, Time published 
a special issue devoted specifically to giving voice to Christian suffering in Europe.139 A separate 
article emphasizing German Protestant martyrdom made the almost certainly erroneous claim 
that more than 80% of concentration camp inmates were Christian rather than Jewish.140 While 
                                                 
135 The Confessing Church itself did not form until May of 1934. See Barnett, For the Soul of the People. 34-38. 
136 By The, A. P. (1933, May 28). PROTESTANTS BAR NAZI CHURCH RULE; ELECT OWN LEADER. New 
York Times (1923-Current File). See also, Wireless to THE NEW, YORK TIMES. (1933, May 25). DICTATION 
OF NAZIS SPURNED BY CHURCH. New York Times (1923-Current File) 
137 By Ewart Edward Turner Special Correspondence of, The Post. (1937, Sep 27). Cross and swastika. The 
Washington Post (1923-1954)  
138 By, E. E. (1938, Sep 22). Churches in captivity. The Washington Post (1923-1954) 
139 See Preston, Sword of the Spirit. 329.  
140 "German Martyrs." Time 36, no. 26 (December 23, 1940): 44.  
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the statistic perhaps might not be as inaccurate as one might suspect at first glance, given that in 
1940 when the article was published Jewish extermination camps in Eastern Europe had not yet 
become active, the article nonetheless implies that the basis for the confinement of the majority 
of Nazis prisoners was their Christian faith, a claim most certainly incorrect. Such evidence 
demonstrates the effectiveness of the narrative told by church leaders. While these articles may 
also be interpreted as demonstrating American indifference toward Jews, the media and 
government narrative of the Second World War emphasized Christian oppression.    
All of these articles share five things in common. First, they conflated Protestant 
opposition to Nazi church policy with political opposition to Nazism, one of the central myths of 
resistance narratives.141 Second, they described Nazism and Christianity as fundamentally 
incompatible. Nazi encroachments upon church sovereignty were but logical manifestations of 
the “State which tried to supersede God.”142 Third, they evaluated the power of the Nazi State as 
omnipotent and omnipresent, quite similar to Hannah Arendt’s definition of the totalitarian state. 
Fourth, they all posited that Christian resistance to Nazism in some way strengthened the faith of 
those involved for the betterment of Germany. Finally, they all implied that democratic choice 
and compromise were the only viable alternatives to the totalitarian state. In short, they 
reinforced the precise tenants of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. Subsequent US 
government wartime propaganda therefore simply made use of existing narratives already 
familiar to much of the American public.    
                                                 
141 See Hockenos, A Church Divided, 47-49. Hockenos also argues in the postwar period Hans Asmussen saw it as 
an imperative to convince foreign church leaders of widespread German resistance.   
142 This was a common critique of totalitarianism from the perspective of Christian thinkers. Even sophisticated 
engagements with the term attempted to define totalitarianism as such. For example, Paul Tillich’s understanding of 
totalitarianism stemmed from what he called a “spiritual and psychical disintegration of the masses such as may only 
rarely be observed in history,” of which social and economic concerns were but just symptoms. The problem, he 
argued, was that both the Left and the Right looked to the nation-state to solve the problems raised by globalization, 
industrialization and mass politics. See Paul Tillich, "THE TOTALITARIAN STATE AND THE CLAIMS OF THE 
CHURCH." Social Research 1, no. 4 (1934): 405-33. Quote on 409.  
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 Newspaper articles and propaganda posters were hardly the only way in which American 
Protestants exalted Christian resistance to the Nazi State. Individual Germans, especially those in 
exile in America, similarly argued that an “Other Germany” existed and strongly opposed 
Nazism. Prominent Protestant theologians such as Paul Tillich and the Swiss born Adolph Keller 
were among them. After the war, Tillich in fact specifically recommended to the Federal Council 
of Churches that Martin Niemöller be brought to America as soon as possible because “nobody 
could impress as strongly as he to the American public opinion with the facts about the struggle 
of the Confessing Church against Hitler” Continuing he said “…it is a general impression…that 
the daily press minimizes the significance of the opposition in Germany during the Nazi regime 
or suppresses such news entirely, in addition to his many publications on the subject.”143 
Marianne Jehle-Wildberger’s recent biography on Swiss ecumenist Adolf Keller (who spent 
most of his professional career in America) makes similar claims about Keller’s work as a liaison 
for the FCCoC to Deutsche Christen Reichsbischof Ludwig Müller in 1933. Keller would spend 
much of the rest of the war promoting the cause of the Confessing Church to both the FCCoC 
and the then-forming WCC.144   
 Still, widespread acceptance of the necessity of war, belief in democracy’s capacity to 
solve the underlying problems of industrialism and mass politics and the incompatibility of 
National Socialism and Christianity developed slowly amongst American Protestantism. Lars W. 
                                                 
143 Rather hypocritically, Tillich’s letter claimed the New York Times was especially “silent” on the issue, when I 
found over 1100 articles addressing the Kirchenkampf from 1933 to 1945 published in the Times alone, the 
overwhelming majority with headlines like this: By, E. L. (1933, Nov 26). GERMANY'S CHURCH STRUGGLE 
ECHOES THROUGH THE REICH: The Protest of 3,000 Clergy Against the Nazi Plans is the First Real Defiance 
That the Hitlerites Have Encountered. New York Times (1923-Current File) (search “German Church Struggle” in 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers selecting only the New York Times in the given time frame. Full Disclosure, not all 
items pertain to the Kirchenkampf, but well over 800 speak of Nazi attacks on Christianity and Christian opposition.) 
For original letter from Tillich see Letter from Tillich to Henry Smith Leiper January 14th, 1946. RG 18 Box 23 
Folder 2. PHSA  
144 Marianne Jehle-Wildberger, Adolf Keller (1873-1963): Ecumenist, World Citizen, Philanthropist. Translated by 
Mark Kyburz (Lutterworth Press, 2013).  
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Boe, a member of the three-person American National Lutheran Council, remained a vocal 
supporter of Hitler and openly sympathized with the Nazi State’s anti-democratic and collectivist 
impulses throughout the 1930s.145 Even detailed reports of Jewish and Catholic persecution did 
little to sway many American Protestants. Some like Sylvester C. Michelfelder, even expressed 
concerns that press coverage of Kristallnacht might be “…turning [many Americans] away from 
the German people. The persecution of the Jews has made martyrs out of the Jews. Personally I 
regret this very much. It will take many years for the German people to recapture some of the 
good feelings that existed just a few years ago.”146 Only through continued pressure, Nazi 
persecution of Christians (many of whom were Lutheran)147 and Niebuhr’s political mobilization 
toward support for war led to the eventual acceptance of the Dichotomy by most American 
Protestants.148    
 
 
Historians, The German Church Struggle and the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy 
 
The historiography of the Kirchenkampf has largely focused on the degree of Christian resistance 
to Nazism and National Socialism’s relationship to the Protestant Churches and Christianity 
more broadly. Debates tend to revolve around two central questions: First, to what degree did the 
churches collude and/or resist Nazism; and (if the answer to this question is very little) did this in 
some way constitute a moral failure on the part of the church?149 Second, and very much related, 
to what degree did the Nazi State persecute Christianity? A side debate of this second question, 
                                                 
145 Gerhard Besier, “In Contradiction to the Grassroots?” 129.  
146 Gerhard Besier, “The friends…in America need to know the truth…” 95. 
147 An Estimated 70-80% of Christian and Jewish Emigres from Germany were Lutheran. See Besier, “The 
friends…in America need to know the truth,” 93.    
148 Even Besier concludes that American Protestants did not take significant steps of opposition toward Nazi 
Germany until after 1940 in his analysis of Mainline Protestant pacifism and anti-Nazi rhetoric in the 1930s. See 
Beser, “In contradiction to the grassroots,” 141.  
149 For a good survey of such debates, see Beech, “Between Defiance and Compliance.” 
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raised most notably by Richard Steigmann-Gall’s The Holy Reich, asks whether Nazism itself 
was Christian, with the implication that if in fact it was a Christian movement, then Christianity 
would be far more culpable for Nazi crimes than historiography has typically suggested.150 
Building off of Manfred Gailus’s assertion that postwar historical inquiry has treated National 
Socialism and Christianity as two separate monolithic blocks, I suggest that all of these debates 
correlate to the formulation of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in one form or another.151 
Because postwar Christians in and outside of Germany advanced this view so powerfully in 
public memory, debates arising in opposition to this idea attacked its very premise, namely that 
to be a Christian did not preclude one from being a Nazi (totalitarian), and/or that Christianity 
could not provide any sort of effective defense against totalitarianism.152 Historical myths 
surrounding the Confessing Church all stem from the Dichotomy in one way or another, whether 
concerning resistance, complicity or persecution. The historiographical debates that follow 
largely mirror this conception in one way or another, adhering to the binary even if in moderated 
forms.  
                                                 
150See Richard Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.) 
151 Gailus explores this to some degree, including the limitations or possible use of hybrid definitions such as “semi-
Christian” in his essay ““Nationalsozialistische Christen” und “christliche Nationalsozialisten:” Anmerkungen zur 
Vielfalt synkretistischer Gläubigkeiten im “Dritten Reich,”” in in Nationalprotestantische Mentalitäten: Konturen, 
Entwicklungslinien und Umbrüche eines Weltbildes. Eds. Manfred Gailus and Hartmut Lehmann (Vandenhoeck and 
Ruprecht, 2005).   
152 This idea translates to Catholic historiography also. Rolf Hochhuth’s Play The Deputy, is a prominent example of 
how this debate emerges in relation to Christian anti-Semitism. The play fosters controversy over the Pope Pius 
XII’s relationship to the Holocaust by asserting the Vatican did little to nothing to protect or challenge Nazi anti-
Semitism or the Holocaust. In many ways, it implied that Catholicism and Catholics were responsible for the 
Holocaust, thereby throwing into turmoil myths of Christian Resistance. This of course is the subject of a major 
historiographical debate featuring numerous serious scholars. extremely critical authors see John Cornwell, Hitler’s 
Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII, (Penguin Books, 2008). Daniel Goldhagen, A Moral Reckoning: The Role of 
the Church in the Holocaust and Its Unfulfilled Duty of Repair. (Vintage, 2003). Other more moderate critics 
include Michael Phayer, Pius XII, The Holocaust and the Cold War. (Indiana University Press, 2007), and Susan 
Zuccotti, Under his Very Windows: The Vatican and the Holocaust in Italy (Yale University Press: 2002) and 
moderate supporters Mark Riebling Church of Spies: The Pope's Secret War Against Hitler. (Basic Books: 2016). 
For examples of scholars defending Pius XII’s actions see David G. Dalin, The Myth of Hitler’s Pope. (Regner 
History, 2005). Also, Gordon Thomas, The Pope’s Jews: The Vatican’s Secret Plan to Save Jews from the Nazis. 
(Thomas Dunne Books, 2012).  
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This is not to say that such historical inquiry lacks validity, quite the contrary. It has 
considerable value not only for understanding the inner workings of the Nazi State but also for 
contemplating ethical and political decisions in a post-Holocaust world, as many scholars have 
shown and continue to show. However, I do suggest that clearly identifying the binary, the 
reasons behind its historical construction and its points of origin, are necessary starting points in 
dissecting the intricacies of memory construction after the Second World War and producing 
knowledge that more closely resembles historical truth. From this perspective, one can 
understand why scholarship has tended to partition National Socialism off from Christianity as 
Gailus describes and why attempts to bring them together have been so polemical.153 Invariably, 
acknowledging Christians might have been Nazis or vice-versa inverts the Dichotomy. But 
likewise arguing that all Christians supported National Socialism, or that Nazism drew its 
ideological framework from Christianity neglects the very legitimate concerns raised 
overwhelmingly by Christians in the West during the Third Reich and immediately after.  
 Historiographical inquiry tends to take an either-or approach of analysis. Either Protestant 
resistance to Nazism was significant and noteworthy, or it was overwhelmingly limited and 
lacking in effect. Early narratives emphasized significant Protestant resistance in the face of an 
overwhelmingly powerful and oppressive Nazi state. 154 Revisionist scholars challenged these 
points on both fronts, arguing essentially the opposite.155 Neo-orthodox scholarship has 
                                                 
153 Gailus, “Nationalsozialistische Christen.” 223.  
154 Such interpretations formulated from the memoirs and narratives crafted by former Confessing Church members, 
but also from early historians like Gerhard Ritter and Wilhelm Niemöller, Martin’s Brother. Wilhelm controlled 
narratives by physically constructing archives. See Robert Ericksen’s essay “Wilhelm Niemöller and the 
Historiography of the Kirchenkampf,” in Nationalprotestantische Mentalitäten. This has also been detailed by many 
other historians. For a concise and well cited example in English see Matthew Hockenos, A Church Divided, 11-14. 
155 See an example Shelley Baranowski, "The 1933 German Protestant Church Elections: Machtpolitik or 
Accommodation?" Church History 49, no. 3 (1980): 298-315. See also Heschel and Ericksen, Betrayal. Also Doris 
Bergen, Twisted Cross. Related to denazification see also, Clemens Vollnhals, Evangelische Kirche und 
Entnazifizierung, 1945-1949: Die Last der nationalsozialistischen Vergangenheit. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1989). 
John Conway’s The Nazi Persecution of the Churches was really the first attempt at a nuanced engagement with 
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emphasized the importance of factionalism within the Confessing Church, often describing 
resistance amongst individual members or radical factions (such as the so called “Dahlemites” 
led by Martin Niemöller), but largely still making the same distinctions in regards to limited or 
successful resistance.156 Newer studies have shifted away from making broad generalizations 
about Protestant acclimation or resistance toward Nazism and taken a more regional and micro 
approach offering a more nuanced understanding of the Kirchenkampf.157   
The controversy over Richard Steigmann-Gall’s The Holy Reich best demonstrates the 
tendency to reduce the debate to the terms of the Dichotomy.158 Steigmann-Gall’s central thesis, 
“to revise our understanding of the Nazi movement as intrinsically anti-Christian,”159 speaks 
directly to this point. Certainly, this claim directly challenges one of the central components of 
the Dichotomy: the idea that Nazism was inherently anti-Christian.160 His analysis of Nazi 
religious rhetoric, rituals and church policy situated predominately in the 1920s and 1930s, leads 
him to conclude that for Nazi leaders “Nazism was not the result of a “Death of God”…but 
rather a radicalized and singularly horrific attempt to preserve God against secularized 
                                                                                                                                                             
Church conduct during the Third Reich upon which much of revisionist historiography built, and containing both 
revisionist and orthodox understandings of the Third Reich.     
156 Victoria Barnett, For the Soul of the People. Matthew Hockenos, A Church Divided. Certainly, those in relation 
to Dietrich Bonhoeffer argue the importance of religious faith in relation to resistance. Slingensiepen, Bonhoeffer. 
Eric Metaxas’s biography of Bonhoeffer is an extreme example of recent scholarship validating Christian resistance. 
See Eric Metaxas, Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy. (Thomas Nelson, 2011).    
157 Kyle Janzten. Faith and Fatherland. Stephan Linck, Neue Anfänge? Der Umgang der Evangelischen Kirche mit 
der NS-Vergangenheit und ihr Verhältnis zum Judentum. Die Landeskirchen in Nordelbien. Band 1: 1945-
1965 (Kiel: Lutherische Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013). Christoph Picker, Gabriele Stueber, Klaus Buemlein, and Frank-
Matthias Hofmann, eds., Protestanten ohne Protest: Die evangelische Kirche der Pfalz im Nationalsozialismus, 2 
Vols. (Speyer and Leipzig: Verlagshaus Speyer and Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2016).  
158 See Gall’s The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945. (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
and the myriad of responses (including a counter rebuttal from Steigmann-Gall) in the Journal of Contemporary 
History, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan., 2007). Also of note is Mark Edward Ruff’s, "The Nazis' Religionspolitik: An 
Assessment of Recent Literature." The Catholic Historical Review 92, no. 3 (2006): 252-67. And, Samuel Koehne’s 
"Reassessing "The Holy Reich": Leading Nazis' Views on Confession, Community and 'Jewish' 
Materialism." Journal of Contemporary History 48, no. 3 (2013): 423-45.  
159 Richard Steigmann-Gall, "Christianity and the Nazi Movement: A Response." Journal of Contemporary 
History 42, no. 2 (2007): 187.  
160 This is not as original as he presents it. One of the major thrusts of revisionist scholarship was this point 
precisely. 
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society.”161 He sees Nazi ‘Positive Christianity’ as emerging distinctly from the German 
Protestant nationalist traditions of the Kaiserreich.  
 Steigmann-Gall’s argument that Nazi ideological tenets had links to Christianity carries 
with it a certain degree of historical truth. He is also correct from an historical and institutional 
point of view that many Nazis were Christian, and many Christians were Nazis. One could say 
strictly from that perspective that the Nazis were Christian.162 However, the historian must also 
recognize that neither the Deutsche Christen movement nor ‘Positive Christianity’ resembled 
orthodox Western Christian belief in any significant way. While the central figure of Christ, the 
motif of rebirth and central religious texts are related, the interpretation is radically different in 
several important ways. Steigmann-Gall claims that the State’s attempts to centralize and seize 
institutional control over the Protestant church (Gleichschaultung) cannot be seen as intrinsically 
anti-Christian, and that in fact the decision to ‘coordinate’ the Protestant Church meant that 
Nazism saw Protestantism as something potentially worthy of inclusion. However, such 
inclusion required the Deutsche Christen theological viewpoint to prevail, because, as 
Steigmann-Gall himself states, National Socialism did not allow for an institutional loyalty 
beyond that of the State. Orthodox Lutheran Protestantism never accepted and could never 
accept this precept, let alone Catholicism or Christianity as a whole.163 Steigmann-Gall claims 
that because Positive Christianity emerged from Protestant cultural and liberal theological 
traditions in combination with völkisch theorizes, the basis of Nazi religious belief was 
                                                 
161 Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich. 12.  
162 One can examine both Church statistics and The Holy Reich to see that many Nazism did very little to dissuade 
membership in German Churches. In many instances, it seems in fact to have increased attendance and participation. 
See Doris Bergen, "Nazism and Christianity: Partners and Rivals? A Response to Richard Steigmann-Gall, The 
Holy Reich. Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945." Journal of Contemporary History 42, no. 1 (2007): 25-
33. 
163 The removal of the Old Testament from canonical Christian scripture and the insistence on the Aryan non-Jewish 
nature of Christ in and of itself justified Karl Barth’s charge that the Deutsche Christen worshipped a different God 
from the Confessing Church. See Barnett’s description of the foundations for the Pastors’ Emergency League in For 
the Soul of the People. 35,36. 53-60. 
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fundamentally Christian.164 But such an argument is only possible when one completely ignores 
the broader scope of both theological and religious history in Germany outside of the Third 
Reich and outside of Germany entirely. How many British, French, Italian or American 
Christians would accept such a definition?  
Steigmann-Gall’s desire to equate Christianity with the intellectual basis for National 
Socialism leads to his dismissal of Manfred Gailus’s critique that the Holy Reich fails to account 
for Christian resistance.165 He describes the eventual Christian rejection of Nazism as just “…one 
of the very many instances in the history of Christendom when Christians were at odds – or, 
more to the point, at war – with each other, regardless of the many exhortations to love and peace 
found in their shared religion.”166 This looks entirely past Gailus’s pertinent point about the 
nature of movements such as the White Rose or the importance of orthodox Christian belief in 
the July 20th plot, to say nothing of the theological debates over Nazi racial policy. These facts 
are crucial, because they show that even in Germany during the Third Reich, some actors 
challenged Nazi historical and institutional definitions of Christianity directly.167  
 This leads one to conclude that The Holy Reich’s actual goal is to topple the Christian-
                                                 
164 See Koehne, “Were the National Socialists a Völkisch Party?” 760-790. Koehne in particular argues that Positive 
Christianity did not have any real definable meaning and was just a way in which early Nazism attempted to 
incorporate Christian ideals into a unified völkisch movement. 
165 Manfred Gailus. "A Strange Obsession with Nazi Christianity: A Critical Comment on Richard Steigmann-Gall's 
The Holy Reich." Journal of Contemporary History 42, no. 1 (2007): 35-46. Pg. xx 
166 Steigmann-Gall, "Christianity and the Nazi Movement: A Response." 194.  
167 As an example, Steigmann-Gall argues that because members of the Confessing Church were anti-Semites, they 
therefore accepted the entirety of the Nazi racial interpretation. The Holy Reich,184-185. This completely disregards 
the very poignant controversy in the church over the implementation of the Aryan Paragraph to both church 
congregations and the pastorate. In fact, the point of many revisionist historians on this issue was that church 
resistance was only theological and not political, which in and of itself was a moral failure. Steigmann-Gall’s 
argument claims that the theological point of detraction was irrelevant because Confessing Church members were 
anti-Semitic. But this looks past the fundamental differences between the Deutsche Christen and the Confessing 
Church and, most importantly, the fact that Nazi racial values could not coincide with the Confessing Church and by 
extension traditional Christian beliefs. This was the entire purpose of the Barmen Declaration, which unsurprisingly 
Steigmann-Gall mentions only in passing (pg. 171). On this point Steigmann-Gall even admits that Hitler would 
never accept the position of “loyal opposition” which the Confessing Church attempted to hold. But he fails to 
mention that the entirety of their desire to hold this position is because of their belief in traditional biblical 
interpretation.    
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Totalitarian Dichotomy. Steigmann-Gall admits this, even if he does not refer to the Dichotomy 
as such. He claims: 
The insistence that Nazism was an anti-Christian movement has been one of the 
most enduring truisms of the past fifty years. It started as a preconception even 
before the movement gained power and only gained strength after the war. For 
Western societies intent on rebuilding themselves after the worst devastation in 
world history and facing a new atheistic "menace "it could be argued that 
preserving the truism was a political necessity. Exploring the possibility that 
many Nazis regarded themselves as Christian would have decisively undermined 
the myths of the Cold War and the regeneration of the German nation that the 
metaphor of the Stunde Null (zero hour) so precisely represented.168 
 
This passage stands out precisely because Steigmann-Gall articulates what is one of the central 
arguments of this dissertation, that preserving this “truism” facilitated German Protestantism’s 
transition into the Western World, and that American churchmen played an influential role in 
propagating this concept. However, in so doing, Steigmann-Gall creates a binary of his own, and 
fails to move beyond the parameters of the original conception. His binary description of Nazi 
leaders as Christian or non-Christian belies the complexity of the intellectual crisis of the 1930s 
and the varying ways in which both liberal and conservative theologians and intellectuals sought 
to solve it.169 Moreover, it obscures the very complexity of Nazi thought about religion, which as 
Samuel Koehne has shown, embraced völkisch ideas and blended them with various forms of 
Paganism, Occultism and Christianity. As Koehne put it, “A heterogeneous approach to religion 
problematizes the longer history of the Nazi movement.”170 The framework of the Holy Reich 
does just this, even as it tries to invert historiographical categories. Steigmann-Gall’s text does 
historiography a service by pointing out the ways in which scholarship has internalized the 
message of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. However, as Mark Ruff put it “…he overstates 
                                                 
168 The Holy Reich, 266. Also quoted by Ruff, "The Nazis' Religionspolitik. 267.   
169 See the introduction of Robert Ericksen’s Theologians Under Hitler for an excellent summary of the theological 
stakes in the 1930s.  
170 Koehne, “Were the National Socialists a Völkisch Party,” 760.  
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the case when he argues that the Nazis' positive statements toward Christianity indicated a 
genuine belief in Christian teachings.”171 To that I would add that Steigmann-Gall’s 
determination to bring down the Dichotomy demonstrates his inability to distinguish where it 
fabricated historical truth and where it properly articulated a real threat to the faith.  
The Church Struggle for those invested in Christianity, both in the 1930s and today, 
represents the danger of failing to uphold the main tenants of the faith both theologically and 
politically.172 Despite the witting and unwitting tendency for exaggeration on the part of 
American churchmen in their magnification of both Christian resistance and Nazi-oppression, 
their underlying concerns over the direction of their faith were in effect justified and legitimate. 
The Dichotomy was only effective because it correctly interpreted that Nicaean Christian belief 
could not be reconciled with Nazi racial policy. Nor, from an American or British perspective, 
could National Socialism as a political ideology be reconciled with liberal democracy. Thus, the 
Dichotomy gained further strength by positing that liberal democracy was synonymous with 
Christianity.173 From this perspective, Manfred Gailus’s public request for individual regional 
German churches to continue to thoroughly investigate their own histories174 and his retort to 
Steigmann-Gall, 175 can be clearly understood. 
While The Holy Reich attempts to take this perspective into account by refuting both the 
                                                 
171 Ruff, "The Nazis' Religionspolitik. 267. 
172 Eric Metaxas’s biography of Bonhoeffer is but one example of how contemporary Christians have utilized the 
Kirchenkampf to argue for the necessity both of Christian morality and for upholding the “true” standards of the 
faith. Eric Metaxas, Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy. In fact, Metaxas articulates much of the Dichotomy in his more 
recent publication concerning the spiritual and ethical foundation of American liberty and government in If You Can 
Keep It: The Forgotten Promise of American Liberty. (Viking, 2016).   
173 This is quite clearly a debatable and separate argument one of which that has been taken up by Christians and 
historians alike. Part of the controversy in America as to whether the Founding Fathers were Christian likewise 
correlates to this debate.  
174Manfred Gailus, “Kreuze und Hakenkruze.” Der Tagesspiegel February 2, 2013. Last accessed 1/4/2017 
http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/kreuze-und-hakenkreuze/7722926.html  
175 Gailus. "A Strange Obsession with Nazi Christianity.” 
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“wolf in sheep’s clothing” arguments176 and interpretations that Nazi ‘Positive Christianity’ 
lacked canonical authenticity,177 his text inevitably descends into discarding the entirety of the 
Dichotomy. By arguing that self-professed Christians could not possibly create a “non-Christian” 
movement,178 Steigmann-Gall’s interpretation makes three key assumptions. First, that Nazism 
itself had a clear definition of Christianity. Second that this definition had the greatest value 
during the Third Reich simply because some Nazis in high ranking positions claimed to be 
Christians. Third, that their definition of Christianity was still principally “Christian” in its 
intellectual purity. All three claims are inaccurate.  
Many historians may understandably not wish to enter debates of religious purity. Such 
debates are often best left for theologians because they require one to take normative positions 
on historical debates and theology. I certainly have no intention of rigidly classifying Christian 
belief in this text. However, in this case the need to distinguish between Nazism and Christianity 
has significant bearing on the historical record for two reasons. First, Steigmann-Gall’s decision 
to withdraw from the inter-Nicene debate within the German Churches cedes all linguistic 
territory to Nazis themselves. Such a maneuver simply allows Nazis to claim an identity or 
utilize a method of classification without debate or discussion, thereby validating its assertions. 
Second, numerous scholars have challenged the coherency of Nazi Christian belief. The Nazi 
profession of Positive Christianity had limited, if any, meaning. Even Hitler and his closest 
associates could not sufficiently distinguish the term from non-Christian belief.179 Richard 
Weikart’s recent analysis of Hitler’s religious views went so far as to conclude that “evidence is 
                                                 
176 Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich, 5-8 
177 Ibid. He specifically places Doris Bergen in this camp.   
178 Ibid.  
179 See Koehne, “Reassessing “The Holy Reich.” 
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preponderant against Hitler embracing any form of Christianity for most of his adult life.”180 
Such scholarship highlights the need to examine Nazi classifications. 
Even presuming a lasting coherency in Steigmann-Gall’s interpretation of Positive 
Christianity, his argument still fails to hold up to scrutiny. Both Protestants and Catholics in 
Germany and abroad continually challenged the völkisch content of Positive Christianity, and 
moreover adherents failed to convince even most Nazis of its validity. Gary Dorrien’s analysis of 
Confessing Church theology shows that its members’ primary aim was to maintain the Church’s 
identity. Helmut Thielicke, a student of Karl Barth, remarked that “many Confessing Church 
leaders would have allowed themselves to be burned at the stake if Hitler had impugned the 
Augsburg Confessing or the Heidelberg Catechism. As it was, however, the Nazi bosses had no 
inkling that such venerable documents existed.”181 Nor did they have a need to impugn them 
even if they did. The Two-Kingdoms Doctrine prevented all but a few Confessing Church 
members from ever developing an active political-ethos of resistance.182  
Furthermore, German resistance against Nazism after the Reichstag Fire of 1933, 
consisted of almost exclusively devout Christians. If Steigmann-Gall’s interpretation of the 
intellectual links between Nazism and Christianity are accurate, he must explain why July 20th 
conspirators183 such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dr. Karl Goerdeler and Ulrich von Hassel mobilized 
                                                 
180 Richard Weikart, Hitler’s Religion: The Twisted Beliefs That Drove the Third Reich. (Regnery History, 2016). 
181 This was the entire theological justification of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in the first place. Steigmann-
Gall is either unfamiliar with this literature, does not understand its theological basis or completely dismisses it. I 
suspect the latter. However, given his clear desire to upturn the Dichotomy in its entirety, he likely interprets such 
literature in the same way in which he dismisses arguments about canonicity, despite the fact that his text 
conveniently disregards theological objects to ‘Positive Christianity.’ As Mark Lindsay, has rightly noted, it is 
essentially impossible to fully understand the political viewpoints of church leaders and theologians without having 
some conception of their theological worldview. This is where ‘Positive Christianity,’ even as Steigmann-Gall 
defines it, and almost every other form of Christianity in recorded history differ significantly. See for example, Gary 
Dorrien, The Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology: Theology Without Weapons. (Westminster John Knox Press, 
1999). 134.  For Lindsay and the importance of understanding the theological worldview of church leaders see, 
Mark Lindsay, Barth, Israel and Jesus: Karl Barth’s Theology of Israel. (Routeledge, 2007).   
182 See Hockenos, A Church Divided on the Two Kingdoms Doctrine. 23,27, 120-121.Also pages xx Chapter 5. 
183 The July 20th Plot, or Operation Valkyrie, took place on July 20th, 1944. Carried out by a large network of 
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in opposition because they believed the “…murder of unarmed civilians was an integral part of 
Germany’s dechristianization” (emphasis mine).184 Or why Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin called 
his own execution “the will of God.” Or still why Sophie Scholl, Willi Graf and Christoph Probst 
created the “White Rose” in pacifistic Christian resistance to National Socialism.185 While the 
complex motivations of these individuals must be understood as more than simply Christian 
resistance, to dismiss the religious framing of their opposition as simply part of an inter-Nicaean 
struggle presumes that both sides operated within an agreed upon foundation of Christianity from 
the onset. Just as scholars ought to be wary of aggrandizing resistance figures into demi-gods or 
individuals possessing unimpeachable moral fiber as the Dichotomy often tried to do, so too 
much they be cautious of dismissing the very palpable religious grounding upon which Christian 
resistance rested.186     
Finally, ‘Positive Christianity’ and traditional Christian belief contained vital qualitative 
distinctions. Steigmann-Gall claims that the State was essentially neutral in the Kirchenkampf 
aside from the fact that Hitler required centralization and coordination.187 But the very basis of 
                                                                                                                                                             
German military officers, clergy (mostly Catholic) and other dissenters, the plot involved detonating a briefcase 
bomb in Hitler’s infamous Wolf’s Lair Bunker after a series of previous attempts had failed or been aborted. Count 
Claus von Stauffenberg successfully smuggled and detonated the bomb in a briefing room, after which a planned 
coup occurred by other members of the conspiracy. Ultimately however, the bomb failed to kill Hitler, with most of 
the conspirators captured and then executed.    
184 See Danny Orbach, The Plots Against Hitler.  (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing, 2015) 273. 
185 See just an example, the leaflets secretly published and distributed by the White Rose in the appendices in Jud 
Newborn and Annette Dumbach, Sophie Scholl and the White Rose. (One world publications, 2006).    
186 Danny Orbach’s nuanced analysis of the July 20th Plot and other assassination attempts against Hitler represents 
an excellent attempt at doing just this. Orbach, himself a Jewish Israeli and third-generation Holocaust survivor, 
argues that while orthodox interpretations of resistance movements overlooked anti-Semitism, opportunism and self-
interest of its members, revisionist accounts often made such accusations based upon “skewed-evidence, distortions 
and misreadings of primary sources.” The tendency to elevate individuals to “Olympus” in one interpretation and 
“condemn them to the darkest hell” in another, is yet another example of the ways in which historiography has 
responded to the formulation of the Dichotomy in an either-or manner. See Orbach, Plots Against Hitler. Xi-xvii.    
187 Steigmann-Gall explicitly contradicts himself when he claims that “Hitler understood the BK [Confessing 
Church] per se to be the theological opponents of the DC [Deutsche Christen], not the political opponents of 
Nazism...,” but then goes on to claim that “the creation of a Reich ministry with the sole purpose of ending the 
Church Struggle cannot be taken as an anti-Christian act.” The Holy Reich, pg. 188. Because ‘coordination’ required 
either the theological victory of the Deutsche Christen or the marginalization of the Protestant Church in public life, 
this act can in fact only be seen as in opposition to the structure of the Protestant Church as they knew it.      
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this coordination required the subversion of orthodox Western Christian theology and could not 
tolerate anything less. Yes, many Nazis leaders (especially before 1938) attended church 
services, endorsed the rite of baptism and participated in outwardly Christian rituals.188 However, 
the Deutsche Christen conception of baptism, the only definition of baptism viable within the 
parameters of Positive Christianity,189 deviated significantly from traditional Christianity in its 
assertions of racial purity. As one Deutsche Christen pastor put it, “Baptism did not bring an 
infant into a church defined by a confession of faith…but expressed the community’s “belief in 
the law of blood and in the race” and the parents pledge to “raise this child in German discipline 
and customs and in positive Christianity.””190 Such belief obviously deviated from the standard 
value of Christian baptism. As Doris Bergen put it, the Deutsche Christen emphasized “race over 
grace.”191 Steigmann-Gall tries to distinguish between Positive Christianity and the Deutsche 
Christen, but even based on his own definition of Positive Christianity,192 this analysis falls 
short. Positive Christianity, in so far as the term has any meaning, was an attempt “to preserve 
God” in the Third Reich.193 But the God it preserved was a völkisch God, one which elevated 
characteristics of race beyond all other metrics. Western Christianity, even in early 20th Century 
Germany, did not do so.194   
The Confessing Church may have organized in greater opposition to the Nazi State 
                                                 
188 Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich, 231, 233.   
189 Doris Bergen argues the Nazi state relied upon the churches to enforce definitions of race by distinguishing 
between whether one’s grandparents had or had not been baptized. She also argues that the Deutsche Christen took 
pride in refusing Baptism to non-Aryan individuals because they defined the rite as entering the “people’s church.” 
See Bergen, Twisted Cross. 85-88.  
190 Bergen, Twisted Cross, 49. This statement also highlights the problems with partitioning the Positive Christianity 
of Nazis and the faith of the Deutsche Christen which Steigmann-Gall’s argument depends upon.  
191 Ibid, 88. 
192 He says “Positive Christianity was essentially a syncretic mix of the social and the economic tenants of 
confessional Lutheranism and the doctrine and eschatology of Liberal Protestantism. Liberal Protestantism is of 
particular importance in understanding the racial antisemitism the Nazis would perfect. It represented a Christian 
response to the theological challenges posed both by secular modernity and the perceived danger of the acculturated 
and assimilated Jews.” The Holy Reich, 262-263. 
193 Ibid, 261.  
194 See Koehne, “Reassessing The Holy Reich,” 432-437.   
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sooner if they had not erroneously believed that Hitler was blind to the tactics of the Deutsche 
Christen, and that the Nazi State would either force conformity on this point or marginalize the 
Protestant Church’s public profile.195 Instead, aside from a few individuals, members failed to 
recognize this reality and still naively believed that they could make Nazism work if only “…a 
peaceful relation to the state could have been reached.”196 However, just because the Confessing 
Church failed in this regard does not mean the values espoused by some Nazi leaders were 
representative of Christianity. The national-conservative milieu desired an authoritative 
government that reenergized conservative bourgeois social values, attacked the forces of 
“secularism” and “materialism,” and restored the Church’s “natural” position beside the State, 
but did not impose itself on the inner structure and theology of the church.197 Nazism met these 
conditions aside from the latter, where it diverged significantly in its efforts to define moral 
value solely through the basis of race.198  
In summation, Nazi views on Christianity and religion, just like Christian responses to 
Nazism, were complex historical phenomena which require the careful deconstruction of the 
historical record. Steigmann-Gall correctly claims that Nazi leaders drew religious lessons from 
the fringes of the German liberal Protestant theological tradition and that Kirchenkampf 
historiography often overstates Nazi oppression of Christians. He does historiography a service 
in pointing out that the relationship between Nazism and Christianity was often negotiated 
                                                 
195 Again, Steigmann-Gall’s own interpretation supports the latter point. Niemöller, Diem, Barth, Bonhoeffer and 
many others all claimed as much after the War, and there is little reason to discard their accounts as solely self-
exculpatory, at least in the case of those who gave their lives of ended up in Concentration Camps. See Barnett, For 
the Soul of the People. 239-309.   
196 Bishop Wurm would insist, even after 1945, that he would have “welcomed the Third Reich if …a peaceful 
relation to the state had been reached.” See Barnett, For the Soul of the People. Pg. 49 
197 See Maria Mitchell, “Materialism and Secularism.” 
198 There is a bountiful amount of literature on this subject, as well as numerous myths about this point. See for 
example Dagmar Herzog’s excellent analysis of attempts to define Nazism as solely anti-modern in Sex After 
Fascism. Also, Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wipperman, The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945. (Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
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through much of the early years of the Third Reich, as both Confessing Church leaders and the 
Deutsche Christen competed for favor. But claiming "Christianity…may be the source of some 
of the same darkness it abhors…”199 requires historical clarification.200 Christianity was 
responsible in many ways for both placing Hitler into office and supporting his regime.201 But 
claiming that National Socialism was somehow reflective of Christian belief and not inherently 
intolerant toward it is intellectually disingenuous. In this way, his argument mirrors those who 
blame the entirety of the Enlightenment for 20th century totalitarianism instead of recognizing 
that only some strands, and certainly not the dominant strands, might be used to justify these 
positions.202 Or, those who claim that because a many terrorists are Islamic, then the entirety of 
the faith is responsible.203 Reversing the binary of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy as The 
Holy Reich attempts to do, will not lead to a better understanding of the past. In fact, it will 
simply reinforce its power.  
Conclusion 
 
Richard Steigmann-Gall’s attempts to overthrow the construction of the Dichotomy over sixty 
                                                 
199 Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich, 267. See also, Ruff’s analysis in Mark Edward Ruff’s, "The Nazis' 
Religionspolitik: An Assessment of Recent Literature." 255.  
200 Doris Bergen put this best in her retort to Steigmann-Gall. When asked if the Nazis were Christian or if 
Christians were Nazis, she always answers with a “Qualified Yes.” Yes, in so far as in that historical moment many 
accepted the Nazi parameters of Christianity. But outside of that moment both historically and geographically, 
almost all would have answered absolutely not. This is the important distinction historians must make if they are to 
accurately represent Christianity’s relationship toward Nazism. See Bergen, "Nazism and Christianity: Partners and 
Rivals?” 
201 Gailus. Täter und Komplizen in Theologie und Kirchen. 
202 See Clifford Rosenberg’s analysis of Steven Kotkin’s Magnetic Mountain. Clifford Rosenberg, ‘Population 
Politics, Power and the Problem of Modernity in Stephen Kotkin’s Magnetic Mountain’, Contemporary European 
History, 23(2), 2014. pp. 193–207. 
203 See Mark Jurgensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God. (California University Press, 2003). Jurgensmeyer 
demonstrates that religion can essentially be used to serve almost any political cause if one has strong enough 
motivations. His analysis of current global and international Terrorism shows that any of the Abrahamic religions 
could be used as justifications for terrorism. He then also shows that any of the same religions could be used against 
those same movements. Jurgensmeyer argues convincingly that religion has revolutionary potential, but the content 
of that revolution is determined greatly by the interpretations of individuals based on a specific time and place. 
Steigmann-Gall’s professed desire to broaden the scope of what scholars consider Christian goes too far. He in 
effect broadens it so much so that the term no longer has any real meaning.    
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years after its formulation demonstrates the effectiveness of government propaganda and the 
narrative of the Kirchenkampf constructed in America. It is crucial to consider this context when 
examining the relative ease at which German Protestants would construct their own exculpatory 
narratives during the postwar period, thereby solidifying myths of Christian resistance. The 
crafting of the heroic Christian resisters of the Third Reich therefore easily influenced occupied 
Germany because millions of Americans were already familiar with their stories. 
 The brilliance of the Dichotomy narrative lay in its underlying truth. It was plain to 
almost all American Christians that Christ’s commands to “love thy neighbor as thyself” could 
not coexist with National Socialism. That this also clashed with democratic values was likewise 
apparent. Because Protestants could agree to these truths, proponents of war and moral 
intervention in Europe prevailed within American Protestant circles. The narrative of American-
Christian responsibility in international affairs would carry over into the postwar period and 
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Chapter 2: Controlling the Narrative: American Protestants and German 
Democratization 
 
As American military authorities prepared for a lengthy occupation of Germany at the end of 
World War II, a subdivision of the Cultural Affairs Division received a lengthy OSS intelligence 
report concerning the conduct of the German Churches during the Third Reich. This detailed 
report, sent to the newly formed Religious Affairs Office (RAO), stands out for its striking 
accuracy:  
...they [Protestant authorities] now glorified the state, not, to be sure, the weak 
authority of the [Weimar'] Republic, but the powerful national State which was to 
avenge the German defeat of 1918. This made the Protestant churches a fertile 
ground for Hitler's propaganda, and the Protestant churches carry a heavy 
responsibility for the National Socialist revolution of 1933...204 
 
The report recognized not only the large role the Protestant Churches played in the electoral 
success of the Nazi party, but also revealed a detailed understanding of the Kirchenkampf. It 
even demonstrated a firm understanding of the German Lutheran interpretation of the Two 
Kingdoms Doctrine, correctly interpreting German Protestant resistance to Nazism within this 
framework:  
It should be kept in mind that in Lutheran teaching the individual owes complete 
obedience to the political acts of his government. Even the outward organization 
of the church is a matter of no religious consequence, since the true Christian 
church is not identical with its secular appearance, but a mystic entity. Only in 
matters of repression and conscience, no compromise is allowed. Only passive 
resistance and martyrdom are admitted. None of the groups of the Protestant 
opposition in Germany ever departed from this line, though individual theologians 
like Karl Barth have taken different positions.205 
 
These observations stand out for their accuracy. At a minimum, this report shows that American 
authorities firmly grasped the conduct of the German churches under Nazism. They knew that 
                                                 
204 Undated OSS Report. Pg. 201. 5/369-2/5. Z45, BAK.  
205 Ibid, 204  
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the Confessing Church as a whole did not resist Nazism as a political ideology and even shared a 
great many sympathies with its political framework. It would take over forty years for 
scholarship to come to a similar consensus.206   
 Yet toward the end of occupation, Religious Affairs officials told a much different story. 
Consider for example the comments made by Dr. James Eagan, chief of the Religious Affairs 
Branch in Bavaria. In a broadcast for Radio München in 1948, Eagan stated that "All during the 
Nazi regime, the churches formed the only organized opposition to National Socialism. The 
clergy of various faiths were persecuted, and many died in concentration camps." Eagan 
continued, arguing that the virtues of the Christian Church had been attacked by the Nazis, 
"Tolerance was one of the Christian virtues which the Nazis tried to eliminate from the 
conscience of all Germans."207 These phrases hardly conjured the same image of the detailed 
OSS report, and represented, at best, an overemphasis of Christian resistance to Nazism. Indeed, 
in many respects church leaders' intolerance led them to embrace National Socialism. This shift 
in rhetoric can only be explained by considering the role of American church representatives 
who served as unofficial support staff to the Religious Affairs Office. Such representatives, 
many of whom had connections to the US State department, the World Council of Churches, the 
American Federal Council of Churches of Christ, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) or some 
combination therein, sought to influence Allied policy and bolster the stature of Protestantism 
through a combination of intelligence gathering, offers of material support and lobbying (both 
                                                 
206 See for example Mark Edward Ruff’s analysis of Protestant and Catholic historiography in, "Integrating Religion 
into the Historical Mainstream.” Ruff describes in considerable detail the conflict between Orthodox and Revisionist 
literature, especially that surrounding the limitations of Protestant resistance. It would take until the 1970s for 
publications to demonstrate the limited resistance of much of the Protestant Church, and even longer for an 
examination of underlying anti-Semitism within the Confessing Church. See also, Wolfgang Gerlach, And the 
Witnesses Were Silent. pg. i. In his preface, Gerlach describes the difficulties he had in publishing his 1970s 
dissertation which challenged the then positive narrative of the Confessing Church's role during the Holocaust, 
specifically regarding Anti-Semitism within the Confessing Church.  Indeed, the German edition of the book was 
not published until 1987. As he puts it: "The issues I examined were Taboo." 
207 Script for Broadcast over Radio Muenchen. June 29th, 1948. 5/340-3/29-37. Z45, BAK.  
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public and private). These representatives broadly sought to further the overall goal of their 
respective institutions: To construct a new international order based upon Christian principles.  
The representatives therefore, not only had to convince their German colleagues of the 
merit of their cause and enlist their aid, but also convince the Allies of the German Churches’ 
good standing. Doing so required proving International Protestantism’s argument that 
Christianity and totalitarianism were fundamentally incompatible. However, because the record 
of the Protestant churches, apart from a few standout individuals, could not substantiate this 
claim in any real way, representatives instead concocted a series of convoluted and often 
misleading arguments to explain away the rather “un-Christian” conduct of their new German 
comrades. This stance inevitably resulted in the promotion and exaggeration of the German 
Church’s struggle against Nazism and, somewhat paradoxically, simultaneously emphasized its 
contrition for its conduct during the Third Reich. Politically, American Protestant representatives 
in Germany often loosely endorsed the political platform of postwar German conservatism, 
validating narratives of German suffering (often at the expense of Jews), opposing the 
resettlement provisions of the Potsdam Conference, seriously challenging denazification policy 
and fiercely assailing communism.208  
I argue that during the Occupation, American church officials embarked on a consistent 
campaign to rehabilitate the image of the German churches in the eyes of both military 
authorities and the American and international public. Their mission stemmed almost entirely 
from their understandings of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy insofar as they believed it 
impossible to create a Christian world order without direct German involvement. However, 
because American Protestants saw democracy and Christianity as natural counterparts and 
                                                 
208 See Georg Iggers, “The Decline of the Classical National Tradition of German Historiography.” History and 
Theory, Vol. 6 (1967), 382-412.  
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German churchmen fundamentally did not, the two sides often differed on the structure of 
government best suited for this new world.   
The process of democratization in Germany, and most especially within the Protestant 
churches, therefore unfolded in a paradoxical and often contradictory manner. On one hand, 
international ecumenical Protestants’ support of the German churches bolstered their already 
privileged position, greatly enhancing their reputation and giving weight to their critiques of 
democratic values and Allied policy. Furthermore, this protection largely facilitated the Church’s 
retreat from narratives demanding German responsibility for Nazi crimes and shielded it from 
military and government authorities more skeptical of the conduct of German religious leaders. 
This protection largely prevented initiatives that might have structurally transformed the church 
and its thinking about democracy. On the other hand, ecumenical Protestants succeeded in 
binding the German churches to a rough outline for a new future that largely precluded overt 
displays of racism, militarism and nationalism. Over the course of occupation, this process 
confined German Protestant rhetoric within the broader confines of the Christian-Totalitarian 
Dichotomy. As the Cold War progressed, this would eventually facilitate an uneasy acceptance 
of democracy as a necessary concession to the fight against totalitarian values.  
 
Religious Affairs and the Prominence of the Church 
 
The Religious Affairs Office initially consisted only of 14 members, 8 professional officers 
operating at the Office headquarters and an additional 6 field officers. While the department did 
marginally increase in size in 1948 when the Office was elevated in status to that of a Branch, 
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Religious Affairs in Germany certainly seemed to occupy a rather small role in occupation.209 
However, the lack of staff did not portray a disregard of religion on the part of the Americans, 
but rather their commitment to the idea of the separation of church and state. This did not mean 
that Religious Affairs attempted to instill an American style separation of state and religion in 
Germany, but rather that they ardently believed that as both a foreign power and as state 
authorities they had no right to interfere with the churches. Eisenhower, Clay and Truman all 
agreed that the best course of action from an administrative perspective was to only ensure that 
freedom of worship was firmly established, and then to allow all internal developments, be that 
the relationship between church and state, ecclesiastical organization, education or theology, to 
be settled by the Germans themselves.210  
   Officially, the RAO was to assist in democratizing Germany. To accomplish this task, it 
set three guiding principles that would dictate the Allies’ policy toward the German churches 
throughout their tenure as occupying powers. First, "the guarantee of freedom of religion and 
respect for religious institutions," second, "minimizing the abuse of church privileges to promote 
subversive political activities," and third to ensure "the continuation of traditional German 
Government services to the churches, especially in the field of church finance and the support of 
denominationally controlled elementary schools."211 In short, the Americans sought to disrupt the 
German churches as little as possible, while safeguarding the freedom to worship and assuring 
                                                 
209 Frederik Spotts claims the entire office was thrown together only as a last-minute necessity so that military 
officials might have some official office through which they could deal with religious leaders and questions of 
religious life. See Frederic Spotts. The Churches and Politics in Germany. (Wesleyan University Press: 1973). 54. 
210 James Tent, Mission on the Rhine: "Reeducation" and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany. 
(University of Chicago Press, 1982). Also, General Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany Decision in Germany: A 
Personal Report on the Four Crucial Years That Set the Course of Future World History. (Double Day and Co, 
1950) 16. Harold Zink, The United States in Germany 1944-1955. (Princeton: Van Norstrand Company, 1957). Pg. 
320. Annemarie Smith-Von Osten, Von Treysa bis Eisenach zur Geschichte der Grundordnung der Evangelischen 
Kirche in Deutschland 1945-1948. (Göttingen, 1980). 19-25. 
211 OMGUS Internal Affairs and Communications Divisions Memorandum on the Background of Education and 
Religious Affairs Sections, particularly Religious Affairs to Marshall Knappen. 5/340-2/10, Z45, BAK. 
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that the churches were not to be used as a safe haven for Nazi ideology. In theory, such policy 
represented the separation of church and state Americans upheld as a principle of democracy. In 
practice, this meant almost complete autonomy for the German churches provided they did not 
incite revolt, which greatly undermined efforts to democratize the church.   
 This placed the German churches in a tremendously advantageous position, especially 
considering they were one of the only remaining institutions (perhaps the only across the entire 
country) to survive the collapse of the Third Reich intact. This would have tremendous bearing 
on the reconstruction of the church and German society since, as Martin Greschat put it, “In the 
beginning there was the Church—and no State.” This meant that occupation forces, international 
organizations (such as the Red Cross and the WCC) and the German people at large looked to 
the German churches as representatives of Germany. Personnel was so lacking that Allied 
officers asked both the Catholic Bishop Clemens August Graf von Galen and eventual head of 
the EKD Bishop Theophil Wurm to function as state administrators in early 1945.212 Because of 
this shortage, the churches, whether they desired this role or not, were often looked upon to serve 
as representatives of the German people as well as function as local administrators. Such 
circumstances thrust the position of the German churches into the limelight during occupation.213  
Furthermore, US officials granted clergy members considerable privileges, including 
issuing travel permits across the occupation zones (the Soviets were a bit sticky on this point), 
the right to publish pastoral letters for distribution (even those critical of occupation authorities), 
allowing almost the immediate resumption of church services--which were the only instances in 
which Germans were permitted to congregate in large groups without supervision214--the right to 
                                                 
212 Spotts, The Churches. 54. Both would refuse, citing their obligations to their respective churches. 
213 Martin Greschat, Protestanten in der Zeit: Kirche und Gesellschaft in Deutschland vom Kaiserreich bis zur 
Gegenwart. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Druckerei Gmbh, 1994).  
214 In fact, some military officers initially expressed concerns that the one place Germans could congregate in large 
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petition the Allies and the right to organize conferences.215 Furthermore, the Allies generally 
allowed the clergy to conduct their own internal denazification proceedings and punished Nazi 
sympathizers and supporters within the clergy quite leniently.216 Such favoritism can be 
explained partially by the inherent dilemma attached to the concept of freedom of religion.  
 American leaders believed freedom of religion constituted a major component of 
democracy and considered interfering with religious matters to be an abuse of state power and 
inherently undemocratic. Thus, they often believed that matters of "spirit" and "politics" could be 
firmly separated and compartmentalized.217 In practice however, the line was often difficult to 
trace. Did preaching that Jesus was not Jewish constitute a political or a religious stance? What 
of conversations discussing the relationship between church and state? Or those calling for the 
inclusion of German Protestants in former Prussia as part of a new Germany? What of church 
officials endorsing specific political candidates or policies? In the practical reality of occupied 
Germany, US officials tended to simply allow German church leaders to do as they pleased, 
provided they did not pose a direct threat to the public order or promote Nazism. In fact, from the 
very onset the Western Allies permitted the churches to criticize occupation policies, a privilege 
not usually extended to other members of the German population.218   
                                                                                                                                                             
numbers without supervision was in church, yet none of the clergy had yet been screened. See report from Lt. Col. 
R.W. Hartman on July 18th, 1945. POLA 737/3. Z45, BAK. Frederic Spotts argues the American military especially 
feared the use of religious services as a cloak for nationalistic activity, often completely erroneously. Spotts, The 
Churches, 47-88.  
215 There was some disagreement between the Allies and the Church’s position related to leveling criticism and 
petitions. Technically, the Churches were not allowed to level public criticism against the Nazis and were instead 
instructed to deliver private petitions. However in practice, things were often much more complicated, with 
exceptions granted and a complete disregard for such restrictions. Spotts, 78-79.  
216 Clemens Vollnhals, Evangelische Kirche und Entnazifizierung, 1945-1949: Die Last der nationalsozialistischen 
Vergangenheit .(Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1989). Tom Lawson. “Constructing a Christian Memory of Nazism: 
Anglicanism and the Memory of the Holocaust, 1945-149.” History and Memory. Vol. 16 No.1 (Spring/Summer 
2004). Pp. 146-176. Also for example, see Statement from the US government to EKD council concerning the law 
for the liberation from national socialism and militarism, in which the US Government stated that no matter how 
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 By allowing German Protestants such maneuverability, the American Religious Affairs 
Office had no real hope of instilling firm democratic principles within the church. Instead, they 
largely validated the moral authority of German Protestantism by granting preferential treatment. 
In this sense, the Allied privileging of the Church indicated that church leaders not only had a 
right to be heard, but also legitimized their function as societal moral authorities whose advice 
ought to be adhered to. Indeed, the many privileges of the churches guaranteed that they would 
be one of the few vibrant and vocal German institutions during occupation. Through this 
privileged access to the public sphere, the German churches crafted their own narrative of the 
War and Nazism. Consequently, German Protestants consistently emphasized their own 
resistance to Nazism as well as the state's overwhelming oppression of the churches and the 
average citizen. This 'victim' narrative was not unique to the church, and indeed has been well 
established by current scholarship, even if the role of American churchmen on the matter has 
been overlooked.219  
  The lenient treatment of the churches also meant that most German Protestants 
maintained many of their anti-democratic attitudes well into the founding of the Federal 
Republic. For them, the uneducated masses, sexual degeneration and unstable parliamentary rule 
led to the rise of Nazism. As such, democracy functioned as a gateway to totalitarianism, 
allowing demagogues and materialistic ideologies to sway the masses. If the Weimar state had 
properly maintained order and morality, they argued, the Nazis would not have been able to rise 
to power and disaster would have been averted. This narrative would gain almost unanimous 
acceptance amongst conservative Lutheran Protestants in postwar Germany.220 Their discourse 
not only matched the traditional conservative values of Protestant theology and politics, but also 
                                                 
219 See Robert Moeller, War Stories.  
220 See for example Matthew Hockenos’s analysis of conservative Lutherans in A Church Divided.  
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served to obscure the church's conduct under Hitler.221 The development of this argument is 
closely linked to that of International Protestantism and its representatives in Germany during 
occupation, who fully accepted and propagated definitions of totalitarianism virtually identical to 
German Protestants while not often accepting that democracy inherently functioned as a gateway 
for such political developments. Ultimately though, American leniency does not fully explain 
how and why the RAO embraced the narrative of Church leaders, especially since both press 
statements and their own reports continuously indicated that German Protestant leaders had 
serious misgivings about democracy.  
 Occupation church historiography tends to focus on ecumenical relations, institutional 
transformation and structural changes. Sean Brennan’s analysis of religious policy in the Soviet 
zone demonstrates how the Religious Affairs Office was unable to form any sort of four zone 
consensus on religious policy, stemming in part from German distrust of Soviet rhetoric on 
religious freedom and from the inability of Western and Soviet powers to agree on policy.222 
Steven Schroeder’s analysis of postwar religious organizations likewise articulates the Allied 
belief that Christianity would reinforce democratic principles,223 but notes that many leaders had 
difficulty embracing German religious leaders. Their eventual shift toward liaisons and church 
led NGO’s corresponded in part to contradictory Allied church policy and a desire on the part of 
Allied leadership to avoid ecclesiastical conflict.224 Early historiography from the 1970s and 
1980s emphasizes many of the same points echoed in this chapter, including the privileged 
position granted to churches, attempts to limit both church and occupation rhetoric to 
                                                 
221 Maria Mitchell, The Origins of Christian Democracy. Mitchell similarly argues that Catholic bishops posturing 
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Second World War. 
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ecclesiastics, the importance of early ecumenical contacts and internal political posturing on the 
part of Protestants.225 
 British churches also played a key role in both the process of re-Christianization and as 
proselytizers of democracy. Francis Dixon Graham argues the British government utilized the 
British churches to promote democracy, which in turn eventually resulted in a “moral mandate” 
within British occupation policy. This mandate espoused the principles of the Dichotomy almost 
precisely.226 Dixon concludes that both British and German churches were given “an 
increasingly free hand to spread their doctrines,” because authorities hoped they would provide 
“German refugees and expellees with a more spiritual focus.”227 Dixon also likewise notes that 
numerous British church members criticized British occupation policy for its poor treatment of 
German refugees and expellees.228  
My dissertation adds to existing studies by framing the encounter between American and 
German Protestants within the context of American foreign policy aims and the aims of 
American evangelical organizations. The formulation of Christian World Order and its rhetorical 
value rested upon proving the principles of the Dichotomy in Germany. Therefore, while I cover 
familiar territory such as the Protestant church’s relationship to questions of German guilt, 
denazification and the disconnect between the RA office and American representatives, this 
dissertation suggests there is much to gain by examining how such processes became enveloped 
                                                 
225 Frederick Spotts, The Churches. Also, Clemens Vollnhalls, Die evangelische Kirche nach dem Zusammenbruch: 
Berichte ausländischer Beobachter aus dem Jahre 1945. (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988). Armin Boyens, “Die 
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Nachkriegszeit, ed. Armin Boyens, (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979). 
226 Although the Dichotomy does not feature prominently in Dixon’s analysis, his sources nonetheless reproduce it. 
See the statement from Ivone Kirkpatrick (Head of the Political department in British occupation): “the promotion 
of Christianity in Germany should be regarded as a political aim since it is an obvious method of weaning the 
Germans away from Nazis and Communism.” Pg. 117. Also, British Foreign Office Adviser John Troutbeck’s 
comments in 1944, “A Christian revival is probably the only alternative to the ideal of national socialism…”  
227 Francis Graham-Dixon, The Allied Occupation of Germany: The Refugee Crisis, Denazification and the Path to 
Reconstruction. (London: I.B. Tauris and Co, 2013). Quotes on page 117 and 108.  
228 Francis Graham-Dixon. "A ‘Moral Mandate’ for Occupation: The British Churches and Voluntary Organizations 
in North-Western Germany, 1945–1949." German History 28, no. 2 (June 2010): 193-213. 
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within the broader confines of the Dichotomy.   
 
Protestant Anti-Democracy and Occupying Authorities 
  
Civilian churchmen became unofficial support staff for the RAO largely because of the 
American desire to strictly separate out issues they viewed as "religious" from those considered 
non-religious. An initial memorandum concerning the role of the Religious Affairs Office 
intended for an almost complete separation between American officials and German Church 
leaders. Officials were to initiate contact only through liaisons, and even then, were only 
supposed to facilitate basic administrative needs of the church or relay concerns or requests of 
the churches to governing authorities.229 To some degree this policy bore similarities to the no-
fraternization decrees of the early postwar period.230 Naturally in practice, this too proved 
impractical, and religious affairs did often directly deal with German church authorities.  
 The logic behind the Allied hands-off policy stemmed from earlier meetings with US 
religious leaders and the State War and Naval Coordinating Committee's advisory indicating the 
future of the church-state relationship in Germany would be best left for Germans themselves. 
American leadership seemed to believe that any sort of structural imposition by the Americans 
would be met with resistance by the Germans, and would be seen as an abuse of power by the 
                                                 
229 Beryl R. McClaskey, The History of U.S. Policy and Program in the Field of Religious Affairs Under the Office 
of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1951. Pg. 18-19, 23.  
230 See for example American attempts to limit contact between US soldiers stationed in Germany and German 
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the typical face of the adversary and not largely responsible for war-time activities. See Petra Goedde, GI’s and 
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French, British and Soviets, who each had different church-state structures.231 Some evidence 
also suggests that Allied command was motivated not solely by ideological tenets, but also by a 
desire to exploit the moral authority of the churches for their own benefit. One report concerning 
the churches advised that the "...general objectives of the German churches coincide with the 
interests of the occupying authorities in the US zone, it is probable that more efficient use can be 
made of the moral authority of the churches in promoting those interests." The report continued 
to warn however, that the churches would "...exert continuing resistance or find means of 
judicious circumvention..." 232 should their own agenda be challenged. Such pragmatic policy 
seems to be mostly retrospective, although it does explain to some degree why American 
authorities continued to insist on such a strong separation of church and state. By keeping the 
church relegated to the religious matters, Allied command could theoretically make use of their 
moral authority in promoting anti-Nazi ideology (Christianity), whilst also containing the 
church's influence. That the report also noted the church's main priorities were education and 
youth organization, two things also closely entwined within the apparatus of OMGUS, speaks to 
some degree of an Allied desire to compartmentalize religion.  
 Such firm separation hinged on the appointment of official liaisons from American 
churches, who were expected to engage with German church leaders more directly. The idea first 
came to mind after Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, President of the Federal Council of the Churches 
of Christ, suggested the matter after a tour of Germany in late 1945. Oxnam then held meetings 
                                                 
231 April 13th, 1945, Directive on German Church Affairs. State-War and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). 
105/D. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington DC, United States of America.  This 
decision likely spoke in large part to the connection between American and British churches, and indeed also the 
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232 undated restricted report on the German Churches, 44. AG45/2/4. Z45 BAK.  
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with General Clay and coordinated with Eisenhower and Truman to send a liaison representing 
American Protestants to Germany. Upon hearing his request, the war department recommended 
that each of the three major American religious denominations (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish) 
send representatives. 
 In his initial proposal to Truman, Oxnam stressed the anti-Nazi credentials of the EKD 
and the benefits of cooperation with the churches, while also simultaneously pointing out the 
inadequacies of the current logistical arrangement. He portrayed the EKD as a “gallant body of 
church leaders who resisted the tyranny of National Socialism,” and argued the German church, 
with its unique reach into all aspects of German society, could be a valuable ally “…in the 
building of spiritual bases upon which a free society can be reared…” Oxnam also insinuated 
that US military officers, unaccustomed to dealing with German church leadership, had hindered 
a powerful ally in efforts to democratize and denazify Germany. The current arrangement 
(church leaders reporting to a lieutenant colonel who then passed along reports) Oxnam argued, 
had resulted in a “fundamental misunderstanding” between Occupation forces and German 
church leadership. 233     
The State Department agreed with Oxnam’s reasoning, noting that direct contact between 
American and German church officials would assist reorientation efforts in Germany. General 
Clay quickly agreed to the plan, but also insisted that such representatives be paid for by their 
respective religious institutions rather than European Command, who would offer reasonable 
logistic support but not financial support. General Eisenhower also supported the idea, and 
Truman himself signed off on the decision in early 1946.234     
                                                 
233 See letter from Oxnam to Truman, Jan. 17th, 1946. RG 18, Box 21, Folder 7. PHSA. 
234 McClaskey, The History of US Policy and Program, 18-23. Protestants certainly took the initiative on this issue. 
See for example F.J. Mann noting that Protestants had made up the majority of visitors to Germany in 1945. All 
sources also seem to firmly credit Oxnam with idea and initiative. OMGUS Consular Affairs Branch, Letter from 
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 This decision would have longstanding effects on the German churches and German 
society at large. The representatives of each faith would greatly influence American and German 
rhetoric in the postwar era, which in turn influenced the course of the Cold War, gender roles, 
youth politics, denazification, and the incredible unprecedented American private aid campaign 
for Germany. Because church leaders had their own interpretation of Nazism and its causes and 
because Allied command allowed them considerable freedom and license to publish, tour and 
speak, they wielded considerable influence during postwar reconstruction. From the very onset, 
the RAO faced a significant challenge. Not only were the agendas of the church and Allied 
command bound to produce tension (most especially regarding the Soviets and communism in 
the early years), but also, given that RAO depended almost entirely upon the intelligence of 
church officials during occupation, the narrative of the church was almost certain to win out.  
Allied insistence on maintaining a strict separation of religious and non-religious issues 
also greatly limited possible choices. Overall, this meant that in many ways the reeducation of 
Germany was bound in some ways to encompass the agenda of the church, both in terms of 
moral categories and historical interpretation. One of the initial tasks of civilian church 
representatives was to tour the German churches and interview key leaders to better ascertain 
their circumstances and views. Their reports constituted the main sources of intelligence on 
record, and described the needs, conditions, views and aims of German religious leaders. That 
German pastors invariably demonstrated strong anti-democratic attitudes should come as no 
surprise to scholars of Modern Germany. For the Protestant Church, a predominantly 
conservative and hierarchical institution, this was especially true.  
 Somewhat like their ecumenical compatriots in the United States, German Protestants too 
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believed the future of the world, and most especially of Germany, depended upon building an 
active Christian presence in society. The RAO recorded that "According to virtually unanimous 
Protestant opinion, the political future of Germany will be determined by the fact that Germany 
will be the scene of the decisive engagement between the forces of Western Christian civilization 
and those of the materialistic Marxist philosophy in the East,"235 a worldview bearing significant 
similarities to Mainline American Protestantism's understanding of totalitarianism. Both German 
and American Protestants therefore agreed that Christianity needed to take a more active role in 
international affairs. Similarly, for both sides, the stakes were extraordinarily high. Failure meant 
at best a third world war, at worst the destruction of Western Civilization.  
However, the German Protestant worldview certainly differed from that of American 
Protestantism, especially in relation to democracy. Indeed, German Protestantism had a long 
history of opposing democratic governance prior to the Second World War. During the Weimar 
Republic, German Protestants overwhelmingly organized in opposition toward democratic 
governance for both theological and political reasons. The national-conservative German 
Protestant worldview might be best described as a mixture of Metternichian pessimism with 
Mazzinian messianic nationalism. Their pessimistic interpretation of human nature in 
conjunction with a strong belief in the divine authority of the nation conflated authoritarianism 
with moral order (Obrigkeit), conceptualized in what they referred to as the “Christian State.” 
This contrasted greatly with the vision of Weimar Republic and the creation of a Kulturstaat. 
Discrimination against Left liberal values and Catholicism would disappear in favor of a new 
pluralistic society.236 In stark contrast to their American compatriots, the end of the Kaiserreich 
and the creation of the Weimar Republic therefore marked a distinct shift away from Christian 
                                                 
235 Undated restricted report on the churches, 22. AG 45/2/4, Z45 BAK. 
236 See Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992). Pg. 141. Peukert argues that 
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principles.  
Theologically, Protestantism in Germany traditionally saw the monarchy as the desired 
medium for societal order. Stemming in part from the Lutheran Doctrine of Two Kingdoms 
which separated the spiritual from the temporal realm, German Protestants conceptualized the 
role of the state to be that of a divine order mandated by God. The proper Christian ruler was 
bound by God to uphold Christian morality and social order. The church in this constellation 
offered suggestions and warnings, but never compelled the state toward any direct action or 
policy. The central premise buttressing this arrangement was the omnipresence of sin; no matter 
what the church nor the ruler did, sin could not be erased from the world only contained. The 
church likewise encouraged the ruler’s subjects to offer loyalty and service in recognition of this 
reality. National-conservative Protestants, who by far made up the majority of Protestants 
leading up toward the Weimar Republic, connected revolutionary tendencies with the usurpation 
of God’s Will. If God’s grace sanctified the State via the monarchy they reasoned, then majority 
rule could never reflect God’s desired order. During the 19th century, Protestants would 
increasingly associate revolution and democratic aspirations as fundamentally selfish, arrogant 
and sinful because revolutionaries erroneously believed they could reform and better society 
without God through the secular state.237 Messianic nationalism also reinforced the alignment of 
“Throne and Altar.” Protestant preaching during the First World War consistently articulated the 
war as an expression of Germany’s mission in the world as defined by God.238 The 
internalization of the national mission led German Protestants to see their traditional state as a 
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desirable alternative to western democracy which they assumed made “egoism normative for 
statecraft.”239  
Politically, the Protestant alignment with the monarchy placed them in opposition to 
Social Democrats and Catholics throughout the 19th century. The rising communist party and its 
atheistic materialism and occasionally virulent anti-clericalism naturally also raised the ire of 
Protestants. They therefore often aligned almost entirely with bourgeois middle-class society as 
well as the landed aristocracy against radical reform. The very premise of the Republic therefore 
only gave more political power to the opponents of national-conservative Protestants.    
 The fall of the monarchy and German defeat at the end of 1918 therefore reverberated in 
crippling shockwaves for many Protestants. Most positioned themselves in complete opposition 
to the Weimar Republic, which they described as ultimately “religion-less” and an affront to 
moral authority. That the church itself undoubtedly lost credibility and prestige both for their 
unyielding support of the war and the Republic’s emphasis on secularism only compounded their 
concerns. Moreover, scientific rational criticism in conjunction with the loss of traditional 
structural authority challenged the very heart of Christian claims about the world. The substance 
of the war, rising and changing socio-economic conditions brought about by industrial capitalism 
accentuated traditional materialist and rationalist critiques of Christianity but also gave rise to 
new critiques related to the irrational.240 Protestants therefore entered the Weimar Republic in a 
state of unprecedented crisis. Without the royal family situated as the head of the regional and 
national churches, questions abounded as to what the proper role, value or even purpose of the 
Church was in the newly formed Weimar Republic. 
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The Weimar Republic therefore met with almost instant opposition from the German 
Protestant Church,241 though Protestants rarely moved toward against the Republic directly. 
Instead, the Church’s role during Weimar might be best understood through Otto Dibelius’s 
remark that “the church is politically neutral- but it votes German-national.”242 Because church 
leaders still tended to interpret their role in society as “neutral” in reference to the belief that the 
church ought not to occupy or articulate firm political positions, yet still could not avoid their 
overwhelming preference for a “Christian-State” which would once again renew the nation and 
provide proper temporal authority, the Protestant Church often moved toward a reluctant 
political activism that shied away from direct action on major political questions.243 Church 
leaders openly lamented the loss of the monarchy and territory in the East while perpetuating 
nationalist critiques and myths such as the Dolchstosslegende.244 Still others expressed serious 
concerns about declining church membership and continuing Christian education without the 
monarchy and Protestantism’s privileged position within it.245 While church leaders did not 
universally or consistently articulate these critiques with some even reluctantly moving toward 
begrudging acceptance in the mid-1920s,246 Protestants on the whole undoubtedly welcomed the 
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fall of the Republic in the 1930s and Hitler’s rise to power in 1933.247     
 Therefore, while both Americans and Germans tended to agree that the emergence of 
totalitarian "materialist" ideology largely stemmed from secularization and declension, German 
church leaders also tended to understand Nazism as a consequence of liberal values, in some 
instances even pinning blame on the French Revolution.248 In this respect Germans differed 
considerably from American Protestants. One pastor wishing to remain anonymous stated that 
democracy cannot take root in Germany because "it is a foreign ideology; because of Germany's 
experience with the weak Weimar Republic, democracy is associated in the German mind with 
unemployment and ineffective foreign policy."249 Hans Asmussen suggested that "...the whole 
world obviously does not think of the question, whether, maybe, even democracy is already 
affected by deadly bacilli, which first in Germany succeeded in bringing the organism of 
democracy into dissolution."250 Both of these quotes generally reflected Protestant attitudes on 
democracy. A clear majority of German Protestants considered parliamentary politics to be too 
fragmented, and therefore susceptible to manipulation. Lutheran church leaders often put 
considerable stock in hierarchy, owing in part to their understanding of the Two Kingdoms 
doctrine, and consequently considered democracy too weak and subject to the will of the 
uneducated masses.  
 Some German Protestants, especially those who joined the CDU, often saw the question 
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of political order as secondary to the more pressing issue of ideology. Democracy, they reasoned, 
might or might not overcome communism as a political form of government, but only 
Christianity could truly oppose Bolshevism at its core.251 This facilitated their alliance with 
German Catholics, who also believed that only a Christian democracy could overcome 
communism.252 With this view in mind, the churches often felt themselves ill-treated by the 
Western Allies, who in their minds ought to have treated them as kindred spirits, rather than 
enemies. Many pastors, having prayed for the defeat of their own nation (or at least so they 
claimed), felt they should have been offered some degree of partnership with the occupying 
forces to mold a new Germany, this despite the immense institutional freedom already granted 
by Allied forces.   
 Prominent American churchmen, undoubtedly aware of the anti-democratic proclivities 
of their German colleagues, often recommended to military officers that they might consult with 
"experts" on the German churches (i.e. themselves), so as not to "misunderstand" their position. 
To some degree their requests did have merit. It would have been unfair to ask military 
commanders to mediate the theological infighting of the EKD.253 Nonetheless, American pastors 
defended German church leaders unequivocally despite their often dubious comments toward 
democracy or questionable record of resistance against the Nazis despite the resistance of 
military officials.254255   
                                                 
251 See for example the American assessment of the German churches in restricted report on the German churches, 4.   
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W o l t e r i n g  | 92 
 
In fact, the American Committee to Aid Survivors of German Resistance, formed in 1947, 
specifically attempted to help members of the Confessing Church and their families after the 
war. The Committee, which included both Reinhold Niebuhr and Allen Dulles, brother of John 
Foster and eventual head of the CIA under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy,256 also 
described Christian resistance within the confines of the Dichotomy. A pamphlet entitled “Our 
Allies inside Germany” penned by Helmut Kuhn spoke glowingly of the role of Christianity in 
the July 20th conspiracy to assassinate Hitler. Kuhn wrote:  
Please tell all your friends and like-minded people in the United States that what 
they do to help the German people…is not done in vain. The black shadow so 
painfully cast over the last fifteen years of German history must be the intimation 
of a great hidden source of light. This light…we Germans of today must make 
visible once more. So we may contribute our share towards the illumination of the 
human family on earth in the spirt of Christ.257    
 
Kuhn’s plea corresponded with the general theme of rebirth through Christian values emphasized 
in The Six Pillars. In this way, postwar planning for peace emphasized the need of Christianity 
both in its previous struggle against Nazism and its potential for rebirth at war’s end. 
 Yet as tensions with the Soviet Union increased, the concerns of military leaders were 
pushed aside. In the minds of many American officials, the outlook of both American and 
German Protestantism lent itself quite easily to the Cold War.258 The Germans certainly still held 
fierce animosity towards the Soviets and communism. Take for example Hans Asmussen's 
comments in 1947: "It is impossible for a Christian...to wage war with Adolf Hitler to the death, 
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256 Although his time under Kennedy was brief and ended after the Bay of Pigs invasion in April of 1961. 
257 Pamphlet from Kuhn, undated (likely November 20th, 1946). American Committee to Aid Survivors of the 
German Resistance 1946-1948. Allen W. Dulles Papers; Public Policy Papers, Documents of Rare Books and 
Special Collections, Princeton University Library.  
258 For more on this relationship, see Jonathan Herzog, The Spiritual Industrial Complex. Also John Fousek’s 
analysis of “globalist-nationalism” in To Lead the Free World.  
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and to make peace with Stalin."259 American civilian church leaders certainly made the loudest 
and strongest arguments for their German colleagues by framing the Cold War as a spiritual 
battle upon which all of Western Civilization depended. Germans were only too quick to take 
what was offered. 
 
Stewart Herman and the World Council of Churches  
 
Just as American churchmen lobbied for permission to enter Germany at war's end, so too did the 
World Council of Churches. It too received permission to have a permanent liaison to the 
Protestant Churches in 1947, but had already sponsored several conferences and delegations 
prior, had numerous representatives in and out of Germany and had previously provided the 
Allies with intelligence and contacts during the War.  
 Likely the most influential American Protestant in occupied Germany was Stewart W. 
Herman. In many ways, Herman was unique. As the former pastor of the American Church in 
Berlin from 1936-1939, a Foreign Representative of the American Embassy in Germany from 
1939-1941 and a member of the OSS from 1943-1945, Herman had the distinct experience of a 
foreign pastor in Germany during the Third Reich. He would return to occupied Germany as a 
member of the World Council of Churches in the summer of 1945, and in 1946, became the head 
of the Division of Material Aid of the Department of Reconstruction and Inter-Church Aid for 
the WCC, guiding tours through occupied Germany and submitting official reports to Allied 
command. From the Allies’ perspective, Herman's experience with the German churches and his 
previous employment for the US State Department and the OSS made him an excellent liaison in 
                                                 
259 Publication from Asmussen, 12/19/47 in Marxist or Christian Internationale, News Bureau National Lutheran 
Council. OMGUS, 5/241-1/64-68. ZA 46 BAK. 
W o l t e r i n g  | 94 
 
Germany. 
 But Herman's familiarity with the churches also meant that he had personal stakes and 
biases. Indeed, Herman betrayed as much in August 1945 in a letter to Donald Heath at USCGG 
Berlin. Here, Herman admitted that the WCC was operating "in the conviction that the German 
churches constitute the only agency which has not succumbed, despite a Nazified minority of 
pastors and priests, to Hitler's blandishments and persecution." Herman also went as far as to say 
that German Protestantism needed no encouragement to root out all Nazi sympathizers, which he 
defined exclusively as the Deutsche Christen, stating "...very little outside pressure, if any, is 
needed to encourage the anti-Nazi churchmen to clean house. The process is virtually 
complete."260 Clearly from these statements Herman considered the Confessing Church to be a 
firm ally in the fight against Nazism. He also intimated, being an official representative of the 
WCC, that the entirety of the WCC supported his stance.  
 On this matter, Herman was certainly not unusual. His worldview and understanding of 
Nazi Germany largely mirrored that of ecumenical Protestantism. His 1943 publication It's Your 
Souls We Want, argued Christianity and Nazism were inherently incompatible, stating, "one of 
them must be destroyed if the other is to exist."261 By the 1940s, almost all of Mainline 
Protestantism believed "totalitarian" ideologies fundamentally threatened all of Christendom and 
Western culture. For Protestants such as Herman, only Christianity (implicitly Protestantism) had 
the spiritual capacity to resist the "materialistic" ideologies of communism and Nazism. I suggest 
that Herman, as an example of an American preacher with the ear of the State Department, 
noticeably influenced discourses addressing German "rehabilitation" by severely criticizing the 
Allied policies of German resettlement and denazification, misrepresenting the record of the 
                                                 
260 Letter from Herman to Donald Heath, August 13th, 1945. OMGUS, 737/1. ZA 46, BAK.  
261 Stewart Herman, It's Your Souls We Want. (Philadelphia: Meulenberg, 1943). xv.  
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Confessing Church and emphasizing a motif of German suffering. This rhetoric fostered an 
either-or political scenario in which Christian morality and totalitarian barbarity fought for the 
soul of Germany and set the terms in many ways for public discourse in the United States and 
Germany on Nazism, Communism and Christianity.  
Herman's 1946 publication The Rebirth of the German Church denotes a clear example of 
his attempt to glorify the Confessing Church at the expense of the Deutsche Christen. His first 
chapter outlined the Kirchenkampf in considerable detail, even offering a level of nuance in his 
discussion of the neutral faction. Still, Herman treated the "neutrals" quite generously, slightly 
rebuking them for being unwilling to speak out more boisterously, while also praising their 
"passive resistance" and their ability to "preserve the integrity of provincial church 
organizations."262 But unlike the OSS report, Herman failed to note that the Confessing Church’s 
principle basis for resistance was Nazi church policy, not its political platform. Herman also 
perpetuated the narrative that the Confessing Church from the very onset was in mortal peril and 
resisted Nazism at great personal cost.263 For instance, Herman highlighted Confessing Church 
opposition to the Aryan Paragraph in 1933 (which bared of ‘racial’ Jews from the pulpit) while 
failing to note that such opposition stemmed almost entirely from their theological interpretation 
of the law rather than a political opposition to discriminatory practice.264 
                                                 
262 Stewart Herman. The Rebirth of the German Church: Out of the Ruin and Rubble Rises a New Christian 
Germany. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946), 28-29.   
263 There is a long line of historiography on this, but in general Herman's narrative of the Kirchenkampf lines up 
quite well with that of Wilhelm Niemöller, the brother of Martin and leading church archivist and historian well into 
the 1970s. Niemöller has been shown to have at best have had "blind spot" toward Confessing Church anti-Semitism 
and passivity, and at worst to have deliberately misrepresented archival holdings and the historical record. See 
Ericksen, “Wilhelm Niemöller and the Historiography of the Kirchenkampf.” 
264 Church leaders such as Bonhoeffer and Niemöller argued the Aryan paragraph undermined the sacred rite of 
baptism, and thus fundamentally represented a usurpation of Church affairs by the state. Shelly Baranowski "The 
Confessing Church and anti-Semitism: Protestant Identity, German Nationhood and the Exclusion of Jews." Found 
in Betrayal, eds. Ericksen and Heschel. Barnowski makes a convincing argument that while Confessing Church 
members opposed what they saw as an undermining of Christian scripture through the persecution of racially Jewish 
parishioners and pastors by Nazi authorities, their own anti-Semitic prejudices prevented them from moving toward 
a more active opposition toward Jewish oppression and violence.  
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Through his critique of Allied occupation, Herman framed the situation in Germany as a 
simple binary, Christian or non-Christian. In this respect, anything purportedly seen as anti-
Christian was also by extension totalitarian, and vice-versa. This binary not only readily lent 
itself toward Cold War discourse, it also necessitated either-or zero sum political and historical 
solutions and interpretations. Under this structure, any suggestion that an individual could have 
both been Christian and a Nazi threatened the entire framework, and therefore could not have 
been accurate. Therefore, Herman needed to either make excuses for or explain away, the limited 
resistance of the 'neutral' churches. To do so he argued that they had resisted Nazism “in their 
own way”. Their “passive resistance” he reasoned, emerged because the neutral churches had not 
been "Christian" enough to stand witness. Herman’s argument rested upon biblical metaphors 
about moral and spiritual foundations.265  
 Overall, Herman's book portrayed conflicting messages which roughly corresponded to 
the views of German and International Protestantism. While Herman's efforts to claim victim 
status for Germans aligned precisely with his understanding of the Kirchenkampf and his 
interpretation of totalitarianism, his simultaneous pleas to both honor and respect the members of 
the Confessing Church while emphasizing present misdeeds over past atrocities showed a 
selective prioritization of historical memory. This worldview explains Herman’s analysis of the 
Potsdam Conference. For him, the sanctioned population transfer of Germans undermined both 
the credibility of the Allies and the credibility of Christianity. Given the narrative of both the 
American churches and the German churches allowed for only two possible political outcomes, 
from Herman's perspective any action on the part of the Allies that betrayed his understanding of 
Christianity by extension gave credence to the totalitarian enemy. But Herman's harsh rebuke of 
                                                 
265 See for example the classic biblical parable found in the book of Matthew, 7:24-27 in which Jesus emphasizes the 
importance of a strong spiritual foundation using a parable of building one’s home on either rock or sand.   
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German resettlement sanctioned by Potsdam also exposed his close intellectual affinity to the 
members of the German church. His rhetoric, especially his support of Bishop Wurm’s rebuttal 
to the Archbishop of Canterbury’s criticism of German guilt,266 matched that of the German 
churches almost verbatim.   
The hypocrisy of US policy designed to uphold basic principles of moral and legal justice 
that ignored the crimes of its Allies undermined both the credibility of the Allies, as perceived 
representatives of the Christian West, and by extension weakened the credibility of democracy 
and Christianity. This line of thinking explains in large part why German Protestants and their 
sympathizers found a receptive audience amongst US religious leaders. These sorts of critiques 
would prove effective at engendering a response from the average mainline Protestant 
parishioner,267 and especially effective at convincing high-ranking Protestant officials to question 
the moral validity and proceedings of denazification and war crimes trials.    
 
The Paradox of Guilt: Ecumenical Protestants and The Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt 
 
The most telling example of Herman's effort to shape the public image of the German Churches 
                                                 
266 In a famous address to the arrival of a German delegation to the British Council of Churches, November 28th, 
1945, the Archbishop rebukes Germany and German Christians for pinning all of their hopes to one man and 
bringing destruction to the world. He also in many respects offers Brotherhood and unity to the Germans, provided 
they turn toward the "old faith again," and embrace Christ. Bishop Wurm, in response to this address, condemns the 
British and the allies for the crimes they have committed against the German people, particularly addressing 
denazification. Herman, for his part, supports Bishop Wurm and the German churches arguing that the archbishop's 
declaration was both unexpected and placed the German church's in a difficult position of both having to make 
public declarations and speak for an entire people of which there was no official representative. He also sharply 
critiques the British Press for picking apart and strongly condemning Wurm's response, arguing that such conduct 
smacked of victor's justice and ignored the fact that Bishop Wurm and so many other Confessing Church members 
had bravely and selflessly prayed for the defeat of their own nation. See The Rebirth of the German Church, 79-82, 
126-127. Herman also republished both the Archbishop's broadcast and Wurm's response in full on pages, 273-279. 
Matthew Hockenos has also argued how Wurm's response typified the response of German Protestant's after the 
war, epitomizing their tendency to play the Victim, their disregard for Nazi atrocities and public disdain toward 
accusations for Nazi conduct and the Holocaust. Furthermore, Hockenos has an excellent review of letters by 
ordinary German's thanking the Bishop standing up to the Allies. See Hockenos, A Church Divided.  
267 This was especially true regarding American concern for German refugees. See Chapter 4.  
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came from his analysis of the EKD’s famous Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt (Stuttgarter 
Schuldbekenntnis), which, as its name suggests, broadly and vaguely acknowledged communal 
responsibility for Nazism. The Declaration, issued in October of 1945, emerged out of 
Ecumenical Allies’ desire to reestablish connections with the German churches despite concerns 
over the political and theological ramifications of doing so. The previously-mentioned Willem 
Visser 't Hooft, a Dutch theologian and general secretary of the WCC,268 had been preparing for 
such a statement long before the end of the War and began pitching the idea to several German 
Church leaders almost immediately after the War ended. In fact, this seems to be Stewart 
Herman’s primary function in Germany in 1945 for the WCC, to reestablish contacts and pave 
the way for an ecumenical delegation from the WCC to enter Germany. Herman delivered a 
series of letters from ‘t Hooft to leading German church leaders regarding the idea of some sort 
of declaration of guilt. ‘T Hooft first pitched the idea to Bishop Otto Dibelius, who had already 
discussed the idea informally with Hans Asmussen, Karl Barth and Martin Niemöller.269  
Upon arriving from Switzerland, Visser 't Hooft, Swiss Church President Alphons 
Koechlin and leading members of the FCC Samuel Calvert and Sylvester Michelfelder (who 
officially represented the Lutheran World Council) received military escort from Colonel Sturm 
and lodged with General Koenig in Baden-Baden. The delegation then discussed with the 
General the need to restore relations with the German churches. The group concluded that for 
foreign churches to attain "full confidence" in the German churches, the delegation would need 
some sort of announcement speaking to the crimes committed by their nation. The delegation 
and the General also agreed that such a declaration must not be forced so as to undermine all 
credibility. Thus, the delegation decided that first the WCC must meet with leaders of the 
                                                 
268 See Prologue 
269 Karl Herbert. Kirche zwischen Aufbruch und Tradition. Entscheidungsjahre 1945. (Stuttgart: Radius-Verlag, 
1989). 60-62. 
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German Church to re-establish "fraternal relationships" before requesting the declaration.270 The 
delegation was particularly concerned that without reestablishing some form of unity with 
Germany the entire ecumenical movement would lose traction and falter, as it had, from their 
perspective, after the First World War.271   
 The leadership of the EKD, eager for contact and assistance from abroad, agreed to write 
the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt despite misgivings about the ways in which the document 
might be used for political purposes. They especially feared the document being a sort of 
"second Versailles," in which the church, and by extension Germany, was made to take blame 
for the entirety of the war. To be sure, some members of the EKD likely welcomed the 
opportunity to make such a declaration, especially Martin Niemöller, but many were leery. 
Nonetheless, the EKD found themselves in a rather difficult position. Desperate for material aid 
and international support, leadership had little choice but to acquiesce to the delegation’s request. 
Dr. Koechlin brought requests from Karl Barth for a unified statement from the churches so that 
he could in turn rehabilitate the image of Germany abroad.   
 Nonetheless, drafting the statement proved quite difficult for a newly formed EKD beset 
with internal rivalries and theological disputes. Members disagreed over whether the document 
need mention German atrocities in the East and argued over the proper theological form a public 
declaration of wrongdoing might take. Lutheran members especially worried that any sort of 
condemnation or fierce critique of the State or reassertion of the Barmen Declaration would be 
                                                 
270Report from Visser 't Hooft on his trip through Germany, October 23th, 1945, page 2. OMGUS 5/344-2/6, ZA 46, 
BAK.  
271 Calvert argued as much in a statement by the FCC concerning its relationship to the WCC, stating that “…after 
the First World War the question of “war guilt” bedeviled ecumenical relations for the better part of a decade… See 
“The Prospect for the World Council” from Sam Calvert, January 1946. Pg. 3. World Council of Churches (WCC)-1 
Geneva. Box 42.0027. Microform No 493. Also, Martin Greschat, Der Protestantismus in der Bundesrepublik. Pg. 
16-18.  
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seen as an affirmative support for Barthian Reformed Calvinism.272 Because many Confessing 
Church Lutherans felt the 1934 Statement was principally a product of Reformed theologian Karl 
Barth, in the postwar period they feared upholding the document would signify a theological 
shift away from Lutheranism and toward Reformed Calvinism, despite their earlier endorsement 
for the purposes of unity during the Kirchenkampf and the theological struggle against the 
Deutsche Christen.   
Thus, the Stuttgart Declaration spoke only of the Church's failings and made no mention 
of Jews or the Holocaust. The document’s most important lines, such as “…we know ourselves 
to be with our people in a great community of suffering, but also a great solidarity of guilt,” 
foreground any conversation about German responsibility in a sense of shared suffering. 
Moreover, while the Declaration made mention of the church's failure for "not witnessing more 
courageously, for not praying more faithfully, for not believing more joyously and for not loving 
more ardently,"273 it prefaced that acknowledgement with a statement of Christian resistance, 
“We have for many years struggled in the name of Jesus Christ against…the National Socialist 
regime of tyranny.” Despite this, the Declaration met with severe criticism on the part of the 
German public, with local pastors and parishioners alike condemning the declaration.274 The 
delegation even went through considerable lengths to limit the publication and distribution 
within Germany, which certainly suggests they did not support the declaration.275 Interestingly, 
                                                 
272 Herbert, Kirche zwischen Aufbruch und Tradition. Pgs. 53-62.  
273 Hockenos, A Church Divided. Appendix 4.  
274 See Greschat, Der Protestantismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Hockenos, A Church Divided.  
275 In the British zone, publication of the document was left completely to the German Press, which explains in large 
part why the outcry amongst the general German population was so fierce as church leaders did not control how and 
within what context the Declaration was released. Local pastors were also completely unaware that any sort of 
declaration was to be made. Certainly, also Wurm and especially Asmussen were more concerned with the political 
use of the Declaration than Niemöller. See Christine Brengelmann, Stuttgarter Schuldbekenntnis vom Oktober 1945: 
Rezeptions- und Wirkungsgeschichte der Stuttgarter Erklärung im In- und Ausland. (Norderstedt: GRIN Verlag 
GmbH, 2007). Also, Greschat, Der Protestantismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Hockenos, A Church 
Divided.  
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Visser 't Hooft's report made no mention of any disagreement on the part of the Germans, and 
instead spoke glowingly of their willingness to write the declaration and their general contrition. 
It also made mention of the difficulties experienced in the East under Russian jurisdiction in a 
rather obvious attempt to encourage the Western Allies to support the church against the 
Soviets.276 
 Stewart Herman's report on the Declaration and its aftermath proceeded along similar 
lines. While Herman did report that the Declaration had been met with resistance, he, and the 
EKD in general, attributed such resistance to the non-Christian German youth and/or non-
Christians. Herman reported that Bishop Meiser noted that "good Christians" accepted their guilt 
while non-Christians asked, "why other nations...have not expressed a sense of guilt.," 277 a 
peculiar statement given that just two months later Bishop Wurm would ask that very question in 
response to a radio address from the Archbishop of Canterbury. Moreover, in February of 1946 
Hans Asmussen, one of the principal authors of the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt, circulated a 
pamphlet entitled Die Schuld der Andern (The Guilt of Others), addressing perceived Allied 
injustices.278 Asmussen particularly blamed the German press for the negative outcry, insisting 
that the document was solely ecumenical in nature and that all Germans should love their 
Fatherland just as the law of God commands one to honor his or her parents.279 Herman’s report 
however, concluded that "Despite all opposition the church leaders are nevertheless pressing the 
matter of repentance and will continue to do so even though it may mean a temporary 
                                                 
276 Report from Visser 't Hooft on his trip through Germany, October 23th, 1945 pages, 2-8. OMGUS 5/344-2/6, ZA 
56, BAK. 
277 Report from Stewart Herman on German Reaction to the Stuttgart Declaration, December 14th, 1945.  OMGUS 
POLAD 737/3. ZA 46. BAK.  
278 See Hockenos, A Church Divided. 115. Meiser himself was also notoriously conservative, perhaps more so than 
any other leading member of the EKD. This statement likely reflected an attempt to pander to the Americans, with 
little doubt as to whether Herman would have known this.   
279 Hans Asmussen, Schriftendienst der Kanzlei der Evangelische Kirchen in Deutschland. “Sollen Wir Unser 
Vaterland lieb haben?” pg. 2. Microform No.30. YDS-4 WWII Era Records of the WCC, Germany Wartime. 
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estrangement on the part of fairly large segments of the population." Continuing, Herman 
remarked that "The reaction of the German church leadership to the Archbishop of Canterbury's 
recent radio broadcast...is extremely significant, because it reveals how sensitive the German 
nation is to any...rapprochement being motivated by unchristian political considerations.” 
(emphasis mine)280 In this case Herman again portrayed the Church as good soldiers supporting 
the Allied cause, despite the distinctly unjust and "unchristian" hypocrisy of the Allies.    
 The reports from both Visser 't Hooft and Stewart Herman therefore must be considered 
an attempt to whitewash the record of the Confessing Church and to paint the EKD as good 
Christians.281 This inherently meant that as "good Christians" they were aggrieved over the past, 
but it also meant that they, as opponents of Nazism and representatives of the "good people" still 
in Germany, were allies of the forces of good striving for "justice." Such rhetoric again fostered 
this dynamic of good versus evil, Christendom against totalitarianism, and attempted to provide 
the church with a moral high ground with which they could rightfully rebuke the Allies for not 
being "Christian" enough. If, as Herman and Visser 't Hooft claimed, the leadership of the 
German churches honestly sought to make amends for the Nazi past, then surely their critiques of 
Allied policy warranted further consideration. Herman took this argument a step further positing 
that the Allies themselves were hindering the rejuvenation of the German soul by instilling a 
draconian, "unchristian" victor's justice.282  
 Nonetheless, the Declaration did accomplish the aims of the ecumenical contingent, and 
by extension lent itself toward factions of the EKD who were critical of the traditional Lutheran 
                                                 
280 Report from Stewart Herman on German Reaction to the Stuttgart Declaration, December 14th, 1945, 4. OMGUS 
POLAD 737/3. ZA 46 BAK. 
281 For another example, see interview between Lt. Col R.T. Percival and Visser 't Hooft, Feb 13th, 1945, in which 't 
Hooft intimated Bishop Wurm was the "strong man" regarding anti-Nazi activities in Germany. He claimed that 
Wurm had been building a "shadow" organization of anti-Nazi's preparing for Germany's defeat. He also pushed for 
Allied churchmen to be allowed to enter Germany as soon as possible. See OMGUS, 5/339-3/36. ZA 46, BAK. 
282 See chapter 4 in relation to Herman’s critiques of the Potsdam Agreement.  
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national-conservative worldview. It allowed institutions such as the WCC and FCC to promote 
the “contrition” of German Protestants and defend their inclusion in the Church body, thereby 
providing the first real tangible link between the German churches and the international 
ecumenical movement.283 In this sense, the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt did function as a 
building block for democracy within the German churches, even if, as Karl Barth would put it in 
a letter to Martin Niemöller, “…despite Stuttgart, the church remains obdurate and 
unrepentant.”284 The Declaration provided both a theological foundation for attending the 
question of German war guilt by building upon the political unity forged at Barmen by once 
again repudiating the national-conservative mindset, even if indirectly.285 Moreover, the 
whitewashing of the church response by ecumenical proponents like Herman similarly 
constrained national-conservatives into fully supporting the ecumenical significance of the 
Declaration,286 and by extension ensuring that such conservatives would be a part of any 
attempts to build a Christian world order, even if it came at the expense of historical accuracy 
and obfuscated church attitudes on democratization.  
  
                                                 
283 For instance, see Calvert’s statement that the Declaration got out in front of the “war guilt issue” that had plagued 
the ecumenical movement previously. See “The Prospect for the World Council” from Sam Calvert, January 1946. 
Pg. 3. WCC-1 Geneva. Box 42.0027. Microform No 493. For examples of church leaders publicizing the declaration 
see comments in the FCC Information Service weekly November 17th, 1945. Also, for Stewart Herman’s comments 
showing widespread support amongst German church leaders despite “public resistance” “due to the press, see the 
April 27th, 1946 issue. WWII era records of the WCC. Microform 32. YDS-4. 
284 Greschat, Der Protestantismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 18. Also Vollnhalls, Entnazifizierung, 133.  
285 For more on the significance of Barmen and Stuttgart and its connection toward long term German 
democratization see, Chong-Hun Jeong. Die deutsche evangelische Sozialethik.  
286 See for example, how a conference on German missions, including representatives from British and American 
foreign missions boards, essentially required their German participants to recognize the Declaration in some form so 
as to help soothe relations between Germany and those nations occupied by the Third Reich. While the participants 
refused to endorse the statement in full because it had been utilized by the press as an admittance of German war 
guilt when, in their view, the statement was in fact issued in Christian fellowship from one ecumenical body to 
another. Nonetheless, the German missions board did draw up their own, “watered down” version of the 
Declaration. See report from Mr. Godfrey Phillips concerning the Stuttgart Declaration and German Foreign 
missions in relation to conference held at Hermannsburg, November 14th-16th, 1945. See WWII era records of the 
WCC. Microform 31. YDS-4. 
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“We Hold That Criminal Offenses Should Be Punished,” German Pastors, War Crimes 
and the Ecumenical Relationship 
  
In the Summer of 1947, the US Military Tribunal indicted twenty-three individuals in the 
Nuremburg Einsatzgruppen Trial (case 9). One such defendant was Willy Seibert, 
Standartenführer (colonel) in the SS, member of the SD, and Deputy Chief of Einsatzgruppe D. 
The task force operated in southern Ukraine and Crimea, especially in Nikolayev, Kherson, 
Simferopol, Sevastopol, Feodosiya, and in the Krasnodar region, and was directly responsible for 
murdering over 91,728 people over the course of the war. 287 Seibert, along with thirteen of his 
co-defendants, would be sentenced to death on April 10th, 1948.  
After his sentence, Seibert received multiple letters of support from Protestant church 
leaders, including the Bishop of Hannover Hans Lilje.288 In pleading for mercy for her husband, 
Seibert’s wife Elly specifically emphasized her husband’s strong Christian faith and insistence he 
had maintain a “Christian home” for their children,289 a comment worthy of further analysis and 
consideration.    
Current scholarship has conclusively demonstrated the lengths to which German 
churchmen to undermine denazification and war crimes trials. This included the writing of 
glowing character references known as Persilscheine or "Soap Certificates," which intended to 
wipe clean the record of the accused. They also consistently publicly criticized the proceedings 
                                                 
287 For an example of the crimes and conduct of Einsatzgruppe D, see Richard Rhodes, Masters of Death: The SS 
Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust. (New York: Random House, 2002). For an excellent collection 
of primary documents related to Ensatzgruppe D, see also, The Holocaust as Seen by Its Perpetrators and 
Bystanders. Eds. Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen and Volker Riess. (Fischer Verlag Gmbh, 1988). Specifically pgs. 60, 
70, 85.    
288 See letters from Lukas Church Rectorate (Hanover) pastor Lic. Pommerien May 18th, 1948 to Clay. AG-49/76/1. 
ZA46, BAK. Letter from Elly Seibert (wife), mentioning Lilje’s support, March 14th, 1949. AG-49/76/1 ZA46 BAK. 
289 Ibid.  
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as unjust, immoral and nothing short of victor's justice.290 Their criticism of the trials and their 
support of numerous defendants went a long way toward the acquittal or lessening of charges of 
a great many former Nazis. Their critiques proved so effective that American authorities refused 
to open any new denazification cases in the US occupation zone by 1948.291 However, existing 
scholarship has overlooked the role American churchmen played in reinforcing German critiques 
of denazification in their attempt to control the narrative about German resistance to Nazism.   
Ericksen and Eric Johnson both describe incidents in which Church leaders deliberately 
misled Allied courts in their defense of various Sonderkommando, SS leadership and Gestapo 
members. Eduard Strauch for instance, commander of Einsatzgruppe IB deployed in the Baltic 
States and sentenced to death at Nuremburg, received a glowing defense from Heinrich Held, 
president of the Protestant Church in the Rhineland, after his guilty verdict.292 Not only did such 
prominent Protestant and former Confessing Church figures such as Hans Meiser, Otto Dibelius 
and Theophil Wurm deceive Allied courts, they actually instructed their colleagues as to how to 
best craft their testimonies in order to assist those brought up on charges. 293  
Bishop Wurm in particular sought to discredit denazification. His public criticisms, as 
seen in his response to the Archbishop of Canterbury’s radio address in 1945, attacked the 
                                                 
290 See Steven Remy, The Malmedy Massacre. Clemens Volnnhals, Entnazifizerung. Ericksen, Robert, Complicity in 
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Johnson notes that in many trials raised against Gestapo officers after the war, Protestant and Catholics leaders came 
to their defense as character witnesses. See Eric Johnson, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews and Ordinary Germans 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000), 476-482. Norbert Frei also argues that in the early years of the Federal Republic, 
Christian leaders came to the defense of former Nazis, and were thereby largely complicit with the CDU’s efforts to 
reverse the rather limited denazification proceedings. See Norbert Frei, Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past. 46-
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immorality and hypocrisy of the Allies for blaming all Germans for the actions of the Nazi elite 
while ignoring their own war crimes.294 His private critiques, similar to many of his colleagues, 
demonstrated a complete contempt for essentially any Allied attempt to prosecute Nazi war 
criminals. In a letter to General Clay the EKD council attacked the International Military 
Tribunal on numerous grounds, including evidentiary claims, the use and procuring of witnesses, 
technical difficulties for the defense, witness coercion, false accusations, an inability to appeal 
proceedings to an independent court and the use of new standards of law that had not existed 
previously. The council concluded with: 
The above mentioned facts...have a detrimental influence on the recovery of 
sound public opinion and prevent the return of confidence in law and justice. The 
love of our Lord Jesus Christ urges us to make every effort that the desperate, 
skeptical and nihilistic humanity regains confidence in public order. We hold that 
criminal offenses should be punished. 295     
 
Such criticism by the church led in large part to the hastening of denazification proceedings, the 
lessening of charges and the whitewashing of the Nazi war crimes.296 Yet by framing 
denazification and war crimes trials as an instrument of revenge likely to decrease public opinion 
of Christianity and renew sympathy for “nihilism”, German church leaders would find 
sympathetic ears amongst their ecumenical colleagues.   
After Willy Seibert was found guilty, the bishop of Hannover Hans Lilje wrote to his 
colleague and friend in America John Bodensieck, a former liaison to Religious Affairs and 
professor at Wartburg Theological Seminary in Iowa. Bodensieck appealed to Clay on a personal 
level to commute Seibert's death sentence, even after admitting he knew nothing of the case and 
                                                 
294 For these charges specifically, see text in Herman, The Rebirth of the German Church, 277. 
295 Letter to Clay from EKD council, May 20th, 1948. 2/233. Evangelische Zentral archiv Berlin (EZaB). Berlin, 
Germany.   
296 Certainly, Protestants were not the only ones critiquing denazification. The Vatican lodged an official request to 
Congress in 1948 for mercy to all Nazi war criminals who had been condemned to death. Washington ordered a stay 
of execution, but Clay sought to have it overturned before he retired. Ultimately though when John C. McCloy took 
over as High Commissioner, pressure from both Washington and Bonn saw the death sentences commuted.  
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was acting only on Lilje's insistence that Seibert was a man with "integrity."297 While Clay 
would refuse, the sentence would be delayed under John McCloy and eventually lessened to 
fifteen years in prison. All surviving defendants in the trial would be released in 1958.298 
Bodensieck’s response, as well as Lilje’s appeal to his ecumenical colleagues, was hardly 
unique. 
 Reinhold Niebuhr, Samuel Calvert, Paul Tillich, Roland H. Bainton, Steven Fry, Stewart 
Herman and L.W. Goebel all raised similar concerns about the fairness of trial proceedings and 
the moral justification of denazification. Some, like Stewart Herman, would go so far as to 
condemn denazification in its entirety, siding completely with German Church leadership. Apart 
from Tillich, all were prominent American Churchmen placed in positions of significant 
authority within ecumenical and public institutions. Some, particularly Niebuhr, were respectable 
figures well known to the American public. This made their criticism of court proceedings of 
particular concern to both the American public and US officials.  
 Like Bodensieck, most of these leaders seemed to have little firsthand knowledge of court 
proceedings upon first receiving the concerns of their German colleagues. Their introduction to 
the specifics of the Dachau Trials, denazification proceedings or other International tribunals 
came almost exclusively from prejudiced sources seeking to both publicize challenge and 
overturn the judgments handed down by such courts. Like Bodensieck, they nonetheless took 
their German colleagues at their word, channeling and broadening their critiques.  
 On January 17th, 1949, Samuel Calvert received a letter from his colleague L.W. Goebel, 
president of the Evangelical and Reformed Church in Chicago, concerning material submitted to 
                                                 
297 Letter from Bodensieck to Clay, March 25th, 1949. OMGUS, AG/49/76/1. ZA 46, BAK.  
298 This was the case for 9 of the 14 defendants sentenced to death. See Michael Wildt, An Uncompromising 
Generation: The Nazi Leadership of the Reich Security Main Office. (University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). 372-
377. See Also, Frei, Adenauer’s Germany, 106. 
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Roland Bainton (Yale Divinity) by German Professor Gerhard Ritter.299 Goebel noted that 
incredibly similar material had recently been published in TIME magazine.300 In addition, 
Ritter’s material had been published in the Protestant periodical called Christ und Welt edited by 
future president of the Bundestag and director of the Evangelische Hilfswerk Eugen 
Gerstenmeier. A similar document quite had also been published in Hans Lilje’s Sontagsblatt.301 
Ritter’s letter to Bainton spoke out against the “immoral” conduct of the American forces who 
extorted confessions from German officers in relation to the Malmedy Trial via a combination of 
extortion, mock-executions and violence.302   
 Calvert was already long since aware of these critiques, having received word from 
Bainton directly (who expressed concerns) and the original letter from Ritter along with some 
supporting materials.303 Indeed, Calvert had already been in contact with Reinhold Niebuhr over 
the matter,304 who had received similar supports, and arranged a meeting with the US attorney 
general Thomas Clark, incredibly within just three weeks after writing him.305  
 The meeting, which took place January 19th, included Clark, Calvert, president of the 
United Lutheran Church Steven Fry and assistant solicitor general George Washington. In 
                                                 
299 Ritter was staunchly Lutheran and joined the Confessing Church in 1934. He was active in circles of conservative 
resistance against Nazism and became particularly drawn to ecumenicalism (including Catholic and Protestant 
cooperation) from his participation in such resistance. See, Paths of Continuity: Central European Historiography 
from the 1930s to the 1950s. Hartmut Lehmann, James Van Horn Melton, Eds. Particularly the essay by Klaus 
Schwabe, "Gerhard Ritter." (Washington DC: German Historical Institute, 1994).  
300 "Clemency." Time 53, no. 3 (January 17, 1949): 21. 
301 See letter from Goebel to Calvert, January 17th, 1949. RG 18 22 12. PHSA. 
302 Ibid, letter from Ritter to Bainton, November 20th, 1948. Ritter also noted that Bishop Wurm, the EKD and even 
the Catholic cardinal Faulhaber had already appealed to Clay, Truman and the US State Department with little 
success. See also Steven P. Remy, Malmedy Massacre. 180-212. The case in question involved the murder of 84 
American POWs by the Waffen SS. Remy argues these claims do not bare historical scrutiny, arguing that the 
narrative of the Malmedy Massacre was overwhelmingly apologetic, written almost exclusively by the perpetrators 
and their sympathizers.   
303 See letter from Bainton to Calvert December 15th, 1948. RG 18 22 12, PSHA. 
304 This was particularly Niebuhr’s idea, since he was already aware that a direct appeal to General Clay was 
unlikely to do much of anything given Clay felt hamstrung by American public opinion. PSHA, RG 18 22 12. See 
letter from Calvert to Bainton addressing conversation with Niebuhr, December 23rd, 1948.  
305 See letters from Calvert to Clark and his reply, December 28th 1948 and January 12th, respectively. RG 18 22 12, 
PSHA. 
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preparation for the meeting, Calvert had received follow up letters from Bishop Wurm, and 
spoke with John Foster Dulles.306 The meeting ultimately produced minimal results. The 
Attorney General had no jurisdiction over Army courts, and in any case the trials had already 
been concluded. In addition, a special commission had already reviewed the case and 
recommended that of the twenty-nine defendants sentenced to death they had already 
recommended life in prison or shorter sentences (five had already been executed). However, the 
attorney general did offer to make further inquiries with the secretary of the army and appoint a 
special committee consisting of Calvert, Fry, Barnes, Foster Dulles and Goebel to review the 
case files and offer recommendations.307 While the Federal Council of Churches would 
eventually turn down the request because the trials had already been concluded, Calvert 
nonetheless followed up with US Army Major General Thomas Green confirming that the 
Federal Council’s concerns had been expressed to General Clay. In addition, the council 
expressly recommended that any defendant whose right to a fair trial was in question.308 
 Steven P. Remy similarly argues that German Protestants deliberately publicized their 
defense of German war criminals in his analysis of the Malmedy Massacre.309 For Remy, the 
EKD’s appeals to sympathetic ears (both domestic and international) significantly undermined 
Allied attempts to eradicate Nazism from German society by portraying both denazification and 
the war crimes trials as corrupt proceedings designed solely to bring about a form of victor’s 
justice. American Church leaders with ties to Germany proved to be particularly receptive to 
these types of critiques. 310 Records of the FCC confirm his analysis. In a private letter to Visser 
                                                 
306 Ibid, see letter from Calvert to Bainton indicating discussion with Roswell Barnes in relation to Foster Dulles, 
December 23rd, 1948.  
307 Ibid, see report on meeting January 19th, 1949.   
308 Ibid, See report concerning Calvert’s meeting on January 26th, 1949.  
309 Remy, Malmedy Massacre. 180-230. The case in question involved the murder of 84 American POWs by the 
Waffen SS.  
310 Ibid.  
W o l t e r i n g  | 110 
 
‘t Hooft of the WCC, Sam Calvert wrote that he thought there was a “grave question as to 
whether they [the defendants of the Malmedy case] had received a fair trial.” While Calvert 
would not assume this meant they were innocent, the very possibility of a biased trial troubled 
him considerably since it weakened the relationship with American occupying forces and the 
German people.311   
While the Federal Council’s inquiries and concerns did not directly affect the outcome of 
the Malmedy case, the proceeding circumstances tell us much about the ways in which German 
church leadership attempted to oppose Allied policy. The three-pronged attack against the 
Nuremburg Trials, denazification and the Dachau Trials included direct protest to the authorities 
involved, deliberate politicization of the trials in public forums and the enlistment of favorable 
allies abroad. In this sense, the response of the FCC to the Malmedy case represented a pattern, 
one which over time significantly shaped postwar rhetoric about war guilt and allied attempts to 
find justice for Nazi victims.  
For instance, Bishop Wurm's criticism of denazification and the war crimes trials was 
public, well known and covered by major newspapers in both Britain and the United States. The 
fervor over his critique of Allied war crimes was so great, that as early as 1946 the State 
Department requested the RAO office have Stewart Herman talk to Wurm in order to have him 
tone down his nationalist rhetoric.312  
 A few months later though, Herman supported Bishop Wurm on denazification. Herman 
again argued that punitive measures on the part of the Allies simply painted them as "un-
Christian,” which not only hindered the rejuvenation of the German moral soul but also 
                                                 
311 See letter from Calvert to ‘t Hooft. February 3rd, 1949. RG 18 22 12. PHSA. Calvert did also acknowledge 
however, that he was not sure an alternative process would have yielded a more desirable result.   
312 Advisement from Robert Murphy, March 28th, 1946. OMGUS, POLA/752/2. ZA46, BAK.  The logic behind this 
being Herman had had success in "getting Martin Niemöller to change his nationalist tone." (see also chapter 3 xx).  
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undermined Allied rhetoric about law and justice.313 Herman also described the denazification 
trials as "indiscriminate" and complained that in the eyes of many Germans it meant that 
"democracy was equated with inefficiency."314 For Herman, the difficulty with denazification 
was it meant a "hard peace," for Germany, which resulted only in despondency on the part of the 
Germans. This implicitly set the stage for a return to nihilistic doctrines and a rejection of moral 
(i.e. Christian) principles. Yet again, Herman used a zero-sum argument in his opposition to 
denazification. Unless the Allies stopped these needless trials he argued, Germans would turn 
from God a second time in favor of totalitarian ideologies.  
 The World Council of Churches took a more diplomatic approach toward German 
critiques of denazification, but nonetheless support their ecumenical colleagues. A statement by 
the WCC in response to the EKD’s Treysa Denazification Statement315 cautioned the Allied 
Control Council not to misinterpret the EKD’s position as “political.” Instead, they insisted that 
the “spiritual motivation of the statement in question [was] unimpeachable.” As such, the WCC 
urged the allies to consider the spiritual position from which the EKD operated, especially in 
relation to the “heroic obedience” of certain pastors and in light of the Stuttgart Declaration of 
Guilt.316 Here the WCC clearly recognized the political fallout likely to emerge from the EKD’s 
actions, yet nonetheless supported their brethren’s spiritual right to make such claims.   
 Existing scholarship has recorded similar instances. Robert Ericksen demonstrates that in 
the so called “Soap Certificates,” (Persilscheine), Protestant leaders argued that Christianity had 
served as a "natural counterweight" to Nazism during the Third Reich. Church leaders reasoned, 
as seen in the support of Bishop Lilje for Willy Seibert, that those who observed Christian 
                                                 
313 Herman, The Rebirth of the German Church. 92-93.  
314 Ibid, 92-94, 96, 119-120. 
315 For the text see Konrad Merzyn, Kundgebungen: Worte und Erklärung der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland 
1945-1959 (Amtsblattes der EKD: Hannover, 1993) 35-37. Issued May 2nd, 1946. 
316See statement from WCC in Geneva, May 24th, 1946. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform no. 26. YDS-4. 
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practices could not have been Nazi sympathizers. Ericksen rightly dismisses this assumption 
outright, stating "Clear-eyed honesty would have shown otherwise."317 
Ericksen’s point reveals the central problem with the war crimes trials for the clear 
majority of Protestants and Catholics, including Americans. Because denazification and the war 
crimes trials threatened to expose the fact that Christianity had overwhelmingly failed to prevent 
the rise of Nazism, the entire argument of postwar ecumenical Protestantism (and Catholicism) 
was in jeopardy. Moreover, denazification especially blurred the stark categories of Christian and 
Nazi, imperiling the assertions of Ecumenical Protestantism that Nazism and Christianity were 
fundamentally incompatible. A true reckoning with the crimes of the Third Reich would have 
revealed that many Protestants supported the Nazis in 1933.318 If one takes Seibert’s wife and 
Hans Lilje’s testimony at face value, then some Christians committed terrible war crimes. Still 
others found their faith to be compatible with the Nazi political platform despite its “church 
policy.”319 A fair portion even made up portions of the Nazi elite, even if they practiced an 
unorthodox and certainly non-canonical form of Christianity that the Confessing Church and 
their ecumenical allies considered non-Christian.320 Taken together, one would have had to admit 
that “re-Christianizing” Germany would by no means guarantee a democratic Germany, let alone 
prevent the rise of a totalitarian regime.  
                                                 
317 Robert Ericksen, Complicity in the Holocaust, 171-172.  
318 This was undoubtedly true in 1933 at a bare minimum. See Hockenos, A Church Divided. Barnett, For the Soul 
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This helps explain in part why international Protestants were willing to substantiate the 
claims of their German colleagues. Because international ecumenists subscribed to the Christian-
Totalitarian dichotomy, they were more than willing to listen when German pastors spoke of the 
religious sincerity of the accused. Moreover, from the perspective of many Americans, 
guaranteeing German war criminals a fair trial upheld their notion of both Christianity and 
democratic governance, regardless of the crimes committed.321 Others, like Sam Calvert and 
Visser ‘t Hooft, worried that overwhelming German dissention would threaten their position 
within the ecumenical movement.322 
Nonetheless, one must say that the German church’s campaign to assert public and 
internal pressure on the Allied government proved enormously successful. Their three-pronged 
attack of public criticism, enlisting the aid of powerful ecumenical allies and formally airing 
grievances quickly turned public opinion against the Allied tribunals. Moreover, it solidified, for 
a time, the Christian-Totalitarian dichotomy in the minds of the majority of the public, both in 
Germany and abroad. That this facilitated the reintegration of many of their more ‘compromised’ 
colleagues only furthered their ends.323    
 
Conclusion: The Question of Democratization 
 
 One must say that the Religious Affairs Branch ultimately failed in its attempts to 
                                                 
321 This seems to especially be the case for Goebel. See letter from Goebel to Calvert, January 26th, 1949. RG 18 22 
12, PSHA. 
322, See letter from Calvert to ‘t Hooft, January 24th, 1949 in which Calvert asked ‘t Hooft to inform their German 
colleagues of their actions, stating “…we are anxious to have them know we are not indifferent to it [their concerns 
about the trials]. RG 18 22 12. PSHA. Also, reply from ‘t Hooft, February 1st, 1949, where he warned Calvert that 
there was a “strong feeling in Germany in Nuremberg also great injustice had been done.” WCC-1 Geneva, Box 
42.0015, General Correspondence, Microform 262 
323 See Clemens Vollnhals, “Im Schatten der Stuttgarter Schulderklärung. Die Erblast des Nationalprotestantismus.” 
In Gailus and Lehmann, Nationalprotestantische Mentalitäten.    
W o l t e r i n g  | 114 
 
democratize the German churches. German Church leaders proved reluctant to embrace 
democratic governance, and indeed often assumed democracy would collapse shortly after the 
Western Allies no longer controlled Germany. This failure occurred for three reasons. First, the 
US military government simply gave church authorities too much power and influence over the 
spiritual and institutional reconstruction of the church. This had much to do with the problem of 
instilling democracy in anti-democratic societies, as doing so would have ironically required 
more "totalitarian" measures on the part of the Americans. But even more so, Americans’ 
assumptions about proper separation of church and state and their undeniable sympathies toward 
Christianity guaranteed that German church leadership would have considerable control its their 
own affairs, thus limiting the effectiveness of any sort of cultural transformation programs. In 
addition, the Americans’ willingness to maintain the church as a state financed entity and their 
refusal to treat pastors as state representatives ensured that any sort of drastic institutional 
remaking could not take place unless the Germans did so themselves.  
 Secondly, five years simply did not constitute enough time to truly remake German 
society or the German churches. Perhaps the more hands-off approach taken by US leadership 
might have been more successful if occupation lasted another ten to fifteen years. But given only 
four years of occupation, such an approach was doomed to fail. Even seizing a more direct role 
in the formation of the Protestant churches would have likely only resulted in increased hostility 
and tension between Americans and Germans given the timeline. Religious Affairs did make 
some progress encouraging Jewish and Christian dialogue, but such talks largely took place on 
the margins of the Protestant church.324 Indeed, as the Protestant response to denazification and 
                                                 
324 See for example the letter directed to John J. McCloy, where the Council for Christian-Jewish cooperation 
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the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt indicate, the RAO ultimately achieved only minor progress in 
forcing the church to face up to its actions under National Socialism. Indeed, most such public 
statements were carefully constructed under the watchful eye of the WCC.  
Therefore, under American occupation the German Protestant church did not seriously 
change its outlook toward democracy or Jews, nor did it experience any major institutional 
reforms or extensively consider its relationship to National Socialism. As such, one must 
conclude Religious Affairs did not achieve its goal in instilling western democratic values within 
the German churches.  
 However, this is not to say US occupation failed entirely in relation to the Protestant 
churches, but rather that the building of democratic principles within German Protestantism 
emerged primarily from other origins. The crucial decision to allow representatives from both the 
United States and the World Council of Churches to enter occupied Germany would have greater 
effect than any other Allied policy, if for no other reason than these representatives brought the 
German churches into their own international war against totalitarianism. That this course of 
action continued with funded exchange programs solidified transnational and international 
                                                                                                                                                             
prejudices of the German people, but also for its refusal to engage seriously with the question of Christian anti-
Semitism and its relationship to Nazism. This comes as no particular surprise for a host of reasons. It would take 
until the 1970s for American Protestants to serious begin considering the theological and religious consequences of 
the Holocaust and the Christian-Jewish relationship, and even longer in Germany. See for example, the first 
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networks.325 WCC and FCC representatives such as Stewart Hermann, significantly altered the 
rhetoric of German church leaders to great effect, thereby improving the image of German 
Protestantism both in the eyes of occupation officials and, perhaps more importantly, 
international public opinion. Of course, these non-government employees also significantly 
affected Allied interpretations of the German churches under the Third Reich as well. By 
solidifying the authority of members of the former Confessing Church through their binary 
interpretation of Totalitarian and Christian incompatibility, such representatives obscured the 
anti-democratic attitudes of the EKD, drowned out military officers who held reservations about 
church leaders and undermined Allied efforts to identify and persecute Nazis.  
 However, the need for international aid and support brought Protestant leaders into close 
dialogue with religious leaders from all over the world. German discourse (one might also argue 
theology) therefore had to shift in some ways from nationalistic self-aggrandizement toward 
internationalist Christian unity and its war against materialism. This transition was made 
considerably easier given the strong anti-communist sentiments within the WCC and FCC.326 
Since both German Protestants and their ecumenical allies tended to see the world on the edge of 
a great conflict with materialistic ideologies, the ideological shift toward internationalism 
corresponded in large part with what drove German Protestantism toward Nazism in the first 
place, its strong anti-communist rhetoric. The emergence of international Protestant 
organizations determined to influence world politics demonstrated to German Protestants that 
others found the communist threat to be just as pressing as they themselves had in 1933. This 
                                                 
325 Crucially though, even the exchange programs sought the sponsorship of US church groups as sponsors. This 
would further reinforce the ecumenical alliance forged by postwar Protestants. See for example the report from 
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new international dynamic influenced even the most conservative of German church leaders, 
binding them to a global system which inherently required a degree of democratic participation 
and a softening of nationalist rhetoric.327 This left very little room for maneuver for German 
Protestants who, despite their serious reservations toward democracy, had strong ideological, 
political and material reasons to support their ecumenical compatriots in the fight against 
nihilism and materialism.  
The positioning of Lutheran national conservatives in their opposition to denazification 
only furthered the church’s need to at least ostensibly accept democracy. Because a true 
accounting of German conduct during the Third Reich would undoubtedly challenge the 
assertions of both American and German church leaders that Christianity would serve as a 
bulwark against totalitarianism, the church had little choice but to challenge the overall aims and 
assumptions of denazification. Such arguments required German Protestants to not only 
challenge the American assumption that a majority of Germans had in fact been Nazis, but also 
that denazifying Germany in the manner proposed would not result in democratization. Only re-
Christianizing Germany, which denazification, as a policy of revenge and victor’s justice 
inherently impeded via the prosecution of “Christian” family men, could build a longstanding 
democratic German society. Such positioning naturally buttressed international and American 
Protestant rhetoric that linked Western democratic values with a Christian identity within 
Germany. Thus, the biggest shifts within the church took place in part from external pressure and 
in part from an internal desire to defeat communism and Christianize Germany, not through 
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directed Allied rehabilitation programs. In fact, the Allied reluctance to overhaul the German 
Churches in many respects reinforced the postwar narrative of Confessing Church members and 
their Allies in the WCC and FCC. Despite intelligence to the contrary, American occupation 
authorities not only went along with the myth of the heralded resistance of the Confessing 
Church, but, as Cold War tensions increased, promoted it themselves.  
In totality, the actions of the Protestant clergy reinforced the image of Germans as war 
victims, and indeed often simultaneously recast Germany as a "feminized nation" in the eyes of 
Americans.328 While this interpretation was met with some resistance on the part of American 
and World Protestantism, it also largely matched up with their understandings of totalitarianism. 
In this way, the postwar narrative of German Protestants directly correlated with the narrative of 
postwar Protestantism, namely that totalitarian ideologies inherently controlled all aspects of 
private and public life and directly threatened Western Civilization as whole.      
 One also cannot discount the importance of American clergymen whose lobbying on 
behalf of German church leaders often produced meaningful results, whether by rehabilitating 
the image of an individual clergy member or simply by granting travel permits to attend a 
conference. Their influence explains more so than any other factor why the RAO tolerated and in 
many cases accepted the rhetoric of the German clergy, proving significant enough to override 
the justifiable concerns of military officers who questioned Protestant church leaders' 
commitment to democracy. Such representatives however, also provided much needed stability. 
By encouraging Germans to tone down their rhetoric while also encouraging occupation 
authorities to assist church leaders, these private representatives fostered good will and 
cooperation between Germans and American authorities and solidified a mutually beneficial 
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alliance, even if they themselves often felt Allied command hindered church aims.329 
 Ultimately, the Religious Affairs Office had little option other than to foster goodwill 
amongst Confessing Church members. The stories of Martin Niemöller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
were well known to the American public and taking on such figures directly would have had 
significant domestic backlash in the United States. Certainly, American church leaders who 
clearly wielded considerable influence in the State Department would have been outraged. 
Furthermore, the complicity of the Deutsche Christen left OMGUS with little option other than 
to work with their political opponents who were certainly less morally compromised.330 
Nonetheless, whether through refused action, ideological sympathy, the lobbying of International 
Protestantism or a lack of political alternatives, the hands-off approach of American occupation 
authorities allowed German leaders to determine the course of the German churches and 
dominate postwar discourse. This often meant that efforts to truly instill liberal democratic 
values fell on deaf ears. Only by binding the German Church to international Protestantism did 








                                                 
329 See for example Stewart Herman’s letter to Roswell Barnes in which he insinuates he found “our military 
position in Germany quite irreconcilable with a Christian point of view.” Letter from Herman to Barnes, Feb. 17th, 
1948. 18 10 24. PHSA, RG. 
330 This is certainly the perspective of Visser ‘t Hooft and virtually every American church leader in Germany. See 
Vollnhals, Die evangelische Kirche. XXIV-XXLIII 
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Chapter 3: Martin Niemöller in America and the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy 
 
 On June 5th, 1945 in Naples Italy, numerous British and American reporters interviewed 
the heralded Protestant Pastor Martin Niemöller. Undoubtedly, Niemöller had endured 
significant hardship during the Third Reich. His vocal opposition to Hitler’s church policy, his 
efforts in forming the Pastors’ Emergency League and his lengthy imprisonment in 
Sachsenhausen and Dachau concentration camps had left Niemöller physically and emotionally 
drained.331 Seven years of internment, often in solitary confinement, coupled with the death of 
one of his sons on the Eastern Front, the internment of another as a Russian POW (who would 
eventually return home to Germany) and the loss of his daughter to diphtheria only deepened the 
spiritual crisis Niemöller experienced as Hitler’s “personal prisoner” from 1937-1945. His 
existential turmoil reached such a point that during his imprisonment in Dachau he considered 
converting to Catholicism, in part due to discussions with fellow prominent Catholic prisoners 
Johannes Neuhäusler, Karl Kunkel und Michael Höck.332 Taken to Northern Italy by an SS 
execution squad only to be rescued from certain death by American troops in May 1945,333 
Niemöller was understandably anxious to return to his remaining family in Germany.  
 The interview, resembling more of a press conference than a one on one discussion, 
consisted of a particularly strained pastor not exactly well known for his even-temperament,334 a 
                                                 
331 For more on Protestant Resistance especially regarding Niemöller and the PEL, see Victoria Barnett, For the Soul 
of the People. For Niemöller’s emotional status, see Matthew Hockenos, “Conference Paper, “Martin Niemöller in 
America, 1946-1947: ‘A Hero with Limitations.” ACCH Quarterly. Vol. 18, No. 2, June 2012. 
332 It remains unclear as to whether Niemöller had in fact converted to Catholicism during his imprisonment, as 
reported by multiple news outlets. Niemöller would deny having ever seriously considered the issue. See for 
example, "Niemoeller Denies Change of Faith: Nazi Commentary Gives Pastor's Declaration." Los Angeles Times, 
March 18, 1941. Also, “DENY PLEA BY NIEMOELLER: Nazis Say Militant Pastor Has Not Asked to Become a 
Catholic.” New York Times, February 6th, 1941. See also, Matthias Schreiber. Martin Niemöller. (Hamburg: Rowohlt 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1997). Pg. 81-93.  
333 For a retelling of the rescue, see Niemoeller. (1945, May 13). The Washington Post (1923-1954).  
334 Niemöller was in fact infamous for the opposite. He consistently preached and negotiated in an incredibly 
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handful of American chaplains and a series of non-specialized reporters anxious to get news of 
the famous pastor.335 There is evidence that Niemöller in fact considered the session to be a 
religious service for American chaplains, though this seems unlikely given the presence of the 
press at the event.336 The press’s interest in Niemöller was hardly surprising. His resistance to 
Hitler and Nazism had been sensationalized by American media, pastors and books such as Leo 
Stein’s embellished novel I Was in Hell with Martin Niemoeller (1942) and Basil Miller’s 
biography Martin Niemoeller: Hero of the Concentration Camp (1942), which both dramatized 
Niemöller’s disputes with Hitler. Films like Pastor Hall and plays such as God is my Fuehrer 
similarly aggrandized the pastor’s stand against Nazism.337 TIME magazine’s 1940 cover issue 
also featured Niemöller’s resistance to Hitler, boldly titling the issue “Only the Cross has not 
Bowed to Hitler.”338 The popularity and ubiquitousness of Niemöller’s plight was such that 
Matthew Hockenos claims Niemöller was likely the most well-known German figure in the 
United States outside of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi elite.339 His popularity also conformed in large 
part to the overall propaganda efforts of Judeo-Christian leaders of multiple denominations, as 
well as the US Government, in positioning America as the defender of Judeo-Christian morality 
during the Second World War.340 Unsurprisingly perhaps, Niemöller’s usual candor at the Naples 
interview challenged this simplistic portrayal of his person and actions.  
 Niemöller’s interview confirmed that he had indeed volunteered to re-enlist in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
forthright and often confrontational manner. This was both part of his appeal as a religious and political figure, and, 
in many respects, the reason why controversy often surrounded the man. See James Bentley, Niemöller. (New York: 
The Free Press, 1984). 
335 Hockenos, Niemöller in America. Hockenos suggests as much in this iteration and has even gone so far as to state 
as much directly in subsequent conference papers. See his unpublished paper given the following year at the New 
York State Associate for European Historians, Oct 5th, 2013.  
336 See Stewart Herman’s report concerning a conservation he had with Niemöller and his wife on July 31st, 1945. 
BAK, OMGUS POLA/737/3. Report from Herman on Niemöller.  
337 Ibid. pg. 3. Stein has also published a more scholarly edition in 2003, titled Leo Stein, Hitler came for Niemöller: 
The Nazi War Against Religion. (Pelican Publishing, 2003).  
338 Time Magazine issue, Dec, 22nd 1940. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform No. 249. YDS-4. 
339 Hockenos, “Niemöller in America.” Pg. 1. 
340 See Kevin Schultz, Tri-Faith America and Chapter 1. Also, chapter 1 of this dissertation.   
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German Navy in 1939 despite his imprisonment,341 had nourished hopes that Nazism might have 
been a good thing for the German people and, most sensationally, stated that democracy and 
Germany were incompatible. Niemöller claimed to have “…nourished the hope that National 
Socialism, if it had gone the right way, might have developed into a system for creating good for 
the German people,” further continuing that he had “been deceived” by Hitler and his Nazi 
thugs.342 Moreover, Niemöller said that the German people “like to be governed and live under 
some authority,” and that he believed Germans were “incapable of living under a democracy.”343 
Moreover, he (quite honestly) claimed that his resistance to Nazism had been religious not 
political.344 The response to Niemöller’s comments, both by the general press, American church 
leadership and Niemöller himself, illuminate the ways in which the conflicting American and 
German interpretations of the Dichotomy played out in the early postwar moment. Niemöller’s 
honest self-reflection departed from the American narrative of the Dichotomy by openly 
admitting he did not equate democratic values with Christian morality. Thus, Niemöller’s 
comments diametrically refuted the very principles of the Dichotomy that American Protestants 
had been using him to construct.  
 This chapter charts Martin Niemöller’s trip to the United States in late 1946 and early 
1947, the first time a non-military sponsored German civilian entered the United States after the 
War.345 I suggest that the purpose of the trip, press coverage surrounding it and Niemöller’s 
                                                 
341 Interestingly, Karl Barth wrote an article explaining why Niemöller had offered to fight in 1940, essentially 
saying precisely that his national-conservative Lutheran worldview would only require as much. This was seemingly 
not picked up upon by mainstream press, despite its publication in the Swiss paper La Semanine Religieuse and the 
Watchman Examiner. See Watchman Examiner issue February 22nd, 1940. WWII Era Records of the WCC. 
Microform No. 249. YDS-4, 
342 "For What I Am." Time. June 18th, 1945, Vol. 45, Issue 25.  
343 “GERMANS UNFIT FOR DEMOCRACY: Pastor Foe of Nazis Tells Dispute with Hitler.” Chicago Daily 
Tribune. June 6th, 1945.  
344 Ibid.  
345 Undated Data Sheet concerning Niemöller’s visit to America. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform No. 
246.  YDS-4.  
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actions, illustrate the ways in which both Americans and Germans sought to utilize Niemöller’s 
reputation toward political ends. American Protestants carefully cultivated Niemöller’s resistance 
record to strengthen the Dichotomy and to argue for the necessity of Christian aid to Germany. 
German Protestants, eager to rebuild their reputation abroad in hopes of material and emotional 
assistance, likewise attempted to utilize Niemöller’s record to strengthen the joint American-
German claim that Christianity had, and would continue, to function as a form of protection 
against totalitarian ideology. However, as Niemöller’s candid comments in Naples demonstrate, 
Niemöller himself often refused to abide by or be utilized as a tool for strengthening the 
Dichotomy. Instead, his paradoxical acceptance and refutation of the Dichotomy revealed the 
ways in which both hardline anti-communists, American ecumenists and German national-
conservatives sought to utilize his person for political agendas.          
 After the interview, American press outlets made a meal of his comments with histrionic 
headlines like that from Sam Pope Brewer of the New York Times: “Niemoeller asks [for] Iron 
Rule of Reich.346” To a certain extent, the press reaction to the reality of Niemöller’s character 
was inevitable given wartime propaganda and its portrayal of Niemöller as a paragon of 
Christian opposition to National Socialism. Certainly, there had been ample evidence that 
Niemöller was not everything his most ardent supporters claimed he was, given the fierce 
nationalism he had demonstrated during and after the First World War in his popular 
autobiography From U-boat to Pulpit (1934),347 his participation in the Freikorps and his support 
for the failed Kapp Putsch in 1920.348  
                                                 
346 “NIEMOELLER ASKS IRON RULE OF REICH: Freed Pastor Says Germany Is Unfit for Democracy.” New 
York Times. June 6th, 1945.  
347 Niemöller, like many of his comrades, refused the order to disarm at the end of WWI and was dismissed from his 
post as a result.  
348John Conway, “The Political Theology of Martin Niemöller.” German Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Oct., 1986), 
pp. 521-546. Pg. 524.  
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 Still, the pastor’s record of resistance was among the strongest of any surviving 
Protestant church leader, and his turbulent confrontation with Hitler in 1934 has rightly become a 
key moment in the Confessing Church lore.349 He was one of the few pastors to recognize the 
threat the Aryan Paragraph presented to the Christian rite of Baptism, even if he harbored anti-
Semitic sentiments of his own.350 His open declarations of remorse in conjunction with his 
comparatively positive wartime record of resistance made him an incredibly useful ally in the 
ecumenical movement and a potentially powerful figure in German postwar politics. Perhaps 
more so than any other national-conservative German church leader, Niemöller would transition 
away from German-Lutheran orthodoxy and toward a more ecumenically, politically and racially 
inclusive form of Christianity. But his paradoxical and seemingly contradictory statements, seen, 
for example, in his open admissions of guilt and repentance yet fierce criticism of denazification, 
make it incredibly difficulty to place Niemöller into almost any delineation of Protestant postwar 
factions.351   
 Upon his return to Germany, Niemöller quickly established himself as somewhat of a 
maverick within the Protestant Church. His open engagement with and acknowledgement of the 
                                                 
349 He most famously allegedly shouted to Hitler that “That God, not you Herr Hitler, is my Führer” in 1934.  There 
is perhaps some doubt as to the veracity of the quote, although there is little doubt that Niemöller and Hitler squared 
off in a screaming match in 1934 when Hitler accused Niemöller and the Pastors’ Emergency League of disloyalty 
after reading aloud a secretly recorded phone conversation between Niemöller and theology professor Walter 
Künneth. Niemöller had jokingly remarked that Hitler would be “buttered up” (using a pun with the German phrase 
letzte Ӧlung, which also means last rites) by Hindenburg before the meeting. For the original quote, see Thomas 
Mann’s preface in God is My Führer. For an account of the meeting with Hitler and other Confessing Church 
leaders which make no mention of the quote, see Victoria Barnett, For the Soul of the People. pgs. 50-53 and John 
Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches. pgs. 71-74. The phrase seems to have originated in a TIME article 
called “German Martyrs.” Time, 12/23/1940, Vol. 36, Issue 26  
350Victoria Barnett in fact refutes the idea that Niemöller opposed that paragraph for any reason other than Church 
authority, citing only Barth and Bonhoeffer as rejecting the racial implications of the paragraph. See Barnett, For the 
Soul of the People, pgs. 128-132. 
351 See for example, John Conway’s description of historiographical interpretations of Niemöller in “The Political 
Theology of Martin Niemöller.” One might complicate this picture even further by including more recent 
scholarship. For instance, Matthew Hockenos argues that Martin Niemöller was a part of a small minority portion of 
postwar clerics interested in reforming the EKD (what he calls “reformers.”) But even here, Niemöller represents a 
minority. His open engagement with the Holocaust and, most specifically, Protestant guilt therein, was rarely, if 
ever, met by other “reformers.” See Hockenos, A Church Divided.   
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Holocaust separated him from virtually all of his Lutheran peers. In 1946, he wrote “I think we 
Christians belonging to the Confessional Church have all the reasons for saying; ‘My fault, my 
own grievous fault.’352 Niemöller also urged all Germans to come forth in a public declaration of 
faults and wrongdoings by rejecting the absolution of guilt for the individual who had “just 
followed orders.” In his eyes, every German had something to feel guilty about: “The guilt exists 
there is no doubt about it. Even if there were no other guilt than that of the six million clay urns, 
containing the ashes of burnt Jews from all over Europe.”353 Such comments stand in rather stark 
contrast to the passive admittance of guilt issued in the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt.354 
Niemöller in many ways became the symbol of German guilt and repentance, or at least 
Protestant guilt and repentance, enshrined in his now ubiquitous poem inscribed at the 
Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand (Memorial Site of German Resistance) in Berlin :  
When the Nazis came for the communists, I remained silent; I was not a 
communist. When the Nazis came for the Social Democrats, I remained silent; I 
was not a Social Democrat. When the Nazis came for the trade unionists, I 
remained silent; I was not a trade unionist. When the Nazis came for the Jews, I 
remained silent; I was not a Jew. When they came for me, there was no one left 
who could protest.355  
 
The postwar era also marked the beginnings of Niemöller’s shift away from the rigidity 
of Prussian obedience and national-conservative interpretations of Luther’s Two Kingdoms 
Doctrine.356 For Niemöller, Christianity’s failure to prevent Nazi dictatorship and the Holocaust 
demonstrated the veracity of Karl Barth’s scathing charges of idolatry during the Kirchenkampf. 
While it would take considerable time for Niemöller to develop into the staunch pacifist he 
                                                 
352 Martin Niemöller, Of Guilt and Hope. (Philosophical Library incorporated, 1947). Pg. 15.  
353 Ibid, Pg. 14. 
354 In fact, Niemöller was responsible for sharpening the document from Otto Dibelius’s original draft. See Conway, 
“The Political Theology of Martin Niemöller.”  
355 Martin Niemöller. Quotation translated from the Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand in Berlin. 
356 John Conway, “The Political Theology of Martin Niemöller,” Hockenos, A Church Divided. Greschat, 
Protestantismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. See also Niemöller’s interview with an Army Chaplain in Of 
Guilt and Hope.  
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would eventually become in the late 1950s and 1960s,357 he nonetheless began to distance 
himself from the national-conservative milieu of German Lutheranism, adopting a position of 
Cold War neutrality that roughly corresponded with Karl Barth and his prominent German 
supporters like Helmut Gollwitzer as well as reform oriented Lutherans such as Gustav 
Heinemann, Hans Joachim Iwand and Hermann Diem.358 His refusal to accept the title of Bishop 
(opting instead for President) when elected the head of the Hesse-Nassau Bishopric in 1947 and 
his challenge of Bishop Wurm’s leadership at the Treysa conference on the basis of institutional 
reform in 1945 both signified his retreat from national-conservative orthodoxy.359   
Still, it would be a mistake to say that Niemöller departed entirely from national-
conservative German Lutheranism in the postwar years. While it is true that the Hesse-Nassau 
Bishopric emphasized an ecumenical form of Protestantism and therefore Niemöller in some 
ways unofficially departed from the Lutheran church, many of the foundational teachings of 
Lutheranism were still present in his political and theological worldview, most especially his 
emphasis on man’s sinfulness and his need for grace.360 Furthermore, Niemöller’s emergence as 
the head of Hesse-Nassau transpired in part because of the EKD’s desire to promote the former 
pastor to the rank of Bishop so as to utilize Niemöller’s political record to their advantage. 
Hesse-Nassau was also a newly created bishopric born in part out from the general institutional 
reshuffling required at the end of the War with the redrawing of German borders.361 One might 
also add that Niemöller’s postwar blueprint for a community-based Church (seen in opposition to 
                                                 
357 See for instance, Niemöller’s joining with Gustav Heinemann’s GVP party in the early 1950s protesting West 
German rearmament. Jarausch, After Hitler. Pg. 160. Also, Johanna Vogel, Kirche und Wiederbewaffnung die 
Haltung der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland in den Auseinandersetzungen um die Wiederbewaffung der 
Bundesrepublik 1949-1961. (Göttingen, 1978). Chapter, 6. Also, Alice Holmes Cooper. Paradoxes of Peace: 
German Peace Movements since 1945. (University of Michigan Press, 1996). Protests on Vietnam Pg. 95, 166. 
Arms race Pg. 43-45. Nuclear weapons. Pg. 44-46, 166, 167. 
358 See Greschat, Protestantismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 37-67.  
359 See Hockenos, A Church Divided for a quick introduction into church factions during the occupations years.  
360 Conway, “The Political Theology of Martin Niemöller.” 
361 See the church’s history on its official website http://www.ekhn.de/ueber-uns/geschichte.html 
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the restoration of the old structures of the Kaiserreich) seems to have been influenced by some of 
Luther’s ideas, and suggests Niemöller consulted some of Luther’s writings for guidance.362  
Moreover, Niemöller certainly did not abandon nationalism during occupation or even 
the early years of the Federal Republic. His attacks on the division of Germany in 1949 revealed 
a degree of continuity in his nationalist rhetoric, especially his assertion that the West German 
State was “conceived by the Vatican and born in Washington. The continuation of the West 
German State signifies the death of continental Protestantism.”363 Allied occupation authorities, 
well aware of the potential influence Niemöller wielded, kept their distance from his political 
statements and tread carefully in their dealings with the man. Marshall Knappen, head of the 
American Religious Affairs Office until 1947, noted as early as July 19th, 1945 that American 
officials must distinguish between “Niemöller the…Confessional martyr…[and] Niemöller the 
politically-minded retired naval officer.” Knappen argued that while the former should be 
“accorded the freedom and respect” due, the latter, “who says he will serve his people 
‘politically, if necessary’ and then launches a campaign which tends to turn us against our 
Russian allies and to discredit current Anglo-American policy…is to be carefully watched.”364 
Knappen had good reason to be cautious, as Niemöller’s critiques of US policy (especially 
denazification) demonstrated. Even General Clay, who largely supported church activities during 
his tenure as American military governor, expressed concerns about Niemöller in September of 
                                                 
362 This is mostly speculation since Niemöller seems to return to some of Luther’s ideas about a priest reflecting the 
will of its community as opposed to vice-versa. He also cites Luther in some of his interviews and writings. See Of 
Guilt and Hope pg. 16, 47-52. 
363 Geschat, Protestantismus und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Pg. 29.  
364 Report from Knappen July 10th, 1945. OMGUS POLA/737/2. ZA 46, BAK. There are also many other examples 
of trepidation and concern about Niemöller on the part of American authorities. Harmon remarks that Niemöller’s 
“mixture of Prussianism and Lutheranism brings him out in what many of us regard definitively as “enemy terrain” 
filled with intellectual dangerous “minefields.” Frankly, the writer of these notes cannot go along with Niemöller.” 
See undated interview conducted by Francis S. Harmon, Executive Vice Chairman of the War Activities Committee 
(Motion Picture Industry). OMGUS, POLA/737/2, ZA 46 BAK. Many other scholars have made similar remarks, 
most especially Clemens Vollnhals, Evangelische Kirche und Entnazifizirung.  
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1945 stating “While permitting Niemöller to take active leadership in religious affairs, we have 
not felt it is advisable to utilize his services in other fields as yet. While his anti-Nazi stand was 
demonstrated fully by his own actions, it is still too early to predict as to his wholehearted 
rejection of the militaristic and nationalistic concepts of the former German state.”365   
Considering Niemöller from an historical perspective requires a great deal of caution. On 
one hand, one can and must say that Niemöller’s experiences during the war greatly affected his 
political and theological outlook, facilitating his break from the enduring spirit of Prussian 
Lutheran conservatism. But on the other hand, one must be careful not to presume that 
Niemöller’s transition into the broader ecumenical pro-democratic consensus was inevitable.366 
He himself consistently iterated as much in relations to questions about democracy and the 
political future of Germany. In 1947, when asked to choose between the Weimar Republic or the 
Kaiserreich he answered unequivocally in favor of the latter.367 In late 1947, Niemöller reiterated 
to a certain extent his controversial comments from 1945, that he could not be certain democracy 
would work in Germany.368 In 1981, when asked why he had volunteered to join the German 
navy, Niemöller admitted that patriotism drove him, and he had brooded over another possible 
German defeat like that of 1918.369 Ultimately, Niemöller, like many German pastors, 
                                                 
365 Clemens Vollnhals, Die evangelische Kirche nach dem Zusammenbruch: Berichte 
ausländischer Beobachter aus dem Jahre 1945 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 
XXVI. Quote also in Hockenos, “Martin Niemöller in America.” Pg. 4.  
366 This is implicit in many interpretations of Church democratization. Niemöller and other reformers are seen as the 
faction that pulls along the rest of the Church, eventually manifesting in a more pluralistic and democratic EKD. In 
such interpretations, Niemöller, as well as other reformist leaders within the EKD challenge head on many of the 
platforms of traditional Lutheranism, especially regarding the Two Kingdoms Doctrine, Christian anti-Semitism and 
institutional reform. See for example, Hockenos, A Church Divided.  
367 See confidential special report of the RAO dated October 27th, 1947. Pg 7. OMGUS, 3/429-3/37. Z45, BAK. 
368 See interview with Niemöller in “Pastor Niemöller: The Evolution of an Anti-Nazi”, published by the Research 
Branch of the Information Control Division of OMGUS. OMGUS, 3/429-2/37. Z 45, BAK. There, Niemöller 
diplomatically claimed he was “undecided” about democracy, but nonetheless considered it successful in America 
specifically because it was “an expression of the folkways of the American people.” Whether it could be “put to 
practice in Germany has yet to be determined.”   
369 Barnett, For the Soul of the People. Pgs. 157. This is quite important, as Niemöller would later claim that he 
volunteered to fight only so that he might join a resistance movement and overthrow Hitler.  
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reexamined his faith and its implications for public and private life in the postwar period. While 
Niemöller’s experiences in prison likely caused him to reevaluate his values more critically than 
many of his peers, his position during occupation and the early years of the Federal Republic, 
especially toward democracy, was in flux. Ultimately though, both the EKD and international 
ecumenical leaders needed Niemöller, precisely because he had a reputation that supported 
claims that Nazism and Christianity were incompatible. Furthermore, his notoriety similarly 
purchased credit with Allied occupation forces and international audiences. This meant that even 
his EKD opponents sought to utilize the image of a heroic Niemöller to further the EKD’s 
position in German society and its privileged position during occupation. Moreover, Niemöller’s 
ecumenical allies, especially Americans who equated Christianity with democracy, likewise 
needed to gloss over Niemöller’s anti-democratic attitudes to reinforce and propagate their own 
understandings of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy, especially in their efforts to raise 
support and awareness for the German Churches abroad.   
 
“That Unfortunate Incident in Naples”: Rehabilitating Niemöller’s Image 
 
Upon Niemöller’s return to Germany, American religious liaisons and visitors were quick to seek 
out Niemöller to begin damage control for his comments in Naples. Being acutely aware of the 
firestorm of negative press coverage Niemöller’s comments caused, and concerned about the 
effect this might have on incorporating the Confessing Church into the World Council of 
Churches and the broader ecumenical movement as well as Allied authorities, ecumenical allies 
in Germany all sought to minimize the damage, insisting Niemöller’s comments were “taken out 
of context,” and did not fully represent Niemöller’s values or his potential usefulness to the 
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Allied cause.  
 Ecumenical leaders in the United States also desired Niemöller to tour the United States 
almost immediately upon making contact with him in 1945.370 Niemöller himself desired to visit 
both England and America to personally thank friends and colleagues for their support,371 but 
upon becoming vice-president of the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany and the 
head of its department for relations with foreign churches, Niemöller’s status, reputation, the 
great material need of the German churches and the evolving postwar relationship between 
Germany and the United States meant that any sort of visit was bound to take on significant 
meaning both politically and religiously.  
 However, gaining State Department and military approval for Niemöller to enter the 
United States meant proving to Allied authorities that his visit would be purely “religious.” 
American Protestants also presented themselves as supporters of the occupation agenda (as 
indeed they certainly desired democracy in Germany) by encouraging Niemöller to tone down 
his nationalist rhetoric. S.C. Michelfelder sought out Niemöller along with Stewart Herman and 
Visser ‘t Hooft during the WCC’s Department of Reconstruction and Inner-Church Aid tour of 
Germany and Alsace in October of 1945. Michelfelder said he wanted to speak with Niemöller to 
explicitly have him explain “that unfortunate incident in Naples.” According to Michelfelder, 
Niemöller claimed to have offered to serve only to overthrow Hitler and then negotiate a separate 
peace for Germany. He claims to have put the issue directly to Niemöller, asking: “If you had 
known at the time that your own enlistment would have given victory to Hitler’s armies, would 
you have enlisted?” He looked at me in astonishment…and answered: “No! No! Never!””    
                                                 
370 The FCC in fact desired Niemöller above all others. However, they were careful to phrase their requests as 
though Niemöller would be the first of many German church leaders to visit the United States in hopes of ensuring a 
long lasting relationship between the American and German Churches. See for Example BAK OMGUS, AG45/2/4 
Letter to Clay from Sam Calvert, Oct. 3rd, 1946.  
371 Marshall Knappen interview with Niemöller June 19th, 1945. Pg. 2. OMGUS POLAD 737/-2. Z45, BAK. 
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Michelfelder, completely taken with Niemöller, reported that he was convinced that the 
press had not told the full story during the interview in Naples. Concluding with “My sympathies 
are with Pastor Niemöller,” and a glowing character reference:  
This is the explanation of a man…who loved his God more than he loved his 
country or his own life and who is ready to lay down his life rather than deny his 
Christ or see another dictator come to Germany who shall enslave the people and 
the Church. You cannot be in the presence of such a great personality as Martin 
Niemöller without realizing that here is a man like a re-incarnated Jeremiah or 
John the Baptist...He also did say that he objected to the Nazi regime for religious 
reasons, because Niemöller considers every question whether political or 
economical, a religious question. Since the national socialist regime ran counter to 
God’s command by killing the weak and helpless it posed a religious question…. 
And so Dr. Niemöller explained his position that he objected to Hitler on religious 
grounds. And who would not?372 
 
There seems little reason to consider Michelfelder’s account disingenuous, or his enthusiasm for 
Niemöller artificial, even if his fawning over Niemöller may seem excessive. After all, Niemöller 
was known for his charismatic and passionate sermons in the late 1930s which inspired a 
substantial number of supporters.373 If his comments in Naples demonstrated nothing else, 
Niemöller never shied away from what he saw as the truth, regardless of the consequences 
involved. Undoubtedly, this tendency is what brought his differences with Hitler to the forefront 
and likely captured the attention of the American press and wartime propaganda machine as 
well. Certainly, the legend of his character during the Kirchenkampf centered around his bold 
confrontational manner.374 One may however, raise doubts about his desire to join in the war to 
overthrow Hitler, as his later comments suggested a second German defeat had weighed on his 
mind considerably at the time.375 
                                                 
372 See Report from Michelfelder October 15th-25th 1945. OMGUS 5/344-2/6, Z45, BAK. 
373 See for example a set of Niemöller’s sermons during the Third Reich. God is my Führer.  
374 Robert Ericksen, “Wilhelm Niemöller and the Historiography of the Kirchenkampf,” 
375 Still, it is almost impossible to be certain what Niemöller would have done had he been allowed to serve during 
the war. He certainly fits the profile of the July 20th resistance movement, but it’s worth pointing out that much of 
the cadre of officers pertaining to the movement had served to some acclaim for years before finally moving against 
Hitler. His sons service on the Eastern Front may have tempered any possible recourse Niemöller may have taken 
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Nonetheless, Michelfelder’s report tells us much about how ecumenical Protestants 
attempted to control the narrative of German church leaders with Allied leaders and the often-
contradictory way in which they attempted to separate and parse out religious issues from 
politics. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, American authorities attempted to rigidly enforce 
an American style separation of Church and State in occupied Germany in part to avoid entering 
inter-Nicene debates. However, this attempt to partition religion and politics gave German 
pastors significant maneuverability in conducting their own affairs, which included to a lesser 
degree freedom to make political statements as well. American Protestants often claimed in 
reference to political statements made by German Church leaders that the issue at hand was often 
spiritual, or, at a minimum, that a particular political statement was made because of a religious 
or theological position.376 Here, interestingly, Michelfelder seemingly acknowledges that there 
IS no separation between religious and spiritual issues (at least in Niemöller’s case), because he 
interpreted political scenarios as a religious matter, thereby, again, explaining away Niemöller’s 
political stance. However, Michelfelder also conflates Niemöller’s religious and moral objection 
to Hitler and Nazism with Niemöller’s political beliefs. As we have seen, and as his own 
comments in Naples illustrated, Niemöller had little objection to the political platform of 
National Socialism. He certainly did not oppose Nazism based on liberal individualism, but 
rather welcomed aspects of its virulent anti-Semitism and anti-communism.  
Michelfelder’s report on his meeting with Niemöller therefore illustrates some of the 
inconsistencies with the Christian-Totalitarian narrative, and most especially with differences 
between the German and American interpretations of postwar Christian ethics. Michelfelder 
seems to suggest here that because Niemöller is “ready to lay down his life” for Christ, then he 
                                                                                                                                                             
against Hitler, to say nothing of his reaction or the stipulation of terms attached to any potential release from prison.  
376 This was particularly true regarding ecumenical attempts to explain away or recuse German critiques of 
denazification. See Chapter 2.  
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therefore cannot possibly be anti-democratic. This fact alone for Michelfelder proves that 
Niemöller is and was opposed to dictatorship in all forms. However, Niemöller’s own comments 
suggest otherwise, and indeed Michelfelder’s presumed knowledge of German theology and the 
Kirchenkampf demonstrates the lengths to which he goes to equate Christianity with democracy, 
even when he surely knows differently. To this extent then Michelfelder’s report obscures 
Niemöller’s political beliefs to portray him as a noble resistor fighting for the same goals of 
occupation, brushing aside the “unfortunate incident in Naples” as nothing more than poor or 
biased reporting.  
  Stewart Herman’s reports on Niemöller proceed along similar lines. He noted that 
Niemöller informed him he tried to explain why he offered his services to the German navy, but 
the press was apparently “forbidden to print his comments." Furthermore, Niemöller further 
stated that he was acting on advice from his lawyer, who was attempting to save his life at the 
outbreak of war. He also felt moved to stand by his sons, both of whom served on the Eastern 
Front during the War.377 
 Both reports clearly demonstrate an attempt to rehabilitate Niemöller’s image for US 
authorities. To be sure, Allied command was likely only too pleased to have American Church 
leaders warn Niemöller about the effects his comments had on the press at large,378 especially 
since they likely presumed further contact from American church leaders would encourage 
Niemöller to tend to church issues over political issues.379 The Holocaust and Nazism, however, 
                                                 
377 Report dated July 31st, 1945 concerning Stewart Herman’s meeting with Niemöller. OMGUS POLA/737/3, Z46 
BAK. 
378 memo from Robert Murphy, March 28th, 1946. OMGUS, POLA/752/2, Z46 BAK. The logic behind this being 
Herman had had success in "getting Martin Niemöller to change his nationalist tone." See for example, Robert 
Murphy indirectly expressing gratitude for Herman’s attempts to get Niemöller to tone down his Nationalist 
rhetoric.  
379 See for example, the memo from Donald Heath expressing hopes that they might see further proof that Niemöller 
was a “simple man of God,” and refrain from “sounding off in public” a bit like an “unrepentant nationalist.” Letter 
from Heath, September 5th, 1945. OMGUS, POLAD/737/2. Z46, BAK.   
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had blurred the separation between “political” and “religious” issues even more so than they 
already were. Michelfelder rightly pointed this out regarding Niemöller, even if his interpretation 
of Niemöller’s actions obscured the concept of the Two Kingdoms doctrine and its role in 
German religious life.380 Surely the murder of innocents fell into the “religious” sphere to some 
extent? Thus paradoxically, American Protestants claimed Niemöller’s religious worldview 
necessitated political action, while also simultaneously claiming his political statements were in 
fact religious in nature and therefore within the realms of “proper” conduct for a church official.  
 Evidence exists that Protestant representatives not only succeeded in convincing 
Niemöller to change his tone, but also in convincing Allied command and the public at large that 
Niemöller in fact, was a supporter of democracy, and the “unfortunate incident in Naples” was 
predominately a misunderstanding and by extension misrepresentation of the true Niemöller. 
Indeed, John Conway notes that as late as 1963, some were still positioning Niemöller as a 
defender of liberal-democratic values.381 John J. Muccio of the American Religious Affairs 
Office after observing Niemöller speak at Treysa (the site of the foundational meeting of the 
EKD by members of the former Confessing Church) noted that Niemöller’s “true” feelings on 
democracy were in fact positive. Niemöller, he insisted, believed that the church must foster 
democracy because Christianity alone could foster law and liberty.      
 The FCC employed similar tactics in its efforts to petition for Niemöller and his wife to 
visit the United States in 1946. Ostensibly, the stated purpose of the trip was to thank the 
American churches for their support during Hitler’s reign in Germany,382 but in practice 
Niemöller’s speeches sought to reinforce the ecumenical relationship between German and 
                                                 
380 This is especially important here in reference to the fact that the German interpretation of this doctrine in the 
Weimar period was a political choice.  
381 See Conway, “The Political Theology of Martin Niemöller,” 533. Conway Specifically cites E.H. Robertson’s 
Christians Against Hitler, (London, 1963), as well as other war-time publications.  
382 Hockenos, “Niemöller in America,” pg. 5. 
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American Protestants, express German guilt, reinforce Niemöller’s understanding of Christian-
Totalitarian Dichotomy and to ask American churches for material aid.383 It also seems likely at 
least certain portions of American military command was aware of this, since Lucius Clay 
himself offered suggestions to Sam Calvert so as to help pass through some of the State 
Department red tape.384 Overall, the trip strengthened ties between the transnational churches, 
and improved the image of Germany in the eyes of many Americans.  
 
“That Was the Fight, that was the War!” Niemöller in America and Hitler’s War against 
Christ 
  
Niemöller’s speeches to American listeners continually reiterated the incompatibility of 
Christianity and Nazism in his descriptions of the “totalitarian” Nazi state. Speaking in Phoenix 
on December 15th, 1946, Niemöller stated, “There was no place on earth for both Jesus Christ 
and Adolf Hitler at the same time…because Jesus Christ was raised from the dead and He is 
living, not only in heaven, but on earth, so Hitler…had to try to fight Jesus Christ…” While 
Niemöller did acknowledge that part of the church had succumbed to Nazi pressure, he further 
claimed that no matter how many pastors Hitler threw into prison, another simply took their 
place, declaring “the Word of God could not be bound.” 385 At Davidson College in North 
Carolina, he also emphatically declared “Hitler and Jesus Christ—these two were competitors, 
from the beginning, and rivals; and there was no place in the world, and not in Germany, for both 
                                                 
383 At least these were directly suggested (or implied in the case of the Dichotomy), in a letter from Paul Tillich to 
Henry Leiper in relation to a meeting he held with the FCC’s German Advisory Committee. See PHSA, RG 18 23 1. 
Report from Tillich to Leiper, January 14th, 1946.  
384 Letter from Calvert to Clay dated October 3rd, 1946. OMGUS AG 45/2/4 Z46, BAK. In relation to a previous 
conversation between the pair in which Clay suggested the FCCoC invite more than just Niemöller to visit 
385 See speech in Phoenix on December 15th, 1946. YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform N0. 252. 
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of them!386 Essentially Niemöller’s entire tour followed this rhetorical tract: “Not even the 
prisons and the camps and the totalitarian authority of Adolf Hitler was able to get the better of 
the church of Jesus Christ.”387 
In this sense, Niemöller’s interpretation of totalitarianism mostly matched that of other 
German Protestant leaders, with some exceptions. Much like his American counterparts, 
Niemöller understood “the real war” in Germany to be between Hitler and Christ.388 He 
underlined this point repeatedly with his interpretation of totalitarianism, stating:  
Adolf Hitler couldn’t help persecuting Jesus Christ because this Jesus Christ is not 
just the founder and representative of a new religion…Why? Because…Jesus 
Christ has claimed [a] totalitarian regime for all the world, and for the world of 
our present times. He claims that his commands and his rules shall govern 
mankind…That is the word that couldn’t be heard well by Adolf Hitler, who 
claimed all this, not in heaven but on earth for himself…Therefore he went out 
from the beginning of 1933 to do away with Jesus Christ, first, in the German 
nation and afterward in all those territories he got into his hands.389  
 
Niemöller’s use of the word totalitarian in conjunction with Jesus Christ warrants further 
scrutiny and offers considerable insight into how German Protestants understood and used the 
word. First, it seems clear that “Totalitarianism,” for Niemöller, represented the complete 
permeation of an ideology into all facets of society. Because of this absolute encroachment into 
society, Niemöller argues no two totalitarian ideologies can exist side by side. Even more 
importantly, Christianity qualifies as a totalitarian ideology because true Christianity could not 
ever accept a form of law above God’s own. Therefore, we can understand the theological 
framework of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. Any ideology that sought to supersede 
God’s Law threatened the entirety of Christianity.  
                                                 
386 See speech at Davidson College, NC, January 4th, 1947. YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform N0. 
253. 
387 See speech at the Church Federation of Greater Chicago, January 14th, 1947. YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the 
WCC. Microform N0. 255.  
388 Ibid.  
389. See speech given December 22nd, 1946 in Davenport Iowa. YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform 
N0. 252 
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 Thomas Stafford, in an interview with Niemöller, wrote that Niemöller understood 
Christianity as a counter to Statist doctrines, and it’s here one must say that Niemöller stood 
apart from his German colleagues. Because Christ is the only one who can be granted 
“totalitarian authority,” Niemöller distanced himself from a denominational identity in favor of 
ecumenical Christianity.390 In so doing Niemöller theologically shifted away from a nationalist 
identity, even if at times his comments still reflected a strong adherence to German nationalism 
because Christian identity took priority over nationalist identity.  
Niemöller, in contrast to American Protestants, largely discounted a Nazi resurgence in 
Germany.391 Instead, he saw communism as the central threat to a Christian order, though in 
comparison to other German Protestants Niemöller’s anti-communism was considerably less 
pronounced. Still, Niemöller argued that Eastern life constituted something fundamentally 
different from Western Life. “The Russian will never be a democrat—The same sort of human 
animal as is today (sic) and will be 2000 years since.” Germany’s fate, according to Niemöller, 
rested not necessarily on a communist take-over of Europe but rather the spiritual fortitude to 
survive the clash of East and West. For Niemöller, “The question of whether this or that can be 
done in Europe is a question of the meeting of those two types of life.” Christianity, he 
contended, was the only hope for Germany because only Christianity can exist within both the 
East and West.392 Niemöller’s categorization of Russians and Americans as “types” bears 
similarities to his insistence that Germany was unsuited for democracy. Both reflected the sort of 
racial and nationalist thinking that dominated late 19th century and early 20th century European 
thought. For Niemöller, only Christianity could solve the classic question of community versus 
                                                 
390 See undated article from Thomas Stafford “Niemöller and Totalitarianism.” YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the 
WCC. Microform N0. 260. 
391 See essay titled “Widersehen mit Deutschland.” YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform N0. 249. 
392 See speech at “The Swedish Church,” February 17th, 1947. YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform 
N0. 256. 
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individual by allowing for individual faith but binding the individual to a larger faith-based 
community.    
Without a common goal to work toward, without hope for the future, “nihilism” would 
overtake the German people. The German trapped between these two types, neither of which 
particularly suited his needs, leads to despondency and aimlessness. Germans, Niemöller said, 
“live, but they live without faith, and therefore without any conscious plan of life.”393 Because 
the threat of nihilism was still grave, Niemöller argued Protestants must forget their 
denominational differences and recognize their commonalities under Christ.394   
 
“His lights are not the lights of the American people.” Eleanor Roosevelt and Critiques of 
the Niemöllers’ Visit 
 
Just as American Protestant leaders attempted to improve Niemöller’s reputation in the eyes of 
American authorities, so too did they try to promote Niemöller as a paragon of Christian 
faithfulness, contrition and anti-Nazi resistance to the American public. Leading up to his visit in 
December of 1946, several prominent newspapers published excerpts from Niemöller depicting 
the sort of contrition he would become best known for predominately in an effort to garner 
sympathy for Germans. Still, public criticism of both the visit and Niemöller the individual 
countered the public image presented by the FCCoC and their allies. Such criticism drew harsh 
                                                 
393 essay titled “Widersehen mit Deutschland.” YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform N0. 249. See 
394 On this front Niemöller repeated many times a story of holding a Christmas service in Dachau 1944. There, he 
held service for a British Anglican, A Dutch Reformed Calvinist, two Norwegian Lutherans, a Yugoslavian 
Orthodox Christian and a Macedonian journalist who claimed to have no denominational affiliation, though was still 
Christian (he himself being Lutheran). Niemöller utilized this example to argue that in the face of Nazi 
totalitarianism, the redemptive power of Christ overcame national and denominational differences. This experience 
he said, conceived him of God’s plan in his life and the need for Protestant ecumenical unity (though he still insisted 
he would forever be Lutheran). Speech given January 12th, 1947. YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. 
Microform N0. 254  
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rebukes from Niemöller’s supporters. Their defense of Niemöller from public criticism 
corresponded precisely with attempts to rehabilitate his image, often through the confines of 
Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. 
 Press coverage leading up the Niemöller’s visit focused on explaining the “Naples 
incident” while also emphasizing Niemöller’s, and by extension German Protestantism, 
repentance and contrition for the Holocaust and their blindness and inability to prevent Hitler’s 
conquest of Germany. For instance, just a month and a half prior to their arrival the New York 
Times published Niemöller’s comments in the Berlin Tagesspiegel: “We were dreaming when 
we thought guilt belonged to the past. When, however, in the midst of a Christian people 
6,000,000 persons are deliberately murdered only because they belonged to another race, no one 
can maintain that that guilt is not a fearful reality.”395 Announcements of the Niemöllers’ visit 
often came accompanied with pleas for mercy and sympathy for Germans and their material 
conditions, establishing a theme for the tour’s tone and emphasis.396  
However, the Niemöllers’ visit certainly did not go without criticism. Dean Acheson in 
fact rejected their visa applications in late 1945 despite earlier approval, at least until John Foster 
Dulles and Bishop Oxnam stepped in to convince him otherwise.397 Eleanor Roosevelt, a vocal 
critic of Niemöller after the Naples Incident,398 also opposed the couple’s visit. In an excerpt 
                                                 
395 NIEMOELLER SEES GUILT. (1946, Oct 28). New York Times (1923-Current File).  
396 By KENNETH CAMPBELL By Wireless to THE NEW,YORK TIMES. 1946. "CHURCHMEN URGE PEACE 
OF 'MERCY'." New York Times (1923-Current File), Feb 26, 2.  
397 Letter from Calvert to ‘t Hooft, November 15th, 1946. RG 18 23 2, PHSA. Calvert complained that he felt 
Acheson had been “misled” by media reports. The New York Times also reported that Niemöller had been placed 
under a “gag order” by the State Department during the beginning of his trip, though I have thus far been unable to 
confirm or deny the report in question. The “gag” in question allegedly restricted Niemöller from discussing 
anything other than “religious issues” during his visit to America. See STATE DEPT. GAG ON NIEMOELLER 
FINALLY BARED. (1947, Jan 11). Chicago Daily Tribune (1923-1963).  
398 On August 7th, 1945, Roosevelt had indeed compared Niemöller’s statements at Naples in to sounding “almost 
like a speech from Mr. Hitler,” claiming that Niemöller sounded like “a gentleman who believes in the German 
doctrine of the superiority of race.” See Eleanor Roosevelt, “My Day” (August 7, 1945) last accessed electronically 
on 8/11/2017 at George Washington University: 
https://www2.gwu.edu/~erpapers/myday/displaydoc.cfm?_y=1945&_f=md000096,  
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from her syndicated column “My Day,” published shortly after their arrival, Roosevelt argued 
that “We must try to prevent easy forgetfulness of where responsibility really lies for the coming 
to power of the Hitlers and Mussolinis of the world.” Niemöller, she argued, not only bore 
responsibility for Hitler’s rise to power, but also sought to whitewash Germany’s record. She 
continued stating “Anyone who comes to this country and…makes us forget this…even 
temporarily, does harm to the policy which must prevail if everywhere we are going to watch out 
for another rise of fascism.”399 In an earlier piece prior to his arrival, Roosevelt said that “while 
one may applaud his devotion to his church, one can hardly applaud his attitude on the Nazi 
politics, and I cannot quite see why we should be asked to listen to his lectures. I am sure he is a 
good man according to his lights, but his lights are not those of the people of the United States 
who did not like the Hitler political doctrines.”400   
Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, an accomplished scholar, a leading member of Jewish-
Christian relations and a staunch Zionist, likewise critiqued the narrative of Niemöller as a 
leading anti-Nazi. In a public address in New York on February 2nd, 1947 (during Niemöller’s 
tour), Hillel claimed Niemöller was “unfit” to serve as a “prophet or spiritual leader” in post-war 
Germany because he was “opposed to Hitler and Nazism not because of its humanity-destroying 
racism but because of its persecution of the German Christian Church.” Like Roosevelt he 
worried about the agenda of the press tour stating, “What we are most afraid of in this visit of 
Pastor Niemoeller is that his utterances may be used to allay the fears held by many American 
people that Germany will be rebuilt without a real moral regeneration of the people.”401 
 While Roosevelt’s criticism of Niemöller tended to reflect American assumptions that 
                                                 
399. See article published in the Cincinnati Ohio Press. January 4th, 1947. YDS-4, WWII Era Records of the WCC. 
Microform No. 260 
400 See article titled “Pastor Niemöller” by Eleanor Roosevelt.  YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform 
No. 262. 
401 NIEMOELLER CALLED 'UNFIT' AS A LEADER. (1947, Feb 03). New York Times (1923-Current File)  
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every German was a Nazi or complicit with Nazism, she and Rabbi Silver in many ways astutely 
anticipated the tour’s agenda. While often expressing guilt and responsibility for failing to 
prevent Hitler’s rise to power, the tour tended to center on Niemöller’s experiences in prison and 
Nazi oppression of the Christian churches. This, in combination with his descriptions of material 
conditions in Germany and his insistence on Christian unity against totalitarianism, did much to 
do just what Roosevelt feared: Make Americans forget the role Germans, and especially German 
Protestants, played in Hitler’s rise to power. Moreover, Roosevelt’s criticism of Niemöller 
decoupled American democratic liberalism from Christianity, obviously challenging one of the 
core concepts of Dichotomy for American Protestants. Both comments accurately deduced that 
the values of German Protestants did not correspond with those of American liberalism, and 
therefore its leaders at minimum ought to be treated with caution if not disregarded entirely. 
Such critiques therefore also threatened to undermine the Protestant instance that Christianity 
had, and would continue, to operate in direct opposition to totalitarian regimes.    
 Well aware of the criticism against Niemöller and having learned from the Naples 
incident, the FCCoC sought to carefully control press coverage by limited ad hoc speeches, 
refusing all unscheduled interviews,402 and having an FCCoC representative (the former 
Methodist pastor of the American Church in Berlin and longtime friend of the Niemöllers) Ewart 
E. Turner.403 General Secretary of the FCCoC Sam Calvert even included a templated letter to all 
relevant potential hosts that they would be required to “protect the Niemöllers from the press,” 
signifying the seriousness of the FCCoC’s concerns. They also responded in force to the 
accusations levied by Eleanor Roosevelt and other critiques of Niemöller.  
                                                 
402 See unaddressed and undated letter from Calvert detailing instructions.  YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. 
Microform No. 246.  
403 See memo titled “regarding the Visit of Pastor and Mrs. Martin Niemoeller.” YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the 
WCC. Microform No. 246.  
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Niemöller’s supporters continuously defended the pastor against his critics, especially 
Eleanor Roosevelt. In response to her comments, the FCCoC called Roosevelt’s critiques a 
“smear” and demanded she retract the statements immediately. They accused Roosevelt of 
perpetuating “misinformation,” and stated emphatically that “The record clearly shows that he 
[Niemöller] repeatedly spoke against the political aims of the nazis (sic).” They further requested 
she “correct the erroneous impression created by [her] column and give recognition to the fact 
that Niemoeller took a courageous stand against nazi polices long before our own country was 
alert to their danger.” Moreover, they argued her critiques of Niemöller stemmed from an earlier, 
likewise erroneous, smear campaign orchestrated by “fellow travelers” and “leftists.”404  
Niemöller’s campaign also attended to the critiques by emphasizing his experience in 
prison. Press coverage similarly accentuated his resistance to Nazism. For example, during 
Niemöller’s visit to Seattle in December of 1946, press coverage directly refuted Roosevelt’s 
critiques by squaring them up with Niemöller’s retelling of his confrontation with Hitler in 1934 
as proof of his political opposition to Nazism.405 The famous conservative journalist Westbrook 
Pegler criticized Roosevelt’s “hypocrisy” for defending the free speech rights of communists but 
refusing to allow Niemöller the “chance to tell his story.”406 Some published letters from readers 
also condemned Roosevelt’s stance. For instance, Katherine T. Lowery of Elmhurst, New York 
complained that Roosevelt was “short on memory.” Surely, she exclaimed, Niemöller “did all he 
could to make his people see where brown communism would lead them!...Mrs. Roosevelt is 
                                                 
404 See Evans, J. (1946, Dec 06). RETRACT SMEAR OF NIEMOELLER, ELEANOR TOLD. Chicago Daily 
Tribune (1923-1963).  
405 "Cause of Hitler's Anger Related by Niemoeller." 1946. Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), Dec 06, 2. For 
his full speech given in Seattle on December 4th, see address from Niemöller “The Faith that Sustains me.” YDS-4. 
WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform No. 247. 
406 Pegler also made a number of dubious comparisons between some of FDR’s New Deal Policy’s, conservative 
immigration ideals and National Socialism to reiterate her “hypocritical” stance. See “Niemoeller Deserves Chance 
to Tell Story” December 20th, 1946 and “Mrs. Roosevelt Contradicts Herself,” and December 30th, 1946. in YDS-4. 
WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform No. 262.  
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always pleading with us to understand the Russians. Would it not be a good thing for her now to 
try and understand a German’s love of country too?”407  
The FCCoC and other Protestants came Niemöller’s defense continuously leading up to 
and over the course of his tour in the United States. Estelle Sternberger, the leftist Jewish activist 
and political commentator, likewise experienced the full force of the FCCoC’s influence after 
criticizing Niemöller in a series of columns in early 1947. After raising questions about 
Niemöller’s record in the First World War (particularly his participation in unrestricted 
submarine warfare and his decision to volunteer for military service despite being imprisoned at 
the outbreak of the Second World War), Sternberger retracted her statements and “clarified the 
record” in a radio address over WLIB Brooklyn after being “challenged” by Henry Smith Leiper 
and Samuel Calvert of the FCCoC. In response, she issued a lengthy statement depicting 
Niemöller as a defender of Jews, and a contrite Christian openly repentant for past errors. She 
also thanked Dr. Leiper, Dr Calvert and General Eisenhower for challenging her, exclaiming 
“None of us wants to perpetuate stories that can be denied by reliable evidence.” 408 
The cases of Sternberger and Roosevelt reveal two important aspects of how Niemöller’s 
person was used and interpreted. First, American Protestants clearly made every possible effort 
to utilize his person to uphold the tenants of the Dichotomy. Not only did they consistently 
defend Niemöller’s conduct during the war, they also often interpreted critiques against him to 
have originated from “communist” or other “totalitarian” forces. The careful attention given to 
control Niemöller’s access to the press and immediate and forceful refutation of any and all 
criticism made against Niemöller’s person likewise indicates that the narrative of Protestant 
                                                 
407 “Many Things that Should be Remembered,” published December 23rd, 1946. YDS-4, WWII Era Records of the 
WCC. Microform No. 262. 
408 See “Sternberger Reverses Position on Niemöller in Light of Evidence,” January 15th, 1947. YDS-4 WWII Era 
Records of the WCC. Microform No. 262.   
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resistance did not emerge accidentally within American political and religious rhetoric. The 
fundamental refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of Roosevelt’s nuanced critique of 
Niemöller’s political effort outlines the ways in which the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy 
dictated rhetorical and political positions. 
 
Niemöller and “The Call for Mercy:” Press Coverage and Sympathy for Germany    
 
Coverage of the Niemöllers’ tour continued to promote and highlight Niemöller’s speeches, 
while also continuing to emphasize his personal story and resistance.409 The FCCoC and 
Niemöller’s allies also continuously published documents explaining Niemöller’s decisions and 
his “easily distorted” anti-democratic statements.410  Yet in addition to highlighting Niemöller’s 
understanding of totalitarianism and his religious justification for resistance, the tour emphasized 
a need for understanding, mercy and unity between Christians and nations.  
While Niemöller’s speeches usually centered on his personal experiences and Nazi 
persecution of Christians, he did at times address current circumstances in Germany. While he 
did not directly ask for assistance from American churches,411 he occasionally told stories 
detailing the poverty, violence and despondence many Germans were experiencing. Many of his 
speeches included anecdotal evidence of German despondence and fears of starvation. 
Niemöller’s descriptions of the “East” best demonstrate this tendency. In one speech, he 
exclaimed:  
                                                 
409 See for example the article “Who’s Who and Why” in the Detroit Michigan News, Jan. 5th, 1947. YDS-4, WWII 
Era Records of the WCC. Microform No. 262.  
410 See “This man Niemöller” by Henry Leiper Smith published in Advance and reprinted by the FCCoC, February 
1947. YDS-4, WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform No. 247. 
411 On one occasion Niemöller claimed that he had not come to American in search of material assistance but instead 
to tell of God’s power and magnificence. YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform No. 247. See address 
from Niemöller “The Faith that Sustains me.” 
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The sense of this cutting off of the East has remained incomprehensible even to 
those who accepted, without opposition albeit with a heavy heard, the succession 
of whole German provinces to the Polish State. But why…now that the war has 
ended…is starvation on a gigantic scale being allowed to rear its head, starvation 
to which must fall victims hundreds of thousands (sic), who for the most part bear 
no personal guilt for the events of the past…412 
 
Niemöller also described the refugee situation as exacerbating Germans’ existential despair and 
material circumstances. After being asked to officiate the funeral of a fifty-year old refugee 
weighing a meagre fifty-eight pounds who perished just one day after reuniting with her family 
in “the West,” Niemöller asked rhetorically whether “with a little good will, all this confusion 
and want could have been avoided.” He argued that “such cases [of the refugee] are by no means 
isolated…[and] they leave deep and abiding scars on the souls of the people…and at the same 
time they lend support to the current rumors, which maintain that the occupied Powers are 
determined further to decimate what remains of the depleted German population.”413  
Such stories from Niemöller were not unusual,414 and reveal that Roosevelt’s concerns 
about the tour generating sympathy for Germans were by no means unfounded. They likewise 
indicate, especially Niemöller’s understandable lamentation at the loss of the East, that he 
certainly still held nationalist impulses and concerns. But most importantly, and in conjunction 
with more overt appeals by the FCCoC and other Protestant congregations, they reveal a joint 
Protestant opposition to the conditions imposed by Potsdam and a clear campaign to politicize 
the material conditions in Germany through the confines of the Dichotomy. The implications 
were clear: Americans Christians, through their brotherhood in faith, had the capacity to prevent 
the rise of despair, injustice and totalitarianism in Germany through financial, spiritual and 
                                                 
412 See speech “Wiederstand mit Deutschland.” YDS-4, WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform No. 249.  
413 Ibid.  
414 See “Dr. Niemoeller tells of German Church’s Fight Against Hitler,” given at the WMCA in New York Jan. 19th, 
1947. YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform No. 255.  “Martin Niemoeller’s Sermon in the Second 
Presbyterian Church, Jan. 25th, 1947 (given in Germany). Also, YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform 
No. 255-256.  Also, Niemöller’s address to “Ministers of the Swedish church.” Feb. 17th, 1947. in Microform 256. 
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emotional support of the German Churches. This clearly therefore reinforced Fousek’s concept 
of global nationalism within American Protestantism by detailing America’s messianic role in 
the world.   
Niemöller also undoubtedly intended to further strengthen the link between American 
and German churches, who had already begun to send aid to Germany. He continually thanked 
the American people for their prayers during his imprisonment, and even wrote a special 
Christmas message to “Our Christian Friends in America” circulated by the FCCoC. The 
statement directly thanked Americans for demonstrating:  
New evidence of the real and deep-rooted unity of the one ecumenical church of 
Jesus Christ, our Lord…your churches…have become a great blessing to us and 
you have helped us in our hour of need by sending food, clothing and medical 
supplies. In this way, you have helped in saving lives, and have testified to the 
spirit of Christian brotherhood and reconciliation.415    
 
Moreover, most of Niemöller’s speeches also included the collection of some sort of 
donation (usually clothing), with some even calling for a donation in their 
advertisements.416 Thus, while neither Niemöller solicited gifts or donations, their very 
presence in the context of Protestant rhetoric encouraged such donations—especially as 
Niemöller consistently detailed Nazi oppression of Christians and emphasized Protestant 
ecumenism. Furthermore, the FCCoC authorized and announced the creation of Church 
World Service, a conglomerate of Protestant worldwide relief agencies in December of 
1946, just as the Niemöllers arrived in America. Thus, FCCoC promotions for the tour 
often included the announcement in conjunction with promotions for the tour.417       
On his return home to Germany in late Spring of 1947, with his rhetorical restraints 
                                                 
415“A message to our Christian friends in America.” See YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform No. 
249. 
416 See advertisement for the gathering at St. John’s Presbyterian in Berkley, CA, December 10th, 1946. YDS-4. 
WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform No. 247. 
417 Ibid, See for instance, Metropolitan Church Life, Dec. 26th, 1946. 
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seemingly lifted, Niemöller wrote a letter to Reverend Frederick Forell, secretary of the 
Emergency Committee for German Protestantism, urging the sending of food stuffs to Germany 
in great haste. He lamented that “people who are suffering today and who are facing the death of 
starvation…are being convinced that the whole propaganda for democracy has been an illusion, 
worse even than Hitler’s propaganda.” Continuing, he remarked their faith in Western Powers 
purported Christianity “has been utterly shattered…the result is Nihilism, and the dying people 
today cursing God and man.” He went on to question both Western and Soviet reports, stating 
“since the end of hostilities, 6,000,000 Germans have disappeared…people who know these facts 
and are facing now the general starvation in the Western Zones can’t help thinking that this 
whole development is nothing else than the Morgenthau plan put into action, with the tendency 
to exterminate a whole nation to its very roots.” The letter, subsequently summarized in part by 
the New York Times,418 conclusively indicates Niemöller’s aim to influence Western policy in 
Germany as well as acquire relief for Germans. He would reiterate such critiques and concerns 
throughout the late 1940s.419     
 But just as Niemöller’s critiques of Western policy contain hints of anti-Western belief, 
his subsequent statements and actions reveal a firm mistrust of the American understanding of 
the Christian World Order and a refusal to abide by the anti-communist aspect of the Christian-
Totalitarian Dichotomy. If Niemöller’s assertion that the partitioning of Germany had been 
“conceived by the Vatican and born in Washington,” did not demonstrate this clearly enough, his 
critiques of German rearmament, his outbursts against western “propaganda,” his unsanctioned 
                                                 
418 NIEMOELLER ASKS CHANGE IN POLICY. (1947, May 11). New York Times (1923-Current File) 
419 See AID EUROPE IN TIME, NIEMOELLER URGES. (1947, Nov 27). New York Times (1923-Current File). 
Also, Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES. (1949, Jul 14). NIEMOELLER ASKS DISMANTLING HALT. New 
York Times (1923-Current File)  
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and impromptu visit to the USSR in 1951420 and his refusal to adopt a strong anti-communist 
position surely do. It would be fundamentally inaccurate to see Niemöller as a quick convert to 
the American understanding of the Dichotomy.  
 
Conclusion: Niemöller, Ecumenism and the Implications of the Christian-Totalitarian  
Dichotomy  
 
While Martin Niemöller’s shift toward ecumenism over a nationalist-based religion was more 
pronounced than that of the majority of his colleagues, his prioritizing of Christian identity as a 
response to totalitarianism was not. In this respect, his trip did much to solidify the ecumenical 
movement in Europe and the United States and furthered the push for a “Christian World Order” 
centered around biblical teaching. Conservative Protestants such as Hans Asmussen, Hans Lilje 
and even arch conservative Hans Meiser would support international Protestant movements in 
one form or another following Niemöller’s lead after 1946. The resounding success of his trip 
confirmed, at least in the minds of the FCCoC and the WCC, that a broader proselytizing of 
Europe was in fact possible.421  
 The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy therefore served two distinct purposes. On one 
hand, it allowed Americans and Germans to find common ground after the War. For Americans, 
this “proved” that all Germans were in fact not Nazis, and in fact could be counted upon to 
                                                 
420 This caused quite a bit of controversy in both Germany and the WCC, since Niemöller, as a representative of 
both the EKD and the WCC, took it upon himself to visit without any real consultation with said institutions. For 
some selected press clippings and letters concerning the trip See YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. 
Microform N0. 260-263.   
421 See article published in The Christian Century, January 15th, 1947 which reported that “Pastor Niemoeller’s visit 
to the United States…provides the clearest possible proof that the ecumenical principle is a living for in American 
Christianity. YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform N0. 247. Sam Calvert also wrote that the 
“Niemoellers are having something like a triumphal entry as they go from city to city…Our people take them as a 
symbol of the fact that there was a real resistance in the German church to Nazism.” See Letter from Calvert to 
Visser ‘t Hooft, December 26th, 1946. RG 18 23 3, PHSA.  
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uphold biblical values in the future if given proper support. For Germans, it paved a path forward 
after Nazism that did not involve a complete break from German tradition. By claiming 
Christianity was the antithesis of Nazism, German pastors and parishioners alike could 
simultaneously repent for not believing or praying ardently enough, while also claiming 
membership in a group that could not possibly be Nazi and was in fact a principal opponent of 
Nazi totalitarianism. That this identity also carried with it varying degrees of anti-communism 
and an international support network (and European as well), further meant that membership also 
included a place in the new Christian world.  
 Because of the flexibility of this concept, individuals could maintain existing ideological 
and/or racial assumptions without threatening its coherency. In this way, it allowed for a diverse 
set of Christians to buy into the concept and work toward similar goals. For Americans, this 
often meant reinforcing the connection between American’s Wilsonian promise to spread 
democracy.422 For Germans, this meant continuing racial prejudices/ 
 like those uttered by Niemöller in relation to Russian and German capacities for democracy. 
That Niemöller contradicted his own emphasis on Christian identity over nationalist identity 
demonstrates both his individual transition away from conservative-nationalism and also the 
ways in which the identities often conflicted in the postwar period.  
The Niemöllers’ trip therefore reinforced key rhetorical and theological points of 
ecumenical Protestantism: First, that Christian principles could provide both international peace 
and prevent the return of “totalitarian” ideologies. Second, that the example of German history 
and the Third Reich demonstrated the effects of a societal abandonment of God and his 
commandments. To a certain extent, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy blamed Hitler’s rise 
                                                 
422 Quite a bit has been written on this, see for example Walter LaFeber America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-
2002. (McGraw Hill Publishing, 2002). Mark Noll. D.G. Hart, That Old-Time Religion in Modern America  
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on a lack of true faith. Finally, that America was uniquely poised to help show Germany the 
proper path once more. Central Europe, Niemöller said, had “somehow gotten a new faith, a new 
soul, a new life” in response to Nazi persecution. When Christians congregate, it fosters a peace 
that is “higher than all human understanding…and [more] durable and…stronger even than 
persecution and suffering.”423 His implication was clear: A Christian World Order required 
German and American cooperation toward peace. 
 The tour however, also demonstrated that American and German understandings of the 
Dichotomy were strained, especially regarding politics. Roosevelt’s critiques of Niemöller’s 
political ethics demanded a response from sympathetic Protestants eager to change the tide of 
American public opinion and influence American occupation and foreign policy in Europe. Their 
insistence on coupling theological and political ethics best demonstrates this point. Efforts to 
organize Niemöller’s speaking points, limit press interaction and otherwise “control” the 
narrative similarly indicated that the tour was in many ways a continuation of American wartime 
propaganda. The FCCoC used Niemöller as a symbol of Christian resistance toward 
totalitarianism, a mantle Niemöller was happy enough to take up provided it did not bind 
Germany indefinitely to Western democratic-liberalism and did not include an uncompromising 
stance toward the Soviet Union. Still, the Niemöllers’ American tour succeeded in eliciting an 
emotional response from American Protestants by reinforcing the Christian-Totalitarian 
Dichotomy and facilitated Germany’s transition from enemy to victim in the eyes of many 
Americans. But the tour also in some ways subtly revealed the ways in which the concept might 
be interpreted differently between Germans and Americans.424     
 
                                                 
423 Speech given at Hartford Connecticut, February 17th, 1947. YDS-4. WWII Era Records of the WCC. Microform 
N0. 256 
424 See Especially chapter 4 regarding their fundraising. 
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Chapter 4: “The Wilderness of Want:” American Protestant Aid to Germany and the Marshall 
Plan 
 
On March 11th, 1948, some eighteen-hundred Protestant pastors and politicians crowded the 
Episcopal Cathedral in Washington D.C., to hear addresses from Secretary of State George C. 
Marshall and John Foster Dulles [Figure 12].425 Intently focused in the front pew, was President 
Harry Truman and his wife Bess. The service, presided by the vice president of the Federal 
Council of Churches of Christ and bishop of the evangelical United Brethren Church John S. 
Stamm, was for many the culmination of years of preparation and lobbying. Angus Dun, bishop 
of the Washington Cathedral remarked in the opening sermon:  
We meet as Americans, proudly and penitently, grateful for the faith of our 
fathers, accepting in fear and trembling the vast responsibilities that follow on the 
power which has been granted us. But even more we meet together as Christian 
people seeking to discover the purpose of God for ourselves and our nation. By 
the faith we share we are constrained to acknowledge that before God English 
men and French men and Greek men and Chinese men, yes German men and 
Russian men, are as important to God as we are.426  
 
Marshall, discussing the upcoming congressional vote on the European Recovery Program, had 
in mind an answer to Dun’s search for God’s purpose: “At no time has it been so important for 
cool judgement. For an appeal to one’s self for a proper sense of justice. For a realization of 
conditions; material, political and spiritual, in other parts of the World.”427 Foster Dulles echoed 
his sentiments, “The European Recovery Plan can and will be an American Recovery Plan if it 
evokes vision and sacrificial effort such as enabled our founders to make our nation great.”428 
                                                 
425 Dulles would take office after Dean Acheson in 1953. 
426 Bishop Dun’s speech at the Washington Cathedral concerning the European Recovery Program. March 11th, 
1948. RG 18 32 2. PHSA. 
427 Anthony Leviero, “Marshall Urges Calmness to Solve Crisis in World: Propaganda, Fear” New York Times 
(1923-Current file); Mar 12, 1948; pg. 1.   
428 Speech from John Foster Dulles, March 11th, 1948. RG 18 32 2, PHSA. 
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The fact that all three speakers embraced the massive foreign aid package to Europe likely came 
as no surprise to attendees. After all, leading American churchmen had been calling for greater 
American aid to Europe since the end of the Second World War. In their minds, the 13-billion-
dollar European Recovery Plan served as the instrument of the divine providence for which they 
had been praying. 
 
Figure 12: March 11th, 1948. Episcopal Cathedral, Washington D.C.  
  
The majority of mainline Protestant leaders viewed the situation in postwar Europe, and 
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in particular Germany, as dire. Europeans, they believed, had turned away from God and 
embraced a secular materialist lifestyle which had led to the disasters of the First and Second 
World Wars. America too, in their eyes, had sinned by failing to espouse Christian principles in 
state building and foreign policy. For them, communism and Nazism were the logical 
manifestations of a State which had tried to supersede God. These radical ideologies could only 
be countered by Christianity, with America uniquely poised as the biblical “city upon a hill” in 
this epic spiritual battle for the soul of the world.  
 Questions surrounding postwar Europe tended to center on Germany. Advocates 
of a “hard” peace tended to emphasize severely punishing the German people, either via 
territorial loss, reparations, economic and military restrictions or all of the above. The infamous 
Morgenthau Plan called for an almost complete de-industrialization of Germany, particularly in 
the Ruhr region. Even though the Plan had fallen out of favor before the end of the war, many 
American Protestants still feared the sentiments behind its conception.429 They believed that such 
“vindictive” policies would lead to nihilism and rampant materialism, which in turn would 
facilitate the birth of another totalitarian regime in Germany. By equating the spiritual and moral 
crisis in Germany with the prospect of building democracy, Protestants positioned America as 
God’s ordained nation, capable of remaking the world in His image. Drawing upon long standing 
Protestant traditions of American exceptionalism and the New Deal, Protestant organizations and 
individuals lobbied the Federal government for access to Germany, the right to send material 
relief, and firm government action in favor of humanitarian aid. This chapter traces the evolution 
of Protestant critiques of US occupation policy, the postwar German refugee crisis and private 
aid sent by American churches to Germany in the immediate postwar era. By implementing what 
                                                 
429 Much has been written on this topic, for a good overview see James C. Van Hook, Rebuilding Germany: The 
Creation of the Social Market Economy, 1945–1957. (Oxford University Press, 2004).  
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they described as a “Christian” peace in Germany, America could rebuild the world in Christ’s 
image, ushering in a more “Just and Durable Peace.”  
John Fousek argues the American postwar emphasis on globalism and international order 
emerged as a mechanism to reinforce American nationalism. This new nationalism strove to 
spread American freedom and prosperity to the rest of the world in direct competition with the 
Soviet Union. The “developing ideology of nationalist globalism” he argues “was based on 
increasingly intertwined notions of national greatness and global responsibility.”430 I suggest 
these notions of intertwined greatness and responsibility emerged in part from the imagined 
construction of a Christian World Order. The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy therefore must be 
understood in part as an attempt to reconfigure America’s divine responsibility in relation to the 
creation of radical totalitarian adversaries. Like Fousek, I too see this construction as a 
mechanism through which Americans understood and justified their political position in the Cold 
War. By emphasizing America as the only possible savior of German suffering, American 
Protestants sacralized giving as both a Christian and national mission necessary for lasting peace.    
Many scholars address the relationship between American Protestantism and what 
Jackson Lears calls “The impulse to conduct a world crusade.” Lears argues late 19th and early 
20th century Americans, drawing on traditions within American Protestantism, sought to translate 
reform into public policy and in doing so purify the entire country.431 Wilsonian progressives 
similarly expanded this impulse to “make the world safe for democracy.” Gary Gerstle makes 
similar claims amount the relationship between Anglo-American Protestantism and racial politics 
of the early 20th century, linking together Protestantism, masculinity, and white racial identity 
                                                 
430 Fousek, To Lead the Free World. 2-8. Quote on page 8. 
431 Jackson Lears, Rebirth of a Nation. 
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with American imperialism.432 Barry Hankins traces the theology of Woodrow Wilson, linking 
his belief in Reformed predestination and election with that of American national identity.433 
This emphasis on global responsibility often also reinforced understandings of American identity 
as distinctly white and Protestant. 434 Such scholarship demonstrates that Protestants’ discursive 
production of American global responsibility had long-standing pulls within both American 
political culture and American Protestant self-identification. While some scholars such as Kevin 
Kruse argue the “Christian America” of the 1950s began in business and conservative Christian 
circles in opposition to the sermonizing of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal,435 I suggest 
instead that the identification of American Cold War policy began in part with the more 
politically liberal Federal Council of Churches and the interventionist ideals of Christian 
Realists.436 Through their support of American aid to Germany and by extension the Marshall 
Plan, these Protestants positioned and defended the spread of American liberal democracy as a 
crucial weapon against totalitarian aggression.437  
While Marshall Plan funds greatly surpassed Protestant aid sent to Germany, 438 the 
extent of Protestant support for Germans citizens should not be easily dismissed. Protestant Aid 
to Germany likely totaled over 200 million dollars during the peak years of late 1946 to early 
1948.439 Church World Services, the postwar umbrella relief agency created by the FCCoC, 
                                                 
432 Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century. (Princeton University Press, 2001). 
433 For more on Protestant exceptionalism and its relationship to nationalism see. Barry Hankins, Woodrow Wilson: 
Ruling Elder, Spiritual President. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).   
434 While historical scholarship addressing Mainline Protestantism and its relationship to humanitarian relief is 
lacking, quite a bit exists about the evolving support of Protestant groups for the New Deal during the 1930s. For an 
overview of Reinhold Niebuhr and “Christian Realism” see, Heather A. Warren, Theologians of a New World. Also, 
Reinhold Niebuhr Revisited. Fousek, To Lead the Free World.  
435 Kruse, One Nation Under God. 3-8.  
436 Michael G. Thompson, For God and Globe.  
437 Mark Thomas Edwards, The Right of the Protestant Left 
438 Marshall Plan Aid to Germany totaled approximately 2.5 Billion Dollars from 1948-1953. On a per annum basis, 
this was roughly equivalent to 500 Million, although distribution did vary year by year.  
439 This number is extremely difficult to calculate given the limited availability of CARE distribution statistics. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to calculate precisely how much money American religious organizations sent to 
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provided approximately eighty-percent of licensed private foreign relief to Europe and Asia in 
1946.440 In just six months from April to October 1946, American Christian aid amounted to 
7,114,833 tons of supplies to Germany alone.441 More personalized aid also arrived in record 
numbers from the newly formed CARE organization (Cooperative Association for Remittances 
to Europe). That such an incredible volume of foodstuffs, clothing and other supplies went to a 
former and much hated enemy after four years of rationing and war, not to mention the Great 
Depression, emphasizes the effectiveness of church campaigns to raise funds.  
 Yet for as much as humanitarian aid alleviated the food and housing crisis of Germans, 
the political agenda of postwar Christianity altered Germany’s social and political reconstruction. 
The fact that German Catholic and Protestant church organizations distributed approximately 
ninety percent of humanitarian aid442 placed German churches in an enormously advantageous 
position, if for no other reason than it sanctioned the expansion of church infrastructure and 
fostered institutional loyalty during a time of scarcity. Moreover, because ecumenical American 
Protestants linked re-Christianization into relief efforts, refugees and aid recipients often also 
received copies of the New Testament and other proselytizing documents. The gendered 
                                                                                                                                                             
Germany during the initial years of occupation. An estimated 1.2 billion dollars of CARE packages were sent to 
Europe from July 1946-1947, with roughly half to Germany. Religious organizations tended to give approximately 
3/5ths of all total CARE packages, with Protestants estimated at approximately half of the total religious 
contributions. In total this would equal roughly 182 million dollars. Additional direct private Protestant church aid 
totaled at $28,674,373 for the Western Zone of Germany during occupation. Concerning Church World Services, I 
received annual reports directly from the organization itself, specifically Ms. Lisa Hayes. The records of Lutheran 
World Relief can be found at the Evangelical Lutheran Church Archive of America, specifically NLC 2/3/2 and 
ULCA 4/2 Box 16. For a complete breakdown of aid sent into Germany via CRALOG see Beryl R. MacClasky, The 
History of U.S. Policy and Program in the Field of Religious Affairs Under the Office of the U.S. High 
Commissioner for Germany. (Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, Historical Division, Office of the 
Executive Secretary, 1951). 24-30. In relation to CARE packages see Kevin M. Henry, “CARE International: 
Evolving to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly December 1, 1999 
vol. 28 no. 109-120. Also, By, G. S. (1947, Jul 06). “The package that means life and hope.” New York Times (1923-
Current File) http://search.proquest.com.proxy.wexler.hunter.cuny.edu/docview/107897031?accountid=27495 
440 Ronald E. Stenning, Church World Service: Fifty Years of Help and Hope. (New York: Friendship Press). Pg. 2. 
This almost certainly must not include CARE packages, which presumably must have been considered purely 
private aid and therefore unlicensed.  
441 Hilfstelle distribution records. Z1/993, BAK. Approximately 2,334,724 tons came from non-Protestant sources 
(overwhelmingly Catholic).   
442 Beryl R. McClasky, The History of U. S. Policy and Program. Pg. 25.  
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distribution of aid also served to accentuate the traditional Breadwinner-Homemaker economy 
by creating specific packages for women with children and male laborers. [see Figures 13, 14]443 
In addition, a sizable portion of Protestant aid focused on rebuilding church communities and 
churches themselves, often by shipping material to build makeshift Notkirchen (emergency 
churches). [see figures 15, 16]444 Pastors and congregations received everything from bibles to 
deaconess robes, as ecumenical Protestants sought to rebuild the German churches both literally 
and spiritually.  
 
 
Figure 13: In 1947, The Lutheran Churches of America provided 48,300 Children extra meals 
every day for 3-7 Months in all four occupation zones 
                                                 
443 Joel Thoreson (archivist at ELCA), e-mail to the author, August 4th, 2016. 
444 Joel Thoreson (archivist at ELCA), e-mail to the author, August 4th, 2016. 




Kiddie Kits, Lutheran World Relief 1949 
Kits contained: washcloth, soap, toothpaste with brush, note book, pencils and a bar of candy 
 
 
Figure 15: Lutheran Church in Dresden, 1945 
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Figure 17: Barracks Church, Nuremburg 1945 (Before-Left and After-Right) 
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 Although the postwar material crisis forced a degree of confessional cooperation between 
Protestants and Catholics, competition and theological maneuvering between the various 
American and German factions also colored the politics of refugee and foreign aid. Moreover, 
many Protestants had limited patience for Jewish suffering or the needs of Jewish communities, 
and rarely cooperated with other relief organizations such as UNRRA (United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration) and JOINT (American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee). In 
fact, CRALOG (Council of Relief Agencies Licensed to Operate in Germany), which organized 
in 1946 to distribute private aid in Occupied Germany, consisted almost exclusively of Christian 
organizations and did not include a single Jewish organization.445 Anti-semitism colored both 
German and American Protestant arguments against “hard” peace policies, especially from 
American Lutherans. Such discourse often reflected indifference toward Jewish suffering, or at 
minimum, a limited interest in providing restitution for Jewish victims.  
 As the humanitarian crisis in Germany continued through 1947, church leaders began to 
call more broadly for federal assistance to Germany, eventually resulting in a full-fledged 
promotion campaign for the European Recovery Program, more commonly known as the 
Marshall Plan.446 Scholarship on the Marshall Plan is unsurprisingly diverse, with debates over 
its effectiveness,447 association with American business leaders448 and relationship to the Cold 
                                                 
445 Beryl R. MacClasky, The History of U.S. Policy and Program. 24-30. 
446 The official title of the legislation was the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, but most press (and church sources) 
referred to the European Recovery Program or simply the Marshall Plan. 
447 John Gimbel’s in depth reading of the Marshall Plan tends to be the predominant interpretation in favor of the 
Marshall Plan’s economic effects. He argues the Marshall Plan grew predominantly out of a struggle between the 
army and American bureaucrats over the costs and aims of German reconstruction. See John Gimbel, The Origins of 
the Marshall Plan. (Stanford, 1976). Greg Behrman in particular argued the Marshall Plan essentially “saved” 
Europe by allowing European economies to focus on investment and growth without sacrificing social funding. See 
Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and How America Helped Rebuild Europe. (Free 
Press, 2008). Behrman described Marshall as a selfless leader only interested in serving America’s best interests. He 
somewhat similarly describes Republican senator and ex-isolationist Richard Vandenberg as a key ally who 
transcended party politics in support of the plan. Nicolaus Mills tries to take a larger view of the conceptual and 
psychological effects of the Marshall Plan without being as full of praise as the above cited authors, in his book 
Winning the Peace: The Marshall Plan and America's Coming of Age as a Superpower, (Hoboken: John Wiley and 
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War.449 More recent scholarship deals with the politics of hunger in occupied Germany, yet 
makes no mention of church groups.450 Despite a burgeoning body of scholarship attending to 
the relationship between religion and the Cold War,451 no scholar to date has attended to the 
religious arguments for the Marshall Plan, nor connected it to Christian humanitarian aid in 
Germany.452 Even German church scholarship hardly mentions American aid to ethnic German 
                                                                                                                                                             
Sons, 2007).  
448 Most recently, Stephanie M. Amerian, “Buying European”: The Marshall Plan and American Department 
Stores.” Diplomatic History, 39, No.1. (2015). The most well-known piece is likely See Victoria de Grazia, 
Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, 2005). Michael J. Hogan’s 
study of the Marshall Plan similarly traces its relationship to American political corporatism in his book The 
Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, (Cambridge University 
Press, 1987). Related to the question of consumerism, see Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of 
Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York, 2003). Also, although not related to the Marshall Plan directly, 
Kevin M. Kruse’s One Nation Under God, deals directly with the relationship between certain factions within 
American churches (particularly Protestants) and their relationship to American Capitalism. On this end, Kim 
Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Businessmen's Crusade Against the New Deal, (New York: Norton and Co., 
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449 Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe’s, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall 
Plan,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Winter 2005), pp. 97–134, set off a debate over the importance of 
the Marshall Plan and its relationship to the start of the Cold War. Cox and Kennedy-Pipe both argue that American 
policy makers and leaders gave little credence to Soviet security concerns, and that the Soviet Union behaved much 
more reasonably in response to the Marshall Plan than scholars tend to depict. Of course, the standard classic of 
Cold War neo-revisionism, Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman 
Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992) tends to emphasize the defensive 
nature of both American and Soviet policy as well as a certain mistrust for what was seen as an unpredictable status 
quo by both sides in the early years of the Cold War. Also, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, tend to 
emphasize the pragmatic nature of Soviet decision making in relation to the Marshall Plan, Inside the Kremlin’s 
Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 98–139. 
450 G. Daniel Cohen rightly places the Marshall Plan within the context of expanding governmental aid to Europe via 
programs like the UNRRA and DP camp aid, though for Cohen the unique thing about postwar aid was its distinct 
“secular” and “professional” character. See G. Daniel Cohen, "Between Relief and Politics: Refugee 
Humanitarianism in Occupied Germany 1945-1946." Journal of Contemporary History 43, no. 3 (2008): 437-49. 
Atina Grossman specifically ties the issue of hunger and units of measuring to that of human rights (especially of 
Jewish DP’s) in relation to occupied Germany in her essay, "Grams, Calories, and Food: Languages of 
Victimization, Entitlement, and Human Rights in Occupied Germany, 1945–1949." Central European History 44, 
no. 1 (2011): 118-48. Alice Weinreb convincingly argues that the politics of German hunger eventually outweighed 
actual medical evidence that Germans were starving. See Alice Weinreb, "For the Hungry Have No Past nor Do 
They Belong to a Political Party": Debates over German Hunger after World War II." Central European History 45, 
no. 1 (2012): 50-78 Nick Cullather, "The Foreign Policy of the Calorie." The American Historical Review 112, no. 2 
(2007): 337-64. Also effectively demonstrates how the calorie as a unit of measurement guided American policy in 
regards to state-building, distribution of humanitarian aid and productivity. Cullather specific credits Anglo-
American thinkers during German occupation for the widespread use of the calorie in relation to questions of 
population and world hunger. 
451As an example, see William Inboden III The Soul of Containment. and Jonathan P.Herzog The Spiritual-Industrial 
Complex. T. Jeremy Gunn, Spiritual Weapons.  
452 There is one exception to this, though the source is problematic in several ways. The controversial Canadian 
author James Bacque’s book Crimes and Mercies: The Fate of German Civilians Under Allied Occupation, 1944–
1950, (Talon Books, 2007), deals to a certain extent with Christian charity and its relationship to Herbert Hoover. 
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refugees.453  
I do not intend to claim that the Marshall Plan was born entirely out of Christian aid to 
Germany, but instead argue that it significantly contributed to anti-isolationist rhetoric and the 
formulation of a Christian national-identity during the early stages of the Cold War within the 
United States. Linking together hunger, victimhood and nation-building would produce lasting 
trends in both German political memory454 and American foreign policy.455 Certainly there were 
many political and economic reasons to support the Marshall Plan beyond religious 
justifications. However, the centrality of the German question to postwar American foreign 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bacque’s text routine offers some rather dubious statistics, including the fact that Hoover’s humanitarian hunger 
plan saved over 800,000,000 million lives or that over 1,000,000 Germans perished because of resettlement clauses 
in the Potsdam Agreement. Bacque, no stranger to controversy over his accusations against Eisenhower’s treatment 
of POW’s, levels incredibly harsh critiques against key military officials, relies far too much on published primary 
documents for his source base, and similarly treats sources like George Chichester (and German church leaders for 
that matter), far too uncritically and with little historiographical knowledge. Still, his text is the only document that 
references foreign church aid to German civilians.  
453 Ian Connor’s in-depth study of the Catholic Church’s rhetoric on refugees makes no mention of ecumenical aid, 
although he does argue that German church leaders saw refugees as a potential political threat and susceptible to 
communism. He also does mention “totalitarianism,” and how the word tended to mean both Left and Right radicals. 
Ian Connor, "The Churches and the Refugee Problem in Bavaria 1945-49.” Journal of Contemporary History 20, no. 
3 (1985): 399-421. Pg. 401 for totalitarianism. His less rigorous iteration concerning German Protestants makes 
similar arguments. See Ian Connor “The Protestant Churches and German Refugees and Expellees in the Western 
Zones of Germany after 1945,” Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 15:1, 43-63, Harmut 
Rudolph’s Evangelische Kirche und Vertriebene 1945 bis 1972: Kirchen ohne Land (Göttigen: Vandenhoeck and 
Ruprecht, 1984), two volume study is the most expansive and comprehensive look at the German Protestant 
Church’s humanitarian organization, Hilfswerk, and their efforts to care for and administer to refugees. However, 
even his text has only a very small eight-page chapter on ecumenical material aid sent to Germany. He estimates an 
estimated 200,000,000 DM were sent to Hilfswerk alone from 1945-1950 from international ecumenical 
organizations. See Chapter 3, pages 44-52.  
More recent studies have tended to focus on the politics of integrating refugees into new local church communities. 
See Vertriebene finden Heimat in der Kirche: Integrationsprozesse im geteilten Deutschland nach 1945. Ed. Rainer 
Bendel. (Köln: Böhlau, 2008). Also, Marion Josephin Wetzel, Die Integration von Flüchtlingen in evangelische 
Kirchengemeinden. (Münster: Waxman Verlag GmbH, 2009).  
454 Scholars have firmly established the postwar motif of German suffering. It would take until the 1960s for the 
suffering of Jews and other "non-desirables" at the hands of the Nazis to really begin to register with the German 
people at large. Indeed, this topic has fostered an historiography of its own. See for example, Bill Niven Ed., 
Germans as Victims, Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany. (Palgrave McMillan, 2006). Robert G 
Moeller. War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past.  
455 Both Nick Cullather and Michael Latham consider the role of social science and agricultural planning in 
relationship to US aid and policy objectives in the Middle East and Asia, but make little connection to the Marshall 
Plan and its predecessor---private Christian Aid to Germany (and Europe). Cullather's analysis of calorie counting 
and agricultural politics bears a striking resemblance to General Clay's insistence on 1500 calories for Germans 
during occupation. See Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia. 
(Harvard University Press, 2011.)  Michael Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development 
and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present. (Cornell University Press, 2011). 
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policy and the way in which key Protestant church leaders and laymen like Reinhold Niebuhr, 
John Foster Dulles and Samuel Calvert politicized the condition of Germans, significantly 
altered American occupation policy by portraying Germans not as violent Nazi savages, but as 
the pacified suffering victims of Adolf Hitler. This portrayal eventually gained more credence 
with both American policy makers and the general public, resulting in victories for key 
Protestant lobbying positions, including the right to offer Germans humanitarian aid, changes to 
the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 to allow Germans to claim asylum and enter into the United 
States and the inclusion of Germany into the Marshall Plan.456  
 
“The Christian World in Peril” Protestant Politicization of the Refugee Crisis  
  
Church leaders’ tours of Germany in the summer of 1945 emphasized the terrible condition of 
the country and its residents.457 With millions homeless, hundreds of thousands of Displaced 
Persons pouring into the country on a weekly basis, and the displacement of approximately 11.7 
million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, early church reports spoke of widespread 
destitution, failing nutrition, disease and poor health care.458 Pastors feared the political and 
cultural environment created by such difficult conditions would lead to a second totalitarian 
regime and possible war.   
Refugees topped the concerns of church leaders. Even as late as 1949, reports from 
church groups warned that “the reorientation of Germany [was being] critically hampered by the 
                                                 
456 In relation to Immigration reform, see lobbying on behalf of the NLC 3/3 Boxes 8-10. Evangelical Lutheran 
Church of America Archives (ELCA), Chicago, United States. The records of Robert E. Deusen, the Lutheran 
representative in Washington, show a continued push to include allow ethnic Germans to enter the United States 
after the Second World War. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 originally prohibited any Germans former German 
holdings in eastern Europe from entering the country.  
457 See Prologue 
458 See for example the following reports: Report from Visser 't Hooft on his trip through Germany, October 23th, 
1945, OMGUS 5/344-2/6. Z46, BAK Also report from Stewart Herman, POLA 737/3 October 1945. Z 46, BAK. 
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refugee issue.” Because of the dire material circumstances, American pastors believed refugees 
were vulnerable to totalitarian propaganda. “Unless some effective solution is found…” the 
report warned “…the expellee group will be ripe for picking my extremist leaders of the right or 
left.” The solution, they argued, was to notify the American public by any means necessary, 
including both church and secular presses.459 In truth, by 1949 American Protestants and 
Catholics had already been politicizing the refugee crisis for some time as part of their campaign 
to raise funds for the German churches.460 Still, the quote demonstrates the seriousness of the 
issue for ecumenical Protestants. Even after the passage of the Marshall Plan, the repatriation or 
emigration of the majority of DP’s and improving health and living standards in Germany, 
Protestants still saw the displacement of refugees as the central obstacle to a favorable 
rehabilitation of Germany. 
 Protestant leadership certainly internalized the call to action. Articles featuring or written 
by prominent Protestant leaders emphasized the prolonged negative effects of reduced caloric 
intake in Germany,461 pastor homelessness462 and severe shortages of clothing.463 Their rhetoric 
emphasized extreme hardship, most especially for children. One report noted that millions of 
children were now doing the “dance of death” in relation to food shortages. Quoting German 
bishop Otto Dibelius, the same report warned it was “impossible to save the children born in the 
years 1944 and 1945…” due to “tremendous scarcity of milk and other food products.”464 Still 
                                                 
459 Interview with Roswell Barnes and Paul Empie. August 18th, 1949. NLC 3/3 Box 8. Folder “NLC PR 
Washington Office Robert E van Deusen. 1949.” ELCA. 
460 See for example the following newspaper articles: Special to THE NEW,YORK TIMES. "CHRISTIAN WORLD 
DECLARED IN PERIL." New York Times (1923-Current File), Jan 22, 1947. "SECULARISM CALLED AID TO 
COMMUNISTS." New York Times (1923-Current File), May 29, 1948."Europe Needs Christian Aid, Says Dr. 
Bell." Chicago Daily Tribune (1923-1963), May 23, 1945."COMMUNISM SPREAD NOTED IN GERMANY." 
New York Times (1923-Current File), Jan 31, 1947. 
461 RELIEF ADVOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. (1945, Dec 03). New York Times (1923-Current File) 
462 CHURCHES PLIGHT IN EUROPE DEPICTED. New York Times (1923-Current File), Apr 28, 1947. 
463 RELIEF ADVOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. (1945, Dec 03). New York Times (1923-Current File) 
464 LUTHERANS SEEK AID FOR GERMANS. (1945, Oct 14). New York Times (1923-Current File). 
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others remarked that diseases such as tuberculous and continued weight loss were chronic 
problems resulting from the minimal caloric allotment for Germans.465 Another article described 
Germany as a “Wilderness of Want,” desperate and sure to fail without serious action. The 
article described the poor state of German health, food supplies and “degenerating morality.” 
The report included estimates that suggested the population of Germany would decline by over 
25 million people if the current food shortage continued.466 Such alarmist articles did much to 
foster sympathy and raise aid for German Churches and featured prominently in efforts to raise 
funds for refugees. 
Protestants’ rhetoric tended to connect the material crisis with spiritual failing and 
advocated Protestant unity as the only viable solution. Because of the gravity of the refugee 
crisis, ecumenical Protestants argued that only denominational unity could mobilize the 
necessary response to the underlying decline in moral values.467 One particular speech argued 
there was “…no other answer to confusion, political, economic and moral, but the Christian 
Church.”468  
In a notable article titled “The Fight for Germany,” published in Life magazine in 
October of 1946, Reinhold Niebuhr outlined why Russian actions in Germany demanded an 
American and Christian response. Niebuhr’s multifaceted argument clearly reflected rising Cold 
War tensions. He insisted that Soviet policy designed to spread communism signified that 
“Russia recognized the crucial character of the German questions long before we did,” and that 
only the united Catholic and Protestant forces of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) have 
                                                 
465 OUTLOOK FOR COMING WINTER IS DARK FOR MOST OF EUROPE. New York Times (1923-Current 
File), Dec 01, 1946. 
466 “Wilderness of Want” by E. Theodore Bachmann. Box 22 ETB and Postwar Germany 1947-1951. ELCA.  
467 "PROTESTANT UNITY IN EUROPE SOUGHT." New York Times (1923-Current File), Nov 29, 1945. Also, 
Van Deusen, Henry,P. "PROTESTANTS ARE UNITING." Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), Dec 04, 1949. 
468 "PROTESTANT UNITY IN EUROPE SOUGHT." New York Times (1923-Current File), Nov 29, 1945. 
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thus far staved off a “Russian ideological conquest” through the German Socialist Party 
(SPD).469 Moreover, Niebuhr specifically blamed Russians for the economic division of 
Germany, arguing “Russia will not permit it [economic unification] so long as she has hopes of 
conquering Germany ideologically through the economic misery created or accentuated by this 
disunity.”470 Given this reality, Niebuhr, like his colleagues, argued that building democracy and 
staving off Russian totalitarianism depended upon American humanitarian aid to Germany. 
Citing occupation welfare officers, Niebuhr estimated that some 20 million dollars would be 
needed just to provide elementary school children with a supplementary meal in the American 
zone alone.471 Niebuhr therefore dismissed both conservative and liberal American objections to 
American support for German reconstruction, arguing “A little more justice now would obviate 
the necessity of charity later.” While conservatives might object to the importance of free 
enterprise, Niebuhr countered some form of social constructivism was necessary to rehabilitate 
Europe and to reaffirm democracy. He contended a firm insistence on free market principles with 
democratic governance would not have much support in Europe. Niebuhr also opposed 
“misguided” liberals who might think such American action would provoke war through 
needless antagonism, by suggesting their position ignored the reality of Russian aims.472 In a 
direct comparison to Nazism, Niebuhr argued:  
Our tyrannical opponent is as unscrupulous as tyrannies always are. I am sure 
there were once more creative elements in Communism than in Nazism…But the 
actual tyranny which has emerged and the fanatic fury which has been 
generated…[is] not distinguishable from the practices derived from the purer 
paganism and cynicism…Since this new tyranny is not only unscrupulous but 
possesses the guile to exploit our moral and political weaknesses, it must be the 
business of a genuine liberalism not to relax our outer defense but to make our 
political and economic life more worth of our faith and therefore more 
                                                 
469 Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Fight for German,” Life. October 21, 1946. 65-72.  
470 Ibid, 66-68. 
471 Ibid, 70. 
472 Ibid, 70. 




Niebuhr’s comments stand out for several reasons. First, he positioned Germany as the 
central focus of the American dispute with Russia not only because of its economic capacity, but 
also because of the tremendous squalor in place. This indicates he subscribed to the popularly 
held belief that totalitarianism and communism relied upon economic squalor to spread. Second, 
his vilification of Stalinist Russia continued to affirm the need for the Dichotomy. His framing of 
the struggle as primarily ideological again concluded that what was needed to win the fight more 
so than anything else was an “impregnable” faith, capable of withstanding an ideological assault 
on Western (Christian) values. Third, his support for the CDU again served to bolster the 
Dichotomy’s claim that Christianity alone held back Soviet totalitarianism, this time by seeing 
through Soviet propaganda. Finally, his prescribed solution to the ordeal inevitably meant 
solving the terrible humanitarian and economic crisis in occupied Germany.        
The liberal Protestant journal the Christian Century also continually attacked Harry 
Truman’s initial refusal to allow relief from Church agencies to Germans. Lutheran Sylvester 
Michelfelder published a moving piece in January 1946 titled “O Come, Sweet Death”474 
detailing the rape of German women and children, the murder of innocent babies and extreme 
poverty of homeless Germans bemoaning his own incapacity to help given Allied Military 
Control policies.475 Robbins W. Barstow, director of European relief for the WCC, also appealed 
to the American public to beseech Washington to revisit their restrictive policies on Christian 
relief agencies noting complaining that “If Christian charity is not to be allowed to obey the 
scriptural injunction to go to the help of our late enemies, then that fact needs to be made explicit 
and the reasons for that decision should be explained…” Continuing, he remarked that 
                                                 
473 Ibid, 72.  
474 The title references a famous hymn from Johann Sebastian Bach.  
475 Sylvester C.  Michelfelder, “O Come, Sweet Death.” The Christian Century January 16th, 1946. 79-80.  
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“ordinarily it would not be necessary more than has already be done to register the rejection of 
the Potsdam folly…But it is now evident that…the time has come for a united expression of all 
the churches of America to break through the indifference and timidity of Washington (emphasis 
in original).476 The journal’s complaints at times even came paired next to articles describing the 
“crucible” faced by the German churches in the fight against paganism. 477 Even after restrictions 
were lifted the journals criticism continued, with one article boldly asking if the president was 
“callous” for not moving quick enough to delineate rules and extend aid.478   
In light of this evidence, it seems clear that church leaders politicized the refugee crisis 
from the standpoint of American foreign policy aims and humanitarian ethics. For Protestants, 
these issues were intrinsically linked together. The material squalor encouraged totalitarianism, 
which fundamentally threatened Christianity and by extension democracy and America’s hope in 
building a peaceful world order. Moreover, ignoring the material crisis deepened the spiritual 
crisis in the eyes of many Protestants. The human costs of German rehabilitation, Protestants 
likewise warned, not only encouraged communists and fascists, but also associated America with 
such ideologies. Only democratic governance based on Christian morality could solve the 
spiritual and structural crisis of Europe. The Protestant interpretation of the refugee crisis was 
therefore but a logical extension of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy.   
 
“With Malice Toward None, with Charity Toward All.” Aid Programs to Germany 
 
Most American aid to Germany arrived in one of three different ways. The most common form 
                                                 
476 “Let Washington Know!” The Christian Century. January 23rd, 1946. 102-104.   
477 See “Washington Bars Relief Anywhere in Germany,” “Who is Responsible for the Relief Run-Around?,” The 
Christian Century, January 30th, 1946. 131-132.   
478 See Ewart E. Turner, “German Churches in the Crucible,” “Lutherans Attack Ban on Relief” and “Is the 
President Callous,” The Christian Century, February 6th, 1946. 173-174. 180, 200-201.  
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of aid came directly from personal sources via CARE Packages. Unlike church directed forms of 
aid, CARE Packages could be sent directly to specific individuals, although a good majority of 
donations did not have a direct recipient in mind. The typical package included five pounds of 
milk powder, seven pounds of cheese, five pounds of rice and five pounds of beans.479 CARE 
packages made up the largest portion of humanitarian aid sent to Germany by far, with an 
estimated 600 million dollars reaching Germany between 1946-1947. With religious groups 
giving approximately 60% of all total care packages,480 CARE became the primary way 
Protestants offered Germans material support. The distribution of these packages was far less 
overtly political and proselytizing insofar as the packages did not contain any sort of religious 
pamphlets or, often, even return addresses. The aid also consisted almost entirely of foodstuffs, 





                                                 
479 http://www.care.org/impact/our-stories/care-history 
480 This statistic excludes individuals who may have also donated for religious reasons but did so privately instead of 
through a church organization.  
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 The second way church groups sent aid was through specific church organizations.481 
Organizations such as Church World Services, the collective charity arm of the Federal Council 
of Churches designed solely to raise funds for Europe after the war, gathered different materials 
specifically to suit the needs of particular congregations or localities. Aid sent through these 
institutions varied from construction materials for barracks churches to communion wine, 
although these charities also provided many tons of food stuffs and clothing as well. Still, such 
organizations tended to directly bolster the resumption of religious services. They often also sent 
religious reading material (the Bible being the most common gift) to ensure church services and 
missionary work could resume as soon as humanly possible. While monetarily direct institutional 
aid to German churches paled in comparison to that of CARE packages, the speed at which 
congregations received such material speaks to the effectiveness of organizations such as Church 
World Services. In many instances, it seems the local parish was the first structure rebuilt after 
wars end.482  
 Finally, Protestants also organized specific campaigns designed to raise both awareness 
and support for Germany. Likely the most successful fundraising campaigns came from the 
“Christian Rural Overseas Program” or “CROP,” which collected over 3,555 railway freight 
carloads full of food for distribution in Europe in 1948. To this effect, CROP marked one of the 
most successful examples of confessional cooperation between Catholics and Protestants. Others, 
such as the “Million Dollar Sermon” by Reverend Henry Knox Sherrill of the Presbyterian 
Church of America, also proved tremendously successful within individual denominations.483 
CROP itself came into being as a joint program between Lutheran World Relief, Church World 
                                                 
481 To see more on the origins of these institutions see Chapter 1.  
482 See for example the Church in Ostheim in prologue  
483 The Sermon, broadcast over radio to over ten million Protestants emphasized the “spiritual” problem of Europe 
and the need for material relief. See "'$1,000,000 SERMON' PREACHED BY RADIO." New York Times (1923-
Current File), Mar 01, 1948. 
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Services and Catholic Relief Services. The program emphasized the importance of foodstuffs for 
the spiritual and material peace of all mankind. Inspired by the Abraham Lincoln Friendship 
Train, an idea developed by Quaker muckraking journalist Drew Pearson which toured the 
country collecting food for Europe to prevent the spread of communism, CROP similarly sought 
to transport food to Europe (specifically Germany) to “spread peace amongst nations.”   
 
Figure 19: Abraham Lincoln Friendship Train, 1947  
 
 The CROP program typified the way in which church leadership sought to develop 
international harmony after the war. At a sendoff ceremony in Chicago on United Nations Day 
(October 24th) 1948, President of Lutheran World Relief Franklin Clark Fry remarked “The food 
which is represented by these bills of lading is blessed food, because it will contribute so many 
things that are good to the lives of those who eat it.”484 For church leaders, charity marked a way 
through which Christian America could promote its image of a postwar order. It represented not 
only the generosity and goodwill of man toward fellow man of Christianity, but also the 
abundance and freedom of the United States. Because CROP Freedom Trains came specifically 
                                                 
484 Undated press release of Church World Services. Sent to author from Ms. Lisa Hayes at Church World Services.  
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from the Heartland America, they encapsulated the superior morality of the American yeoman 
farmer, a fact not lost on organizers. As Fry put it “All honors, therefore, are due to the good 
sound common sense and good will of the farmers of America.”485  
 For Fry, charity epitomized the political potential of the universality of the Christian 
postwar order:  
…I see in these gifts the evidence of faith…It is because men have had faith in a 
good and living God that they have given their gifts and the gifts will be 
distributed in the name of that same love and of that same faith. They will be 
given to the people of every creed and of no creed at all. No one will attempt to 
use the gifts as a means of compelling others to any convictions. But in receiving 
these gifts, men will know that these things come from men who believe in God 
and who worship His Son.486 
 
His emphasis on sending food to all peoples of all creeds reveals the quiet political emphasis 
promoted by Christian Foreign Aid campaigns. Its implicit rejection of fierce nationalism, 
especially racialized nationalism, demonstrates how Church leaders believed they might win 
over hearts and minds through inclusion in a Universal Church.  
The campaigns set out to demonstrate the potential power of Christian charity in building 
world peace. That the campaigns emphasized both the centrality of Christian faith as the impetus 
for giving and the universal nature of recipients shows that American Protestants attempted to 
identify America with Christianity while also demonstrating the potential benefits Christianity 
might bring to the world. Giving through the church therefore became a way in which 
individuals could both practice their faith in practical terms while also heralding the benefits of 
faith and the concept of America and American democracy.  
While Germans who received American aid tended not to associate Christian charity with 
democracy, the aid did ease the transition from enemy to ally significantly. Instead, American 
                                                 
485 Ibid.  
486 Ibid.  
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charity demonstrated to Germans the generous and forgiving spirit of the American people, 
which they had assumed viewed them as bitter enemies.487 Report after report spoke of Germans 
greatly relieved to hear how much American congregations cared about their needs. A pastor in 
Hannover reported that the actual value of American giving was less important than the effect of 
CROP on Germans; They “had their faith in God and the Brotherhood of Man restored.”488   
Fundamentally, the universality of ecumenical Protestantism (indeed even ecumenical 
Christianity) promoted by aid programs offered Germans a path toward a new identity that 
emphasized forgiveness and peace. Both concepts appealed to Germans greatly after 1945, since 
years of hardship during the war and Allied accusations about universal guilt fostered feelings of 
intransigence amongst many Germans. That ecumenical Protestantism also shared with it a place 
for Germany in a new international world order and carried with it undercurrents of anti-
Semitism and traditional bourgeois values about sex and gender likely also appealed to German 
conservatives looking for a way forward after the Third Reich.489 
 
Vengeful Jews and The Christian Man 
 
Because ecumenical Protestantism required German participation both in terms of political and 
spiritual unity, many American church leaders viciously condemned Allied policies they saw as 
antagonistic toward the Christian World Order. From this perspective, any policy that attempted 
to single out German barbarism during the war threatened to deepen the divide between German 
and non-German churches. Moreover, any policy that threatened a resurgence of totalitarianism 
                                                 
487 There is likely good reason for this. Many Americans did tend to conceive of Germans only as Nazis. Years of 
Nazi propaganda similarly portrayed the Americans as unforgiving and dominated by “Jewish” interests, even if the 
racialization of America was not as strong in Nazi propaganda as Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia. Add source.  
488 CROP report Vol. III No. 7 PP. 9-12 (Sept. 1, 1950). Sent to author from Ms. Hayes at Christian World Services.  
489 I expand on these ideas greatly in Chapter 5 using the Protestant Kirchentag as a case study.  
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in Germany similarly threatened the ecumenical postwar order via the confines of the Christian-
Totalitarian Dichotomy. In this vein, ecumenical Protestants naturally lined up against “hard” 
peace policies such as the Morgenthau Plan and certain aspects of the Potsdam Agreement, 
which emphasized German war crimes and German militarism in their arguments for greatly 
restricting German economic output and territorial loss. For many church leaders, however, 
Jewish ‘vengeance’ clouded the judgement of those supporting a “hard peace.” For them, a hard 
peace not only represented the “unchristian” principle of revenge, but also reinforced a form of 
savage and barbaric masculinity in opposition to the idealized benevolent Christian father.  
 The reasons American Protestants associated vengeance with Jews are not immediately 
clear. It may relate to Henry Morgenthau, Roosevelt’s Secretary of Treasury from 1934-1945 
and architect of the proposed “Morgenthau Plan” which considered deindustrializing Germany in 
its entirety prior to the end of the Second World War, being Jewish. It may relate to the role of 
Jewish petitioning for international and federal aid in response to the Holocaust, aid which was 
subsequently denied to Germans. Likely too, their association with German pastors influenced 
their judgement, particularly concerning disputes with German clergy and Allied prosecutors 
with Jewish ancestry during war crimes and denazification trials.490 The prevalence of Jews 
amongst communist leadership in Poland and Hungry during the hijacking of Eastern European 
democracy could have also factored into play.491 Undoubtedly, such an association would not 
have been possible without pre-exiting prejudices on the part of American Protestants. While 
their writings never mention specific Jewish actors or organizations, many American Protestants 
conflated German suffering with Jewish suffering and believed “Jewish” forces to be arrayed 
                                                 
490 For instance, Steven Remy demonstrates how Bishop Wurm directly challenged prosecuting attorney German-
Jewish emigre Robert Kempner during the Malmedy Massacre Trials, and openly referred to the trials as 
miscarriages of justice designed to punish “innocent” Germans by vengeful Jews. Remy, Malmedy Massacre. 200-
212.  
491 Judt, Postwar, 181.  
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against them. The most egregious examples of anti-Semitism also tended to come from 
American Lutherans, and often those of German descent with time spent living abroad in 
Germany. 
American Lutheran Stewart W. Herman typified Protestant attitudes toward Jews. His 
published works and reports to Allied command sought to exculpate German Protestants by 
misrepresenting the Confessing Church's record toward Jews during the Third Reich.492493 In his 
1946 publication The Rebirth of the German Churches, Herman compared the persecution of 
Jews during the Third Reich and Germans in the postwar period. He quoted Pastor Heinrich 
Grüber (whom Herman rightly described as a courageous supporter of Jews and non-Aryans)494 
uncritically: "I know what the Jews suffered. I shared the tortures of the concentration camps, but 
that which is now taking place before our own eyes far exceeds all that has hitherto been known, 
in extent or kind,"495 and even went so far as to compare the Polish treatment of Germans to that 
of the Nazis, stating that "not even the Jews in Germany had been so badly treated, at least 
until...Hitler discovered that there was no where else to drive them except into the death camps 
of Poland..."496  
Herman's relative disregard for Jewish suffering and his willingness to condemn Polish, 
French and Russian atrocities reveal his great sympathy toward the German people and his lack 
of compassion for their victims. To a degree, Herman at least acknowledged the treatment of 
                                                 
492 Herman’s broader efforts to influence and control Allied and public perceptions of the German churches are 
detailed in the Chapter 2.  
493 Stewart Herman. The Rebirth of the German Church. 28-29.   
494 Grüber was one of the few Protestant pastors who made a serious attempt to protect “racially” Jewish converts to 
Protestantism, and even some non-converts. He was particularly active in hiding of several Berlin Jews after 
Kristallnacht, also aiding in the release and eventual emigration of several others who had been arrested by the 
Gestapo. He was arrested in late 1939 and imprisoned in Sachsenhausen concentration camp, transferred to Dachau 
and released in 1943.  
495 Ibid, 230. 
496 Ibid, 236. It should be noted that Tom Lawson incorrectly cites this quote as coming from page 219. Lawson also 
misrepresents Herman, quoting only the first line of the above quote and failing to mention that Herman at least 
acknowledged the death camps.  
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Jews, but his quick dismissal of their suffering likely reflected his Protestant upbringing, 
especially since he spent a good part of the 1930s and the entirety of the war in Europe where he 
would likely have not have been exposed to the new alliance between American Catholics, Jews 
and Protestants during the war at home.497  
 Herman's primary objection to Allied policy was its vindictiveness. For him, every such 
policy, varying from Potsdam, to the use of the Atomic bomb in Japan to denazification, 
betrayed Christian principles.498 Such policies he argued, only increased "despair" and ended any 
"hope" Germans had for the future. While the German churches attempted to alleviate the despair 
as best they could, Allied policy greatly hampered their efforts to restore "morality" and "joy" in 
Germany. 
His comparison of German and Jewish suffering capped off a campaign to claim German 
victimhood. Indeed, virtually every chapter of The Rebirth of the German Church emphasized 
the suffering of Germans, with his last two chapters especially portraying Germany as a broken 
and desperate nation in need of Christian mercy. This worldview explains Herman’s analysis of 
the Potsdam Agreements. For him, the sanctioned population transfer of Germans undermined 
both the credibility of the Allies and the credibility of Christianity. Given the narrative of both 
the American churches and the German churches allowed for only two possible political 
outcomes, from Herman's perspective any action on the part of the Allies that betrayed his 
understanding of Christianity by extension gave credence to the totalitarian enemy. His harsh 
critiques of the Allies as "unchristian" and his strong condemnation of Russian and Polish 
                                                 
497 The advent of war fostered considerable unity between Protestants, Catholics and Jews in the United States, who, 
through the directives of the NCCJ (National Council for Christians and Jews), promoted a unified Judeo-Christian 
American identity. Their campaign, which included significant public outreach via press, film and sponsored tours 
of US military bases, did much to foster unity. See Kevin Schultz, Tri-Faith America.  
498 Ibid, 269. Herman notes specifically that the use of the Atomic bomb brought "A tidal wave of political 
cynicism...[in which] whole populations were drenched, if not drowned, in an attitude of hopeless dismay which 
infected victor and vanquished alike."  
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actions towards Germans in Eastern Europe likely raised a few eyebrows. His introduction for 
example, argued that "The Potsdam Policy...seems to be no less detrimental to the Christian 
cause than Hitler's Nuremberg decrees."499 In this respect Herman specifically referred to the 
forced expulsion of Germans from Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. He continually 
castigated the Allies for allowing the Poles to forcibly remove the Germans from their homes, 
leaving millions of people destitute and homeless. He even suggested that to some degree the 
Allies themselves were committing mass murder, since "...there was no area in Germany, or in 
Europe for that matter, where they [German refugees] could go with some assurance of finding 
food and lodging."500  
Herman’s arguments, while perhaps more extreme than many of his colleagues, were not 
especially unique. German-emigre Professor Otto A. Piper, a notable biblical scholar at 
Princeton Theological Seminary and German veteran of the Western Front during the First 
World War, wrote a scathing letter to the World Council of Churches condemning the hypocrisy 
of Allied statements of moral law and justice at the Nuremburg trials with the blatant disregard 
for atrocities committed against ethnic Germans. He too used the Holocaust as a frame of 
reference stating, “But the same [concentration] camps are now used by Czechs, Poles and 
Russians; and the interned Germans die at the same speedy rate in the Stadium in Prague, in 
Auschwitz and Myslewicze as did the Jews and the opponents of the Nazis until a year ago.”501  
The Protestant effort to push this narrative made similar claims denouncing American 
initiatives in Germany as “starve[ation] policy.” Joined by Catholics and members of the 
Missouri Synod, the Federal Council of Churches denounced restrictions on religious 
                                                 
499 Herman, The Rebirth of the German Church.  
500 Ibid, 217.  
501 Letter from Piper to Ecumenical Committee for Refugees, March 19th, 1946. Pg. 2. YDS- 17. WWII Era Records 
of the WCC. United States of America Microform No 5.    
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humanitarian aid entering Germany.502 In preparation for a joint meeting between the three 
groups, executive director of the Missouri Synod Lawrence Meyer stated, “I do not think the 
Christians of this country, nor millions of other Americans, would want democracy to sentence 
people of other nations to slow death by starvation.”503  
Sylvester C. Michelfelder, an American Lutheran of German descent who served as a 
representative in the World Council of Churches, similarly rejected the “Jewish” position of 
“vengeance” against Germans. While sympathetic to the Jews, Michelfelder nonetheless 
condemned Jewish actions as “shortsighted.” In a letter to his friend and eventual director of 
Lutheran World Action, Paul C. Empie, Michelfelder wrote, “Now I do not underestimate the 
injustice which the Germans have perpetrated against the Jews…if however, the spirit of these 
vengeance loving Jews can influence the politics of the world, then Hitler really won the war…” 
The problem with such “vengeful Jews,” Michelfelder warned, was that the Soviets were sure to 
take advantage of the situation. “Bolshevism,” he noted, “has always prospered in an atmosphere 
of confusion.”504  
Michelfelder’s opposition to the “Jewish” position bordered on the conspiratorial. He 
warned Empie in 1945 that the “[The Jews] have their noses in everything,”505 and proposed that 
Ralph Long make a poster out of an anti-Semitic painting from a deceased friend of Swiss 
painter Max Huber which depicted the parable of the good Samaritan. The painting Michelfelder 
noted, “The picture of the Levite is there in full length, looking down his nose with his huge 
moneybag in his hand…The jackass that looks around the tree has more love and sympathy in 
                                                 
502 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed description of this policy and religious efforts to change it. 
503 25. John Evans, "CHURCH EDITOR DENOUNCES U. S. 'STARVE POLICY'." Chicago Daily Tribune (1923-
1963), Jan 09, 1946. 
504 Letter to Paul Empie, December 28th, 1945. NLC 2/3/2 Box 1. Folder titled “NLC- Long LWF-USA 
Michelfelder, Sylvester C. Aug-DEC.” ELCA. 
505 Ibid.  
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the eyes than there is in the eyes of the Levite.”506 Michelfelder’s vivid description of the 
painting and the broader context of his letters to America strongly suggests he found the painting 
applicable to the current political situation in Germany. This is significant for multiple reasons. 
First, his description and use of “Jewish noses” represents a continuation of existing anti-Semitic 
stereotypes somewhat surprising considering Michelfelder’s awareness of the Holocaust. The 
anti-Semitic depiction of the Levite as both wealthy and selfish was likewise a familiar trope 
amongst anti-Semites. Most importantly though, the depiction of Germans as beaten and half-
dead again reinforced the motif of German victimhood. Michelfelder’s depiction of Germans as 
the victims of the war emerged ironically in direct contrast to the Jewish Levite, whose wealth 
and indifference to the victim’s plight was an affront to Christian morality.      
Robert E. van Deusen, the main representative of the Evangelical Lutheran Churches of 
America in Washington D.C., similarly observed the negative effects of “Jewish influence” in 
relation to Lutheran attempts to reform the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 to include ethnic 
Germans. Jews and their allies he complained, sought to unfairly prohibit any person who had 
registered with the Nazi Party from entering the country, regardless of individual 
circumstances.507  
Protestant opposition to these so called Jewish influences related to their understanding of 
Christian masculinity. Professor Otto A. Piper framed his critique of the brutal sexual violence 
committed by Soviet soldiers during the conquest of Berlin from the perspective of the ideal 
                                                 
506Letter to Ralph Long, October 11th, 1945. NLC 2/3/2 Box 1. Folder titled “NLC- Long LWF-USA Michelfelder, 
Sylvester C. AUG-DEC.” ELCA. Michelfelder also remarked that he was sending a picture of himself standing in 
front of the painting and was hoping to have a copy made, but regrettably neither survived in the archival records. 
Jesus’s parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37) tells of a traveler [likely Jewish] beaten and robbed lying 
half-dead on the road. First a priest and a Levite come by, but both avoid the victim. Finally, a Samaritan (who 
typically hated Jews) passes by and helps the injured man, paying for food and lodging at a nearby inn---The parable 
resulted in the colloquial phrase “The Good Samaritan.”  
507See Letter from Van Deusen to a O.E. Hill, December 16th, 1950. NLC 3/3 Box 12. Folder title “Washington 
Office Van Deusen, Robert 1950.” ELCA. 
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biblical patriarch, asking “Do we have so little regard for the honor of our wives that we can 
keep silence when we see how any stranger in uniform is allowed to soil the pure bodies of 
mothers and faithful wives and to infect their system with the poison of venereal disease?”508  
Piper’s response to the violent resettlement of the ethnic Germans and the crimes of 
Soviet soldiers against German women typified that of American Protestants. They saw, perhaps 
justifiably, a willingness on the part of American leadership to turn a blind eye toward the 
violent realization of the Potsdam agreement and the end of the War. Moreover, they would 
interpret this “indifference” as a threat to the moral postwar order they hoped to create. The rape 
of “pure” German mothers threatened their understanding of the ideal male who protected the 
honor and modesty of his wife and daughters, while also indirectly threatening the health of “our 
boys” who were likely to encounter German women during occupation. In this sense, the rape of 
German women threatened to poison both the US soldier who had served with honor and the 
traditional German family which most Christians tended to see as the foundation of a moral 
society.509  
Some Protestant pastors, concerned about the “staggering immorality” in American 
occupied Germany, even advocated for a “cooling off period” between perspective American 
service men and German or Austrian women before permitting marriage. The plan encouraged 
sending troops back stateside for “a few months,” to determine if they “really want a German or 
Austrian bride.” The same article also advocated not stationing “boys” under the age of 21 in 
Germany or Austria because of how “relatively easily such…boys get into trouble.”510 
                                                 
508 Ibid, pg. 3-4. 
509 This was true in both the US and German case. See Petra Godde, GI’s and Fräuleins and Maria Höhn GIs and 
Fräuleins. Concern about venereal disease effecting US soldiers was a major concern for both Allied command and 
concerned Christians. This was also one of the main justifications for the “No Fraternization” policy designed to 
keep German women and US soldiers separated.  
510 Special to THE NEW,YORK TIMES. "4 U.S. CLERGYMEN URGE HASTE ON AID." New York Times (1923-
Current File), Oct 05, 1947. 
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 American Church leaders also took ques from their German counterparts. Hans 
Asmussen argued the average German sought a “father, a mother…and brothers and sisters.” He 
needed “…a unity fathered around the family table for a family life.” If the Allied powers could 
not grant Germans that much, then “…nothing remains for us, the lowest of all men, the most 
despised, the nation at whom one points.”511 Asmussen’s emphasis on restoring family life 
relates to Piper’s condemnation of Soviet aggression. For Piper, the hypocrisy of an American 
policy designed to uphold basic principles of moral and legal justice that ignored the crimes of its 
Allies undermined both the credibility of the Allies, as perceived representatives of the Christian 
West, and by extension weakened the credibility of democracy and Christianity. Any policy not 
in full agreement with church leaders’ interpretation of Christian morality implicitly encouraged 
the sort of degenerate morals that church leaders believed facilitated the rise of nihilism in 
Europe.  
 American and German concerns for the family stemmed in part from the disruptive 
nature of the occupation. Because German women far outnumbered German men (160 to 100 
from ages 20-40 in 1946)512 and often lived and worked with American soldiers they depended 
for foodstuffs and everyday materials, social conservatives continually expressed anxiety about 
the status of the German family. Black market trading and the great the material gap between 
American soldiers and German women often resulted in de-facto prostitution and sexual 
exchanges for status, comfort, entertainment.513 Many of these relationships also turned 
marriages, especially as American soldiers continued to be stationed in Germany in large 
                                                 
511 Undated lecture from Pfarrer Asmussen at Marburg University. POLA 5/341-2/34-43. Z46, BAK. 
512 Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans, 44.  
513 Ibid, 134. Goedde likewise argues that many concerns arose about the “nihilistic” tendencies of German youth 
were not by products of such relationships.   
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numbers throughout the Cold War.514 These conditions led many to see the occupation period as 
one of intense sexual promiscuity and immorality.515    
 Vengeful policies therefore threatened every aspect of ecumenical Protestants’ vision for 
the post world order. Much like many postwar German historians, American Protestants believed 
vengeful impulses clouded Jewish judgement.516 Such policies threatened their visions for the 
future on three separate fronts. First and foremost, "vengeful” policy presented unchristian 
values as American values. This fundamentally challenged American Protestants’ conceptions 
national identity, but also threatened to give Germans a negative impression of American justice 
and democracy. Relatedly, these unchristian policies encouraged radical materialist and nihilist 
sentiment amongst Germans. Communism and Fascism, they believed, relied upon disorder and 
the sort of moral depravity that accompanied material shortages. By severely punishing Germans 
America encouraged communism.   
Third, “hard peace” policies disrupted German families, dishonored German women and 
encouraged conduct in men that undermined the moral integrity of the ideal Christian man. By 
displacing German families in Poland, raping German women in Berlin and starving or 
imprisoning German men, Allied authorities fostered a depraved environment ripe for a return of 
extremism. That this environment threatened to erode the morals of American soldiers through 
fraternization with single, widowed or lonely German women doubled their anxiety. As the 
bedrock of the postwar Christian world order, the ideal Christian family could restore stability in 
Germany by ordering the “aimless” German youth through patriarchal authority and proper 
                                                 
514 See Maria Höhn, GIs and Fräuleins.  
515 Elizabeth Heineman,  "The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany's "Crisis Years" and West German 
National Identity." The American Historical Review 101, no. 2 (1996): 354-95. Also Herzog, Sex After Fascism, 
chapter 2.  
516 Benjamin Carter Hett, “This Story Is about Something Fundamental”: Nazi Criminals, History, Memory and the 
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feminine child-rearing.  
Finally, ecumenical Protestants feared a return of theological isolationism and 
nationalism which, along with the war, had shattered the unity of the ecumenical movement in 
the interwar years.517 Because of the moral questions raised by Nazism and the political 
consequences of the Second World War, Germany would function as the battleground for the 
spiritual soul of Europe. Moreover, as the birthplace of Protestantism, Germany held symbolic 
value for Lutherans in both America and the rest of Europe. The moral superiority of the 
Christian World Order could therefore be proven in the struggle to rehabilitate Germany, and 
therefore depended upon its success.   
 
“That is not Christian!” The Churches and the Moral Imperative of the Marshall Plan 
 
As American policy makers began to consider broader aid packages to Europe in 1947 and 
tensions with the Soviet Union likewise increased, American Church leaders voiced their 
wholehearted support of the Marshall Plan. In 1948, the Federal Council of Churches petitioned 
Congress directly, stating “We believe that the motives and objectives behind the Program 
should be essentially moral and spiritual…We appeal to the Congress of the United States to 
adopt such legislation…” The Program, the FCCoC argued, had the potential to represent the 
generous Christian nature of America which could “stand above politics.” 518  
The Marshall Plan, as ecumenical Christians understood it, demonstrated the way in 
which Christian ethics might be applied to foreign policy decisions. Stewart Herman, in a 
missive in the New York Times, claimed the Marshall Plan was “nearer to being Christian than 
                                                 
517 Thompson, For God and Globe, see chapters 2-4 on Oxford Conference in 1937. 
518 “Petition to the Congress of the United States in Support of the European Recovery Program.” March, 1948.  
PHSA. RG 18 32 22.  
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anything offered to Europe by a single government or by a group of governments for more than a 
generation.”519 The New York Episcopal Bishop Charles Gilbert claimed the proposal for 
European recovery “should have support of Christians everywhere…” and was opposed only by 
“those whose concern [was] limited to selfish partisan and political ambitions.”520 For them, the 
Marshall Plan revealed the potentials of a foreign policy constructed on Christian principles.  
Protestant leadership therefore understood and politicized the Marshall Plan less as an 
attempt to foster free market capitalism in Europe and more as a vital piece of humanitarian 
legislation similar to their original call for European aid.521 The Human Relations Commission of 
the Protestant Council of New York City recorded itself “as supporting in full measure the 
purposes embodied in the constructive approach of Secretary Marshall…because Europe is in 
increasingly desperate emergency.”522 Everett Clinchy, President of the National Council for 
Christians and Jews and an ordained Presbyterian Minister, argued the Marshall Plan could only 
be successful if the reconstruction of Germany also implemented a “spiritual” solution to the 
feeling of “hopelessness” prevalent amongst many Germans. If “the disease of materialism,” he 
warned, “was not cured soon…she [Europe] will go down and in all probability carry with her 
the whole of Western civilization.”523 Both Clinchy and the Council’s statements demonstrate 
that Protestants continued to understand aid packages to Europe, even massive government 
packages like the Marshall Plan, as a source of humanitarian aid. Moreover, leaders such as 
                                                 
519 FOREIGN AID URGED ON SPIRITUAL BASIS: Christian Reconstruction Must ... New York Times (1923-
Current file); Nov 19, 1947; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times pg. 3 
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Clinchy understood and interpreted the origins of the Second World War within the context of 
the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy.   
In fact, support for the Program amongst the upper echelons of mainline Protestantism 
was so common that one Wisconsin pastor complained that just because his denomination had 
approved of the Plan he had been urged to become its “propagandist,” after having received a 
directive encouraging clergymen and congregations to vote and pray in favor of the Marshall 
Plan. The directive, he complained, encouraged pastors to not only personally “write, wire or 
interview their senators and congressmen to put pressure on them to support the plan,” but also 
encourage their congregations to do the same.524     
 Allen Dulles, brother of John Foster Dulles and eventual head of the CIA, likewise 
conceptualized the Marshall Plan as something larger than material aid. Dulles, in a statement 
supporting Stewart Herman’s affirmation of the Christian reconstruction of Germany, argued for 
a “Marshall Plan of the Spirit” for all of Europe. Dulles said “Appropriation of money or grants 
of food, fuel and the tools for material rehabilitation are not enough.” Such a plan he continued, 
“could only be provided by the people of the United States, not by Congress. The churches 
should be one of the main vehicles in helping make this plan concrete, and then in carrying it 
out.”525 Dulles’ argument here demonstrates the saliency of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy 
amongst leading American church figures and key political figures they associated with. The 
emphasis on spiritual rehabilitation as a crucial supplement to material aid corresponded 
precisely with the arguments church leadership had espoused throughout the War and certainly 
in its immediate aftermath. Moreover, Dulles’s logic presumed the effectiveness of Christianity 
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as a mechanism for restoring Europe’s moral center.        
By the time the Plan reached the floor of Congress, Protestant church groups had already 
succeeded in associating the Marshall Plan with Christian charity. In a speech on the floor of the 
Senate in 1948, Senator Clive Hoey of North Carolina emboldened Congress not to abandon 
Europe a second time:  
In an all-out effort to win the war and preserve our liberty and freedom…we gave 
prodigally of men and money…Now, while the sweet incense of that sacrifice is 
still ascending to high heaven, shall we abandon the altar, quench the fire, 
extinguish the flame, and walk away to our own complacent selves, muttering that 
we have done all that we intend to do…? That is not American, that is not 
humanitarian, that is not Christian!”526 
 
Hoey’s sacralizing rhetoric not only described the American effort in the Second World War as a 
holy act, but also linked together American national identity with Christianity. The portrayal of 
the Marshall Plan as selfless Christian charity demonstrated the effectiveness of church 
campaigns to politicize and prioritize the material squalor of Europe.  
 The proximity of the debate over the Marshall Plan with the Berlin Airlift, which began 
just a few short months after Hoey’s speech, reinforced the Protestant mission in Germany. In 
response to both the Allied intention to establish a separate West German State in June of 1948 
and the issuing of a new currency (Deutsche Mark,) Soviet officials responded with a new 
currency of their own and the cutting of rail lines and roadways into Western Berlin. The 
American response to airlift their own provisions into the now isolated city resulted in the 
shipping over 2.3 million tons of food over 277,500 flights over eleven months.527 Cold War 
propaganda quickly celebrated the Airlift’s success in ending the Soviet blockade, praising 
American and British ingenuity for “saving” 2.5 million “starving” Berliners, even though Soviet 
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officials repeatedly offered West Berlin coal and food. While the airlift undoubtedly solidified 
the importance of humanitarian aid in the fight against communism and strengthened American 
nationalistic-globalism, it came as a logical conclusion of the longstanding Protestant insistence 




 In summation, private Protestant aid to Germany politicized the treatment of ethnic 
Germans under occupation by portraying American policies as “unchristian” and “vengeful.” 
Such “Jewish influences,” they feared, would deepen the spiritual and material crisis of Europe, 
opening the door for a second “totalitarian” regime. In lobbying on behalf of Germans, American 
Protestants sought to challenge American isolationism by arguing for the necessity of a 
“Christian” outlook on foreign policy. In so doing, they sacralized American democratic state 
building in Germany by portraying American efforts as part of God’s purpose.  
 Furthermore, both Protestant critiques of the forced resettlement of ethnic Germans and 
their strong opposition to “hard” peace proposals, eased Germany’s transition from enemy to ally 
in the eyes of the many Americans. By portraying Germans as victims of Nazism and draconian 
Allied policy, Protestant leaders effectively built up sympathy and support for Germans in 
America, as demonstrated by the effectiveness of their various fundraising activities. Such 
arguments made room for the Marshall Plan within the scope of American politics, and certainly 
facilitated the inclusion of Germany into such programs. After all, the Marshall Plan, in some 
ways, built upon the foundation of private aid started overwhelmingly by church organizations. 
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Chapter 5: Save Mankind! Building an Imagined Protestant Political Community at the German 
Kirchentag, 1949-1961   
 
On a warm afternoon in July 1951, over two-hundred and fifty-thousand congregants packed the 
Berlin Olympic Stadium beyond capacity, chanting and singing in a dramatic mass rally. 
Germans from far and wide came to hear speeches, participate in group study sessions and enjoy 
entertainment from a large chorus with a supporting brass band. Towering high above the main 
entrance of the stadium stood a massive wooden cross.528 This was the closing ceremony of third 
annual Protestant Kirchentag.529 As participants departed the stadium, they passed by numerous 
signs declaring: Wir Sind Doch Brüder! (We Are Still Brothers!), an obvious attempt to foster 
emotions of Christian and German unity despite Germany's (and Berlin's) divided status. Even 
after the end of formal proceedings, people lined the still war-damaged streets of Berlin, singing 
in unison the refrain to Martin Luther's "A Mighty Fortress is Our God," which just over a 
decade earlier had served as the rallying hymn of their heroes the Confessing Church.530 
Yet, the Protestant Kirchentag was much more than an annual rally531 and display of 
Christian faith. By 1951, it had grown into the signature public event of German Protestantism. 
The tremendous mass rallies, while easily the most visible and recognizable feature of the 
Kirchentage, only represented the program's final component, the closing ceremony.532 The full 
                                                 
528 Berlin 1951: Der Deutsche Evangelische Kirchentag in Wort und Bild. Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag 
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event entailed a five-day series of speeches, conferences, study sessions, open public discourse, 
public prayers and music. Throughout the 1950s, the Kirchentage brought together clergy and 
lay-Protestants from all across divided Germany, including a considerable number of attendees 
from the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) who crossed into the West to attend. 
These participants held a range of political and theological positions, which made the 
Kirchentag’s stated principle of ‘political neutrality’ progressively more difficult to maintain as 
the decade wore on. Nonetheless, because of the program's lack of an ostensible political 
message, it offered open political space for an engagement with several burning issues in the 
early history of the Federal Republic, namely the Nazi Past, sexual politics, rearmament, and the 
Cold War. The Kirchentag therefore represented an attempt to negotiate the practical realities of 
the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy, now that direct Western oversight of German affairs had 
ended and the immediate material crisis of the postwar years had abated.  
 Above all, the Kirchentag movement attempted to control the perceived instability of 
democracy through the creation of an imagined Protestant political community characterized by 
strong leadership, idealized gender roles and a commitment to Christian morality. This attempt 
resembles what Dagmar Herzog has called a “normalization strategy,” specifically aimed at “the 
construction of a wholly new version of the Third Reich.”533 Organizers theorized that by 
mobilizing lay Protestants into a unified and active community in both the church and politics at 
large, the church could confront directly the "totalitarian” forces that threatened Germany, and 
by extension, Christianity and the World at large. Only Christianity, which ecumenical 
Protestants positioned as the antithesis of materialism, secularism and nihilism, could “Save 
                                                                                                                                                             
history, bringing together 650,000 and 600,000 Germans, respectively. It is also worth mentioning that the 
Kirchentag also attracted a number of international and ecumenical participants, although in relatively small 
numbers in the 1950s, Frankfurt saw the highest turnout of 1,700 such persons. See Meet the Church: The Growth of 
the Kirchentag Idea in Europe. (World Council of Churches, 1959), 7.  
533 Herzog, Sex After Fascism, 107.  
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Mankind” from powers.534 While Protestantism's internal divisions prohibited this imagined 
community from ever fully materializing, certain themes such as family politics and the 
reunification of East and West Germany did produce moments of unity. As the 1950's progressed 
the Kirchentag functioned unintentionally as a sort of laboratory for democracy, encouraging 
participation and the acceptance of differing political opinions for the sake of Protestant unity. 
While initially the Kirchentag reinforced authoritarian qualities of the Adenauer regime by 
emphasizing the importance of powerful executive authority and a rejection of political 
compromise, by the end of the 1950s Kirchentag participants had largely come to accept political 
pluralism, somewhat reluctantly, as a natural part of democratic society.    
 This chapter considers the origins of the Kirchentag idea and its relationship to West 
German politics during the 1950's. I argue that the Kirchentag program's attempt to build an 
imagined Protestant political community reflected Protestants' underlying attitudes about the 
inadequacy of democracy and a firm desire to restore order, which they conceived as the 
reconstruction of the paternal family and the reunification of Germany. This desired community 
never fully materialized and instead unintentionally fostered political pluralism through a set of 
mutually reinforcing actions. The more Protestants attempted to build a coherent platform, the 
more pronounced their internal political divisions became. The more they attempted to influence 
politics and restore 'order,' the more often they resorted to political compromise. The more they 
attempted to tame the forces of democracy, the more they participated in the democratic process, 
thereby strengthening its extra-institutional support and undergirding its values. Herbert 
                                                 
534 I will provide some examples of the way in which this concept manifested itself at the Protestant Kirchentage, 
but many other scholars have also remarked upon the fact that German Protestants tended to see Christianity as the 
only alternative to Soviet Communism in the postwar period. See for example, Michael Inacker’s observations on 
Martin Niemöller’s thoughts on Germany’s future in the postwar period (Christianity or communism) in his book: 
Michael J. Inacker, Zwischen Transzendenz. Maria Mitchell also notes something similar in her essay: Mitchell, 
Maria. "Materialism and Secularism.”  
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Butterfield’s interpretation of the Protestant Reformation in his important book The Whig 
Interpretation of History, might make an apt comparison. Just as Butterfield argues the 
Reformation attempted to reassert religious authority but instead brought about pluralism, so too 
did the Kirchentag through its attempted re-forging of a German national community through the 
rehabilitation of German conservativism.535  
Ironically, Protestants' acceptance of democracy emerged not from a desire to foster 
political coalitions or promote diversity, but rather through an attempt to dominate and 
commandeer the political process to safeguard German society from what they saw as an 
inherently weak state and moral decay brought about by parliamentary governance and its 
presumably inevitable degeneration into totalitarianism. In this way, the Kirchentag sought to 
construct a German identity posited as an antithesis of National Socialist “totalitarianism,” 
thereby creating a “useable past” for a new postwar Germany based upon Christianity.536 This 
identity clashed considerably with Catholic inclusion in the Dichotomy, just as its begrudging 
acceptance of democracy conflicted with Protestant understandings of State’s role in society.   
 The Kirchentag, with its emphasis on national unity, confessional identity, massive 
crowds and grand spectacles, was an attempt by moderate national-conservative Protestants to 
utilize the effective political mobilization of the Nazis for their own benefit. In this respect, the 
Kirchentag represented a continuation of certain aspects of Nazi political mechanisms and values 
                                                 
535 See Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History. (W. W. Norton & Company, 1965). For the 
Reformation and religious authority see pages 50-61. For accidental pluralism see 82-90. The comparison is not 
perfect of course. Butterfield argues the Reformation emerged in a moment in which liberalizing secularizing forces 
were challenging church authority all across Europe. The Reformation initially therefore, should be understood, at 
least in part, as an effort to reframe religious authority in the face of such powers. However, the disagreements and 
violence that emerged in response to Protestantism eventually resulted in pluralism. The Kirchentag comparison is 
similar in so far as it attempted to reframe conservatism after the disastrous results of National Socialism. But when 
disagreements emerged within this reframing of community, pluralism emerged.  
536 Robert Moeller argues one of the primary difficulties in building community in postwar Germany stemmed from 
the fact that any sort of nationalist sentiment would inherently be contaminated by National Socialism. Instead, a 
shared sense of victimhood and the insistence that “totalitarian” forces were a European, not just a German, 
problem, made space for a new sense of political unity. See Robert G Moeller. War Stories: The Search for a Usable 
Past. 
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during the 1950s, including an emphasis on community, anti-communism, centralized state 
authority, public spectacle and nationalism.537 This likely brought an air of familiarity to the 
program for the average attendee and increased its drawing power. As such, the Kirchentag 
facilitated the transition toward democracy by espousing a common spiritual-national identity by 
means of familiar political mechanisms through which Germans could reorient themselves to 
new political realities and norms. Unlike church leaders such as Martin Niemöller and future 
Bundespräsident and prominent Protestant politician Gustav Heinemann, who emphasized a 
need to engage with the Nazi past and to examine the crimes of the Church, the Kirchentag 
movement focused on the here and now, something that resonated with most Germans who had 
suffered tremendously under Hitler (once the war tipped unarguably against Germany). Such 
rhetoric distanced Germans from their own complicity in Nazi war crimes, often by positioning 
themselves as victims of Nazism.538 
 The Kirchentag therefore deviated from and carried over Nazi community-building 
practices. It clearly altered the concept of the Volksgemeinschaft by replacing racial identity with 
Christian identity as the primary mechanism for defining the nation. By extension, it also 
retreated from virulent anti-Semitism and violence. However, like the Volksgemeinschaft, the 
Kirchentage affirmed national unity through a singular superseding identity, emphasized 
community through shared suffering and attempted to mobilize the people against shared 
                                                 
537 One British observer of the 1951 Kirchentag in Berlin even remarked upon this, though he claimed the 
“disciplined soberness,” of the crowd stood in contrast to Nazi rallies. See Report from the Church of England 
Council of Foreign Relations on the Church Congress in Berlin. World War II Era Records of the WCC (YDS-4). 
Microform. No 60.  
538 This is not to compare German suffering to Nazi victims, but rather to emphasize that a majority of Germans did 
face major difficulties in the postwar period, including homelessness, starvation, unemployment and significant 
personal and property loss, which therefore made them understandably more receptive to rhetoric that empathized 
with their plight. Scholars have firmly established the postwar motif of German suffering. Indeed, this topic has 
fostered an historiography of its own. See for example, Bill Niven Ed., Germans as Victims. Also Moeller, War 
Stories.  
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enemies. 539 To some degree this mirrored earlier Protestant attempts at fostering community in 
the Weimar Republic, especially in its hostility toward a “secular” or “pluralist” State, by 
merging German communal-nationalism with the American concept of a Christian World 
Order.540  
But the Kirchentag also differed significantly from these earlier attempts because it had 
to contend with the National Socialist past and the discredited idea of a national community. 
Here, it relied firmly on the either-or of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy to facilitate the 
needed ideological distance. Mimicking the Dichotomy, the Kirchentage reframed the national 
German community by positioning Christian values directly against both communism and 
Nazism. But because this rehabilitation relied upon the confines of the internationally 
ecumenical construction of the Dichotomy, it also necessitated a repudiation of overt racism and 
anti-Catholicism despite existing prejudices. This transition came slowly, through selective 
memory, paradoxical rhetoric, surface level gestures and the obfuscation of historical record.   
The establishment of East and West German States in 1949 created an opportune political 
moment for Kirchentag program on three levels. First, its emphasis on unity and ability to attract 
                                                 
539 For a good overview of debates surrounding the concept and its uses see Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: 
Social Engineering and Private Lives. Eds. Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto. (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
For violence and exclusion see Sven Keller, Volksgemeinschaft am Ende: Gesellschaft und Gewalt, 1944/45. 
(München, Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013). Peter Fritische equates this directly with an attempt to recapture a perceived 
national unity at the eve of the first world war. See Peter Fritsche, Germans into Nazis (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1998). Also Patrick Dassen “The German Nation as a Secular Religion in the First World War? 
About the Problem of Unity in Modern German History.” In Political Religion Beyond Totalitarianism: The 
Sacralization of Politics in the Age of Democracy. Eds. Joost Augusteihn, Patrick Dassen and Maartje Janse. 
(Palgrave Macmillan: 2013). For shared suffering see, Moeller, The Search for a Usable Past. Michael Wildt, 
Hitler’s Volkgemeinschaft and the Dynamics of Racial Exclusion: Violence against Jews in Provincial Germany, 
1919-1939. (Berghahn Books, 2012). 17-18. 
540 Björn Küllmer and Manfred Gailus explore Protestant efforts to construct the Volksgemeinschaft often through 
key German religious figures such as Martin Luther in the early years of Nazi rule. See Björn Küllmer Die 
Inszenierung der Protestantischen Volksgemeinschaft: Lutherbilder im Lutherjahr 1933. (Berlin, Logos Verlag, 
2012). Gailus is admittedly more concerned with the stability of the concept despite the many often contradictory 
aims of Christian theology and völkisch belief. See Gailus and Armin Nolzen’s introduction “Viele konkurrierende 
Gläubigkeiten – aber eine “Volksgemeinscahft?” in Zerstrittene Volksgemeinschaft: Glaube, Konfession und 
Religion im Nationalsozialismus. Eds. Manfred Gailus and Armin Nolzen, (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 
2011.)  
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participants from both states appealed greatly to Protestants who found themselves separated for 
the foreseeable future. Second, it reinforced the Dichotomy in that it confirmed the 
incompatibility of communism and Christianity in the eyes of its proponents. By 1949, the 
Stalinization of the German churches in East Germany was also clearly discernable to those 
involved.541 These factors created the necessary political and cultural immediacy to attract 
attention. The outbreak of the Korean War also encouraged German Protestant’s look westward, 
reaffirming the association of Christianity and democracy through martial combat against 
totalitarianism. 
Certainly though, rapidly improving living standards, Germany’s divided status and the 
geo-politics of European Integration also greatly influenced and dictated the Kirchentag. Indeed, 
one of the Kirchentag's principal features was its ability to draw participants from both halves of 
the newly divided nation. In this respect, the Kirchentag program represents an excellent case 
study not only because of its public nature, but also because it offers a glimpse into the minds of 
both men and women parishioners as opposed to high church leadership, which naturally allows 
for a broader understanding of cultural transformation within the church and the Federal 
Republic. 
 Recent historiography suggests that Germans’ fierce desire to 'normalize' at the onset of 
the Federal Republic fostered a probing for political consensus. This desire to normalize 
primarily emerged from the horrors of the Second World War, but also from the uncertainty 
surrounding the partition of East and West Germany, the tensions of the Cold War and the 
Weimar, the brutal sexuality of Occupation and the Nazi past. As a result, many West Germans 
deliberately turned to conservative political and social positions directed by the Adenauer 
administration. This conservative turn occurred for a myriad of reasons, most notably the 
                                                 
541 Sean Brennan, The Politics of Religion in Soviet-Occupied Germany.  
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German rejection of Allied definitions of guilt, a reaction to the perceived breakdown of social 
order in the occupation period, and an effort to manage and reinterpret and the Nazi past.542 
Because of its accessibility to both political and church leadership and the general public, the 
Kirchentag functioned as an important forum for negotiating these processes.    
 There has been relatively little historiography discussing the Kirchentag; most of what 
there is has been published in the past decade. Dirk Palm’s Wir Sind Doch Brüder is the only 
major publication on the topic, although Benjamin Carl Pearson has also written a dissertation 
and published an article on the subject.543 Palm's argument focuses on high politics and the 
interplay between the two divided German states and does not directly address the movement’s 
domestic importance.544 Pearson’s focuses on the theological and institutional importance of the 
Kirchentage. In many ways, this essay supports Pearson’s claim that Kirchentag debates 
inadvertently led to the acceptance of a pluralistic democracy by the late 1950s. He too sees the 
                                                 
542 The idea of a cultural orientation toward a specific set of values comes primarily from Eckart Conze's Die Suche 
nach Sicherheit. Conze argues that postwar West Germany constantly sought a sense of "security," the definition of 
which changed over time. In the 1950s, this was specifically associated with a return to patriarchy, a focus on 
immediate material needs and the stabilization of politics, which were acquired through the reintegration of former 
Nazis into mainstream society and reestablishing German autonomy (gained through Western integration). 
Similarly, Tony Judt makes congruent observations about the 1950s in the coda of part I in Postwar: A History of 
Europe Since 1945.). Dagmar Herzog too observes a period of sexual conservatism as a reaction to and rejection of 
the mores of the Nazi period, which shifts beginning in the early 1960s. See Dagmar Herzog, Sex After FascismFor 
more on the reintegration of Nazis and the stabilization of politics see Norbert Frei. Adenauer's Germany. 
543 Dirk Palm. Wir Sind Doch Brüder: die Evangelische Kirchentag und die Deutsche Frage 1949-1961. Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002. Pearson, Benjamin Carl “Faith and Democracy: Political Transformations at the 
German Protestant Kirchentag, 1949–1969” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 2007). Pearson, Benjamin 
Carl "The Pluralization of Protestant Politics: Public Responsibility, Rearmament and Division at the 1950s 
Kirchentage." Central European History, 43 (2010), 270–300. Other historiography does consider the Kirchentage, 
but not as independent entity. Siegfried Hermle and Gabrielle Kammerer both consider the Protestant-Jewish 
dialogue at the Kirchentag. See Gabriele Kammerer, In die Haare, in die Arme, and Siegfried Hermle, Evangelische 
Kirche und Judentum- Stationed nach 1945. (Göttigen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1990).  
544 Palm argues that the Kirchentage took on great importance for establishing political dialogue between East and 
West Germany. For Palm, the West German government supported and funded the Kirchentage largely because it 
offered space (through its “neutral” outward political stance) to critique the East government, particularly by 
residents from the GDR. This dialogue damaged the political standing of the GDR, and as such GDR officials 
became increasingly unwilling to allow East Germans to cross the border to attend Kirchentag events. He posits that 
the movement declines after 1961 because it no longer offered the same advantages to the Federal Republic, as the 
building of the Berlin Wall severely limited East German participation. In addition, once it became clear to Germans 
that the division between East and West would be prolonged, the message of Christian unity no longer resonated as 
it once did.   
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open political space made available at Kirchentag forums as crucial to understanding the 
movement’s success, and charts similar shifts from conservatism in the 1950s to a more liberal 
brand of politics in the 1960s.545 But Pearson does not frame the Kirchentag as a production of 
postwar ecumenical Protestantism nor examine its relationship to Nazi and earlier Protestant 
National-Conservative attempts to construct political community, thereby missing its broader 
purpose in creating a unified Protestant political block.546 Furthermore, Pearson does not 
evaluate its role in establishing conservative gender norms, a process which undoubtedly 
fostered political stability and political consensus.547 While Pearson is correct in arguing that the 
Kirchentage “inadvertently” drove Protestants toward political pluralism by the end of the 1950s, 
he overlooks the ways in which it attempted to rehabilitate Christianity and German 
conservatism in the aftermath of Nazism. Because organizers positioned this new community, 
and Christianity more broadly, as the antithesis of National Socialism, the Kirchentage 
simultaneously refurbished German anti-Semitism, anti-communism and nationalism while also 
repudiating some of the more radical aspects of National Socialism, most especially its racialized 
gender values and occultist secularism.548 Christianity, as posited by Kirchentag organizers, 
                                                 
545 Pearson, “The Pluralization of Protestant Politics." 
546 To be fair to Pearson, he would probably argue that this essay fails to engage sufficiently with changes the 
Kirchentag brought about within the Protestant Church. Such criticism would be valid. Nonetheless, this very 
criticism reflects the insular nature of the subdivision of church-historiography, which as a whole often fails to 
engage with the major "profane" metanarratives of Germany history, much to the detriment of both camps.  
547 Much has been written on the topic of masculinity and gender crisis in the postwar years. In general, such 
scholarship argues Germans coped with their humiliating defeat by attempting to reconstruct a patriarchal social 
order. For example, see Atina Grossman, Jews, Germans and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans. Dagmar Herzog, Sex After Fascism. 
Maria Höhn, GI's and Fräuleins. Elizabeth D. Heineman, What Difference does a Husband Make?:Women and 
Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1999) and 
Heide Fehrenbach Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005).  
548 Such values included permitting extramarital relations and childbearing outside of marriage for the racial elite 
and emphasizing an important political, military and racial position for socially unmarried women. Sexual relations 
also took on a racial meaning, as Nazi leadership sought to maintain sexual relationships along racial lines, despite 
the large number of prisoners of war and forced laborers brought into Germany during the Third Reich. See Herzog, 
Sex After Fascism. Heineman, What Difference a Husband Makes. Birthe Kundrus, “Forbidden Company: Romantic 
Relationships between Germans and Foreigners, 1939 to 1945,” in Dagmar Herzog, ed., Sexuality and German 
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therefore facilitated democratization by promoting a shared religious identity that allowed 
Germans to gloss over national-conservatism’s close ideological affinity to Nazism while also 
repudiating its political legitimacy.  
 
Founding and Purpose: Contextualizing the Kirchentag 
 
Understanding the Kirchentag movement requires grasping the ideal of ‘neutrality.’ The 
Kirchentag came about almost solely through the efforts of Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff, the 
son of a Prussian Junker and theologian with strong ties to the World Council of Churches. A 
career military officer with limited military ambition and a longtime supporter and leader of the 
Weimar era Christian Student Movement, von Thadden had a firm background in lay Christian 
movements. During the War, he served as Regional Commissioner in the Belgian Louvain 
district, where he allegedly countermined SS and Gestapo orders to the benefit of local citizens. 
After a car crash during a British air raid in 1944, von Thadden spent the rest of the war 
recovering and trying to manage his estate before being captured and imprisoned by the Soviets 
and suffering several serious health complications as a result. His eventual release in 1946 saw 
him working for the World Council of Churches until 1948. 549 As a proponent of Protestant 
ecumenism, von Thadden desired the unification of the bickering factions of the German 
                                                                                                                                                             
Fascism (New York, 2005).  
549 For more on von Thadden see, Werner Hühne, Thadden-Trieglaff.  Ein Leben unter Uns (Stuttgart: Kreuz Verlag, 
1959); the abridged English translation is Werner Hühne, A Man to be Reckoned With: The Story of Reinold von 
Thadden-Trieglaff, ed. Mark Gibbs, trans. Robert W. Fenn (London: SCM Press, 1962).  A similar account can be 
found in Franklin Littell, The German Phoenix: Men and Movements in the Church in Germany (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1960), 79-86. The sources are somewhat dubious in nature and must be treated with caution. All are 
especially favorable toward the Confessing Church and the laudatory description of von Thadden’s conduct during 
the War certainly raises suspicions. Still, his sister Elizabeth was executed in connection with the July 20th plot and 
undoubtedly Reinold had the support and respect of other Confessing Church members. See Matthias 
Riemenschneider and Jörg Thierfelder, “Elizabeth von Thadden: eine widerständige Christin,” in Mit Herz und 
Verstand- Protestantische Frauen im Widerstand gegen die NS-Rassenpolitik. Eds. Manfred Gailus and Clemens 
Vollnhals. (Göttigen: V&R Unipress, 2013).   
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Protestant Church. Thus, Kirchentag programs did not have an official political or theological 
agenda, and in fact insisted upon “neutrality.”550 This emphasis on neutrality defined the entire 
basis of the Kirchentag signifying its true function: the creation of a united Protestant community 
designed to re-Christianize Germany.551  
 Institutionally, the Kirchentag functioned in a semi-autonomous space, operating outside 
of, and also simultaneously unofficially under, the umbrella of the EKD.552 For von Thadden, the 
end of the war demonstrated two things beyond any doubt. First, the entire world faced an acute 
spiritual crisis. Clearly the church had failed to properly minister to the spiritual needs of the 
people, who turned toward nihilism and materialism as a result. Second, like Karl Barth, von 
Thadden theorized that the German churches' inability to resist Nazism stemmed primarily from 
a disengaged laity and a hierarchical church structure that encouraged inaction. He created the 
Kirchentag to invigorate common parishioners into taking a more active role in the church and 
public life, while simultaneously making Christianity more appealing in the 'modern' world.553 
Only such a movement, he argued, could both cater to the spiritual needs of the German people 
and invigorate them into political action.  
Von Thadden’s conception of the Kirchentag, while certainly unique, emerged at a 
moment in which Protestant leaders all across Germany sought ways to mobilize lay Protestants 
                                                 
550 Pearson, "Faith and Democracy," 19. Palm, Wir Sind doch Brüder.   
551 This corresponded in part with what Visser ‘t Hooft, a Dutch Reformed theologian and one of the main founders 
of the World Council of Churches, envisioned for postwar Europe: a new world order founded upon Christian 
statesmanship and moral rejuvenation. See for instance his writings in Visser ‘t Hofft, Die Welt war meine 
Gemeinde: A Theologian for Europe between Ecumenism and Federalism. Preface by Huns Kung. (Brussels: Peter 
Lang, 2014).  
552 This occurred in part because church leadership initially questioned the aims and probability of success of the 
Kirchentag concept, and therefore proved reluctant to endorse it outright. Furthermore, the various factions of the 
EKD had competing designs for the restoration of German Protestantism, and therefore did not agree with the 
concept in its entirety for various theological reasons. Von Thadden himself likely desired greater autonomy then the 
EKD offered, but after assuring church hierarchy of the absence of a political and theological message and that the 
new institution would pose no threat to the authority of the EKD, he accepted the circumstances to press forward. 
See Benjamin Pearson, "Faith and Democracy." 47-89.   
553  
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and influence political agendas directly. The Protestant Academies (Evangelischen Akademien), 
founded in many of Germany’s regional churches in the immediate postwar era, functioned as 
religious think designed to engage lay-experts in fields such as politics, sociology and 
economics.554 New informal political circles also arose to lobby for specific political agendas.555 
Thus, the Kirchentag idea formulated around a broader Protestant (and Catholic) postwar 
assumption: Without re-Christianizing and mobilizing the faithful, Germany had no basis for a 
moral renewal.   
Von Thadden believed that for the Kirchentag to succeed, he would need to unite the 
various Protestant factions behind it. To curry favor with these factions, he insisted on the 
"neutrality" of the Kirchentag within the spectrum of Protestant debate, focusing on the present 
instead of the past. This visionary emphasis on the present proved successful. While church 
leaders continuously challenged elements of the Kirchentag’s political message, particularly as 
debates about rearmament and communism took center stage in the mid-1950s, the movement 
remained fixed on attending to present political circumstances instead of past transgressions. 
Still, as a public forum dependent upon the participation of the clergy and parishioners, the 
overall message of the Kirchentag shifted over time corresponding to the concerns of its 
attendees. The Kirchentage therefore functioned as a barometer of Protestant rhetoric, offering 
glimpses as to what could and could not be said during the 1950s.  
 
Democracy, Mobilization and the Restoration of "Order"  
 
Undoubtedly, German Protestants harbored attitudes critical of democracy. To be sure, 
                                                 
554 See Thomas Mittmann, Kirchlichen Akademien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2011). 
555 See the Kronberger Kreis in Chapter 3 of Thomas Sauer’s, Westorientierung im deutschen Protestantismus?   
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categorizing the church as an ardent supporter of Nazism would be an exaggeration, but 
nonetheless during the Weimar Republic German Protestants participated in undermining the 
authority of the democratic system.556 Most Protestant leaders enthusiastically welcomed Hitler’s 
rise to power, sharing his anti-communist, anti-Semitic and anti-democratic attitudes.557 Clemens 
Vollnhals and Michael Klein both demonstrate that in the postwar period, Protestants held 
ambivalent and apprehensive (if not antagonistic) attitudes toward democracy and political 
parties, which they believed to be morally corrupting, ineffective and subject to the will of the 
uneducated masses.558  
 Such reasoning carried well into the 1950s, and indeed took on even greater precedence 
as Protestants often saw democracy as a medium through which potential demagogues and 
materialism corrupted the masses. However, describing all Protestants, or even the entirety of 
conservative Protestants, as firmly anti-democratic would be misleading.559 Postwar politics 
brought about significant cultural shifts, and the ambivalence if not hostility directed at the 
Weimar Republic by the church shifted toward something more akin to a resigned acceptance of 
democratic governance in some conservative Protestant circles. As such, Reinold von Thadden 
might best be described as a sort of Vernupfterrepublikaner. He certainly seemed to have 
resigned himself to the reality of Western democracy in Germany yet sought to harness the 
                                                 
556 Julia Sneeringer, Winning Women’s Votes. Sneeringer demonstrates how national-conservative parties such as the 
DVP and then DNVP unabashedly called for the restoration of the German Monarchy and simultaneously appealed 
to women as the purveyors of Christian teaching and moral foundations in the family. Such rhetoric concerning the 
monarchy tended to deride political compromise, especially with communists and Social-Democrats.  
557 For some of the most recent publications, see Susannah Heschel. The Aryan Jesus, Robert P. Ericksen, 
Complicity in the Holocaust. Doris L. Bergen A Twisted Cross. Also the introduction and chapter 1 of Matthew 
Hockenos, A Church Divided.  
558 Michael Klein, Westdeutscher Protestantismus und politische Parteien: Anti-Parteien-Mentalität und partei-
politisches Engagement von 1945 bis 1963. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005). Vollnhals, Clemens. Evangelische 
Kirche und Entnazifizierung, 1945-1949. 
559 See Thomas Sauer, Westorientierung im deutschen Protestantismus? Sauer argues that even amongst German 
Conservatives, there was a slight but discernible shift toward democracy and a western orientation in German 
Protestantism as early as 1951. The Circle at the center of his analysis consisted of Eberhard Müller, Hanns Lilje and 
Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff. Incidentally, these same men also played some part in the founding of the German 
Kirchentag.  
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power of mass politics for the church’s own purposes. In 1949, after the mild success of the first 
postwar Kirchentag in Hannover (which attracted around 7,000 registered guests and close to 
35,000 for the closing ceremony),560 von Thadden argued in a statement to the EKD council the 
necessity of the Kirchentag program. For him, the "New" church must:  
Be fully ready to commit itself to witness, to minister, to serve and to sacrifice 
to...the duties of church involvement in the parishes, as we so often impressively 
encounter in the Catholic Church, and, much to the disgrace of Christianity, 
naturally features in political modification to radical communism.561   
 
Such statements reflect Protestant assumptions about democracy. If the church did not willingly 
devote itself to mobilizing the masses, its opposition, especially communists, would dominate. In 
other words, Protestants must participate in democracy to prevent their own destruction. Implicit 
in this line of reasoning was a distrust of the democratic system. If, presumably, a more 'natural' 
order were in place, then there would be a limited need for the church to fight communism 
directly. However, because such a system no longer existed, (From a Lutheran point of view, the 
state was no longer upholding its divine task in maintaining order) the task fell to the church. The 
emphasis on Catholicism also speaks to Protestant fears of Catholic dominance, both in the CDU 
and in society at large. While certainly Protestant participation in the CDU signified a 
meaningful change from the Catholic Centre party of the Weimar Republic, many Protestants 
often felt marginalized within the CDU.562 In fact, von Thadden borrowed much of the 
Kirchentag program from the Catholic Katholikentag (Catholic Day), which had roots in the 19th 
century.563  
                                                 
560 Benjamin Pearson, "Faith and Democracy," 77.  
561Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag in Hannover Rückblick und Ausblick von Reinold von Thadden-Trieglaff, 6.  
EZA 71/1253, EzAB. 
562 Maria Mitchell, The Origins of Christian Democracy.  
563 This is rather plain to see for anyone familiar with both movements. Von Thadden admitted as much in 1949. See 
Pearson, Faith and Democracy, 62. The Protestant Kirchentag also had precursors during the early years of the 
Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic. Both attempted to emphasize to some degree Protestant confessional unity 
and evangelism, though neither really placed much emphasis on lay-participation. The Kirchentage during the 
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 Understanding von Thadden's language requires some further explanation of the divisions 
within German Protestantism. The majority of postwar German Protestants were national-
conservative Lutherans,564 who, since the Kaiserreich, had maintained fierce loyalties to the state 
through their interpretation of Luther's Two Kingdoms doctrine. However, in the postwar period 
many German Lutherans began to reconsider the ethical implications of the Two Kingdoms 
Doctrine to varying degrees. While many Lutherans observed a strict separation between the two 
realms when it came to voicing official political stances,565 Hitler's reign raised earnest questions 
for some who argued the state could no longer be relied upon to act justly or morally.566 
 Members of the German Protestant Reformed Church tended to take their lead from the 
towering figure of the Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth, who argued that Lutheran 
obedience and adulation of the state constituted a form of natural revelation, thereby resulting in 
a form of idolatry.567 Barthian theologians allied with reform-oriented Lutherans such as Martin 
Niemöller,568 challenging Lutheran national-conservatives politically and theologically, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kaiserreich eventually splintered over debates between German Lutherans and the Old Prussian Union Churches, 
though it eventually transformed into the missionary arm of German Protestantism, Inneren Mission. See Margot 
Käßmann, Zur Geschichte des Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchentages. (Hannover: Vortrag im Niedersächsischen 
Landtag, 2005).   
564 See Robert P. Ericksen and Susannah Heschel. Betrayal Also, Doris Bergen, Twisted Cross, and Sussanah 
Heschel, The Aryan Jesus. 
565 See for example, Alice Homes Cooper's description of the EKD's refusal to take an official stance on rearmament 
in Paradoxes of Peace. 45-50. 
566 For more on this, see Victoria Barnett, For the Soul of the People., Matthew Hockenos, A Church Divided. 
Martin Greschat's Der Protestantism in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  
567 For Barth, God, and by extension Christ, was something "Wholly Other," transcending mankind in every way. 
Barthian theology stated that Christ came to the world to forgive and save man, not for mankind to identify with and 
possess God. Barthian dialectics therefore turned liberal theology, which emphasized Kantian Reason and the 
revelation of God through 'progress, on its head. See Phillip Kennedy. Twentieth Century Theologians: A New 
Introduction to Modern Christian Thought. (New York, NY: I.B. Taurus, 2010). 76-78. Also, Gary Dorrien, The 
Making of American Liberal Theology: Idealism, Realism and Modernity, 1900-1950. (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2003). 435-437. 
568 Niemöller is a particularly challenging figure to classify because of his shifting allegiances and unique 
experiences under Nazism. One might even argue that he abandoned Lutheranism entirely, in favor of a more 
ecumenical brand of Protestantism owing to his increasing participation in the World Council of Churches in the 
postwar period (he eventually becomes one of nine presidents in 1961), although he still identified to some degree as 
a Lutheran, especially in the early postwar period. In WWI, he served as a decorated U-boat captain and made up 
part of the national-conservative wing of German Lutheranism. His outspoken opposition toward Nazi Church 
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specifically regarding anti-communism and rearmament: For them, the difficulties experienced 
under Nazism stemmed from the church’s hierarchical submission to the state. As such, they also 
attempted to engage with the Nazi past much more critically than conservative Lutherans, which 
often earned them the disdain of the public at large.569  
 Von Thadden's focus on Protestant unity in response to Catholicism and communism 
therefore cannot be divorced from these theological stakes. While certainly maintaining his 
confessional identity as a Lutheran, von Thadden’s devotion to Protestant ecumenism 
overshadowed his confessional identity.570 His argument that the church must ensure that the 
state maintains some sort of moral order put him somewhat in line with reform oriented 
Protestants, who sought a great reorganizing of the church and a complete departure from the 
Two Kingdoms.571 However, from a motivational and theological standpoint, von Thadden’s 
argument that only a re-Christianization of Germany would be able to prevent another turn 
toward materialism, atheism and nihilism more closely resembled that of national-conservatives.  
 Von Thadden's insistence on the neutrality of the Kirchentag also takes on additional 
meaning when considered in this light. To be sure, the program was anything but politically 
                                                                                                                                                             
policy resulted in his incarceration in Sachsenhausen and later Dachau concentration camps. Nonetheless, at the 
outbreak of war Niemöller still offered to serve in the military, an offer which was refused. In the postwar period, 
Niemöller became an outspoken opponent of rearmament and made several serious and notable public attempts at 
contrition over the Church's role during Nazism. He also advocated continually for Christians to take an active role 
in political life. Such political and moral stances often earned him the ire of Church leaders, government officials 
and the public at large. Yet because of Niemöller's incontrovertible resistance credentials (despite serious prejudice 
toward Jews), he commanded enormous respect as a moral authority. Church leaders such as Niemöller are therefore 
quite difficult to classify, given his nationalistic sympathies (which subside but never completely dissipate) and his 
willingness to take on some of the difficult questions of the Holocaust. See Matthew Hockenos, A Church Divided 
for Niemöller in the postwar period. Similarly, Victoria Barnett, For the Soul of the People for his conduct during 
Nazism and significant biographical and background information.  Also James Bentley, Martin Niemöller.  
569 See for example, the public reaction to the "Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt" (1945) in Matthew Hockenos, A 
Church Divided 84-94.  
570 See letter from von Thadden to his American friend and colleague Carl Schneider on January 29th 1953, in which 
von Thadden, in response to a question from Schneider concerning confessional membership, stated: “I suggest that 
the Evangelical [meaning Lutheran] and Reformed Church should not trouble itself too much with such statistics [of 
church membership], but should rather preserve its ecumenical thinking and its close relationship with German 
Protestantism.” EZA 71/825, EZAB.   
571 For a good summary on Protestant Church factions in English see Matthew Hockenos, A Church Divided.  
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neutral, or even theologically neutral, despite its claims. However, von Thadden likely meant 
neutrality within the meaning of the Two Kingdoms idea. The Kirchentag was "neutral" 
precisely because it sought to downplay questioning of theological denominational difference, (at 
no time during the Kirchentag events in the 1950s did the question of theology emerge) but 
rather sought to unite all of Protestantism to greater influence politics.  
Claiming neutrality therefore offered von Thadden several key advantages. First, it 
facilitated negotiations with both the West and East German governments.572 If von Thadden had 
proclaimed any explicit political position, he likely would have faced even more opposition from 
East German officials reluctant to be seen endorsing a religious institution. Indeed, this likely 
would have prevented any East Germans from participating in the Kirchentage. Furthermore, 
claiming neutrality within the context of EKD factionalism allowed von Thadden to court all 
segments of the EKD, as well as attract ecumenical participants, including both Catholic and 
Orthodox Christians as well as Protestants from other national churches.573 Certainly those who 
interpreted the Two Kingdoms doctrine conservatively would have required nothing less than 
political neutrality before taking part in the Kirchentag, yet fortunately for von Thadden the 
movement's efforts at mobilizing the laity and encouraging political participation convinced the 
vast majority of the EKD to participate.      
 Yet for von Thadden, the restoration of order and the re-Christianization of Germany574 
                                                 
572 See Palm, Wir Sind doch Brüder.  
573 On this issue, the Kirchentag program seems particularly constrained, if not contradictory. On one hand, the basis 
on the ecumenical movement was Christian unity. The necessity of securing funding from the West German state 
also made it necessary to cater to the Catholic leanings of leading CDU figures like Adenauer. On the other hand, 
the project clearly focused on Protestants above all others, often bemoaning the perceived superiority Catholic or 
even communist institutions. However, from the onset a select number of ecumenical participants were invited to the 
Kirchentag, including members of the Catholic and Orthodox church, as well as leading Catholic politicians. See for 
example imagines of the 1950 Kirchentag in Essen including members of the Russian Orthodox Church. See World 
War II Era Records of the World Council of Churches. YDS-4, Microform 13.  
574 This concept of re-Christianizing Germany corresponded directly with the platform of the former Bishop Wurm 
(retired as head of the EKD in 1948). See Karl Herbert. Kirche zwischen Aufbruch und Tradition. Greschat, Der 
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were one and the same. In an essay published in 1951, von Thadden argued that the German 
State of the past had failed because of individual selfishness and desire, which resulted in the 
state becoming either “an idol or a devil,” depending on the perspective of the individual and 
whether he or she stood to benefit. He attributed enthusiasm for Hitler to “…the primitive desire 
for security in the completely private, individual sense…” Von Thadden continued, stating the 
construction of “self-government” or the reorientation of Germans toward “democratic 
principles” could not succeed unless “our great political need is rooted with our religious need.” 
His concluding remarks put it even more bluntly: “Here is a question of either-or: Either the 
Christian Church on the basis of its faith will help the German people to a clean and responsible 
“yes” to the state, or the German nation will not find this “yes” anymore.575  
Protestant rhetoric at the Kirchentag also interpreted the postwar crisis as a symptom of a 
declining Christianity. Von Thadden in particular made veiled references to the Nazi past to 
emphasize the nation’s present condition. In his opening remarks at the 1950 Kirchentag in 
Essen, von Thadden called upon God to "Save the People" (Rettet den Menschen), stating:  
After two World Wars countless millions of human lives have perished...an equally 
large flock of human beings lives daily without real freedom, without homeland, 
without family and without faith, surely sometimes just vegetating. In the detention 
camps for displaced persons and refugees, in the cellars of bombed-out cities, upon 
the highways of the greatest mass migration of all time...friendless, restless, 
loveless--infinitely alone! It is these people today we are concerned with. Not with 
the people of past decades and centuries...It is necessary to save “the people” (Den 
Menschen) of our generation.576 
 
This passage demonstrates how von Thadden strategically constructed the Kirchentage to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Protestantismus in der Bundesrepublik. 
575 See Translation and notes on essay by von Thadden published Nov. 1951 in Die Neue Furche. “Das Ja Zum 
Staat- Ein Problem der Deutschen.”  World Council of Churches (WCC-1) [Geneva Box 42.0078]. Microform 
Correspondence Records No. 1338.  
576 Rettet den Menschen: für den Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchentag 1950 in Essen. (Essener Druckerei 
Gemeinwohl) 3. On a note about theological undertones, von Thadden continues on in his opening remarks to state 
that human beings do not have the power to change their fate, and instead can only pray ardently and honestly for 
God to change their current circumstance. Von Thadden employed this sort of rhetoric often, which reflects the 
general conservative theological underpinnings of the Kirchentag in the 1950s. Original Quote, “ 
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prioritize the present over the past. Such a maneuver alleviated the need to engage with the Nazi 
past, instead focusing on contemporary needs and wants. This similarly emphasized the 
imperative of Protestant action, for without it surely all of Germany would fall into ruin. This in 
some ways corresponded with Nazi rhetoric about the Volksgemeinschaft and the need for 
concrete political action.577 Intriguingly, this same quote condemned the Nazis while continuing 
their political methodology and simultaneously alleviating the need to address the past.  The 
emphasis on present day suffering also marked an attempt by church leaders to reestablish their 
moral authority after the Third Reich, a task deemed essential for re-Christianization.578  
 East Germany concerned Kirchentag participants perhaps more so than any other topic. 
This occurred for a multitude of reasons, which explain in large part von Thadden's initiatives 
and the Kirchentag's success in attracting large crowds. For the first time in modern German 
history, West German Protestants found themselves as a religious minority after Catholics, with 
large portions of the overwhelmingly Protestant Prussia and Saxony now part of the GDR.579 In 
addition, a majority of Protestants perceived their brethren in the East as being oppressed by the 
'Godless' communists, and many imagined this to be their own fate should materialism or 
nihilism take hold in West Germany.580 The Kirchentag program intended on solving this 
                                                 
577 For more examples of Nazi rhetoric and the need for immediate political action, see Rüdiger Graf, "Either-Or: 
The Narrative of "Crisis" in Weimar Germany and Historiography," Central European History 43 (2010), 592-615. 
Also, Jörg Echternkamp "At War, Abroad and at Home: The Essential Features of German Society in the Second 
World War," in Germany and the Second World War: German Wartime Society 1939-1945: Politicization, 
Disintegration, and the Struggle for Survival, Ed. Jörg Echternkamp, Volume IX/I (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008). Nachdem in zwei Weltkriegen ungezählte Millionen Menschenleben zugrunde gingen…erleben wire s 
jetzt, daβ eine nicht minder groβe Schar von Menschen ohne echte Freiheit, ohne Heimat, ohne Familie und ohne 
Glaugen dahinlebt, ja, manchmal nur noch dahinvegetiert. In den Auffanglagern der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge, 
in der Kellern der zerbombte Städte, auf den Landstraβen der gröβten Völkerwanderung aller Zeiten…freundlos, 
rastlos, liebleer – grenzenlos allein! Mit diesen Menschen haben wir es heute zu tun. Nicht mit den Menschen 
vergangener Jahrzehnte und Jahrhunderte… “Den Menschen” unserer Generation gilt es zu retten.  
578 Herzog, Sex After Fascism. 103.  
579 Maria Mitchell, The Origins of Christian Democracy.  
580 See for example, the critiques leveled by Leftist reformer Hans Iwand at Bishops Otto Dibelius, Hans Meiser and 
Theophil Wurm for their pro-Western anticommunist stance. Iwand believed the Cold War allowed Church leaders 
to slide into a friend-enemy mentality thereby obscuring the threat presented by Western culture. Nonetheless, a vast 
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problem not only by binding together Christians of all denominations, but also by reuniting the 
East and West. As Bundesminister Jakob Kaiser put it after the 1951 Kirchentag, “…the 
experience of those days in Berlin was deep and sustainable, not least because the Western 
World, the world of the West and Christianity, presented itself [to the East] without 
demonstrations, banners…or propaganda.”581 
 That Protestants now found themselves on par with Catholics in the Federal Republic 
explains in part why participants responded so strongly to von Thadden's rhetoric about 
confessional unity. Consider the comments by refugee Minister Pastor Albertz of Hannover, who 
stated "We must not limit the question of [saving the homeland] to the Federal Republic and 
West Berlin...We must never forget that eighteen million people, mostly Protestant, live in 
Mitteldeutschland...It must also remain important to us what is happening beyond the tragic line 
of Oder and Neisse..."582 Albertz’s desire to reunite the divided German states and with German 
Protestants in parts of former Prussian territory ceded to Poland after the war reveal continuing 
nationalist sentiment. Indeed, West Germans often used the term Mitteldeutschland as a 
euphemism for the German Democratic Republic, which logically therefore dictates that territory 
lost to Poland must be Eastern Germany.583  
 Dr. Manfred Müller of Stuttgart also called for Protestants to unite in dramatic fashion at 
the 1951 Berlin Kirchentag. After affirming that Germans in both East and West must bind 
                                                                                                                                                             
majority of Protestants focused on combatting the communist threat. See Matthew Hockenos, A Church Divided. 
126-127. The threat to Protestant rites of passage were in fact quite real. By the mid 1950's, the GDR deliberately 
tried to crowd out Christian beliefs and values. See Robert Goekel, The Lutheran Church and the East German 
State: Political Conflict and Change under Ulbricht and Honecker. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1990). 
581 See “Ein Nachwort zum Evangelischen Kirchentag,” from Jakob Kaiser. BAK, B/136/5861. 
582 Kreuz auf den Trümmern: Zweiter Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag Essen 1950. Deutscher Evangelischer 
Kirchentag Essen. (Hamburg: IM Furche-Verlag), 52.  
583 Robert Moeller likewise argues that grievances over lost territory was one of the central features of the newly 
formed imagined postwar community of West Germans. See for example his analysis of German Reunification in 
relation to Silesia. Moeller, War Stories, 197-200.   
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themselves together, he had participants clasp hands with their neighbors and shout out, "You 
belong to us and we belong to you!"584 Similarly, working committees operating under headlines 
of "Brothers at work," and "Brothers in Nation (Volk)," promoted Protestants working together 
for common cause.585 The 1951 Kirchentag effort to unite Germans was so effective, that CDU 
Bundesminister Jakob Kaiser remarked that even the government had not been able to fully 
“appreciate” the value of the Protestant Church presentation of the “high unified-German 
position” (die hohe gesamtdeutsche Position) to the Soviets. This presentation of the “Western 
World and Christendom” to the East without “demonstration” or “propaganda,” can only 
encourage those living in the Soviet Zone to grasp freedom for themselves.586     
 Of course, the Kirchentag movement failed to reunify the two Germanys, despite the 
1954 Kirchentag in Leipzig (which marked the first and only time the event met exclusively in 
the GDR) attracting over 600,000 participants and considerable press coverage. Continued 
disagreements with the GDR would see future attempts to hold a Kirchentag in the East falter, 
particularly an attempt to return to Berlin in 1958.587 Indeed, as 1961 demonstrated to all 
involved, whatever gains the movement had made in reuniting the German nation, reunification 
was a long way off. Nonetheless, the movement undoubtedly succeeded in attracting interest 
from both East and West Germans, even if it primarily sought a conservative nationalist agenda.  
 
“They Remain Brothers in spite of Borders,” Catholics and Jews and the Paradox of the 
Kirchentag Community 
                                                 
584 Berlin 1951: Der Deutsche Evangelische Kirchentag in Wort und Bild. 9. 
585 Ibid, 32-48.  
586 report from Kaiser on the Protestant Kirchentag, undated. The report undoubtedly refers to the 1951 Kirchentag 
in Berlin, despite the lack of date. BAK, B122 297. 
587 See Benjamin Pearson, "Faith and Democracy," also by Harry Gilroy, Special to The New York Times. 
"Religious Parley in Berlin Upset." New York Times (1923-Current File), Oct 26, 1957, "No German Church 
Talk." New York Times (1923-Current File), Apr 14, 1957, Special to The New York Times. "German Red Curb on 
Churches Told." New York Times (1923-Current File), Apr 22, 1956.   
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Perhaps the most challenging problem in constructing a Protestant political community was 
attending to inter-religious relations. Whilst most religious leaders, and indeed German 
conservatives more broadly, had little difficulty publicly refuting and distancing themselves from 
political Nazism, communism and capitalist materialism, how precisely to conduct themselves 
toward Catholics and Jews proved problematic on both theological, political and practical levels.  
Protestant-Catholic relations had to be considered carefully at the Kirchentage for 
financial reasons since the Kirchentage received significant funding from local, municipal and 
federal offices where Catholics wielded considerable influence during the Adenauer Era.588 
Moreover, because von Thadden required Adenauer’s direct approval to allow East Berliners to 
visit the Kirchentag in 1951, alienating Catholic support for the movement would have 
undoubtedly proven problematic, if not fatal.  
Some of the most obvious contradictions within the Kirchentag program emerged over 
Protestants’ relationship to Catholicism. As we have already seen, Reinold von Thadden clearly 
conceptualized the Kirchentage in response to (perceived) Catholic unity. But public Kirchentag 
rhetoric, unlike von Thadden’s private correspondence and reports to the World Council of 
Churches and the EKD, emphasized the Kirchentag’s support for a State that was “not Protestant 
nor Catholic.” In 1950, regarding the Kirchentag meeting in Essen, von Thadden declared 
unequivocally that “the unholy times (of the Kulturkampf) were over,” replaced by a new 
contract between Catholics and Protestants formed in opposition to National Socialism. “It seems 
to me more important,” von Thadden said, “to keep alive in the consciousness of the state” the 
faith of Protestants and Catholic “martyrs,” than it does to focus on “confessional statistics.”589 
                                                 
588 See Palm, Wir sind doch Brüder.  
589 See article titled “Kein evangelischer und kein katholischer Staat.” YDS-4 WWII Era Records of the WCC 
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Here von Thadden’s emphasis relates to the Dichotomy, emphasizing the shared Christian 
opposition to national socialism as the overriding characteristic necessary in the “new State.”  
Von Thadden also resisted utilizing the Protestant character of the Kirchentag against 
Catholicism. Leading up to the 1950 Kirchentag in Essen, Martin Niemöller encouraged von 
Thadden to combat the “propaganda” of Catholic politicians and their Protestant allies.590 But 
von Thadden refused complaining in a letter to Visser ‘t Hooft that Niemöller’s anti-Catholicism 
threatened to undermine the Kirchentag’s efforts to “awaken community consciousness and a 
sense of confessional responsibility in our Protestant laity.” Moreover, he charged that “every 
attack…against Roman influence in central Europe will have disastrous consequences, 
weakening rather than strengthening our cause.”591 Although von Thadden refused to openly 
oppose Catholics at the Kirchentag as Niemöller wished, his description of Catholicism as 
“Roman influence” nonetheless hinted at stereotypical Protestant critiques of Catholics as anti-
Nationalist and loyal to a “foreign” power. Moreover, his emphasis on awakening Protestant 
consciousness likewise demonstrated his ultimate desire to foster Protestant unity. We might 
therefore interpret his position toward Catholics to be that of a sort of Vernupfterrepublikaner, 
conceptualized fully within the confines of the Dichotomy. Cooperation with Catholics was 
possible precisely because of the shared Christian history of resistance toward Nazism. The death 
of Christian “martyrs” therefore made possible the creation of a new state, one sufficiently 
Christian and therefore anti-totalitarian.  Because of this shared history and the greater threat, 
Catholics were necessary allies. 
Cooperation between Protestants and Catholics at the Kirchentage therefore remained 
                                                                                                                                                             
Germany Wartime, Microform No.13.  
590 Pearson, “Faith and Democracy,” 78-79. 
591 Letter from von Thadden to Visser ‘t Hooft, March 18th, 1950. WCC-1, Geneva. Box 42.0078. General 
Correspondence Microform No. 1337.   
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high, with prominent Catholic and even Orthodox ecumenical visitors appearing consistently 
through the 1950s.592 Still, the conception of the Kirchentage in the early years of the Federal 
Republic carried with it an undercurrent of anti-Catholic sentiment on the part of individual 
participants and an overriding concern for Protestant unity in the face of both totalitarian 
opposition and Catholic unity.  
The question of Jews and by extension racism proved much more difficult to contend 
with for Protestant leaders. Unlike Catholics, there was never a need to contend with the physical 
presence of Jews in Germany nor contend with a mobilized Jewish political block. That the 
Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy treated Jews as an afterthought only encouraged intentional 
silence.593 Moreover, as Niemöller’s forthrightness during his American tour illustrated, 
expressions of guilt and introspection threatened to undermine the narrative of Christian 
resistance that facilitated Protestantism’s distancing from totalitarianism. Of course, this 
distancing itself obfuscated the continuities of German assumptions about race.594 In this way, 
the very topic of Jews raised all sorts of unwanted questions about the composition of 
community in the early years of the Kirchentage.    
Von Thadden’s emphasis on the present remained a consistent theme throughout the 
1950s Kirchentage, with attempts at reconciliation, interfaith dialogue or a thorough examination 
of Christian or German responsibility for the Holocaust remaining on the margins of Kirchentag 
discussions until the 1959 meeting in Munich. Still, because of Protestantism’s association with 
German conservatism (and perhaps also Nazism) a serious need to firmly repudiate any 
association with National Socialist racial dynamics emerged. This emerged overwhelmingly as a 
                                                 
592 For example, see summary of press reports regarding the 1952 Kirchentag in Stuttgart titled “im Spiegel der 
Presse.” Specifically, the emphasis on ecumenism and Katholikentag. YDS-4 WWII Era Records of the WCC 
Germany Wartime, Microform No. 75.  
593 See Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory. 10. 
594 See Heide Fehrenbach, Race After Hitler.  
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rhetorical refutation of totalitarianism and often within the confines of nationalistic and the motif 
of German victimhood. While some, especially left leaning Protestants like Gustav Heinemann 
and Martin Niemöller, emphasized and pushed for a greater acknowledgement of German and 
Christian responsibility for Nazism and the Holocaust, their efforts failed to attract much 
attention until the turn of the decade.    
Early Kirchentage tended to repudiate racism by affirming God’s universal love of all 
and Man’s inherent sinful condition. For instance, participants at the closing ceremony at the 
1951 Berlin Kirchentag declared “We have recognized that the people of God are all over the 
world. We have brothers amongst all peoples and in all races. They remain our Brothers despite 
borders. He does not want us to lose them. Therefore, say and show with your life that Christ is 
Lord of all.”595 While the emphasis of people across borders in this statement cannot be 
separated from earlier speeches at the 1951 Kirchentag lamenting the loss of German territory 
and Protestant separation, the recognition of God’s creation consisting of all peoples from all 
races was a necessary step in a Christian refutation of National Socialism.  
Some Kirchentag participants, principally Adolf Freudenberg (a lawyer married to a 
Jewish-Protestant convert and Secretary of the Refugee Commission in the World Council of 
Churches) and Lothar Kreyssig (a Saxon lawyer and member of the EKD synod) desired to 
address the “Jewish Question” from the onset of the Kirchentage, but their interests and requests 
rarely progressed beyond initial planning. Reinold von Thadden seemed to acknowledge the 
need to address the issue from the onset of the 1949 meeting in Hannover, but the planning 
committee seemed to prioritize other issues, failing to even vote on Freudenberg’s proposal for a 
drafted statement on German-Jewish relations.596 Freudenberg continued to press for working 
                                                 
595 Berlin 1951: Der Deutsche Evangelische Kirchentag in Wort und Bild. 90. 
596 For Freudenberg see Sigfried Hermle, Evangelische Kirche und Judentum. 195-196, 251-252. For his lobbying at 
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committees on the topic of restitution to Israel and an in depth discussion of the “Word on the 
Jewish Question” adopted by the Berlin Weißensee Synod in 1950, at both Stuttgart in 1952 and 
Hannover in 1953 respectively, but the former was relegated to a minor small gathering of about 
300 held by The German Protestant Committee for Service to Israel and the latter never 
proceeded beyond the early planning stages.597 Subsequent events organized by Lothar Kryssig 
included the creation of an East West political working group emphasizing reconciliation 
between former enemies in Leipzig in 1954, but they scarcely featured at all in Kirchentag 
proceedings and were not recorded in the yearly Kirchentag proceeding of events. Freudenberg’s 
committee again organized a meeting in 1956 in Hamburg, but turnout remained small.598 Only 
in 1959 would the Kirchentag feature a direct engagement with the “Jewish Question” at the 
promoted “Israel Evening,” with the subsequent meeting in 1961 including a Jew--Rabbi Robert 
Raphael Geis--for the first time.599 
The 1959 Kirchentag emphasized the Christian universalism first rhetorically produced at 
the 1951 Kirchentag operating under the slogan “Ye, shall be my people,” which official 
documents translated into eight different languages to drive home the international meaning of 
the slogan.600 The program included a large ecumenical contingent, including Protestant pastors 
from Indonesia and Haiti while also prominently featuring “Israel Evening,” which addressed 
Jewish-Christian relations and the Holocaust. There, a number of speakers addressed a need to 
face the “facts” of the German past. As the moderate conservative lawyer Hans-Adolf Dombois 
put it, “The crimes of humanity from our forefather Cain up to the crematoria of Auschwitz 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Kirchentage see Pearson, “Faith and Democracy,” 111.  
597 See Hermle, Evangelische Kirche und Judentum, 254-55 
598 No records of the content of the 1954 gathering exist, but other Kirchentag documents suggest the gathering was 
quite small, with a space reserved for 50 people; see “Sondertreffen: Deutscher Evangelischer Ausschuss für Dienst 
an Israel,” EZaB 71/86/130; the 1956 gathering met in a room designed for up to 500, EZaB 71/86/132. I must thank 
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599 Gabriele Kammerer, In die Haare, in die Arme. 
600 Languages included German, English, Swedish, Greek, Russian, “African,” Chinese and Egyptian.   
W o l t e r i n g  | 214 
 
depend on the fact that humans do not want to face up to the facts…but instead want to sweep 
them away.”601  
Theologians Walther Zimmerli and Helmut Gollwitzer also addressed Jewish-Christian 
relations, with Zimmerli claiming that Christians needed to face the past actions of the church 
with humility, especially since the peoples of Christendom (including Russia, Poland and 
France), had permitted and encouraged terrible atrocities toward the Jews. As he put it, “We 
Christians have no occasion to wash our hands of this responsibility.”602 Gollwitzer’s speech 
focused on the need for German Christians to remember their past to overcome present-day and 
anti-Semitism.603 Participant interest in “Israel Evening” as well as the emphasis on racial unity 
at the 1959 Munich Kirchentag did conform in part to the rhetoric of earlier meetings, but its 
emphasis on the past and its shift toward broader racial and interfaith participation represented a 
clear departure from the earlier nationalistic emphasis.  
 
“Men and Women Belong Together:” Family and Gender at the Protestant Kirchentag 
 
From the onset of Kirchentag meetings, Protestant leaders perceived the family to be in crisis, 
and attempted to reconstruct traditional Christian bourgeois family after displacement and 
occupation.604 Years of war and occupation certainly strained German families. Infidelity, the 
loss of masculine individuality from both the military and as prisoners of war, women’s immense 
                                                 
601 Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag 1959, Munich (Stuttgart: Kreuz, 1959). 429-30. 
602 Ibid., 434-35. 
603 Ibid, 713-719. 
604 For more on this see Dagmar Herzog, Sex After Fascism. Herzog argues that beginning in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, conservatives, in particular religious conservatives, attempted to reestablish patriarchy and family order 
after the disruption of family life brought about by war. This conservative turn in gender politics also served as a 
coping method with the Nazi past, since reestablishing patriarchy and traditional marriage was in and of itself a 
rejection of Nazi sexual mores. However, in the 1960s, a new generation of German youth erroneously believed 
these conservative sexual values to be a continuation of Nazi values, and therefore rejected such values in favor, 
ironically, of liberalized mores more akin to Nazi sexual values. 
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difficulties feeding their children and the intense physical and psychological deterioration for 
both men and women all left their marks. Moreover, the unknown fate of many German POW’s, 
almost exclusively those who had served on the Eastern Front, fostered uncertainty within 
marital relationships.605 Economic planners and labor leaders, eager to reformulate in some way 
a “livable wage” and social protections for German families during the early years of the Federal 
Republic, ran into opposition from CDU/CSU politicians who refused to classify the large 
number of households headed by single women (meaning never married, divorced or widowed) 
as families, insisting that “normal families” consisted of a working husband and a wife in the 
home.606    
For Protestants at the Kirchentage, rehabilitating the family was synonymous with the 
restoration of morality and order. Because West German conservatives understood the 
establishment of a structured, censored and controlled sexuality as key in the fight against 
totalitarianism. Because they assumed permissive sexuality opened the door to political 
radicalism, they deliberately attempted to control sexual conduct through state laws such as the 
Law on the Dissemination of Youth-Endangering Texts and Images (1953), which deeply 
restricted the sale and visibility of sexual-consumer goods. While German conservatives and 
liberals argued over whether the state or the individual ought to regulate sexual morality, the 
1950s generally promoted and protected the conservative bourgeois family in response to both 
Nazi sexual morality and the Occupation’s disruptive familial effects.607 
Kirchentag leadership and participants presumed that women participating in the 
workforce in large numbers would negatively affect the moral upbringing of German youth and 
                                                 
605 See Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make?, 108-136. 
606 See Robert Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany. 
(University of California Press, 1993). 110-121.  
607 Elizabeth Heineman, Before Porn was Legal: The Erotica Empire of Beate Uhse. (University of Chicago Press, 
2011). 1-4, and Chapter 2. For more on the Occupation and sexual disruption see chapter 4, pages xx.    
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create tensions between men and women. For practically every church leader present at the 
Kirchentag, women were needed to teach moral values to German children, many of whom had 
already been dangerously exposed to "materialistic" or "nihilistic" value systems. Their rhetoric 
also postulated that the restoration of marital order served as a rejection of Nazi values, even if, 
as with discussions on the nation, church leaders kept the past at arm’s length. Because Nazism 
often celebrated the “Aryan” body, associated masculinity with a “healthy” and active sexual 
drive, and openly advocated for female sexual liberation and pro-creation provided it stayed 
within agreed upon racial parameters, Kirchentag participants and organizers therefore 
constructed masculine and feminine ideals to be in direct opposition to Nazi definitions of 
femininity and masculinity.608    
 The 1950 working committee in Essen designated to discuss the family operated under 
the heading "Save the Family!" which in and of itself suggested that the West German family 
required saving. However, at no point during this committee did participants attempt to address 
how or why the family had broken down. Instead, they vaguely addressed concerns for children 
raised without a proper Christian education, and somewhat abstractly decided that families 
needed balance between an overabundance of work and unemployment, to have basic necessities 
yet still have free time to spend with one another. Precisely how to go about such goals went 
unsaid. Church leaders were not so naive as to state that women should not work; they 
recognized that many families, including those no longer completely whole, needed women to 
provide for their families. Nonetheless, the breakdown of the traditional Breadwinner-
Homemaker household left them disconcerted. Some of the ideas bandied about included half 
work-days for widows or those whose husbands could not work to allow for better child-
                                                 
608 See Herzog, Sex After Fascism, Chapter 1. Also, Elizabeth Heineman, "Gender, Sexuality, and Coming to Terms 
with the Nazi past." Central European History 38, no. 1 (2005): 41-74. Elizabeth D. Heineman, “Sexuality and 
Nazism: The Doubly Unspeakable?” Journal of the History of Sexuality, vol. 11, no. 1/2, 2002, pp. 22–66. 
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rearing.609 Church leaders were unambiguous; women belong in the home to teach children 
proper moral values.  
 The 1951 Kirchentag made definitive statements regarding such difficulties. Releasing a 
statement after their meeting, the working committee on the family stated: 
We have recognized that men and women should stay together, as well as parents 
and children. God gives us our children and they belong him. He does not want 
false gods and tyrants to destroy them. He does not want people to drive our 
children to hate and recompense. For that reason, help them to remain His 
children.610 
 
The emphasis on "false gods and tyrants," an obvious reference to the "nihilism" of Nazism and 
Hitler, represents the ways in which discourse on the family negotiated the Nazi past. Here, the 
committee did not engage with the norms of the Nazi past, delineating how and why they went 
against Christian values. Instead, they attempted to imagine an idealized version of the martial 
relationship, one which would inherently reinforce Christian teachings and values. Furthermore, 
the committee posited that reuniting the family, that is the naturally determined Christian family, 
would restore societal order. This implicitly suggested that any abstract influence contradicting 
this directive, be it the "false gods and tyrants" of the past, present or future, was corrupting and 
ungodly. Should evil in the abstract continue to corrupt children, violence and destruction 
indisputably followed. From statements such as these, we can conclude that Kirchentag 
participants contributed to argumentation that sought to restrict the availability of sexual-
consumer goods.611  
 Similarly, the 1952 Kirchentag in Stuttgart attempted to set right the institution of 
                                                 
609 Kreuz auf den Trümmern. 37-51.  
610 Berlin 1951: Der Deutsche Evangelische Kirchentag in Wort und Bild. 90. Original Quote: “Wir haben Erkannt: 
Gott will, daβ Mann und Frau zusammen bleiben, wie auch die Eltern und die Kinder. Gott gibt uns unsere Kinder, 
und sie gehören ihm. Er will nicht, daβ Götzen und Tyrannen sie verderben. Er will nicht daβ Menschen unsere 
Kinder zum Hassen und Vergelten treiben. Drum helft ihnen, daβ sie seine Kinder bleiben.”  
611 Heineman, Before Porn was Legal, 27-35.  
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marriage by emphasizing the man's place as head of household and spiritual authority. One 
speaker argued:  
Marriage is both a gift and a task. Such knowledge has widely disappeared. A major 
question of marriage is "What does marriage expect of you?" and not conversely 
"What do you expect of marriage?...Marriage calls for conversation. The husband is 
especially called here to stamp out silence at home and not use the radio as a 
substitute.612  
 
In this instance, men were called upon to be more vocal and expected to assume control of the 
home. The emphasis on marriage as a task, as well as the question "what does marriage expect of 
you," served as an effort to reinforce gender roles and duties. The implication was clear; a proper 
Christian marriage required men and women to fulfill their respective roles as provider and 
caregiver. The question was not what the individual desired, but rather what the individual must 
do to ensure a marriage succeeded. The emphasis on men breaking silence and leading the 
family, and the woman's place responding to that criticism, were understood as key components 
to a natural and happy marriage. This fostered an alternative image Christian of masculinity to 
the lustful, aggressive Nazi soldier, to that of the caring, loving and respectable father.613  
 Despite Church leaders' best efforts, the 1956 Kirchentag in Frankfurt demonstrated that 
many women found it difficult to accept such conservative gender roles and challenged the 
legitimacy of familial constructions in the "modern" world. Changing youth culture and the 
growth of West German consumerism clearly left its mark on Kirchentag proceedings. The 
                                                 
612 Wählt das Leben: Der Deutscher Evangelischer Kichentag Stuttgart 1952 in Wort und Bild. (Stuttgart: Kreuz 
Verlag, 1952), 18. “Ehe ist sowohl Geschenk wie auch Aufgabe. Das Wissen darum ist weithin geschwunden. Eine 
Hauptfrage der Ehe lautet: "Was erwartet die Ehe von dir?" und nicht umgekehrt:  "was erwartest du von der Ehe?" 
Ehe fordert das Gespräch. Besonders der Mann ist hier aufgerufen, aus dem Verstummen zu Hause herauszutreten 
und das Radio nicht als Ersatz zu nehmen.” 
613 Contrast for example, the image of masculinity here in comparison to the ideal SS soldier as described by 
Himmler. See Peter Longerich, Himmler. (Oxford University Press, 2012). 260-276. Perhaps an even better example 
would be to that of the German Christian ideal of masculinity. Bergen argued the “manliness” of a German Christian 
congregation was often defined by the amount of men they had serving on the Front. See Doris Bergen, A Twisted 
Cross, 200-205. Till von Rahden addresses attempts to create the “gentle father” in contrast to the Nazi militarized 
masculinity in “Fatherhood, Rechristianization and the Quest for Democracy.” 151-157. 
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proliferation and success of American movie stars such as Marlon Brando also threatened the 
ideal of the controlled father with sexual-conquests and rebellious attire.614 Women frequently 
recalled holding deep fears of becoming pregnant, and, despite the illegality of the practice, West 
Germany was gripped with a “abortion epidemic.”615  
At a session of open discourse addressing the family at the Frankfurt Kirchentag, a 
woman from Neustadt called professional life "a great temptation" for the married woman 
because the financial burden of raising children was so high. A Professor Ellwein raised the issue 
of male dominance, asking what a woman was to do if a man exploited their marriage for his 
own gain, despite her best endeavors to remain patient and respectful.616 Both women seemed to 
agree that women needed to be in the work force, either to help support the family or to protect 
themselves and their children from potential male abuse. These tensions illustrate the difficulties 
Protestant women faced in maintaining their idealized role as dictated by church leaders. By 
1959, generational tension foreshadowed larger shifts. A Mrs. Charlotte Hoffman-Hege at the 
Munich Kirchentag addressed the dangers of "children" (young teenagers), with spending cash 
and an overabundance of free time. She argued that while the financial cost of trips to the 
movies, a new pair of shoes or a night out on the town with a companion may not add up to 
much, the inner cost was considerably higher. She complained that young people were “at risk” 
to “damage their souls,” and therefore needed moral guidance.617  
 Discussions about family and gender remained some of the most conservative working 
committees at the Kirchentage even though women often expressed difficulties in accepting, 
                                                 
614 Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany. 
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615 Herzog, Sex After Fascism. 125-127.  
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enacting and implementing the values professed by church leadership. As the decade wore on, 
these working committees provided a sort of haven where Protestant women dissatisfied with 
married or working life could freely discuss their difficulties and concerns. This certainly 
suggests the difficulties Kirchentag leadership had controlling the conclusions and direction of 
open forums.618 Nevertheless, we can conclude that for von Thadden and Kirchentag organizers, 
a truly Protestant society would feature the breadwinner-homemaker economy, with the father as 
provider and spiritual authority and mother as nurturer and protector of the German youth. In 
their minds, as long as these roles were in place the "demonic" forces of materialism could not 
permeate within German society and undermine its Christian foundations. Ultimately however, 
the practical reality of everyday life in postwar Germany made such an arrangement a fleeting 
ideal. Church leaders, therefore, had to continually compromise their ideals and accept both 
dissention and moderate "solutions" to the family question. Eventually, this required organizers 
to accept alternative family structures and differences as an unalterable reality.    
 
"Should We Affirm the Dangers of Parliamentary Democracy?" The Reluctant Acceptance 
of Pluralism 
 
While likely the vast majority of church leaders and Kirchentag participants desired German 
unification and yearned for traditional family structures, such agreement over rearmament and 
German militarization remained elusive. Despite von Thadden's efforts to build a uniform 
"neutral" political community with which all Protestants could identify, sharp divisions between 
German Protestants prevented any such consolidation, particularly in discussions over the role of 
                                                 
618 It also supports von Rahden’s claim that opposition to patriarchal rigidity was palpable within Christian lay 
movements. Till von Rahden, “Fatherhood, Rechristianization and Democracy.” 
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the Church in public life.  
 Lutherans in favor of remodeling the postwar Church often aligned with Reformed 
Protestants in opposition to Western integration, particularly because they felt the church's anti-
communist stance had blinded them to the true nature of Nazism and feared repeating such an 
occurrence. Western capitalism and materialism, according to Barth, hardly represented 
Christian values, nor did militarization and continued warfare.619 However, lingering prejudices 
and disagreements with the Social-Democrats made a true political alliance between reform 
oriented Protestants and the SPD unattainable until the mid-to-late 1950s. Still, the groundwork 
for this alliance was laid in both the theological shifts of the initial postwar period and an 
aligning of political agendas between reform oriented Protestants and the SPD.620  
 Protestant attitudes toward parliamentary democracy were considerably convoluted. On 
one hand, as early as 1946, Karl Barth suggested that Christian teachings and democracy went 
hand in hand. However, Barth qualified that by stating that in challenging times, a monarchy or 
even dictatorship might be legitimized if circumstances warranted. Therefore, the Christian 
stance toward such issues must be neutrality with conduct dictated by circumstance.621 Martin 
Niemöller for his part, at times seemed inclined to favor democratic government, but had 
misgivings about the German people's willingness to accept and support such a form of 
government.622 Similarly, all church leaders tended to disdain party politics and held doubts 
about the stability and effectiveness of parliamentary states.623 The problem, as Bundestag 
                                                 
619 Both Karl Barth and Martin Niemöller argued this point repeatedly in the postwar period. Niemöller was 
particularly vocal in his opposition toward rearmament. For an example of Barth on this point see, “The Church 
Between East and West in Karl Barth. Against the Stream: Shorter Postwar Writings 1946-1952. (London and South 
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621 Ibid, 77-78.  
622 Clemens Vollnhals, Evangelische Kirche und Entnazifizierung, 281-282.  
623 See Michael Klein, Westdeutscher Protestantismus und politische Parteien.  
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President Theodor Heuss so eloquently put it in 1955, was that “Democracy is ruling on a 
deadline,” (Demokratie ist Herrschaftsauftrag auf Frist).624 Heuss’s comment reflected the 
unease many Protestants felt toward democracy. Because election cycles necessitated political 
turnover, democracy not only prohibited lasting centralized authority, but also promoted partisan 
politics, as one party could simply stall until the next election cycle.625  
National-conservative Lutheranism, given its theological belief in subservience and its 
traditional place as an ally of the old aristocratic elite, generally promoted a centralized state 
capable of maintaining order, morality and stability. Its rhetoric in large part mirrored that of 
conservative parties during the Weimar republic, often bemoaning the unbecoming corrupted 
nature of “politics.”626 But even left-leaning Protestant leaders envisioned a unified Protestant 
base capable of exerting influence on political matters when needed, and as such, made 
theologically exclusive claims to acquire the moral high-ground. Even at Essen in 1950, certainly 
one of the least contentious meetings, Niemöller cautioned listeners about straying too close to 
Western values reminding them that power comes not from weapons or wealth, but Jesus 
Christ.627  
 Despite such subtle rhetoric in Essen and Berlin, political divisions within the Protestant 
community over rearmament and the Soviet Union emerged in 1952, divisions which would mar 
                                                 
624 See Heuss’s speech at Bad Boll Academy “The German Weg. Rückfall und Fortschritt.” September 29th, 1955. 
BaK, B122/299.   
625 In this respect, German Protestants seemed to fear precisely the tactics of American Tea Party Republicans in 
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won’t confirm him.” The Washington Post. March 16th, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
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“cleanse the home of hated politics” by ridding daily life of the politicization of Leftist political parties.  See 
Sneeringer, Winning Women’s Votes, 44, 110-112.  
627 Kreuz auf den Trümmern, 103.  
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all other Kirchentag meetings in the 1950s. Likely, the unity of the first three Kirchentage 
stemmed from the consensus amongst Protestants in relation to reunification, sexual morality and 
re-Christianization. Undoubtedly as well, the continuation of the Kirchentag movement was still 
in doubt until 1951. Rearmament in particularly took center stage in 1952, as Adenauer had 
agreed to the Deutschland Vertrag (Germany Treaty) on May 26th, 1952, and subsequently 
signed the European Defense Community Treaty the following day, only three months before the 
fourth Kirchentag meeting in Stuttgart, August 27th-31st, 1952.628  
 The German rearmament controversy lines up interestingly with German interpretations 
of the Dichotomy. Because American geopolitics and military logistics greatly favored a 
powerful Western Europe following the outbreak of the Korea War (1950-1953), German 
rearmament quickly emerged as a key political issue in the early 1950s.629 The strongest 
opposition from within German Protestant circles toward rearmament overwhelmingly came 
from those who challenged the narrative of church resistance, such as Martin Niemöller, Helmut 
Gollwitzer and Gustav Heinemann. Politically this resulted at first in a break from the CDU by 
Heinemann through the creation of the short lived All-German People’s Party (Gesamtdeutsche 
Volkspartei, GVP) from 1952-1957. The rearmament debate would also form the basis of the 
beginnings of Protestant cooperation with the SPD, evidenced by the fact that when the GVP 
eventually dissolved many of its members joined the SPD. Not coincidentally, the merger 
occurred at the height of the second re-armament debate concerning nuclear weapons. 630 The 
national-conservative milieu however, despite its clear preference for peace, nonetheless 
                                                 
628 See Alaric Seerle, Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society and the Debate on Rearmament 1949-1959. 
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acquiesced to Adenauer’s argument that Germany must rearm both to combat communism and to 
maintain a modicum of state power.631 Their concerns would only become magnified following 
the Soviet use of force against the East German Workers’ Uprising in 1953. 
At the Stuttgart Kirchentag in 1952, organizers actively addressed the issue of politics, 
evident in the slogan "Choose Life!" (Wählt das Leben!), a reference to both the physical act of 
voting (the German verb wählen can also mean to vote) and the symbolic decision of choosing 
salvation through Jesus Christ.632 Hans Puttfarcken, a councilor in the Hessian Justice Ministry, 
speaking on the theme of "How does politics concern the Christian," outlined the pessimistic 
attitudes many Protestants held toward politics. Puttfarcken stated that many Protestants had 
adopted an "Ohne mich" (count me out) attitude, citing the Catholic domination of the CDU, lies 
told by both the political right and left and the corrupting effect political life had on one's 
character as the reasons for their withdrawal. Nonetheless Puttfarken argued that love for 
brothers in Christ forces should force one into political action.633 Many participants seemed to 
echo these sentiments, despite their division over rearmament.   
 In the open discussion following Puttfarken's speech, the theme of rearmament spurred 
significant debate. For the most part, even supporters of rearmament did not see the situation as 
ideal, but felt as though the Soviet threat demanded action. Friedrich Wuttke, a participant who 
claimed to have been forced out of his home in Breslau by the Poles, cautioned against relying 
too much on American protection. Russian violence and terror posed a serious threat to Germany 
he argued. Even though he had no desire to remilitarize, Wuttke argued that depending upon 
                                                 
631 This occurred in part through a refusal to take a firm political stance by the EKD following the Two Kingdoms 
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foreign protection was both immoral, as Christians should not ask someone to fight in their stead, 
and unwise, as no one knew how long the Americans could be counted upon. Opponents 
however, saw war as inevitable with significant remilitarization. One woman asked, "Must not 
all the means of violence involving weapons, inevitably lead to war?"634 The Barthian theologian 
Helmut Gollwitzer took an even harder stance. Gollwitzer's speech, entitled "Are there 
instructions from God for our political action?," argued that God had twice seen fit to disarm the 
German nation and its people, and therefore Germans should not defy His will a third time by 
allowing the "old spirits" of national egoism and violent militarism to control public policy.635 
By asserting that History had revealed God's desire for a demilitarized Germany, Gollwitzer 
attested that rearmament would be an act of defiance against God. Gollwitzer's rhetoric 
attempted to chart the proper political course for all Christians. A true Christian, he argued, could 
never support rearmament because doing so would be a rejection of God's will.  
 In contrast, Provost Hildebrand similarly alluded to rearmament in his speech "How do 
we see the Future?," but from a position more akin to national-conservative orthodoxy. 
Hildebrand's speech expressed concern that a weak de-centered government would be unable to 
maintain order and authority, a position clearly formed within the framework of Luther's Two 
Kingdoms. With an obvious retort of the Barthian position in mind, he stated, "The Christian 
must understand the necessity of state power. The question is not whether state power is evil, but 
rather how that power is handled."636 His argument implied that the state must rearm so as to 
maintain order in accordance with its ordained role described by Luther. Therefore, in opposing 
rearmament, and by extension centralized state power, one essentially rejected God's natural 
order. The question at stake was not whether or not state power was essential, but rather how that 
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power was wielded. To solve the problem of state power, Hildebrand advised avoiding the 
divisive effects of party politics and placing checks on the unbridled and easily misled masses: 
"The knowledge and the need to pursue politics in a democracy according to popular opinion, 
does not obviate the requirement that a delegation take political responsibility seriously and have 
the courage to make unpopular decisions."637 Hildebrand's statement posited that democracy 
inherently subjected itself to the will of the masses, and therefore only a determined and 
powerful executive authority could control such forces. In this respect, much like Gollwitzer, 
Hildebrand maintained that Protestants must not oppose God's commands. By declaring that 
democracy has the potential to upset this natural order, Hildebrand asserted that Protestants must 
ardently seek to keep such forces in check so as to prevent any disruptions.  
 Unsurprisingly, almost all attendees and speakers at Stuttgart agreed that Christians 
needed to have a voice in political life. What is more surprising however, is that many attendees 
seemed to agree that parliamentary politicians and even Church leadership did not speak for all 
Protestants, evidence that neither the exclusivity rhetoric by speakers such as Gollwitzer and 
Hildebrand, nor von Thadden's attempts at building a united ecumenical community, had the 
desired effect. In many cases however, their rejection of exclusivity claims did not affirm 
widespread support of political pluralism, but rather the rejection of it. Participant Wilfried 
Überschwer from Neuwied stated that "in the nature of a free democracy," one must be aware 
that party representatives speak only for their political parties, not all Protestants. Überschwer 
also argued that Christianity was incompatible with materialism and Marxism, because 
Christianity required "commitment", something representatives of the SPD needed to come to 
address more effectively. He argued "We [Christians] are subject to the binding of Christ, and 
therefore we must put an end to the old teachings that are now considered outdated. Likewise, we 
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must also not permit unfettered liberalism."638 Such statements reflected the ambivalence many 
attendees felt toward party politics. Moreover, his argument suggested that political rhetoric of 
exclusivity, which resulted as a product of "free democracy," fostered such divides. Christians 
therefore, must find a way to adapt democracy to avoid being corrupted by "unfettered 
liberalism."  
 Other attendees made even stronger claims. A Mrs. Emmi Welter put the matter quite 
succinctly. Politicians, she argued, could not be counted upon to uphold Christian values; 
because not only are they beholden to their political party, but politics in general corrupt one's 
moral constitution. Therefore, "...a practical conclusion from our present knowledge [that 
politicians cannot be trusted] arises: we have a responsibility in public life."639 Similarly, Kurt 
Neumann, a professed supporter of the CDU, rejected the idea that Christians who supported the 
CDU were somehow better than those who supported the SPD. Neumann exhorted Protestants to 
temper their expectations of political leaders, stating, "…One cannot expect a politician, to be 
considered from the outset a cheater and a liar only seeking political power, to take a stand for 
everyone."640 Given such facts, Neumann encouraged Protestants to be active in politics and 
work together to better the nation. While Neumann’s rejection of the need for exclusive 
Protestant political positions drawn from the theological logic of speakers like Hildebrand and 
Gollwitzer represented a minority position amongst participants, his agreement that politicians 
were generally corrupt corresponded with the opinions of those like Frau Welter, whose clear 
disdain for party politics can only be described as anti-parliamentarian. Similar to Neumann, a 
Fritz Heidler from Berlin argued that Christians must learn that just because they may hold 
different political opinions, it did not mean they should be bound to them. Instead, they should 
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be bound together through Christ despite these differences.641 Heidler's willingness to accept 
democracy and political pluralism outright obviously lent support to calls for Protestant unity, 
which softened political divides and built political consensus. Efforts such as these, in addition to 
the common ground most Protestants found in discussing the family and the nation, prevented 
further splintering and factionalism. 
 Nonetheless, the stark differences in opinion shared by speakers such as Hildebrand and 
Gollwitzer reflected the strained atmosphere at Stuttgart in 1952. Furthermore, speakers and 
attendees alike continually addressed reservations about democracy and parliamentary rule. 
Political action therefore, resulted not in the acceptance of democracy, but rather out of a distrust 
of parliamentary politics. The solution to the structural issues presented in democratic societies, 
could be countered with honest 'Christian' faith and political activism, even if Protestant leaders 
contested what that meant and how it might be implemented. Benjamin Pearson has shown quite 
conclusively that the 1953 Kirchentag in Hannover took place in a similarly highly charged 
political atmosphere given its proximity to upcoming elections. As such, Kirchentag organizers 
deliberately prohibited divisive figures like Gustav Heinemann from speaking, hoping to limit 
political divisions. Nonetheless, speeches by Theodor Paul Pfizer, the mayor of Ulm, and CDU 
politician Ernst Lemmer highlighted the tension between the various Protestant factions. Pfizer 
blamed the breakdown of the middle-class political tradition in modern democracy, which 
catered unabashedly to the masses unable to make rational decisions. The educated aristocratic 
elite on the other hand, could make the fine political distinctions necessary to uphold order by 
basing their political decisions on reason not emotion. Conversely, Lemmer stated that Germans 
needed to fundamentally alter their understanding of politics and accept political difference, 
arguing that while modern democracy may not be ideal, if carefully protected, it offered the best 
                                                 
641 Ibid, 326-327.  
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opportunity to guarantee individual freedoms.642 
 By 1956 in Frankfurt, discourse over political issues addressed the encroachment of 
secularizing forces on public life in both East and West Germany. In this instance, attendees 
again reiterated their distrust of political politics, this time directly confronting political 
ideologies and the propagandistic impulses of political media. Multiple attendees compared 
Soviet Bolshevism to a religious faith, emphasizing a need for a Christian response to communist 
influences.643 CDU Bundestag Deputy Elisabeth Schwarzhaupt, speaking at an open forum on 
the "Nation and Politics," stated, "The functioning of a democracy, in which we indeed do not 
want to leave only to rulers, depends on the fact that we do not exercise our right to vote as 
members of a mass, but rather as individuals who choose freely..."644 Similarly to comments 
made in Stuttgart, Schwarzhaupt advised political action to counter the potentiality of political 
abuse by politicians. Indeed, again we see an apparent abhorrence of mass politics countered by 
individual action on the part of an active Protestant believer. 
 By 1959, Kirchentag speakers abandoned, for the most part, rhetoric of moral superiority 
and exclusivity. Fritz Erler, a leading member in the SPD, emphasized the importance of 
political competition and the recognition of different viewpoints during the working committee 
on "When Christians are Political Opponents." Erler defined politics not as a battle between 
enemies, but rather a discourse in which people attempted to learn to live with one another, 
summed up by his assertion that "In politics, there is not only one truth."645 Still, questions about 
parliamentary democracy persisted, even as official rhetoric from both the SPD and the CDU 
                                                 
642 See Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag Hamburg, 1953. Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag. (Stuttgart: 
Kreuz-Verlag, 1953), 195-204. Also, Pearson, "The Pluralization of Protestant Politics," 292-295. 
643 See for example, comments by Ernst Oskar Petra and Manfred Scheib in Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag 
Frankfurt 1956., 272 and 298 respectively. 
644 Ibid, 270. 
645 Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag München 1959. 415. Also see Benjamin Pearson, "The Pluralization of 
Protestant Politics," 296-298.  
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accepted Protestant political divisions. CDU culture minister Edo Osterloh who also spoke with 
Erler on the topic of internal Protestant political opposition, addressed the question directly, 
stating:  
We have been asked whether the parliamentary democracy of today...is just. It is the 
hardest, most complicated, most vulnerable form of government on Earth...as long 
as we want freedom, we should affirm the danger of parliamentary democracy, and 
also, especially as, Protestant Christians.646 
 
Osterloh's statement reveals the long-term effects of the anti-party mentality in Protestant 
politics. At very few instances over the course of the 1950s did Protestant leaders or lay 
members express a desire to proceed with party politics at the Kirchentage. In fact, Protestant 
leaders and Kirchentag participants constantly sought to find a way to bridge their political 
divisions and build a new political community which was to serve as a bulwark against the forces 
of materialism and secularism. Nonetheless, this fear of parliamentary politics drove Kirchentag 
participants to become active in public life. The "vulnerability" of parliamentary democracy 
encouraged active participation on the part of lay Protestants to keep deceitful politicians in 
check and prevent any abuses by the state. As such, West German Protestants came to accept 
democratic pluralism, despite their persistent apprehension toward it.    
   
Conclusion: Unintentional Pluralism 
 
In 1961, the Kirchentag returned to Berlin for a third time.647 Held just before the building of the 
Berlin Wall (the meeting occurred July 18-23, with construction on the wall beginning less than 
a month later on August 13th), East German authorities proved unwilling to cooperate barring 
                                                 
646 Ibid, 427.  
647 A shortened form of the Kirchentag took place in a hastily constructed meeting in 1957 in Berlin, because 
negotiations with the GDR had broken down over talks to hold the 1958 Kirchentag in Thüringen.    
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Western participants from East Berlin unless organizers agreed to ban "NATO pastors" such as 
Otto Dibelius. Leadership refused, continuing the event in West Berlin only.648 With the border 
between East and West Berlin sealed less than a month later, 1961 marked the last time the 
Kirchentag movement included participants from both East and West Germany until after 
reunification in 1990.649    
  For Kirchentag leaders, the Berlin Wall fostered institutional turmoil. Having lost its 
signature political appeal as the "only all-German organization that has so far not been cut by 
zonal boundaries," Kirchentag organizers reconsidered the future agenda of the meeting.650 Thus, 
the Kirchentag would cease to function as a symbol of continued German unity, with attendance 
falling considerably in comparison to the mid '50s.651 Questions of national identity still 
continued, but new leadership led by Klaus von Bismarck,652 catered to the interests of a new 
generation of Protestants, organizing forums on ecumenism and Judaism.653 Ultimately, the Wall 
marked an end to von Thadden's vision of a united Protestant community, and an end to 
conservative political and theological dominance in West Germany.654 The physical separation of 
East and West mirrored Protestants’ inability to agree upon a united political or theological 
worldview.  
                                                 
648 Pearson, "Faith and Democracy," 260-263.    
649 The 1989 meeting, again held in Berlin, took place from June 7th-June 11th, some four months before the wall 
came down in October. See the official Kirchentag website http://www.kirchentag.de/das-ist-kirchentag/archiv/seit-
1989/1989-berlin.html. There was no event held in 1990.  
650 Special to The New York Times. "German Red Curb on Churches Told." New York Times (1923-Current 
File), Apr 22, 1956.  
651 For full attendance numbers, see Rüdiger Runge and Margot Käẞmann, eds. Kirche in Bewegung. 50 Jahre 
Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag. (Gütersoh: Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 1999).  
652 As a great-grandnephew of the former first Chancellor of Germany, Klaus von Bismarck held numerous 
important positions within the Kirchentag. He was a member of the Kirchentag Presidium (1950-1995) and served 
as president from 1977-1979.  
653 See for example Gabrielle Kammerer's analysis of the 1961 Kirchentag's working committee 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft) of Jews and Christians. Kammerer demonstrates, despite genuine efforts to confront Christian 
responsibility for the Holocaust, continued prejudice and limited progress with talks breaking down in the following 
two meetings. Gabriele Kammerer, In die Haare, in die Arme. 
654 This had much to do with generational change, and even the Kirchentag itself reshuffled sizable portions of its 
leading council in the late 1950s and early 60s. Pearson, "Faith and Democracy," 310-311.   
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 The success of the original Kirchentag message at attracting large crowds, important 
political figures and church leaders should not be overlooked. Its depiction of Christianity as an 
alternative to totalitarianism and materialism was flexible enough to include the many disparate 
factions of German Protestants, as well as garner institutional support from Catholic politicians 
while also undergirding many of the traits scholars have identified with postwar Germany; the 
restoration of the patriarchal family, the motif of German victimhood and the obfuscation and 
tacit rejection of the Nazi past.  
In many ways, Protestants’ distrust of parliamentary democracy was a continuation of 
Weimar political views, although the experiences of the Second World War and Nazi 
authoritarianism forced church leaders to rethink their relationship to the State and politics. Such 
rethinking fostered divides, divides the Kirchentag sought to alleviate in favor of a new national 
community designed to rebuild and re-Christianize the German nation on the basis of 
confessional identity. Ironically however, as much as the Kirchentag initially attempted to foster 
Protestant unity, it often instead highlighted the irreconcilable political differences of its 
participants. By the late 1950s, despite claims of exclusivity regarding Protestant political 
conduct, the majority of Kirchentag participants seemed willing to accept political pluralism. 
The underlying cause of this political acceptance ironically stemmed from Protestants' distrust in 
parliamentary democracy. This distrust provided the impetus for greater political involvement, 
which, over the course of the 1950s, eventually eased fears and cultivated acceptance.  
The concept of the Kirchentag demonstrates how postwar German society both departed 
from and sustained Nazi norms and values. The Kirchentag’s emphasis on mass spectacle, anti-
communism and concern for lost territories in the East all represented ways in which German 
Protestants continued Third Reich practices well into the 1950s. However, new norms also 
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emerged, most especially surrounding rhetoric on the ideal “Christian” marriage and family life 
which aimed to reestablish the moral authority of Christianity. More important are the ways in 
which the Kirchentag sought to redefine Nazi values. Reconstituting the Volksgemeinschaft to a 
community based upon confessional identity created the necessary space for both the 
continuation of Nazi values via a rehabilitation of German conservativism and the possibility of 
political pluralism by shifting communal identity away from racial and national qualities. 
Because in theory a confessionally based community was open to all peoples, the Kirchentag, as 
a public forum, inherently gave voice to alternative interpretations and redefinitions of the Nazi 
past. This in turn fostered the eventual breakdown of this imagined community, as a new 
generation of Germans challenged the central tenants of postwar Christianity, most especially the 
sexual rigidity of Christian patriarchy.655 Redefining 1950’s interpretations of the past in the 
1960’s naturally led to challenges and questions about Christian responsibility for the Holocaust, 
questions which would greatly undermine the moral authority Christianity had reestablished 
during the 1950s leading to both secularization and an even greater splintering of 






                                                 
655 See Dagmar Herzog, Sex after Fascism. 141-220.  
656 For more on the splintering of Protestant thought in the 1960s, see Dagmar Herzog, "The Death of God in West 
Germany: Between Secularization, Postfascism and the Rise of Liberation Theology." Die Gegenwart Gottes in der 
Moderne. Ed. Michael Geyer and Lucian Hölscher. (Wallstein, 2006.) For the collapse of Christian moral authority, 
see Michael Phayer, The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930-1965. (Indiana University Press, 2001). 217-227.  
Also, Greschat, Protestantismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  
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Conclusion: The Effects of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy and National Renewal 
 
In 1956 in an interview with West German media, the controversial former first head of West 
Germany’s domestic intelligence service (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) Otto John,657 
proclaimed “whomever was not a Resistance fighter had no right to call themselves a patriot.” 
Continuing he claimed, “One could not be a Christian and a Nazi at the same time.”658 John’s 
statement reflects the power of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy in the postwar West. Not 
only does he declare the incompatibility of Nazism and Christianity, but also positions true 
patriots as members of the German resistance. Such argumentation undergirds the effectiveness 
of the Dichotomy in rehabilitating German national-conservativism after the Second World War. 
By defining oneself as a Christian, the Dichotomy facilitated a shift away from political and 
ideological association with Nazism while still allowing for the continued respectability of 
national-conservative beliefs such as anti-Communism, anti-Semitism and patriotism.  
 The birth of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy emerged within Western critiques of 
Nazism, most especially within the United States and Great Britain. Its ascension to near 
universal acceptance within the United States occurred in the context of American pro-war 
propaganda and neo-liberal theological critiques of liberal Protestants and pacifism. Because 
proponents of war positioned Germany and Nazism as anti-Church, anti-religious freedom and 
ultimately anti-Christian, mainline American Protestants mobilized, sometimes reluctantly, in 
opposition to Adolf Hitler’s Germany. As proponents of war reasoned the rise of European 
“totalitarianism” occurred as a byproduct of secularization and a disregard for the God given 
                                                 
657 John ran domestic intelligence in West Germany from 1950 to 1954, when he appeared controversially (perhaps 
willingly, perhaps kidnapped) in East Berlin, only to return to the West in December of 1955 to stand trial for 
treason. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment for espionage, but released in July of 1958.  
658 Die Rheinpfalz, November 17, 1956. B 443/1562, BAK.  I thank Benjamin Hett for bringing the quote to my 
attention and passing along the citation.  
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rights of the individual, Americans internalized the link between Judeo-Christian values and 
American identity.659  
 But because the mobilization of American Protestantism required concretely 
demonstrating the anti-Christian tendencies of National Socialists and the heroic resistance of 
“true” Christians in Germany, pro-war propaganda instantiated a narrative of fundamental 
incompatibility between the two worldviews. This narrative most certainly embellished Christian 
resistance and Nazi oppression of Christianity, while completely dismissing any cooperation or 
intellectual affinity between German Protestantism and National Socialism. While adherents to 
the Dichotomy rightly described the radical Deutsche Christen movement as heretical, their 
outright dismissal of the sect obfuscated the ideological overlap between the movement and the 
“neutral” and Confessing churches. This narrative quickly emerged during occupation, especially 
as German pastors in opposition to Allied denazification measures found American pastors 
sympathetic supporters both legally and publicly.     
 However, despite the Dichotomy’s political utility, many of the German Protestant Left 
refused to embrace the concept wholeheartedly for a variety of reasons. Barthians especially 
rejected the implicit hardline anti-Communist position for theological reasons660 and in fear of 
becoming willing servants of the capitalist-materialist American agenda. Others, especially 
Martin Niemöller, refused to embrace both the inherently pro-Western American position as well 
as the unquestioned rhetoric of Christian resistance. While Niemöller’s American tour largely 
propagated the Dichotomy, his continued open engagement with the political, theological and 
moral failings of the Church threatened to undermine its entire basis. If Niemöller’s example 
represented the best of Protestant resistance and still proved overwhelmingly unable to prevent 
                                                 
659 On this point, my dissertation offers further evidence to support Kevin Schultz’s claim that the Second World 
War reinvigorated Judeo-Christian American identity. See Schultz, Tri-Faith America. 
660 For more on this see Epilogue pages 249-262 
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Jewish annihilation, then surely the church’s resistance was ineffective at best. While this 
particular point perhaps reinforced the proposed need for re-Christianization, it still demonstrated 
the weakness of the church. Second, if, as Niemöller constantly claimed, the church ought to 
have done much more to stop the Nazis and carried significant guilt for having not done so, then 
the Dichotomy’s narrative of Christian resistance required revisiting. Finally, Niemöller’s open 
willingness to deal with the Russians damaged proponents of the Dichotomy’s anti-communist 
position and, especially on the part of the Americans, the insistence that a strong church would 
and could function as a barrier toward totalitarianism.  
Moreover, the fact that the overall veracity of the Dichotomy was consistently contested 
by those with comparably strong resistance records demonstrates the degree to which it often 
functioned as an exculpating tool for those eager to brush the failings of the church under the 
rug, excuse away broader German participation in the Holocaust and counter parts of allied 
cultural rehabilitation. Niemöller’s consistent emphasis on both personal and institutional 
responsibility best demonstrates this point. But proponents of the Dichotomy in America needed 
his person to continue to rehabilitate the image of Germany abroad especially because he was so 
well-known in the United States thanks to wartime propaganda. In this respect, his contrition and 
moving descriptions of Nazi totalitarianism did much to foster support and sympathy for 
Germans in America and generally enhanced the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy, even if at the 
same time they hinted at the simplicity of the narrative.  
From an American standpoint, the Christian World Order depended more on establishing 
and spreading Judeo-Christian morality fused with democratic-liberalism and capitalism than any 
real evangelization. The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy therefore functioned as an important 
arm of American nationalism, infused with rhetoric of moral international responsibility. This 
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national globalism is most clearly visible in Protestant rhetoric in support of both German aid 
and the Marshall Plan, as it emphasized the moral responsibility of American Judeo-Christian 
democracy in the fight against international totalitarianism and communism. 
The Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy functioned as a crucial tool of democratization 
because it encouraged the creation of a Western Christian identity that facilitated a shift away 
from National Socialism for German national-conservatives. While German Protestant distrust 
for democracy lingered throughout the 1950s as demonstrated at the Kirchentage, the Dichotomy 
facilitated a supra-national identity that ostensibly linked democracy to Christianity which 
created the space for a gradual German Protestant embrace of democracy. However, the 
Dichotomy also undoubtedly obscured the Nazi past and facilitated Protestant critiques of Allied 
policies designed to end Nazism. Undoubtedly then, the Dichotomy served to transition German 
conservativism away from National Socialism by whitewashing the record of former Nazis and 
creating the necessary moral space for integration. Robert Moeller’s “useable past” emerges 
distinctly within the context of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. Its rise both facilitated 
German democratization and West German “normalization” by linking German Protestants with 
a theorized anti-communist Christian West. By distancing German conservativism from National 
Socialism, the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy obscured the ways in which Nazism had 
emerged from within the German national-conservative Protestant worldview and hid the 
continuation of Nazi values in the Federal Republic.       
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 In 1948, the World Council of Churches finally convened its first meeting in Amsterdam. 
The meeting, which brought together many of the most important Protestant leaders in the 20th 
century, including Samuel Calvert, Willem Visser ‘t Hooft, Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, 
Martin Niemöller and Karl Barth, set the stage for the central questions of postwar Christianity. 
Principally among them, was “God’s Design” for man and the Church. Karl Barth’s opening 
address entitled “No Christian Marshall Plan” caused an immediate stir.  
 Barth charged that Christians should begin from a common belief in faithfulness to 
Christ, not culture or politics or the threat of the atomic bomb. The World Council of Churches, 
he claimed, was perilously close to constructing “an order of justice and peace embracing our 
whole planet.” The danger of such a path he warned, would root Christian concerns in the very 
anxieties of human existence Christ had already resolved through crucifixion, not Christ himself. 
What the World Council of Churches needed to achieve went far beyond some sort of “Christian 
Marshall Plan” that addressed the world’s ills, but instead the very nature of Christian witness 
and the purpose of the Church on earth.661  Barth, deliberately trying to provoke, stated, “We 
ought to give up, even of this first day of our deliberations, every thought that the care of the 
church, the care of the world, is our care.”662   
 Niebuhr, as one might expect, was furious.663 Over the course of his career, Niebuhr had 
criticized Barthian theology for its tendency to discount the world in which human beings 
resided for “otherworldliness,” but he had respected Barth’s position in the Kirchenkampf and 
                                                 
661 Karl Barth, “No Christian Marshall Plan,” The Christian Century, December 8, 1948. Pg. 1330-1332. 
662 Ibid, 1331.  
663 Scott Erwin, The Theological Vision of Reinhold Niebuhr’s “The Irony of American History.” 104 
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the two had got along well enough in a meeting the year prior despite their differences.664 In the 
time leading up to Amsterdam he had also invested considerable time and effort in hopes of 
forcing a concrete resolution against the Soviet Union and plan of action of the of World 
Council. He feared greatly the sort of vague obtuse statements that such gatherings tended to 
produce.665 Barth’s opening address had thrown everything he had worked toward into chaos. 
 Both Niebuhr and Emil Brunner objected to Barth, Niebuhr seemingly impromptu at the 
end of Barth’s speech. Brunner rightly noted that Barth had advocated passionately against 
Nazism, yet refused to condemn Soviet communism. Brunner emphatically stated “Let me say 
that the Church is duty bound to postulate two things unconditionally—social justice and 
absolute negation of totalitarianism as implied in state socialism.” He called Totalitarianism “the 
real devil in our time” and “the grave of freedom.”666 While Niebuhr conceded Barth’s point that 
God would have final victory, he argued Barth “was wrong to preach this gospel…as if there was 
no history.” Continuing, he noted “Christian life without a high sense of responsibility for the 
health of our communities, our nations and our cultures degenerates into an intolerable other-
worldliness.”667   
 But Barth countered there had been a qualitative difference between communism and 
Nazism. Nazism, he argued, had threatened the very soul of Christianity. “We were in danger of 
bringing, first incense, and then the complete sacrifice to it as a to a false god.” In opposition to 
Brunner, Barth claimed communism did not possess this same quality because it did not threaten 
to “hypnotize” the church as Nazism did, regardless of the detestable similarities between the its 
                                                 
664 Brandon Morgan, “The Lordship of Christ and the Gathering of Church: Considering Hauerwas’ Debts to the 
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political structure and the much more vigorous suppression and persecution of religious belief in 
the Soviet Union.668 In Niebuhr’s estimation, Barth’s failure amounted to a political misjudgment 
stemming from Barth’s theology. The two never saw eye to eye again on this issue.669     
 Much to Niebuhr’s dismay, the World Council’s published reports condemned both 
communism and capitalism equally. Niebuhr blamed Barth. Niebuhr would later accuse Barth of 
being “obliquely pro-communist.” In his first article published in The Christian Century since 
the founding of Christianity and Crisis in 1941, Niebuhr claimed Barth “seems inclined today to 
regard the differences between Communism and the so-called democratic world as insignificant 
when viewed from the ultimate Christian standpoint. But we are men and not God, and the 
destiny of civilizations depends upon our decisions.”670 The two would spar continuously over 
the issue, with Barth consistently arguing for neutrality from the Christian perspective. His 1958 
declaration: “I regard anticommunism as a matter of principle an evil even greater than 
communism itself,” summed up his political position quite succinctly. For Barth, the belief that 
the church could in some way cure the world’s ills in fact infringed upon its ability to proclaim 
the Gospel. Moreover, rabid anticommunism threatened to push the church toward political 
positions that obscured its philosophical and theological aims, much as Nazism had. In so doing, 
Americans, and in fact the World Council itself, were in danger of presuming to know and 
understand God’s plan for the world. 
 This story, seldom told outside the narrow confines of theological history, offers 
significant insight into American and German politics. First, it showed that the tentative 
agreement formed around the Dichotomy during the Second World War had frayed at the seams. 
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Barth was but one of several Western Protestants who back-tracked from direct condemnation of 
Soviet communism. Second, it foreshadowed the desired uniformity of Realists like Niebuhr or 
ecumenists like ‘t Hooft would be almost impossible to achieve. Without the urgency of war, 
Realist arguments began to fall on deaf ears. Indeed, Niebuhr had never fully convinced many of 
his liberal allies of the entirety of his theological worldview as it applied to political and ethical 
action. More importantly though, the Dichotomy in America would take on a life of its own, 
ironically coming back to haunt those who had advocated for it most forcefully. In Germany, 
where reform minded Lutherans like Martin Niemöller joined the Barthian reluctance to embrace 
political action against the Soviet Union, the Dichotomy likewise could not produce uniformity.  
 
Weapons Turned Inward: “How Red is the Federal Council of Churches?” 
  
In 1946, The Commission on a Just and Durable Peace submitted guidelines for conduct 
with the Soviet Union. The guidelines, adopted by The Federal Council of Churches’ executive 
council, urged a “formula of tolerance” with the Soviet Union. The Commission, now devoid of 
John Foster Dulles’s leadership, argued that while “our people generally consider the faith and 
institutions of Soviet communism to contain grave evils...The American people must be resolved 
never to advance their own faith by forcibly crushing another faith.” The Council also warned 
the Soviet Union must not persist “in methods of intolerance, such as purge, coercion, deceitful 
infiltration and false propaganda…”671 The Council’s middle position resembled that of liberal 
Protestantism’s pacifistic tendencies prior to the war. Just as liberal Protestants had initially done 
with Nazism, offering value judgements while refusing to take definitive political action, so too 
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they did here.  
Crucially however, the Council still upheld the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy. The 
guidelines also stated “However, Marxist Communism in its orthodox philosophy stands clearly 
opposed to Christianity. It is atheistic in its conception of ultimate reality and materialistic in its 
view of man and his destiny. Its utopian philosophy of history lacks the essential Christian notes 
of divine judgement, divine governance and eternal victory…Such differences will never be 
removed by the compromise or surrender of faith by Christians.”672 Unbeknownst at the time, the 
refusal to take a more aggressive stance would pave the way for a theological shift in America 
toward an evangelical fundamentalism characterized by fierce anti-communism and strict 
dogmatic belief. 
Evangelical fundamentalists had always viewed the Federal Council of Churches with a 
certain degree of skepticism if not outright hostility. They saw the entire Council as corrupted by 
liberal theology and attacked it as a “modern church” seeking to diminish the uniqueness of 
Christianity. Like most Christians during the 1930s and early 1940s, they too embraced the 
Dichotomy, and needing little encouragement to see communism as incompatible with 
Christianity.  
However, by embracing the Dichotomy during the War and continuing to uphold its basic 
tenets, the Federal Council and mainline Protestants painted themselves into a political and a 
theological corner. The very concept of the Dichotomy emphasized the importance of Christian 
Identity and spiritual fortitude. But by emphasizing the importance of Christian identity, the 
Dichotomy created a need to define precisely who was, and was not, Christian. The very essence 
of the politicization of the Kirchenkampf stemmed from this crucial frame of view. In the late 
1940s and early 1950s, evangelicals characterized liberal theology as fundamentally unchristian. 
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To be sure, such criticisms had existed for the better part of 30 years, and in fact many historians 
trace the genesis of the fundamentalism movement in the United States as a response to liberal 
theology.673 But the prevalence of the Dichotomy in American culture meant that such criticisms 
hit home in ways they had not previously.  
In the late 1940s as America approached the height of McCarthyism and anti-communist 
hysteria, evangelicals launched a series of attacks against the Federal Council of Churches 
accusing it of secretly supporting communism, housing communist spies and degrading the 
moral integrity of Christianity. These attacks often bordered on the fantastical, but nonetheless 
fostered all sorts of conspiracy theories about the Council, many of which still endure to this 
day.674 Consistent attacks against the theology of the Federal Council also continued, though 
these tended to be more accurate despite bordering on the hysterical.675  
Likely the most important attack came in the form of Carl McIntire’s widely circulated 
pamphlet entitled “How Red is the Federal Council of Churches.”676 The pamphlet, which 
featured images of the Soviet Hammer and Sickle draped over the Cross and a sprawling red 
spider web featuring individuals, initiatives and committees supported by the Council, included 
                                                 
673 See George M. Marsden, Fundamentalism in American Culture. (Oxford University Press, 2006).  
674 A quick internet search of the Federal Council turns up several noteworthy examples. See: Gene Bladock’s The 
Neutralized Church (Self Published: Trafford Publishing, 2011). Also, http://www.reformed-
theology.org/html/issue07/apostasy.htm, http://www.truthmagazine.com/archives/volume15/TM015013.html and 
https://jamesperloff.com/tag/national-council-of-churches/ for just a few of the outlandish accusations leveled 
against the Council. The latter example even accuses the Council of undermining Herbert Hoover’s investigation 
into American military and government officials in the early 1950s, acts most historians deem as radically unjust. 
Hoover’s use of secret informants denied the accused the right to cross-examine their accusers, and often, the 
accused was not even informed of specific charges. See Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in 
America (1998) Also, David H. Price, Threatening Anthropology: McCarthyism and the FBI’s Surveillance of 
Activist Anthropologists, (Duke University Press, 2004).  
675 PSHA RG 18 9 1. Dan Gilbert wrote in the fundamentalist journal The Voice in April of 1946, that the Federal 
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accompanying quotes or snippets describing all the items in question as communist. Most of the 
quotes came from the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) but lacked any sort 
of context and were devoid of any actual evidence.677 Nonetheless, the pamphlet accused the 
Federal Council of promoting socialism, containing large numbers of communists and even more 
“fellow travelers.” Even still they accused the Council of apostasy, specifically attacking Harry 
Fosdick and G. Bromley Oxnam (former president of the Federal Council from 1944-1946) for 
denying biblical inerrancy. 
Yet despite the baselessness of much of the pamphlet’s claims, attacks against the 
Council did have some validity. In 1922, Fosdick ignited a firestorm of controversy in a sermon 
attacking fundamentalism titled “Shall the Fundamentalists Win?” There and in future sermons, 
Fosdick defended progressive skepticism of belief in the Virgin Birth and Christ’s physical 
resurrection, while deriding fundamentalists who refused to tolerate any view other than biblical 
inerrancy. While Fosdick carefully avoided directly challenging those who still believed in 
biblical literalism, he nonetheless professed his own position quite clearly. Fundamentalists 
attacked Fosdick’s position with sermons of their own, including Clarence McCartney’s “Shall 
Unbelief Win?” The particulars of the theological debate aside, Fosdick’s sermon created 
significant tension between fundamentalists and modernists until well into the 1930s when the 
rise of Neo-Orthodoxy and dialectic theology shifted the terms of debate.678 This meant that 
opponents who wanted to dig up dirt against the Federal Council and ecumenists often did not 
have to look very hard.  
Even Niebuhr, who became in many ways became the representation of mainline 
Protestant anti-communism, had at one time been a firm supporter of the Social Gospel and 
                                                 
677 See, “How Red is the Federal Council of Churches?” PSHA RG 18 9 3. 
678 See Longfield, The Presbyterian Controversy. Pgs. 9-25, 180-214.  
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member of Socialist Parties. Indeed, Niebuhr himself consistently warned of the dangerous 
tendencies the Dichotomy produced, particularly its sanctification of democracy, free-market 
capitalism and liberalism. In 1947, he warned Americans “have only one religion: devotion to 
democracy.” Their blind support of its values led many to “claim unconditioned validity for its 
ideals.”679 Throughout the late 1940s and 1950s he would critique the very nationalist globalism 
he had helped to engender, arguing that while American responsibility was paramount to 
protecting western civilization, Americans needed to be wary of assuming the universal validity 
of American values and especially ought not to impose those structures on others by force.680   
Existing narratives concerning the rise of the “radical right,” evangelicalism and 
fundamentalism in the 1950s and beyond all overlook the importance of the Christian-
Totalitarian Dichotomy. Standard narratives argue evangelicalism emerges out of Cold War 
hysteria, provincialism and resistance to religious pluralism and rising anti-racism in Northern 
Mainline Churches.681 I suggest that the coalescence of American Identity as fundamentally anti-
communist and Christian only becomes possible because of the war time alliance built around 
the Dichotomy. While scholars correctly argue that the evangelical movement emphasized a 
more racialized nationalistic understanding of Christian Identity, such narratives overlook the 
shifting nature of Christian Identity which only became supremely politically important because 
of the Dichotomy. Therefore in the late 1940s, fundamentalist accusations of subversion against 
modernists and even Realists carried extra weight precisely because of the mainline Churches’ 
courtship of the Dichotomy. By reinforcing rhetoric that emphasized the “Christian” nature of 
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America and the imperative of Christianity in the fight against communism and Nazism, 
ecumenical Protestants opened themselves up to critiques from evangelicals who, perhaps 
rightly, charged that the international non-denominational nature of ecumenical mainline 
Christianity subverted its unique identity. This made Billy Graham’s shift toward biblical 
revelation and away from the FCCoC’s Enlightenment and Modernism all the more possible.682  
Consider Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam’s appearance before the House Un-American 
Activities Committee in 1953. Oxnam, who claimed in 1946 that “Protestantism has been 
inevitably cast for its role as chief adversary of communism,” went before the court to defend his 
name after the “Minute Women,” an organization of evangelical women, accused Oxnam and the 
Methodist Church more generally of supporting communism. Even the notorious House found 
no basis to support the claims after Oxnam’s defense.683 Or when the Federal Council released 
the New Standard Bible and evangelicals like Carl McIntire publicly burned copies denouncing 
it as “Stalin’s Bible.” McIntire even accused secretary of state John Foster Dulles of anti-
communism for his support of the “radical and pacifist leaders in the Federal and World 
Councils.”684  
The unequivocal failure of European nationalistic dictatorships likewise shifted 
theological questions away from the quest of existential meaning and toward ethical practice, as 
captured by the disagreement between Barth and Niebuhr. With the theological search for truth 
seemingly resolved (or at least muted), leading Christian figures shifted toward questions of 
Christian ethical conduct after 1945.685 Jason Stevens convincingly argues that Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s emphasis on tragedy and original sin, which the American diplomat to Russia George 
                                                 
682 See Jason Stevens, God Fearing and Free. 31-34.  
683 See Oxnam trial in, United States Congress House Committee on Un-American Activities. Hearings 1953/54, 
Volume III. (University of Michiagan Press, 1954.) 3595-3804.   
684 See Martin E. Marty, Modern Religion in America vol. 3. 1941-1960. 366-372. 
685 Heinz Zahrt. The Question of God. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1969).  
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Kennan internalized, contrasted poorly with the redemptive power of evangelical fervor in the 
Cold War climate of the 1950s.686  
The evangelism of leaders like Billy Graham better suited government structures that 
sought to organize religious opposition to the Cold War687 precisely because it articulated a more 
nationalistic redemptive form of Christianity while still maintaining a considerably degree of 
universalism. However, while the more precise definition of Christianity posited by 
evangelicalism harnessed unity amongst its own supporters, its specificity detracted from its 
ability to draw from different spectrums of religious thought. This meant that over time, leaders 
in government became frustrated with Protestantism’s inability to unite against communism.688 
The fundamentalist bent of evangelism also carried with it a strong degree of racial hierarchy, 
something evangelical blacks like Martin Luther King exploited to the fullest in the context of 
the Cold War.689 Again, the Dichotomy came into play. If America symbolized Christian values 
and free democracy, why then did so many evangelicals espouse racial inequality in the 
South?690 Maria Höhn and Martin Klimke have also examined the ways in which exported 
American racial segregation in American military bases in Cold War Germany influenced 
German leftists and the ’68 Student’s Movement.691 This division, along with the polarization of 
interpretations of the Dichotomy during the Culture Wars, would forever fragment Protestantism 
mostly at the cost of mainline churches. That mainline churches began to broaden ecumenism to 
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also mean religious pluralism only reinforced their separation from evangelicals.692 Thus 
America’s “Christian” identity would come under increasing strain as the 1950s transitioned into 
the 1960s.   
 
The End of German Christendom: Germany and the collapse of the Dichotomy 
 
In Germany, the terms set by the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy generally kept Christian 
resistance narratives in place until the 1960s. The struggle against communism in addition to 
serious concern for Protestants “left behind” in the East continued throughout the 1950s and into 
the 1960s. Still, Protestants like Niemöller and his supporters challenged the very fabric of 
postwar myths of resistance by engaging with the Nazi past in a way most shied away from. The 
eventual decline of the Dichotomy in Germany was therefore inevitable. Niemöller’s importance 
cannot be overestimated here, but not because he, and his cadre of supporters pulled Germans 
into democracy, but because the Protestant Left’s unceasing critical self-reflection constantly 
threatened and eventually overturned the Dichotomy. Standard narratives of Church 
democratization might be best described as the a few brave souls pulling the cart forward. In 
such narratives, left leaning reformers eventually bring the Protestant church face to face with its 
own past, also democratizing and liberalizing its structure and political outlook.693 But recently, 
some scholars have challenged these assumptions by instead arguing that a group of moderate 
conservatives drove the churches more toward democracy than had previously been assumed.694 
 This dissertation offers evidence in support of the conservative democratization thesis in 
                                                 
692 For more on spreading religious pluralism in Cold War America see Kevin Schultz, Tri-Faith America.  
693 Hockenos, A Church Divided. Chong-Hun Jeong, Die deutsche evangelische Sozialethik. 
Martin Greschat's Der Protestantism in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  
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two distinct ways.  First, the tug-boat narrative has multiple flaws when one looks outside the 
context of the church. Because of his experiences during the war and his general shift toward 
ecumenical Protestantism, Martin Niemöller and the Dahlemites were never likely to advocate 
for extreme authoritarianism in postwar Germany. While Niemöller’s views still often lingered 
inside that of the national-conservative milieu during the occupation period, his theological 
outlook had shifted significantly as demonstrated in both his refusal to be sponsored by the 
Lutheran Church during his tour in America and his consistent assertions that he now supported 
ecumenicalism wholeheartedly. Niemöller would continue in this path for the rest of his life, 
eventually becoming president of the World Council of Churches in 1961.  
Karl Barth never quite attained the same authority in Germany after 1945, but his many 
students continued to endorse his political and theological positions throughout the 1950s. 
Helmut Gollwitzer, probably Barth’s most influential pupil, demonstrated this consistently 
throughout his career.695 But as indicated in Barth’s theological dispute with Niebuhr, 
Barthianism actively avoided a significant political profile. While Barth’s convoluted 
relationship with democracy included many half-endorsements, neither did he ever reject its 
basic premises.  
In combination, these two groups were the least likely to oppose democratic rule in the 
first place, and, as minorities, were not those that needed to be convinced of its validity. The 
National-conservative milieu, with its strong anti-communist sentiment, refusal to critically 
examine church conduct during the Third Reich and broad support for the traditional 
conservative parties during the Weimar Republic, were those most skeptical. Given also this 
                                                 
695 Helmut Gollwitzer took up the Barthian position against the objectification of God in his refute of 1960s 
existentialists, especially Herbert Braun, whom Gollwitzer claimed “disintegrated theology into Humanism.” Like 
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group continued to make up the majority of the EKD and occupied positions of authority, their 
transition toward democracy was most important in the early years of the Federal Republic. 
For this reason, the American interpretation of the Christian-Totalitarian Dichotomy 
remained vital for German democratization. Because occupation enhanced the reputation of the 
German Churches significantly—certainly to a higher level than it would ever see again in the 
20th century—and because conservative Protestants had turned toward Nazism in more 
significant numbers than any other demographic during the 1930s, binding conservative 
Lutherans to an international system of ecumenical integration did more to build democracy in 
Germany than likely any other cultural act. That Germany remained divided by the Cold War 
increased the need for Western support against the Soviet Union and further reinforced this 
case.696 The very concept of the Kirchentag demonstrates the ways in which national-
conservative Protestants used the Dichotomy as an attempt to reform their own desired State in 
the fight against totalitarianism.  
But in the 1960s as older conservatives left power, the Berlin Wall signified a more 
permanent separation between East and West and the Dichotomy came under scrutiny from 
younger Germans and disaffected Leftists, the hegemony of Christian Democracy in Germany 
began to break apart. The Trial of Adolph Eichmann in 1961 has rightly been called a defining 
moment in Holocaust and political memory and raised numerous questions about the nature of 
the Holocaust, law and historical continuity into the present.697 Devin Pendas has referred to the 
famous Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial (1963-65) as principally a “political trial” in that “Auschwitz 
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was as much a contemporary political problem as it was a historical one.”698 Mark Ruff has 
recently argued that the breakdown of historical mythmaking first centered on Catholicism 
because Catholics were more closely associated with political power in the Federal Republic 
(especially concerning the Adenauer regime and the political hegemony of the CDU in the mid-
1950s to the early-1960s) and therefore attacks on its historical record bought a greater degree of 
political currency.699 Regardless, West German engagement with the Nazi past unquestionably 
shook the Dichotomy to its core.   
The association of Christian social conservatism with Fascism also engendered spiritual 
experimentation. Challenges to the West German conservative construction of a carefully control 
sexual-moral order likewise attempted to reconfigure precisely what proper sexual morality 
looked like. Indeed, historian Dagmar Herzog notes that the mid 1960s and early 1970s were a 
period of "rethinking God as much as rejecting God."700 Evidence of such a rethinking is clear 
when one examines the multitude of theological shifts that took place during that time; with the 
'Death of God' movement and Liberation theology on the left, and a turn toward fundamentalism 
and evangelicalism on the right.701  
Nonetheless, by the mid to late 1960s, social mobility, economic prosperity and rising 
individualism ensured that Germans now had a very different experience with democratic 
society. Moreover, conservatives now had a point of reference in relation to democracy. They 
still believed it could fail at any moment, as evident in the grave concern in many levels of 
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government over both a fascist coup or a leftist revolt, but they nonetheless would come to be 
vigilant defenders of democracy.702 While aspects of the Dichotomy would make full 
examination of Protestant complicity with Nazism an ongoing difficulty, by the late 1950s it had 
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